At twenty past six on a Tuesday morning in Ikotun, Lagos, Folasade Adeyemi unlocks a kiosk roughly the size of a wardrobe and begins the day’s accounting.
She counts out the garri, checks the level in the palm oil keg against a pencil mark she made the night before, and writes the opening figures into a forty-leaf exercise book that has survived three rainy seasons and one memorable flood.
By the time she pulls the shutter down, a little after eight in the evening, that book will carry the day’s takings to the Naira, the cost of the two bags she restocked, the ₦300 she handed to the market association collector, the ₦200 she gave to a man with a receipt booklet and a local government identity card, and the charge her point of sale agent took on a transfer because her last customer had no cash.
Folasade probably keeps a more exact record of her own economy than the Federal Republic of Nigeria keeps of her. She is not hiding from anybody. There is simply no office she reports to, and no officer who has ever walked into that kiosk and asked her what she sold.
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Her output is not measured. It is modelled, and the distinction matters. Gross domestic product (GDP) is not a weighing scale, but an estimate assembled on a convention called the production boundary, the internationally agreed rule defining what counts as economic activity.
Where qualifying production leaves no formal record, statistical offices use household and enterprise surveys, labour-force data and indirect methods to estimate its value. One approach establishes average output per worker, estimates how many such workers exist, multiplies the two and extrapolates between survey rounds using available indicators.
When the underlying data are recent and reliable, estimates better reflect reality. When they are old, they risk becoming an educated inheritance, carried forward for years while the economy they describe changes underneath them.
On 21 July 2025 the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) rebased the national accounts for the first time since 2014, moving the base year from 2010 to 2019. Nominal GDP for 2019 was restated at ₦205.09 trillion ($668 billion at the 2019 official average of ₦306.92 to the dollar), and 2024 came out at ₦372.82 trillion ($243.3 billion) against a previous estimate of ₦277.5 trillion ($181 billion), making the economy about 34.35% larger than the country had been told.
On a Monday afternoon in July, without a single additional yam being harvested, Nigeria became roughly a third larger than it had been on the Friday. Rebasing is ordinary statistical hygiene, but it is a reminder of what the number is: improve the description and the country appears to change without anything in it changing.
The finding almost nobody discussed is that the recount barely changed the informal economy’s relative weight. Its 2019 contribution was restated at ₦86.85 trillion ($283 billion), or 42.5% of GDP, against 41.4% previously recorded. The overall economy was revised upwards by 41.7%, yet the informal share moved by just 1.1 percentage points.
The exercise captured more activity across the informal economy, alongside previously undercounted digital services, pension administration and creative industries. Nigeria went looking for the economy it could not see and returned with a substantially larger estimate of the one it had only partially measured. The man who counts his goats only in the pen will always believe the herd is small.
Set that against the figure quoted in almost every Nigerian conversation about informality. The familiar 58% is not an official statistic. It traces to a 2014 academic paper by Awojobi, Ayakpat and Adisa, which reported an informal contribution of 57.9% of the ₦80.2 trillion ($509.9 billion) rebased GDP. Other estimates point in the same direction.
World Economics puts Nigeria’s shadow economy at 55.3% of GDP, ranking it third globally, while grading its underlying data poorly. Tonuchi and Idowu, using the multiple indicators multiple causes model (MIMIC) for 1970-2018, estimated a range of 47% to 67%, averaging 56%.
These estimates are not directly comparable, but they expose a substantial measurement gap. The official NBS estimate remains in the low forties. Applying the 12.8-percentage-point difference to 2019 GDP would imply ₦26.25 trillion ($85.5 billion), although that is illustrative, not a measured shortfall. Nobody can presently establish the precise figure with confidence.
One piece of evidence sits awkwardly with the official number, and it comes from the labour market. The NBS puts informal employment at 92.3% in Q3 2023 and 93.0% in Q2 2024. Among women, the latter figure was 96.0%; among rural workers, it was 97.5%, and among young workers aged 15-24, approximately 98%. If the tally says the market has emptied while the road to it grows more crowded, suspect the tally.
