Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria
Past, Present, and Future

Edited by

Abdalla Uba Adamu
Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria
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Proceedings of the National Conference on Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria. Organized by the Kano State Emirate Council to commemorate the 40th anniversary of His Royal Highness, the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero, CFR, LLD, as the Emir of Kano (October 1963-October 2003)

H.R.H. Alhaji (Dr.) Ado Bayero, CFR, LLD
Allah Ya Kara Jan Zamanin Sarki, Amin.
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A Brief Biography of the Emir of Kano

H.R.H. Alhaji (Dr.) Ado Bayero, CFR, LLD
Allah Ya Kara Jan Zamanin Sarki, Amin.

His Royal Highness Alhaji Ado Bayero was born on 15th June 1930 (Sunday 17th Muharram 1349), when his father, Abdullahi Bayero, had been on the throne for four years. Ado was the eleventh child of his father and the second of three born to his mother, Hajiya Hasiya. He was named after Abdullahi's first son, Ado, who had died at the age of five. Because of traditional name avoidance, he was given the nickname "Malam" (the teacher, or scholar) by his parents.

As a child he was given religious instruction within the palace, and he was later enrolled into the school within the palace which was established by his father the emir in 1936. Ado was then enrolled into the Kano Middle School, where he studied from 1942 to 1946. This was followed by further studies at the School for Arabic Studies, from which he graduated in 1947. He then took up
employment with the British Bank for West Africa (BBWA), now the First Bank of Nigeria.

Ado Bayero left the bank to begin his career with the Kano Native Authority in 1949. While working for the N.A. he attended a number of clerical and administrative courses in Nigeria and abroad. In 1952 he attended the Clerical Training College, Zaria. He then took a course on Local Government in the United Kingdom. In 1953 he became the Chief Clerk of the Kano Town Council. He contested and won the election to the Northern Regional House of Assembly in Kaduna on the ticket of the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) in 1954, and he made his inaugural speech in the House on 3rd March 1955. In April 1957 Ado Bayero resigned his seat in the House to take up an appointment as the Police Chief of the Kano Native Administration Police (Wakilin Doka). He was appointed Nigeria's Ambassador to Senegal in late 1962.

In the second week of October 1963, Ado Bayero was on a French course in Switzerland when he was summoned back to Nigeria after the death of his uncle, Emir Muhammadu Inuwa. He arrived back in Kano on the 14th October to be informed that he had been appointed the new Emir of Kano. On 25th June 1966 the Emir of Kano Ado Bayero was installed as the Chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in an obvious attempt to try and ease tension and hold the nation together. Since then he has been called on to play many mediating roles, and he has been given numerous honours and degrees.

From the 12th to the 15th of October 2003 the people of Kano Emirate as well as of Nigeria as a whole joined the Emir of Kano Ado Bayero in celebrating the fortieth anniversary of his reign.
Editorial Note

This book contains most of the papers presented at the National Conference on Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria held from Monday 13th October to Wednesday 15th October 2003 at the Murtala Muhammad Library Complex, Kano, Nigeria. The Conference was held to commemorate the 40th anniversary of His Royal Highness, the Emir of Kano, Alhaji (Dr.) Ado Bayero, CFR, LLD, as the Emir of Kano (October 1963-October 2003).

The conference attracted a lot of interest due to its topical nature, and for the three days the paper presentations lasted, critical commentaries were made about the relationship between chieftaincy and security in traditional institutions. The papers in these proceedings are arranged according to the schedule of presentation during the conference. This makes it easier to follow the blocks of time in analysing the relationship between chieftaincy matters and traditional power structures from pre-colonial, to colonial and post-colonial periods in the history of Nigeria.

The logistic problems faced in assembling the papers immediately after the conference caused the delay between the actual conference itself (2003) and the publication of the proceedings (2006). When it was increasingly getting clear that the papers may not be edited, a decision was taken to assemble whatever was available, edit and publish it. Further, the death of Prof. Philip J. Shea in April 2006 meant that the electronic copies of the papers—which were deposited in his computer—could not be retrieved since he died intestate. A further decision taken was to re-scan all the papers from the physical copies submitted to the Secretariat of the Conference. Thus with the tremendous cooperation of Alhaji Muhammad Maharaz Karaye, Bauran Kano, who was also the Secretary of the main Local Organizing Committee, the papers were scanned by Professor Abdalla Uba Adamu in August 2006. The editing process started soon after.

Editing the scanned files proved challenging on many occasions due to the widely different formatting as well as referencing styles used by the individual contributors. Fears of
further delays made it impractical to re-send the papers to the original contributors for corrections. Thus, as much as possible editorial corrections were restricted only to the physical formatting—for uniformity—rather than contents of the individual papers which were left as originally presented by the contributors.

I would like to thank Alhaji Muhammad Maharaz Karaye, Bauran Kano, for providing all the papers as well as necessary contacts to some of the contributors whose papers were missing from the archival copies. I would also like to acknowledge, with gratitude the generous assistance of Alhaji Ibrahim Ado Kurawa, Director Research and Publications, Government House, Kano, whose office facilitated the editing and the publication of these proceedings.

Abdalla Uba Adamu
March 2007
Preface

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The second week of October, 2003, marked the fortieth anniversary of the accession of Alhaji Ado Bayero to the throne of Kano. During that week in 1963 his appointment was confirmed and publicly announced by the Premier of the Northern Region, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, even though the formal and public presentation of the staff of office was not celebrated until the following year.

As part of the events to mark this historic anniversary, the Kano Emirate Council decided to sponsor a National Conference “Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria: Past, Present, and Future”. The Emir and his Council liked to see the anniversary marked by serious and sober reflection on some of the problems confronting the nation in general and the people of Kano specifically. Highly respected scholars from throughout Nigeria and beyond were invited to deliver papers which consider some of the connections between chieftaincy and security in a historical framework, but which also considered how modern Nigeria could best use her traditions and people to ensure peace, unity, and progress. These papers were discussed by other scholars, prominent members of the traditional leadership institutions in the country, and by experienced practitioners from the various security institutions of the nation.

Security is a natural choice of subject for this conference, as the traditional leadership institutions evolved out of people's own attempts to ensure peace and security in their communities. These institutions have changed enormously in the past century or so in

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1 Professor Philip Shea wrote this in August 2003 as background information to the Conference and which was published at [www.kanoonline.com](http://www.kanoonline.com). I thought it is appropriate to reproduce it here as a preface since it captures the spirit of not only the Conference, but also the rationale behind the decision to hold it. Sadly, Prof. Shea died in April 2006 in Kano after a brief illness.
Nigeria, but equally the problems of security have also become more complex and more intractable. Presently the connections between chieftaincy and the various security organizations are mostly informal, but they are very regular and important nonetheless. In examining these relationships over time we shall have a better idea of how to approach some of the most important problems facing the nation.

This was a National Conference, and consideration was given to chieftaincy and security in many differing cultural environments throughout Nigeria. The large Muslim states of the North, as well as some of the less centralized polities elsewhere, and indeed a variety of different traditional political systems, were all included in the scope of this conference. Nonetheless, this Conference was intended to mark the fortieth Anniversary of Alhaji Ado Bayero on the throne of Kano, and considerable attention was paid to his own personal historic relationships with security questions in Kano, the North, and the Nation as a whole.

Under British colonial rule, it developed as a tradition that one of the most prominent of an Emir's sons, and frequently the heir apparent, would serve as the Chief of the Native Authority (N.A.) police force. This was true throughout much of the North, including Adamawa, Katsina, Gombe, and of course Kano. Throughout colonial rule Kano was the most populous and the wealthiest of all the Native Authorities in the nation. The Kano Native Authority Police ('Yan Doka) was similarly the largest such force in the country. In April of 1957, at the relatively young age of twenty-seven, prince Ado Bayero was appointed the Chief of this Kano N.A. Police Force. He retained this position until 1962 when he was appointed Nigeria's ambassador to Senegal. He was ambassador for only one year, and certainly it was his service for five years as Police Chief (Wakilin Doka) in Kano that influenced his election by the King Makers and his acceptance by the Government as the new Emir of Kano in October 1963. These were difficult years to be in the police force as political parties were increasingly vocal and aggressive in their attempts to grasp power and to bring about radical change. These were also years when Nigeria achieved her independence and then became a federal republic. They were also years of rapidly changing
economic and social conditions, and the consequent rise in ethnic competition. Through all these troubles Ado Bayero was able to maintain his position as an arbiter of justice, and as one of the pillars of stability in Kano society.

The forty years reign of Alhaji Ado Bayero as the Emir of Kano have seen very many difficult crises, but a review of a few of them will suffice to demonstrate not only the passions and dangers of the period, but also the necessity for respected and solid traditional leadership in troubled times.

The 1966 coup d'etat against the First Republic of Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and the deaths of the Prime Minister, the Premier of the Northern Region, and many other prominent political and military leaders was a terrible shock to the people of Kano as well as to the nation as a whole. In many ways the nation has not yet fully recovered from that terrible blow to the body politic and from the terrible Civil War which followed. Kano was set aflame with the passions released by these drastic actions, and many were killed, but it could all have been even much worse were it not for the phenomenal role played by the Emir of Kano in calming his people and helping negotiate for a new and more stable government. It was during this time that Kano State was created out of the Northern Region, and it was only with the advice and assistance and cooperation of the Emir and his Council and the rest of the traditional leadership that Kano State was able to emerge as a strong and influential force in the country. Throughout the Civil War and in the later trying periods of reconciliation and the return of abandoned properties in the 1970s, the traditional institution and the Emir in particular contributed much with his sound advice and guidance with respect to difficult issues throughout the country.

Military rule was an aberration, but it lasted for most of the independence period in Nigeria's history. Representation was essential if the Military Governments in Kano and Nigeria in general were to have any success at all. This representation was achieved through co-opting prominent and popular citizens for government work as Commissioners, Ministers, Ambassadors, Chairmen, and the like. It was, of course, the traditional leadership
which continued to guide and advise the government as to how best to recruit Kano people for healing the nation's wounds.