The fair objection is that informal work is genuinely less productive, so a gap is expected. But the scale matters. The official figures imply that the average formal worker produces roughly sixteen times as much as the average informal worker, an extraordinary differential that deserves a published methodological explanation.
Cash leaves a trail where output does not. Central Bank figures for September 2026 show ₦4.92 trillion ($3.62 billion) outside the banking system, 89.23% of the ₦5.52 trillion ($4.06 billion) in circulation, up 10.26% from a year earlier. Nearly nine Naira in every ten issued remains outside banks, although physical currency represents just 3.76% of broad money of ₦146.60 trillion ($107.9 billion), down from 4.21%.
Nigeria is digitising its financial system while cash remains deeply embedded in everyday transactions. At the June 2026 launch of Payments System Vision 2028, Governor Olayemi Cardoso set a target of reducing cash outside banks below 40% and raising formal financial inclusion to 95% by 2028, against a 64% baseline in 2023.
The distance between those ambitions and the September figures is considerable. Moving from 89.23% to below 40% in two years would be among the fastest such transitions achieved anywhere.
This matters because GDP is the denominator of almost every judgement made about Nigeria. Public debt measured against GDP fell from 42.9% in 2024 to 39.8% in 2025, helped substantially by the larger statistical base. The IMF’s own series puts the ratio at 35.4% for 2026. The debt did not shrink simply because the denominator grew. A debt does not shrink because the farmer has learned to measure his land more generously.
The tax debate is in the same condition: PwC projects a tax-to-GDP ratio of 10.2% for 2026, while the government reports 13%, with differences in revenue coverage requiring explanation. Growth is welcome, at 4.43% in the second quarter of 2026, up from 3.89% in the first. But these are rates calculated on national accounts in which a substantial portion of informal production remains statistically estimated rather than directly recorded.
Three measures tell different stories: debt-to-GDP measures indebtedness relative to economic size; debt service-to-revenue shows how much government income is consumed by debt obligations; and revenue-to-GDP reveals how much of the economy the state can mobilise. Rebasing may improve the first without improving the other two. A statistically larger economy does not automatically mean a stronger fiscal capacity.
The remedies are unglamorous and cheap.
Firstly, publish the informal sector methodology in full, since a country cannot debate a number whose construction is undisclosed, and that silence is part of why a 2014 academic estimate is quoted more widely than the official one.
Secondly, fund the household and enterprise surveys on a fixed published cycle, because an estimate built on a six-year-old survey is not a current reading whatever date is printed on it.
Thirdly, use the administrative data that now exists, including instant payment volumes and point of sale agent records, as an independent check on whether the modelled estimate is drifting from reality.
Fourthly, publish a range rather than a point, because the informal share and the metered oil production figures are not known to the same standard.
A postscript arrived on 1 January 2026, when the Nigeria Tax Act took effect. Small companies, those with annual gross turnover not exceeding ₦100 million and fixed assets not exceeding ₦250 million, are exempt from companies income tax, capital gains tax and the new development levy.
Businesses providing professional services, however, are excluded from the relief. Read generously, it is sensible relief for the productive base. Read plainly, the state has formally stopped claiming revenue it was never collecting from a sector it cannot measure.
That may be correct policy and it is certainly more honest than a decade of pretending otherwise, but it should be named for what it is, because a government that exempts what it cannot see has made a decision about the limits of its own reach. The hunter who cannot reach the far bush declares it a sanctuary.
Nothing in the Act will change Folasade’s Tuesday. Her output will enter the national accounts as a coefficient multiplied by a population estimate, and the resulting figure will be divided into the public debt to produce a ratio that strangers in Washington and London will use to decide what Nigeria should pay to borrow.
She has the numbers. They are in the book, under the counter, next to the torch. In twenty-one years of trading, nobody has ever asked to see them. Part two of this series turns to the other half of the uncounted economy, the half missing not because it is too small to measure but because it is illegal.
Akinola Morakinyo (Ph. D) writes on MINT economies from the Department of Economics, Finance & Quantitative Analysis, Kennesaw State University, GA, USA.
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