There was also a very real need for Kano to transform itself if it was to fully participate in the modern oil era Nigeria of the late twentieth century. The Emir realized that in a number of fields Kano people had to catch up with some other segments of Nigerian society, in terms of education, in terms of leadership in business, in terms of prominence in the intellectual discussions of the day, in terms of giving women opportunities for advancement and for contributing to the general progress, and in terms of playing important leadership roles in the federal government and its institutions such as the parastatals and the military. Since Islam had always been the basis of legitimacy within the Emirate, it was clear that these changes had to take place within the Islamic religious context of Kano society. Moving forward in education had to include moving forward in Islamic education, and so Islamiyya schools were fostered throughout the Emirate, and the school within the Emir's palace was given much encouragement, as were other prominent schools such as the School for Arabic Studies, the Gidan Makama Primary School, the Rumfa College, and numerous schools for women's education. The Tafsîr presentations at the Emir's Palace every night in Ramadan were also important in uniting people from different Islamic sects, in educating people about the true meaning of their religion, and in making the palace itself a focus for the people of Kano. In 1971 there was the first really brutal armed robbery with murder in Kano, and the people streamed out in the morning for solace and guidance and leadership - but it was not to the police station that they went, it was not to the Governor's house that they went - it was to the Emir's Palace - Gidan Rumfa. The palace was seen by many as their solid base and hold on reality in a puzzling world which was changing rapidly.

In 1976, the brutal assassination of the Head of State, General Murtala Ramat Muhammad, a citizen of Kano, was a terrible shock to the people of Kano. The Emir played an important role in helping to keep the Kano people calm at such a critical moment. His presence at the airport when the corpse of the late Head of
State was brought to Kano and then at the funeral were important in maintaining stability in a tense time.

The Second Republic brought with it many new difficulties, even as it tried to revive the democratic basis of governance in the country. The economic troubles of the time complicated everything, and the outbreak of an extremist religious movement led by a man known as “Mai Tatsime”, involved the killing of many innocent bystanders and brought about a state of siege in Kano City, which was occupied by fighting forces. Once again the traditional authorities, and in particular the Emir, played a central role in keeping Kano City calm at a time when fear stalked the streets. An apparent conflict of interests between the Governor of the State at the time and the Emir led to violent protests in parts of the state capital, and to the burning down of a number of government buildings, and the deaths of a number of people. The Emir remained perfectly cool and calm at the time and took a very non-confrontational position, and so this apparently dangerous crisis was allowed to pass and the stability of the state preserved. The tremendous loyalty of many Kano citizens towards their emir was obvious, but the emir himself realized that this loyalty itself had to be kept within careful limits so as not to challenge the legitimate claims of the constituted political authority. That there must be a balance between the monopoly of force of the modern state and the passionate loyalty of the people toward their traditional institutions, is something that is not clear to everyone, but the Emir was surely right that maturity is the best way to deal with such crises.

The Emir has had to play important roles in leading the people of Kano, in advising the governments of Kano, in advising regional and federal governments, and in giving sound advice throughout the country on major national issues, particularly during crisis. His leadership has also been extremely important in guiding religious progress, and Kano has seen an incredible increase in the number of mosques, religious institutions, and schools throughout his reign. But beyond the political and religious leadership required of him, he has played a major role in projecting the cultural heritage of the Kano people to other Nigerians as well as to people from all over the world. The tremendous display of pomp and ceremony
and the colourful and historic costumes at the various durbars given by the Emir of Kano have played an important part in Kano's giving the nation an important and unique symbol of grandeur and traditional greatness. Various Heads of State have requested the Emir of Kano to mount special durbars to entertain and impress their most important foreign visitors, such as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain, and Presidents Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, as well as many others. This cultural display is not just for foreigners, but also helps to hold together the various communities living within Kano. Every religious Id celebration (commonly known as “Sallah”) is accompanied by five days of horsemanship, during which the Emir and his Councillors and the various title holders and courtiers travel all around the state capital - to the old city, to Government House, to the Nassarawa residential area, through Sabon Gari, out past the university to Dorayi and also to Panisau. The crowds of on-looking supporters are tremendous at all these times, and the pride of the people in their culture, their religion, their history, their institutions, and their leadership are all palpable. The Emir of Kano has helped to ensure that all Nigerians know that in many ways it is Kano that can best demonstrate the tremendous achievements of tradition in this part of Africa.

The last forty years have seen many changes and challenges to the people of Kano and of Nigeria as a whole. The Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero, has done much to provide the stability which has helped to make these years more stable and prosperous, despite the constant threats posed by the modern world.

It is hoped that this book of the proceedings of the National Conference will not only commemorate these historic forty years, but that it will leave behind a solid legacy in terms of serious thinking about security and chieftaincy in the country. Much has been accomplished in these years, and we all wish Alhaji Ado Bayero many more years as Emir, so that he can guide his people in the times ahead.
Opening Lead Papers
Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria: The Role of Traditional Institutions

Lt. General Aliyu Mohammed (rtd), GCON
National Security Adviser,
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Introduction
Ethnic nationalities in Nigeria have a rich heritage which predates colonization. Prior to the advent of British colonialism in Nigeria, the various ethnic nationalities within that entity had well established political institutions which met the social, economic and political needs and aspirations of their peoples. These institutions are today commonly referred to as traditional institutions, which are part of the deep-rooted and rich cultural heritage of those ethnic groups.

We can define an institution within the context of this presentation as an organization whose purpose is to further public welfare and learning, while tradition is a cultural continuity transmitted in the form of social attitudes, beliefs, principles and conventions of behaviour, derived from past experience and used to shape the present and the future. Thus by definition, “Traditional Institutions” are agencies and custodians of traditional practices, which include the customary regulatory bodies that moderate the ordinary business of life in a particular community. They include the following, amongst others:

a. Traditional rulers/chiefs
b. The lineage
c. The extended family
d. The nuclear family
e. The age grade
f. Professional guilds
g. Administration of justice
h. Court historians, Court jesters, and praise singers

Our traditional rulers, nationwide, have been involved in the past and will continue to be involved in the future in the maintenance of our national security. National security for us in Nigeria includes the
following among others:

a. Trans-border Security
b. Internal Security
   i. Physical
   ii. Community
c. Food Security

Food Security
Without food security, no nation will be able to contain the various forms of uprising necessitated by hunger and abject poverty. Government’s concern in planning for good harvest for our staple food crops through the provision of farm inputs, including fertilizer and farm support programmes at subsidized prices, will go a long way in ensuring availability of food at affordable prices to all. Our traditional rulers, beside their administrative responsibilities, are farmers of repute. As farmers, they are role models for the members of the community to emulate and provide us with the food we require.

This is an area of National Security in which I believe governments at the local, state and federal levels should carve a niche for our traditional rulers to assist Security agencies in preventing avoidable incidents before they become national crises.

Community and Personal Security
The other security issue in which our traditional rulers were involved in the past is that of ensuring personal security of citizens, and their properties, by maintaining law and order through the Native Authority System, and their vast network of intelligence gathering system. Although they no longer operate the uniformed police system which has since been taken over by the Federal Government. The intelligence community remains grateful for the goodwill which it enjoys as the traditional rulers have always cooperated in the area of sharing of intelligence information, some of which are highly valuable in nipping in the bud what could have created intolerable ethnic, religious and/or political clashes.

Trans-border Security
This is an area regarding which the non-professionals failed to credit
our traditional rulers in terms of their contribution to the National Security, that is, trans-border security. Nigeria has a complex border situation. We have an extensive land border with several countries and have within our borders various creeks, and difficult terrains in the riverine areas of the Niger Delta.

Prior to the intrusion of colonialists, our traditional rulers had ruled vast territories, especially in the Caliphate, Kanem-Borno and Oyo Empire. The carving of these territories by the colonizers into their spheres of influence was done with little regards to the authority exercised by the Traditional Authorities. It is therefore not surprising that our traditional rulers exercise cultural, religious, and in some respect, political influence across international borders. Take for example, the recent Golden Jubilee of our revered Lamido of Adamawa, in Yola. The traditional rulers of the Northern Cameroon, which was part and parcel of the land of Modibbo Adama, were there to felicitate with the Lamido, because they are kith and kin. With such amiable border relations, any issue, no matter how grave, could be resolved amicably.

Similarly, the case of Kanem Borno, Katsina, Kano, Kebbi and Sokoto which have similar relations with Chad and Niger Republic is another pointer to our mutual bilateral relationship. To the South West, the Oba of Badagry has such relationship with Benin Republic. So also the Alafin of Oyo, who has a vast network of Yoruba speaking people in Benin and Togo Republics. These are very important areas we should emphasize, maintain and nurture. Peace and stability along our borders can only be guaranteed if we service the traditional rulers as they solidify their filial, religious and political relationships with their people.

It is noteworthy to mention that while traditional institutions played, and still play vital roles in the administration of the State, the superior and most important of them is the institution of traditional rulers and chiefs, known as Royal Institution. How they have impacted on national security forms the main focus of this presentation, although reference is also made to other institutions that complement their efforts.

The Royal Institution
It is generally acknowledged that kingship was the earliest form of government known to man. In contemporary African society, kings
Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria

are referred to as traditional rulers in two ways. Firstly, they are rulers who evolved by the laws and customs of the people and, are therefore, part of the people's cultural heritage. Secondly, it is used in contra-distinction to the modern system of government or rulership introduced in Africa by European colonialists.

The king (Sultan; Emir; Obi; Oba etc) was before British rule, the personification of state and sovereignty, although there was usually a collection of other institutions that exercise this function in conjunction with him. This was because, with the exception of some communities in the eastern part of the country and the Middle Belt, monarchy was the form of government practised by most Nigeria societies in the pre-colonial period.

Monarchy as practised by our communities can be defined as a hereditary system of government in which an individual performed executive, legislative and judicial roles. The powers exercisable by the monarch may be absolute in some cases, constrained by customary or religious institutions, which perform roles such as appointments, removal of office holders, superintendents of the checks and balances within the system, in effect, constitutional monarchy.

**Traditional Institutions in Pre-Colonial Era**

In the Hausa/Fulani areas of what later became Nigeria, the defeat of the Hausa States by the great Islamic leader and scholar, Sheikh Usman Danfodio from 1804-1809, led to the abolition of Hausa kingdoms and the establishment of Emirates mostly headed by Fulani scholars who received flags from Danfodio. Sokoto and, to a lesser extent, Gwandu served as the headquarters of the Caliphate. The Emir was the political, spiritual and administrative head of the Emirate and he assigned specific security duties to a number of institutional heads like the Waziri, a senior official; Madawaki, a military commander; Galadima, who administered the capital city; while the Alkalis administered justice based on Sharia law. Consequently, it was considered sacrilegious to violate such orders and as such, there was always unflinching obedience to all rules and regulations.

The Yoruba system in the South West was composed of the Oba and a Council of a number of high chiefs of the community/town over which the Oba presided. The appointment
and promotion of army officers was an institutional affair which received special attention. Yoruba kings gave high priority to security as reflected in the proverb “the king rules with ears (informers) at home and abroad.”

It is on record that the Benin Empire stands out as one of the finest examples of purely African States-craft unaided by foreign influence. The government of Benin Empire revolved around the Oba, who was regarded as the incarnation of the people’s soul. He was an absolute monarch, and by his divine attributes, he had the fear and respect of his entire subjects. The royal officials held office at his pleasure.

In the Eastern parts, the same cannot be said of the Igbo traditional institution. While the North and the West had more of a central system of administration, with separation of powers and delegation of authority and responsibility down the line, the Igbo structure was, in the first place, not hereditary, not ascribed but achieved. It was by direct democracy that a ruler emerged and the powers were usually limited to his immediate village.

In the pre-colonial era, traditional rulers were generally assisted in their onerous task of securing their domains by subordinate chiefs appointed by them. They were divine kings and personifications of the various communities under them. They were seen and observed as the pivots around which everything revolved, the supreme religious head as well as the civil authority in the land.

In his argument in support of the significant roles by traditional institutions in the maintenance of internal security, Professor Tekena Tamuno in his *Crime and Security in Pre-Colonial Nigeria* stated that: “Then law and order were maintained through well structured though undemocratic methods...”

In examining the roles of traditional rulers in pre-colonial Nigeria vis-à-vis the internal security of their domains, one can say that they had ably performed security roles at the executive, legislative and judicial levels. They had unlimited powers to punish offenders in line with their own codes of conduct in the various communities. They also engaged in such duties as the general maintenance of law and order, acting as the chief custodians of communal laws and natural resources, reception and entertainment of distinguished visitors. Usman Dan Fodio set out the following
functions for the Emirs he dispatched to various parts of Northern Nigeria:

1. Organisation of troops, posting them to different areas and fixing their grants;
2. Maintenance of justice and appointment of judges and other State officials;
3. Collection of Haraji and Sadaqat; and
4. Protection of the land, the defence of the State and protection of religion against change or innovations.

The Colonial Era
In order to legitimize their control over the territories after the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914, the colonial masters introduced a system of administration that utilized the already perfected structure put in place by the traditional rulers. This was the development that gave birth to the Indirect Rule system of administration whereby the Emir continued to be in charge of most of the instruments of authority and power like the police, courts; prisons; treasuries; and revenue collection but were denied all executive powers. The same applied to the Yoruba traditional rulers, as the Obas were only vested with powers of being the sole native authority. Although the Obas were still issuing orders to their subjects, they were no longer the land givers, the Commanders-in-Chief nor the Chief Executives.

In some parts of Nigeria, especially in the North, certain categories of Emirs were given powers as the sole Native Authorities to administer their Emirates almost to the exclusion of those officials, who before the advent of the British, had considerable input in the administration of their Emirates.

The Native Authority system could be divided into two: Administration and Finance and Security. The Administration and Finance was composed of the following:

- Family Head
- Ward Head
- Village Head
- District Head
This structure had political, economic and security implications. It was at once a structure for tax collection as it was a security reporting system. The Family Head had as his responsibility to report to the Ward Head the arrival of a visitor to his home; the full bio-data of the visitor including parentage, town, occupation and reason for the journey undertaken. By this method, the entire administrative structure would be fully aware of movement of people within their domain.

The security department was composed of the following units:

a. Emirs personal Body Guards (Dogarai)
b. Native Authority Police
c. Prisons

The Body Guards (Dogarai), Prisons Guards and the Police were a selected group of people loyal to the Emirate. The heads of these units were carefully selected in order to protect the person of the Emir and to ensure peace and security of the territory. To emphasize the importance of the police within the Native Authority structure, the leadership of the Police Force was often entrusted to a prince. Our revered Emir, in whose honour we are all gathered today, had held such office between 1957 and 1962. He succeeded his elder brother when the latter became District Head. Indeed it had become customary for any eligible Prince to control the Police Force-on his way to the throne.

The Court which was an arm of the security system was in the firm grip of intellectual families with sound knowledge of Sharia law - Alkalai. Above the legal system, all appeals were directed to the Emir’s council; which put the Emir at the helm of the legal system—to be advised by the Waziri and Wali. The Customary Courts operated in the same way in the South.

In the Eastern part, the peculiar structure of administration in place necessitated a different approach through the enactment of House Rule Ordinance which recognized the existing political system for security reasons. It gave recognition to the heads of houses as instruments of local government and who were executive agents mostly used for security purposes to serve the interest of the colonial authority.
However, the advent of British colonialism altered, to some extent, all arrangements hitherto in place as the final authority shifted base to the colonial officials. In the first instance, the powers of the traditional rulers were eroded in that they became subordinate to the British officers. Instead of giving orders, they started to receive orders from the Resident District Officers. In spite of the power shift that became one of the consequences of colonialism, the inherent influences of traditional rulers as co-security managers of their various domains continued to be felt in the entire country. These changes weakened the traditional authority structures nationwide.

However, beside the security outfits established to checkmate the conduct of the governed, the colonial officers to a very large extent, relied on the traditional rulers for the maintenance of internal security in their domains. Within the colonial era, they were found very suitable and were equipped by the colonialists to continue to exercise their judicial and legislative functions, all aimed at sustaining peace and stability.

The roles played by traditional rulers on security issues during the pre-colonial days were continued at the inception of colonial administration. The guarded acceptance and respect accorded them by the colonial officer further strengthened their power to maintain law and order in the Native Authority.

The Nationalist Role
The visit by the West African editors to the UK in 1942, which included Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (*West African Pilot*) and Dr. Abubakar Imam (*Gaskiya Ta fi Kwabo*) brought Dr. Imam face to face with Lugard where he raised the issue of the position of Emirs, and the possibility of the Katsina College graduates penetrating the system. The 1946 NCNC national tour led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe to the North, enabled him to raise funds to travel to London and protest against certain colonial policies. The Late M. Bukar Dipcharima and the Late Chief Mrs. Funmilayo Ransome Kuti were among the members of the delegation: On the other hand, *Gaskiya Ta fi Kwabo, Nigerian Citizen* and *West African Pilot*, had began to publish individual views and opinions on the new position of traditional rulers. Similarly, a United Kingdom Student body, the
West African Student Union, also intensified campaign for the role of the educated elites in the traditional system.

The impact of World War II on the Nigerian economy and the role of World War II ex-servicemen in influencing new political culture in the formation and the strengthening of the political parties created both new security problems for the colonial government, and posed great challenges for traditional authorities.

All these influences culminated in late Malam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa’s sweeping attack, in August 1950 on the sole native authority, which he said “Modern Northern Nigerians” referred to as “Democratic Dictatorship.” He went on to add:

> Native Authority Councils, Sir, should be given real powers and their functions should no longer be advisory. These problems can be solved by making all individuals who are now termed Sole Native Authorities—Chiefs or Emirs—in Council. The democratization of Native Authority Councils has now also become a necessity. (A Right Honorable Gentleman, p.140).

He called for the setting up of an Investigation Panel, which by 1954, had issued its report. The powers of Emirs and Chiefs had been slashed.

**Post-Independence Era**

The attainment of independence on 1st October, 1960 saw a gradual depletion of the powers and positions of traditional rulers. This was after their preliminary loss of trust and confidence by the nationalists, consequent upon which some of them were even sent on exile at later dates. It is instructive to stress that the advent of the nationalists gradually eroded the roles of traditional rulers in the day-to-day governance of their subjects. The roles of Late Malam Aminu Kano, Sa’adu Zungur and Mrs. Funmilayo Ransome Kuti are well known in this perspective.

The security problems faced by the Nigerian Government shortly after Independence cannot be unconnected with its lack of capacity to contain local uprising especially in areas where people had lost confidence in their traditional authorities. For example, the Tiv riot in Benue Province, The Agbekoya Tax Riot in the South West, and Isaac Boro Revolt in the Niger Delta.
The post-independence era undoubtedly witnessed radical changes in the administration of native authorities, changes that the traditional rulers were not prepared for. Thus, from the hitherto exalted positions of being the only recognized leaders by the authority, traditional rulers tumbled out of government with limited powers. Some even suffered humiliation in the hands of the politicians when they failed to play along with the government of the day. Thus for personal security, many of them became involved in subterranean politics for survival. Those that did not comply were deposed. Only those who cooperated were co-opted into governance.

The coming to power of the military in January 1966 gave traditional rulers a breathing space for a while. The military rulers cultivated them for grassroots support. Thus, the glory they had lost was brought back by the military and they once again became recognized as embodiments of law and order, but for a short period.

Following the counter coup in July, 1966, with Lt. Col Yakubu Gowon as Head of State, and the subsequent reforms which centralized the country’s Police, the Judiciary and Prisons, traditional rulers were relieved of security business to a very large extent. Furthermore, a twelve state structure for Nigeria which came up automatically decentralized the bargaining powers of traditional rulers. The regime of General Obasanjo 1976-1979 introduced some reforms that further eroded the powers of traditional rulers. For example, their authority over land was transferred to the State Governors through the Land Use Decree. Thus, with most of their privileges virtually eroded, traditional rulers were left with no significant role to play on matters of governance and security.

The 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic did not ascribe any security role to the traditional class but allowed them to only remain relevant as members of the Traditional Councils in their LGAs and States. The 1999 Constitution also did not ascribe any role to traditional rulers in any capacity.

The above unsavoury developments notwithstanding, traditional rulers have continued to perform duties that were of security significance. They still settle family and community disputes amicably.

It is quite important to stress here that, though a good number of traditional rulers lost out in the political sphere, they are still very
much in control of subjects in their domains of influence. Politicians and the military too, many a times had to persuade them and often resort to obtaining their blessings during campaign or taking over government through coup d’etat. This goes to strengthen the relevance of traditional rulers in the present dispensation. In the history of governance in Nigeria, traditional rulers have always acted as instruments of temperance and moderation to reduce tension, and stabilize the polity during crisis.

The Relevance of Traditional Rulers in Security Management

For traditional rulers to participate meaningfully on matters of security in the country, there is the need for them to be re-positioned so as not to just serve as agents of conflict resolution but also as security managers which they were before. With the ever increasing security challenges facing the nation today, the integration of traditional rulers into a security network that will provide necessary stability is desirable. To effectively operate, the security agencies in Nigeria often have to relate with traditional rulers who play prominent roles at the grassroots. They are very well situated to assist security agents in neutralizing threats emanating from their domains or neighbouring communities.

The Traditional Rulers played important roles in recent times that doused tension in crises situations which could have escalated into major crisis in many parts of the country. It can therefore be deduced that interventionist policies of some traditional rulers have attested to how important and helpful. They had been and will continue to be relevant on matters of security affecting any part of the nation. The above stand was further strengthened by the renowned historian Dr. Bala Usman when he said:

Traditional rulers have always been called upon and used to neutralize crises as and when they arose. Besides, successive governments realized that, the surest way to win the hearts and minds of the citizens on major issues of the day was through the traditional rulers.

The argument for a special role for traditional rulers in our constitution should not imply an abandonment of the democratic system of government. What it means is that traditional structures should be accommodated and made to operate with modern democracy in such a way that they reflect and mutually reinforce
each other. It cannot be denied that we may not have survived as a people without the leavening effect of our traditional rulers. They have acted and continue to act as respected interlocutors on behalf of the people with their elected and appointed government officials. They have always served as strong pillars of stability within our society, making our large and diverse populations governable. Apart from the fact that they embody the dynamic, evolving links to our historic past and the future, they also give us pride in the uniqueness and ethics of our society.

Today’s largely heterogeneous communities in Nigeria have made the concept of internal security difficult to realize. The traditional rulers should be encouraged to monitor activities in their immediate domains. In most communities, traditional rulers still have a lot to say in the security management of such areas. There is a need to revive the traditional security institutions which used to support governance in the past. However, these may have to be modified to suit the dictates of civility.

It is an irony of fate that traditional rulers who are recognized in all States of the Federation and graded by State Governments are not given official recognition and security roles by the 1999 Constitution. In spite of the above, they have been the pillars of national security from the grassroots to the centre in the country. May I, at this juncture, use this grand occasion to pay tribute to His Highness the Emir of Kano for his outstanding contribution to the security of Nigeria at all times by utilizing his network of goodwill which spreads far and wide across the nation. I thank your Royal Highness, on behalf of Intelligence Community, past and present.

Conclusion
Traditional rulers and security agents should be seen as partners in the onerous task of maintaining internal security. Since security is a collective responsibility, it is my contention that traditional rulers should be ascribed official roles as they remain the focal point of the rural populace. This becomes more desirable as Nigeria today faces numerous threats to its stability. Traditional rulers who had played significant roles in matters of security in the past can be energized to play more roles in the face of new security challenges. It is an accepted fact that chieftaincy institutions in the country have served and will continue to serve vital roles in the
maintenance of justice and order, and in the preservation of most of our cherished traditional values, especially in the rural areas where most Nigerians live. The clarion call is for more recognition taking into consideration their past and on-going roles in the sustenance of our national security. This calls for our traditional rulers to be true partners with government and security agencies at all levels, in order to achieve the objective of Security For All as stated in the current Grand Strategy on National Security which was enunciated at the inception of the present administration in 1999 by President Obasanjo. The nation is proud of the contributions of traditional rulers throughout our history: before, during and after the colonial period, up to the present time. I wish to thank them, on behalf of Government, for their continued commitment to making our great nation a vibrant example for all of Africa and for the world.

References


University of Ibadan, A study of Nigeria’s Traditional Culture–a Production by University Consultancy Services Unit, Ibadan.
Whoever decided on the theme of this seminar has done a very important favour to the cause of the survival of peace, harmony, stability, well-being, the sense of self confidence and a clear vision of the future for the people of Nigeria. Ultimately, by raising the question of security and traditional institutions at this point he has done a great deal of service to the cause of the survival of Nigeria as one single indivisible entity. This is the prime security consideration and this seminar is important for a variety of reasons.

Whatever may or may not be your feelings about Nigeria there persists a gnawing underlying worry whether the endeavour called Nigeria will survive beyond the tenure of Chief General Olusegun Obasanjo. Calls persist for a so called “sovereign national conference” to determine “the future form of association”. Reference criteria for such future association and indeed participation at the conference include such things as:

a. discrete, autonomous, linguistic, ethnic or tribal entities
b. autonomous federations within a federation of units defined on the basis of ill-assorted language groups, culture groups or territorial groups e.g. federation of Kanuri–Hausa States; of Igbo speaking states, of oil–Rivers States; of Nok Culture States (or Middles Belt States); of Oduduwa States and so on. The variety is endless and includes the proposition for an Oduduwa Republic as the focal point of a loose association in which all other areas are federated separately.
c. fresh and ferocious debates and disputes often breaking out into limited but sustained state of interval war over the issue of resource control. Despite a generally gallant nation oriented posture on the part of the presidency severe damage is continually being done to the nation’s
capacity to generate the revenues necessary to defend itself and to situation among others continues to damage the nation’s reputation and to raise questions over its security, stability and ultimately its physical survival at home and in the world at large.

d. even at the level of government there seems to be a latent nostalgia for a return to the old regions largely on tribal grounds. That status quo ante was an incubation chamber for civil war. An immediate causus belli lies in the proposal built into the “re structuring” panacea to give the South–West the Federal Territory of Lagos. A remote causus belli lies also in the associated claims of Oduduwa Republic advocates to most of Kwara and Kogi as well as parts of Kebbi States.

e. the survival of old established boundaries of intergroup hatred manifest in definitions such as non–indigenes, settlers, strangers and aliens physically expressed in a periodic dialogue in blood. This is very widespread and affects states such as Lagos and the South–West generally; Bayelsa, Delta, Nassarawa, Benue, Kwara, Kaduna, Plateau, Bauchi, Taraba, Gombe, Adamawa and Kano States. The association of some of these situations with religious affiliation such as the Sharia confrontation and the pursuit of ethnic cleansing policies threatens the peace with latent motivations to vengeance. Although party political mobilization may be thought to provide some amelioration the worst cases of interethnic mass slaughter have occurred during the first democratic period 1999-2003.

f. armed robbery both in terms of armed urban burglaries; robbery through gangs often attacking in “formation” using battlefield tactics along with other forms of violent crime are now rampant and increase by the day. Travel at night is almost at a standstill and the rural countryside is dead after dark.

g. though government at all levels has made several attempts to control the situation there is serious doubt whether the police force is organized, equipped, suitably trained or large enough in size to cope with the
menace. In any case there is sufficient evidence of certain factors like the routine resort to strong arm methods such as the use of tear gas and firearms as the first order response in any situation whoever is involved. Not so rare and very real enough incidents of police ethnic and religious bias also exist. These suggest that police methods may themselves create the conditions for disorder. The knowledge of the recruitment of OPC elements into leadership and rank and file positions in the mobile force does not help.

h. the use of regular army units has so far led to ambiguous results such as at Odi and in the Zakybiem incident. At any event Nigeria like other third world nations except Israel is in the unenviable position of being unable to enforce its writ at home by force of arms beyond a certain ineffectual limit without becoming a pariah in the international community.

i. The disbandment of the special forces within the army further curtails national capacity for the use of the military for so called internal security duties or low intensity operations.

j. From the Udoji awards to all subsequent measures, the national economy has decided to be a source of despair to ordinary folk and all other classes. As noted by writers, the ordinary citizen’s position has worsened so much that he barely survives. His law abiding attitudes can not be guaranteed because over the years the state has progressively reduced its contribution to his well-being until he now receives literally nothing at all from it; not even the guarantee of the security of his life, property and community. All these convoluted declarations of fairy tale expenditures at all levels with no real impact on his life induce in him the worst suspicions against the elite and government generally. Conspicuous consumption all around him and daily media reports as well as official assertions about the corrupt theft of billions have conduced to engender in him an image of government as a theft machine and his “leaders” as wells as all public office holders in the
formal machinery of governance as mere predators. His disaffection increases as the demands of a privatizing economy impose on him severe difficulties with food, school fees, medical charges and the means to earn a living.

k. over the years since 1971-1972, crime and pseudo-crime have widened in scope. Urban centers have witnessed a growth in lawlessness manifest in such things as “Daba” culture; criminally inclined vigilantism, gang rape, burglary and the sale and taking of drugs especially among the youths and the relatively young.

l. in general (a)-(k) above would suggest that Nigeria has a serious security problems and it is not unreasonable to speculate whether its circumstances do not parallel those of Yugoslavia before its collapse. Such a view is reinforced by the second consideration which makes this seminar important.

The problems of the democratic experiment latent in all third world, African and specially Nigeria’s political evolution have continued to affect its political culture. In the aftermath of the return to democracy they have gained such intensity as to discredit politics, politicians and governance generally quite apart from those which are endemic in post colonial states especially of our configuration. They are quite numerous but we shall restrict ourselves to those of real security relevance:

a. weak loyalty to the state as opposed to loyalty to other entities such as tribe; hence a ready willingness to break its laws or to subvert or circumvent them. This explains many of the factors enumerated earlier.

b. the persistence of deviance especially poor attitudes to public office, public duty, public trust and of an opinion of public office as an opportunity for corrupt self aggrandizement (lootomania, lootocracy, cryptocracy e.t.c.). This reinforces (a) above and in the period 1999 - 2003 corruption is viewed at home and abroad as having reached the lowest point in probity, honesty and
transparency. Views make no exception e.g. the claims of Transparency International and the statement of a Catholic Bishop that “from top to bottom, repeat from top to bottom, I know of no one in public office in Nigeria who has not stolen public funds”. (A recent sermon on 43 years of independence).

c. a generally low respect for the basic provisions of the constitution and their replacement by the will of leaders. This so called “breakdown of constitutionalism” was blamed for the downfall of all previous generations of government in post independence Africa. In the context of the theme of this seminar we note that the first term of President Obasanjo was rescued only just in time for new elections from the threat of impeachment on charges of unconstitutional behaviour. Though impatience with the laborious complicated and slow process in the presidential system may account for weaknesses in leadership other factors are at play.

d. a poorly developed political infrastructure and a low level of civil culture in which such institutions as the political party for example lack deep roots in society, thorough going articulation and are fragile and ephemeral.

e. in consequence of (d) and other factors elections generally tend more towards the appointive system familiar in monarchies and autocracies because the election process is completely perverted through violence and the use of money, the misuse and abuse of the electoral machinery and formal institutions of state such as the bureaucracy, the police and latterly traditional institutions, at least in the 2003 elections. It is most illuminating that moral legitimacy is so lost in this way that hardly any administration has succeeded in achieving an elective second term without eventually falling prey to military intervention. Whether Obasanjo will prove a true exception or the exception that proves the rule is truly an open question.

f. the impact of privatisation measures especially the sale
of government enterprises and the manner of sale have driven a further wedge between the state and the public, leaving the ordinary citizen dazed and confused but more inclined to believe the worst and accept the allegation that top people have merely knocked down these institutions in a Dutch auction to themselves through the use of dummy companies and proxies.

G. the general decline in the credibility, moral legitimacy and general trust for the formal institutions of governance and for the leadership classes generally has encouraged the emergence of a counter culture of violence as the first order of expression of dissatisfaction. The alarming aspect is that the most recent incidents in this respect have included physical violence or palpable threats of physical violence against functionaries of government from the chairmen of local government councils to much higher authorities.

H. this incipient climate of violence threatens to replace the secular political process. The break down in trust between formal institutions and the people may be its cause. Whatever the cause however we conclude this part of our sketch by taking due note of the emergence of tribal religious and local territorial militias as a significant element in the polity. Their activities in one area has prompted the a local chief to break with professional convention and to declare in public that military solutions are ill-suited, at least in that particular area. Together with the vast underground of private armouries of illegally acquired weapons they pose a veritable nightmare for the management of security. In Warri of late for example set piece encounters suggest strongly that these armouries include higher calibre and light and medium arms superior to those in regular service.

I. finally, we may highlight the relative infancy of the modern system of governance; amnesia over principles of state in old generations and complete unfamiliarity with the inherited culture of due process and the fundamental values of the political culture in the
Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria

j. The foregoing discussion suggests that in the climate of insecurity endemic to our circumstances the formal institutions of governance do not appear to have the capacity to meet contemporary needs. Ironically, it is in the interest of this new secular system of order that chieftaincy and the indigenous system of order has progressively been set aside and excluded from formal involvement in national management. This much has been most admirably and accurately presented by the National Security Adviser in the first paper of this seminar. The irony is that in Kano Emirate as elsewhere the losses of the modern, democratic system have been the gains of our traditional systems. Various reforms since colonial times sustained through the early years of independence completely excluded them from political management and administration and from participation in the control of the enormous resources available to the nation since 1969. In 1967 the Emir and the Emirate council saw the Native Authority Police, the courts and prisons removed from their control, as an aftermath of the murder of our political leaders in the January 1966 coup. Within four years of his succession to the throne of Kano Emirate it became Kano State ruled by an exclusive governor supported by a large body of trained civil servants and staff. The Kano Native Authority was split into five smaller local government councils completely independent of it. The potentials for disorder and chaos should be obvious. By 1976 and 1978 the Dasuki Reforms implemented under the Obasanjo/Yar’adua dispensation attempted to give relevance to the Emir and the Emirate Council by making the Emir the President of all Local Government Councils carved out of his Emirate. The Kano Emirate Council would co-ordinate the activities of the local government councils, superintend their budgets and conduct inspection tours as of old. This palliative however was observed in the letter and not the deed. For an institution that once enjoyed absolute power the relatively young Nigerian democracy.
contrast is exceedingly great. What is remarkable in the reform years is the peaceful climate of their implementation. Even when Rimi cut up the Emirate, and created new ones out of its districts, there was no palace rebellion.

Farouk, Ado Bayero’s biographer, notes that the reforms worked because of the personal qualities and general approach to the issues in human life of the Emir Ado. As pointed out, Ado is a quintessentially alpha type who seems to represent a sort of avatar or reincarnation of three major figures in caliphate history—Sultan Mohammed Bello, Ibrahim Dabo and his own father Abdullahi Bayero in many essential ways. In relation to the implementation of reforms and much else that developed in later years much has depended on Ado’s credo which includes:

a. very formal outlook and strict interpretation of his role as San Kano avoiding any thing and everything not legally in his sphere of competence.
b. a high code of justice which excludes all bias, favouratism or fear of anyone and a rejection of lobbyists.
c. Recognition that traditional institutions are alive and effective for the successful containment of armed robbery for other aspects of the security problems of the society may have guided Obasanjo’s efforts at revisiting the local government question, restructuring, and constitutional reform generally. At any event the proposal to return to the local government system pre-1976 would mean for Kano state.
d. a reduction in the number of local government areas
e. reintegration of the Emirate council and traditional authority in some way into the local government system and government operations generally.
f. a review of the constitution and possible return to the more flexible, cheaper and culturally and socially more accommodating parliamentary system or the more African so called French system. Whatever President Obasanjo’s Technical Committee on local government
may recommend the circumstances of Nigeria today could suggest a re-orientation of our definition and attitudes to the role of traditional institutions. The core problem for the nation state is whether it can cope without them.

g. Those who have made contributions to the debate such as the ACF took note of:

h. the continuing relevance for law and order and the security of society generally;

i. their decline as the root cause of the complete breakdown and the incipient violence and tension evident in society; growth in crime and social dislocation; drug taking; gang rape and the collapse of order generally and recommended them for constitutional recognition.

j. their reintegration into the system of governance as public officers as envisaged by the 1976 Dasuki reforms especially it recommends:-

k. the return to the creation of the office of President of the local government council to cover all such councils created from the territory of the paramount ruler who shall ‘exercise such powers in respect of any matter relating to religious/customary law; cultural affairs; inter–communal relations; traditional land matters; grazing e.t.c. traditional chieftaincy matters, maintenance of law and order within the area covered by the local governments. Membership shall include:

- the paramount–The Emir of Kano Emirate as President and Chairman of Council.
- the Chairmen and Secretaries of all component local government councils;
- the Emirate Council
- the District Heads of the component areas.

l. a return to the 1995 Draft constitution and the insertion of constitutional provisions relating to Traditional Rulers expunged by the PRC in 1999:

- the establishment of a National Advisory Council of Traditional Rulers.
- the provision for a State Advisory Council of
Traditional Rulers, in the case of Kano the Local Government Presidential Council shall act in that capacity.

- The provision for a Local Government Traditional Advisory Council.
- the resurrection of the ministry of local government to function in the manner of the old northern regional ministry of the same name for maintaining and regulation of standards enforcement of financial regulations and due process.

My overview of these recommendations suggests a need to re-emphasize the co-ordinating role viz:

m. the Ministry of local government should create the office of Secretary to the local government presidential council and post him to that council for at least two local government tenures or 6–8 years as the case may be.

n. mandatory regular tours of the local government areas by the President of local government council accompanied by the Secretary among others.

o. in the alternative the provision for a local government presidential council may be replaced by styling the body Local Government Co-ordinating Committee with the structure in (vi) (a)–(d) and 7 (i) and (ii) above.

p. the adoption of the so called French style executive system providing that

- the Presidential shall have only one term limited to 5-6 years.
- the cabinet shall come exclusively from parliament (National Assembly)
- the Prime Minister and the cabinet shall be appointed and dismissed by the President and shall report to the President.
- The cabinet shall have a term not exceeding 4 years.
- maximum devolution of powers to the states and
local government councils shall be effected to ensure full attention to major questions of the security of the nation at all levels especially the national level.

- At the state level the constitution shall be
  - purely parliamentary with no limitation to the number of times a person may occupy the top executive position to be called chief commissioner.
  - his cabinet of the state shall come entirely from the State Assembly.
  - the chief commissioner and his cabinet shall hold office for 4 years in the first instance and be free to return as long as elected.

These proposals may well serve to stabilize Nigeria and remove what seems to be a burgeoning decent into a Yugoslav or Somalian type situation. At any event from the security point of view it creates a much safer environment especially since the prevention, detection and apprehension of crime will benefit greatly from the reintegration of the traditional authority system. It has the aristocratic virtues of absolute loyalty, honesty, dignity, discretion, antiquity and intimacy with accurate local information. By the way, it is interesting that no one thinks of lying to Ado Bayero or his counterparts, but everyone lies freely in front of any political boss. The veracity of information coming from the Palace will certainly reinforce the efficiency of early warning systems.

Before closing this contribution I want to draw the attention of the educated classes, the politicians, the civil servants and the radical elements to take note of the following observations:

- sometime in the 1970s an international panel which reviewed the turbulent circumstances of post independence Africa concluded that by the turn of the century new generations of leaders will emerge to fashion out new political systems much closer to indigenous African forms than to western inherited
forms.

b. Margery Perham, among others once noted that the further Africans move away from the date of independence the less they respect the principles and rules of modern political management.

c. My contribution at Zaria in 1971 that we are merely imitators who mouth but do not adhere to principles such as democracy, human rights, justice and so on and ignore them freely whilst governing gains much greater relevance today than it did in 1971.

d. The latest trend in writing about Africa and in discussing contemporary Africa and the future focuses on universal disenchantment with the ways of our modern elite, the absolute decline of African society and descent into violence and chaos in our hands and the relative virtue of our indigenous political system. People emphasise their value in crisis management, the maintenance of peace, national integration and continent wide unity as well as mobilisation and leadership for development. The National Security Adviser refers to the Adamawa-Cameroon extension of the Badagry- Benin Republic crisis. This has other relevance for say Daura, Katsina and Borno for Niger and Tchad Republics.

e. Time has created a revolution in the quality (education and experience) of emirs, their lieutenants and their Emirate Councils'. We note that most emirs are qualified for high office and most Emirate Traditional Councils are peopled by retired top level officers of government and business.

For me writing about Ado Bayero the Emir himself and his record are a passion and a vindication of my views on him and our indigenous political institutions. I am honoured by the second opportunity to speak in celebration of the Fortieth year of his very eventful tenure as the 54th king of Kano. The choice of such a vastly, important subject fits the occasion perfectly. I regret that my somewhat rambling and untidy presentation does not match the
excellence of Ado Bayero’s inimitable record as person and ruler. This is because:

a. for the last four weeks I have been struggling with a near-fatal encounter with contaminated Panadol. And only the magnificent radiance of an Ado Bayero occasion persuaded me to not to stay away. I have written more or less extempore and you may note I have sought to complement the presentation of the N.S.A. and approach my subject by indirection. I have avoided the advocacy for the use of these institutions only as a means of law enforcement and as crime preventors and apprehenders, and believe that it is through indirection we shall eventually achieve our goals in the context of our democracy.

b. secondly the subject matter; Bayero, Kano, tradition and national security is so crucial I began to see it as a book. and that has influenced the approach. Such a book will probably be written. In the meantime I pray that you have all been stimulated and provoked, and will look at ourselves anew. I pray to Allah that Kano, our society and the future of our country will continue to receive the invaluable services of this most unusual man for many more years to come.

Thank you very much for your patience.
Long before this time, I have had the beckoning to grace this great city of Kano, if only to once again behold the great historical significances upon which the vast culture of rulership and cohesion was firmly built for well over a thousand years now.

Of course, Kano is a lure, an attraction and a compelling invitation to a trip in history. It is a reminder of the greatness of our country, both in vast material as well as abundant human resources. It is a pointer to the diffusion of entrepreneurial potentials of every part of Nigeria and indeed among every community of Nigerians.

Indeed, the cosmopolitan proficiency of Kano and the near polyglot status remain remarkable indexes to measure its possibilities vis-à-vis the boisterousness of the people, who though are ruled by one of the longest monarchies in the land, continue to reveal a certain class of dynamism and growth in all spheres of life.

Of course, it cannot be treated lightly that Kano, as a vastly significant national territory remains one single international centre which has held attractions for centuries of inter-continental initiatives in commerce, diplomacy, territorial expansion, military enterprise and more. It therefore, cannot be surprising that the anniversary of the Kano Monarchy decided to pursue the course of honour through a broadening of knowledge as in this elaborate seminar to mark forty years on the saddle. If this is not the first of its kind, it is the first I have had the privilege of taking a part in. The gesture itself is suggestive of intention to pursue that which outlives generations and which will bring about an enhancement of the system.

Indeed, it is a commendable trip in statesmanship for the Monarchy in Kano to seek to broaden the knowledge of the citizenry on such knotty issue as chieftaincy and security. There is no contesting the fact that these are matters demanding resolution but which must be treated with utmost care and maturity. This is so
because whereas it is easy to ascertain security roles for chieftaincies in centralized politics in Nigeria, it is not that easy in such diffuse polities where definite and irreversible class defining structures are absent and where rank is not permanent as it is open to all.

And whereas it is easy to view the centrality of authorities as running in tandem with swift and more effective patterns of social coercion, the prevalence of traditional order of consensus compel consultation in the less central polities, revealing its own promises in presenting a local version of democracy which would aid our joining the more global arena of pluralism.

To that effect, I consider the topic assigned me to divest in two main dominant factors. One is chieftaincy while the other is security. And for the typical non-centralised polity, it can, arguably, be difficult to quickly situate the possibilities of a cohesive, non-coercive, social control mechanism at confirmation, which is completely diffused, non-centralised or even unknowingly democratic.

Postulations holding the possibilities of efficacy of single-source authority as replicable scenarios in places as multi-faceted as a majority of the Igbo areas of Nigeria can even be contested, if perceived as incongruous. And for the newcomer or visitor, it is certainly difficult to discern such factors of social relations upon which a semblance of central frame for security is built.

Indeed, such visitor may not have had the right mind penetration or sufficient observation to appreciate the dynamics, which keep the society running. He thus may be circumscribed to pursuing an interpretation of the patterns of the society on the outlines of centralized and charted incidences of statecraft. It is even more complex for an observer who may not have trained his mind in the observation of such evolutionary trends, some of which present diffusive tendencies manifest in political incidents tending to multiplicity and attenuation in potency. Consequently a semblance of culture, to him erroneously stands as one and the same, but in fact, the trends are vigorously disparate.

But in reality, African societies have witnessed their own fair share of continuous changes, with each phase of development representing a temporary or transient movement in the historical and dialectical continuum.
Lately, it has become necessary to compare societies, with reference to some particular aspects or parts of the whole social system with reference, for example, to the economic system, the political system, or even kinship patterns. In most cases, sparing incidents or even accidents of history bring about very narrow interpretations by a vocal few who mount a voluble but erroneous claim of insight into the polity in question.

In *African Political Systems* (1940), edited by M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, two broad categories of politics are identified. One is the institutionalized (centralized) political structure in which cleavages of wealth, privilege and status correspond to the distribution of power and authority. The other is the segmentary lineage system, which lacks centralized authority but, of course, wherein there are such systems where there are no sharp or marked divisions of rank, status or wealth. The latter model has been variously characterized as stateless or acephalous societies. But instead of considering such non-centralised politics as anarchical, we sometimes view them as chaotic and therefore ungovernable. In a way, since such societies are not narrowed into a straight rulership pattern, permitting unquestioning exploitation, they are termed ungovernable. But, perhaps to avoid running away with the charge of being impolitic, the conveners of this seminar, politely tagged such a societal model—non-centralised.

In dealing with political systems, we are inevitably dealing with the structures and processes of the maintenance or establishment of social order within a territorial unit. Centralized political systems had had to deal with the issue of a centrally imposed social order through the instrumentality of organized exercise of coercive authority by means of the use, threat or the possibility of use, of physical force.

Thus, the centralized traditional African political systems present little difficulty in this regard. The problematic, however, is in dealing with such multiplicity of societies as the so-called “stateless”, “anarchic” or “acephalous” polities, which obviously lack the capacity to impose social order by means of a pretension to the exercise of coercive authority, including threat or possibility of use of physical force. This is especially so, considering that the absence of a coercive authority did not in any case eliminate
altogether the overwhelming potential for conflicts and disputes or the resolutions of these, even in non-centralised polities.

In order to put the issues in clear perspective, we have to establish here that the challenge of the basic subject here is in the matters of “chieftaincy and security,” while conceptual puzzles arise from issues of context associated with stereotypes. These are “Stateless”, “acephalous”, “anarchical” e.t.c. In the words of Walter Rodney (1980),

... the word stateless is carelessly or even abusively used: but it does describe those peoples who had no machinery of government coercion and no concept of a political unit wider than...the village. After all, if there is no class stratification in a society, it, follows that there is no state because the state arose as an instrument to be used by a particular class to control the rest of society to its own interests. Generally speaking, one can consider the stateless societies as among the older forms of socio-political organization in Africa, while the large states represented an evolution away from communalism (non-centrality)–sometimes to the point of federalism (centralized monarchy).

Elsewhere, acephalous may be employed in describing the political, structure in a simple society, such as a territorial community, which is united by the rule (I) law. but lacking a distinct head, without a leader. it can also be societies in which the largest political unit embraces a group of people, all of whom are united to one another by tics of kinship, in such a manner that political relations are coterminous. with kinship relations and the political structure and kinship organization are completely fused.

There are societies in which a lineage structure is the framework of the political system thereby being a precise co-ordination between the two, in such a way that they are consistent with each other, though each remains distinct and autonomous in its own sphere.

Harold Barclay (1982) characterizes “anarchical” or “anarchic” in the sense of societies, which do not accept the idea of authority as natural. in fact, it does not quite appear to occur to them. To that effect:

Anarchy is the condition of society in which there is no ruler; a society without government and without the state...it is interesting to note here the similarity between anarchism and the segmentary lineage system
characteristic of many anarchic politics, especially in Africa. In both cases, the sum is composed of segments and each segment of sub-segment. In both cases, the most effective authority is in the smallest unit, decreasing directly as one ascends to broader levels of integration.

Although anthropologists have, over the past several decades, documented, through their ethnographic research, innumerable stateless or acephalous societies throughout the world and throughout time, this paper is not oblivious nevertheless of the considerable reluctance to define these societies as pure anarchies. Even amongst anthropologists, there are those so imbued with their own cultural traditions that they will go to any length to avoid recognizing these systems for what they are. Since they contend that social order can exist only in a situation of existence of state, government and law, they stretch the meaning, nay significance, of these terms to cover what is clearly not government or state at all. Hammond (1964) had remarked in this regard:

Even when the population is large, relatively dense, and somewhat diversified, the absence of government does not necessarily imply the presence of anarchy.

By the same token, it has been observed that, among students and historians alike, about the most firmly held myth is the one that no society can exist, least of all function, without government. Its mythical corollary that every society must have a head, an identifiable and visible one at that is also pandemic among the aforesaid group. Thus, the myth of the necessity of the state and of government continues to hold decisively true for many. While this might seem inevitable in today’s modern world, there is no disputing the fact that the states and governments have not always existed in such sense of pursuing absolute and definable centrality. In most cases, there are many states that are, strictly speaking, products of recent political history or results of colonial political engineering or trade-offs.

Prof. M.A. Onwuejogwu, the renowned Nigerian anthropologist, has questioned the classification of certain traditional African societies as stateless, a position he shares with scholars like Profs. Lambert Ejiofor and Ikenna Nzimiro. Stoutly, they contend
suffice it to say that at this juncture that there is a general recognition in anthropological surveys of a complex web of social organizations that fall short of states, and more particularly that were lacking in centralized political authority patterns, pronounced social stratification and advanced role differentiation. Disputes of intellectual nature could routinely attend the criteria for the classification of these models but this can in no way vitiate the substantive defining characteristics of the system of social organization that these represent.

They cannot be faulted in the ensuring truism of such defining characteristics which include communal solidarity, collective action, horizontal political structures, placing premium on leadership instead of authority, absence of role specialization or class differentiation, etc. It is our contention here that all of these features or a combination of same constitute a representative pattern depicting organization and direction even as it never presented a scenario of coercion or forcible pursuit of a one-sided view of governance.

Scattered throughout the continent south of the Sahara, Harold Barclay (1982) argues, “are dozens of anarchic societies, some of which are the most populous of all anarchic communities”. Among these are a variety of segmentary lineage systems that are autonomous and self-managing. Social order is imposed and maintained by means of equivalence and opposition; a template of diffusion of power that thrives on a regulatory framework of diffuse sanctions.

An outline of a survey of these polities yields the Anuak, Mandari, Dinka and Neur (in southern Sudan), the Konkomba (northern Togo), the Lugbara (parts of Uganda and Congo DR), Shona (Zimbabwe), the Tonga (Zambia), the Tallensi (Ghana), the Igbo, Tiv (Nigeria) etc. The list is by no means exhaustive. And at the same time, anarchical.

The character of traditional Igbo social organization (west or east Niger) is a highly contentious topic, and it will probably remain so for a long time to come, Characterized variously as a model of “stateless” or “acephalous” society, and at other times as a quintessential “republican polity”, the structure of the Igbo political economy, in its intrinsic manifestation, is, increasingly, being refracted as “anarchic” by social scientists. Not a few
historians and a sprinkle of anthropologists have continued to insist that there, in fact, existed kingdoms in the Igbo traditional setting.

The village a commune of sorts–provides the fulcrum of social existence and so underlines the context of Igbo characteristic diffusion. Yes, the village delicately shapes the Igbo worldview, interaction patterns and social relationships. The Igbo village setting evinces a complex web of ties and bonds, of roles and responsibilities, of complementarities and asymmetries, and of equivalence and opposition. It is usually a tapestry of views, group and individual aspirations bending to the yearnings of the community assembly–Oha na Eze. In this way, the society continually strives towards equilibrium and consensus.

Lest we forget, the Igbo traditional society was, at all material times, a living organism consisting of individuals and groups, of segments of the extended family And the lineage. Therefore, the diffuse way of living which we refer to here can actually be located in the concrete realm: in the people’s pronounced sense of social equality; in the prevalence of horizontal political organization that emphasized leadership in contradistinction to a vertical, hierarchical and centralized political structure which emphasized authority; in the unstructured, bonding together of the village, the lineage and the extended family which spontaneously expresses itself in collective action, solidarity and diffusion of social sanctions, etc.

But whereas this formed the socio-political configuration of a great bulk of the Igbo world, centrality of administration was a reality and indeed prevalent in some noted Igbo kingdoms.

Among these were the Umuezechima group of clans of western Igbo or what Ejiofor dubbed “Umuezechima Kingdoms”, in addition to the so-called “four Niger States” elaborated in Prof. Ikenna Nzimiro’s Studies in Igbo Political Systems (1972). The nine village kingdoms of the Umuezedima clan include “Onicha Ugbo, Onicha Ukwu, Onicha Olona, Obior, Obomkpa, Ezi, Issele-Ukwu, Issele-Azagba, and Issele-Mkpituime. Nzimiro’s four Niger States consisted of Oguta, Onitsha, Ossomari and Aboh. Other parts of the traditional Igbo society that established the equivalent of “village kingdoms” were Nri, Arochukwu (East Niger) and Asaba and Agbor (West Niger). Ejiofor therefore argued:
The traditional Igbo systems may be divided into two major types, namely, the democratic and monarchical.

He continued:

west of the Niger, village kingdoms are the rule rather than the exception in Igbo communities.

Furthermore, he observed that even the democratic model did have chiefs, but quickly added, “these were at best symbolic. heads of village groups ... and their primacy was honorific rather than jurisdictional”. Of this class of chiefs, G.I. Jones noted (in 1950) thus:

of the type envisaged ... as “strong chiefs” (except) with a few exceptions (did) not exist in this region. The people who are usually referred to as chiefs, and there can be any number of them today, have no executive, judicial or legislative powers rested solely in their office.

Chief Obafemi Awolowo similarly observed that

save in very few places there were no natural rulers in Eastern Nigeria of the stature and jurisdiction of those in the North, West or Midwest (Benin areas).

But Lugard “manufactured” them, as wealthy and influential persons were made “natural rulers” by warrant. On his appointment, a warrant chief became the paramount for a specified area, enjoying the same authority and privileges and subject to the same limitations as a natural ruler in the North or West or Midwest. Even this daring innovation succeeded for well over a decade.

For the purposes of a holistic perspective to the contending issues, I wish to call attention at this juncture to Prof Onwuejogwu’s seminal thoughts in this regard which led him to classify the political system of the Igbo Culture Area into three broad categories, namely, the centralized, gerontocratic and consensus or non-centralized models.

According to this classification, the centralized model is characterized by segmentary lineages, theocratic or secular kingship, less differentiated Ozo or Eze title system and age grades
and associations, which could be located in Nri, Onitsha, Aboh, Ogwashi-Uku, Issele-Uku, Oguta, Agbor and Arochukwu.

The characteristics of the gerontocratic model include segmentary lineages, chiefship or headship and sometimes, hyper-gerontocracy, less differentiated Ozo or Eze title system, hyper-age grades with key examples as Ihagwani, Ibusa, Illa, Okpanam, Asaba etc. The non-centralized model with Owerri, Mbaise and Ngwa as classical examples contains features such as segmentary lineages, age-grades, undifferentiated Ozo or Eze title system, councils and associations. These wield sound social muscles which when applied can exert maximum weight and compel alteration or proper conditioning of the individual and group.

Complex and dynamic as the evolutionary trend of Igbo social control mechanism is, the archetypal political system retains a strong element of the segmentary lineage system, which is known as “Umunna”, which in extension is as politically potent as it is corrective of deviance.

The principal elements in the comparative differentiation of political systems in traditional societies are the degree of specialization in roles that enter into the political and administrative spheres, the number of structural levels at which authority is exercised in addition to the context and changing patterns of the social relationship between those who exercise authority—be it horizontal or vertical—and the rest over whom authority is exercised.

It is by appreciating that social diffusion with its inherent non-centrality of features, that we can begin to come to terms with the fact that although some Igbo communities had managed to construct centralized, monarchical systems prior to the earliest contact with the white man, on the aggregate, such communities constituted a minority, albeit a significant one at that.

Invariably, not one of these communities or kingdoms managed to make the vital transition from communalism to full-blown centrality. We speak of centrality in this sense as a specific mode of statecraft, as well as a system of social organization, including the control of deviant behaviours.

The point can hardly be overstated that the period of transition from diffuse social system to a level of centrality—in those African
societies that managed to advance beyond non-centrality—was one of state formation.

The roles of institutions such as the village general assembly, with the village square (Obodo) as chambers, the age grade society, coupled with those of the daughters’ assembly (Umuada), the masquerade society, the secret society and the Ozo title society were intertwined, complementary and inevitably mutually reinforced each other. Their essence and vitality lay in their functionality, reverence and sheer effectiveness in achieving social cohesion and broad consensus. In many cases, they served the diplomatic roles and effectively broke deadlocks for the society to move forward. In some other cases, they interpret the norms of the society and cry for enforcement of social control to terminate deviancy. In fact, security in the typical Igbo setting is matter for social control and reordering.

In each case of course, each village was autonomous and managed its own affairs in spheres as diverse as religion, festivals, medicare, administration of justice, exercise of sanctions, etc.

Inter-village relations were characterized by the formation of federations of two or more villages especially in times of war. The extended family system provided a second-tier thread that held component units of the village together, enabling them to share and fend for one another in both good and difficult times.

The question now is this: In the event that it was largely democratic, it was completely consensus, it was never centered on any powerful monarch, how would such threatening social conducts such as crime and other deviant acts be tackled?

According to Prof. Richard Okafor, social control can hardly ever come to fruition in Igboland if it is a business of an individual. It comes from established elements of culture, which “protect precious tenets of the social environment from erosion or degradation.” And paradoxically, though every Igbo community possesses highly individualized citizenry, the aggregate life is fully shaped according to the cherished traditions, hallowed secrets and revered institutions that usually ensure that any member who violates any of them is severely punished. The yarn thief is a yam thief, it does not matter who his kith and kin are, he must be exiled. The murderer has murdered a life and must, as determined by the degree of crime, face death or be exiled.
The most potent of Igbo social control systems, which also underlined appropriate security measures, is the age-old pattern of stigmatizing crime or any other deviant behaviour. In the sub-cultures along the Anambra River, Ojebeogene, Ugwunye and Ezedike clans in northern Igboland, it is common to stigmatise crime by smear public parade (inya neha or ite unyi) forced on culprits. In the case of a thief, he is hoisted with the stolen item and paraded through the village square where every person, in passing or on invitation, inflicts his/her own form of insult to the culprit.

For such deviant behaviours as immorality, infidelity of the wife (mind you, never of the husband), abortion, adultery, etc, it is usually made public by specialist minstrels who mock by mimicking such obscene conduct in socially reprehensible ways.

In the various okumkpo festival scenes in Afikpo, they move in a conscious, planned, exaggerated manner, saying unorthodox things; acting differently than they do, and lampooning miscreants and other deviants. That way, such culprits are thoroughly discredited and stigmatized to the extent that they may even leave the community for a long period of time. In some cases as in some northern Igboland, these are never said directly but insinuated in ways that stigmatise families and kindred. Such may compel a family or kindred to force or arrange safe passage of the culprit into exile.

Indeed, the potency of social stigma is such in Igbo world that families and kindred can pledge away any item, including precious land, to stave off the stigma, if possible.

Where there is any semblance of central authority, its job is made easier by this but such personages who are of elevated social ranks in the land also pass through the same beam of the searchlight of probity and are brought through the same trial if found wanting.

The fact of Igbo justice system being a leveler rides the belief that laws are derived from God (divine) and before God, all men are equal. As pointed out by Okafor (1992), such belief formed the bases for consolidation of the diffuse system, which prevented an undertaking of such phenomenal structuring of the society for the benefit of some privileged persons. Perhaps, such supremacy of divine laws over man-made laws actually sustained long adherence to what is adjudged right for the benefit of long-held traditions.
In reality, attendant upon the fact of Igbo laws being effective instrument of social harmony, moral rectitude and political order, natural laws, some of which are considered divine injunctions, form the most potent foundation for well being as they further underline the elements of characteristics of man-made laws such as reasonableness, common good, sufficiency, legitimacy and harmony with traditions.

This foundation consolidates the security of the society where the rules are made and known and where deviance is interpreted as a burden of family and kindred. And although the societal assembly (Oha Obodo, in the case of the whole community or ama/ogbe in the case of village wards) may represent a variegation of interests and competitive factors, the possibility of positions running counter to divine laws stands as checks or restraints to would-be dominators. This prevents the emergence of a one-sided pursuit or centrality of order of enactments, which can confer undue privileges and create avenues for the subversion of the society.

Indeed, Ndigbo see any form of pre-eminence in the village assembly as an unbridled outspokenness, which must be checked to prevent tyranny. According to Victor Uchendu, “they are jealous of their legislative authority and are not ready to surrender it to a small group of individuals.” To this effect, they consider the validity and security of their social environment on the strength of divine inspiration (not just the view of man) in the making of the laws, which informs the pattern of proclaiming a law with the ofo (signifying uprightness) depicting that every contribution and indeed the law, have been reached according to the custom of the land. It is like an oath to uphold the laws of the land and never to be a part of any form of subversion.

But whereas we can say that these sustained the primordial polities, what obtains at the moment is at best an admixture of the old values and new ways, most of which confuse the modern man and induce excuses for violation of the laws. Colonialism and indeed, post colonial African polities, appeared confused about what should constitute their social evolution and political order as in rising to the challenges of complex security questions negating modern mechanisms for restraining of the unbridled quest.
In the case of the modern Igbo societies, what with the multiplicity of chieftaincies, the negation of the age-old social order which effectively informed character and decency, has expectedly set the stage for an exercise of such looming communality affirmation which checkmated unbridled individual assertiveness.

To worsen matters, the stage set by Laggard himself, as in appointing paramount chiefs just among the rich and influential without regard to community feeling or preference, seriously removed any form of credibility that would have been due some of such emerging chieftaincies. In some cases actually, Lugard just appointed such oppressive middle men either involved in the hateful slave dealing regime or the down-pricing of produces of which they (the middle men) reaped bountifully.

But if we excuse Lugard on grounds of ignorance, (and for the fact that his indirect rule system collapsed there in his face), the manner of appointing some of the chieftaincies by successive indigenous administrations seriously altered community prestige and stabilizing institutions. It has even been worsened by the failure of a majority of these chiefs to appreciate their own peculiar social environment. They rather sought an invention of the pomp and grandeur of the empire situations in Oyo, Sokoto, Kano, Benin and Barrio, by initiating and indeed undertaking expensive ceremonies as a replication of age-old panoplies.

This done in total negation of the true age-old Igbo political and social scenario described by Isichei. “One of the things that struck the first western visitors to Igboland”, observed the historian, “was the extent to which democracy was truly practised”. According to her, “an early visitor to a Niger Igbo town said that he felt he was in a free land, among a free people”. Elsewhere, another French visitor observed of the people that indeed true liberty existed in Igboland, although its name was not inscribed in any monument.

So, whereas it was true that the institutions of the old order sustained the socio-political order of that era, particularly with due respect to the belief system ordaining ceaseless morality and rectitude, the current regime of social order faces credibility question on account of rejection of such restraining elements of the social environment which attenuated excessive assertiveness. In
fact, it is in this area of excessive assertiveness, as pointed out by Emenne, that a vitiation of the fabric of social order was regrettably consummated.

But all is not lost. The chieftaincies have shown remarkable abilities in building welters of information network for government, such that security can be easily guaranteed with movements and peculiar conducts duly interpreted by the chieftains. This is even enhanced by the emergence of a new and wealthy chieftaincy class with backgrounds in academics, business, professions, law, medicine and the other callings, who are capable of situating their social environments to suit national security arrangements.

But in the event that it is finally appreciated that the various chieftaincies have imbibed what it would take to achieve social order, the deciding question now is on the extent the nation state can tolerate the national variety as to accommodate distinct polities in security of the societies. If that is done, and if it is pursued, bearing in mind that most of security issues rested on local factors the fabric of which is defined in locality context, the reversal of trends in deviant behaviours would have been reached and for which we declare, as usual, in Enugu State: *To God be the Glory.*

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Session 1

The Past
Colonial Power and Traditional Legitimacy:
Contradictions in Defining and Maintaining Security

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The question of “security” in the colonial context is very contentious, even more so than in other contexts. Who wants to make what secure is central, of course, and if agents of the government and the government itself have different agendas, then there can be an irresolvable conflict of interests. Looking at colonialism in Northern Nigeria, and particularly in Kano, one can see the historical development of different agendas on the part of the occupying power, and on the part of the Emirs and Chiefs. The perceptions, as well as the problems, and therefore the agendas, shifted over the years, and these can best be viewed taking a chronological approach. The problems as perceived by the Emir of Kano Muhammedu Abbas were very different from those perceived by the Emir of Kano Abdullahi Bayero. Similarly the problems faced by Lugard were very different from those faced by Donald Cameron.

Colonialism can easily be seen in one dimensional terms, and frequently everything is seen only in terms of crude economic exploitation. While exploitation was certainly a constant, in many ways the more important concern was to establish the structures within which regular and profitable capitalist exploitation could take place. These structures were very fragile at first, and the security of the entire system was a great priority. The overall question is so enormous and has so many facets and dimensions, that it will be useful here to narrow on a few major misconceptions and hidden agendas by some of the historical actors in the early years of the British occupation of Kano. The reign of the Emir of Kano Muhammedu Abbas (1903-1919) is the focus here, although of course the pattern of conflicting interests did not end with his death. The goal is to look at the demands of the colonial government on the Emir and on how these demands were themselves contradictory—they demanded loyalty and they wanted...
to exploit the loyalty of the monarch’s subjects to him, but the demands brought into doubt the very basis of this loyalty. The question of “loyalty” is itself highly problematic, of course, in the case of a conquered people. For many different reasons (change of personnel, adjustments of perceptions, changing central policy, etc.) the British kept changing their policies, but they expected their local agents, and particularly the Emir, not only to keep up with these changes but also to maintain a constant loyalty to whatever was presented. This was not possible, and many clashes occurred.

There is a general feeling that all’s well that ends well, and since the British were so “successful” in Northern Nigeria then they must have been right—at least most of the time. This ignores the human element which always tries to reinterpret one’s actions to put a good light on them. Even when the British were very aware that they had made serious errors, they tried to patch things up or at least keep their secrets well hidden—even from themselves but especially from their superiors in London. One must therefore be careful with the archives, for often they hide more than they reveal. The personal archives of Lugard contain an example, in a letter from his own brother in October 1907, of how atrocities after the Satiru rebellion were suppressed and why:

I did not press Wallace for details it is well not to spoil a Club carpet by vomiting on it—but he dropped out such items as the spitting of the Mallam on a stake, the cutting off the breasts of women!!—imagination can supply the rest.¹

This desire not to spoil the club carpet had a certain amount of self preservation in it. Silence was also considered to be a good way to deal with the famine of 1908 which the British wanted to hide:

Yes the mortality was considerable but I hope not so great as the natives allege—we had no remedy at the time and therefore as little was said about it as possible.²

The conspiracy of silence was thus not absolute, and a close critical analysis of the documents of the time would be useful. There were certainly many areas which promised collision such as: taxation, appointment of chiefs, village organization, continued
slavery, forced labour on the tin mines and elsewhere, gazetting markets, smuggling, currency exchange, and on and on. However, for this discussion of security here the emphasis will be on a few: the use of spies and the climate of mistrust; the climate of fear and the threat of deposition; the ignorance of Islam and the British desire to “modernize” it; the ambiguous policies toward slavery and the British abuse of the system; and also the professed British respect for tradition with the regular contempt for its praxis.

That Kano in these first two decades of colonial occupation was very peaceful is partly just a myth, one which has become a basic part of the colonially inspired historiography of Northern Nigeria. The apparent stability of the past is one of those romantic remnants of colonialism, and many people remember “the good old days” as being calm and regular, despite the constant upsets which appear in the archives. This is supported by even serious scholars, such as M.G. Smith, who see notable successes made by people such as Abbas, but who tend to ignore the odds against such success, and the price that was paid. Smith’s concern with administrative structures led him to suggest that:

By utilizing these traditional lineage claims to rural areas as the basis for allocating district headships, Cargill and Abbas avoided giving offense and generating resistance to the new territorial system among powerful lineages.... During the next decade (1908-1919), Abbas continued to exploit the political opportunities that this ingenious adaptation provided as occasions arose, and further centralized the administrative control of Kano emirate under the chiefship to promote the interests of his dynasty and his sons. 3

Without wanting to question Abbas’ obvious intelligence or the value of his achievements, the focus here is on the contradictions presented by the occupying power, the British. That there was almost constant negotiation between the Emir and his supporters and the British cannot be doubted, but ultimately the British had the power. By examining some of the conflicts we can begin to understand how really unstable and uncertain life was in the first two decades of the twentieth century in Kano.
Spies and the Climate of Mistrust
One standard reaction to trouble is: Blame the other guy! This seems to have been the motive behind the British claim that the Kano people are naturally contentious, while conceding that there might be a historical cause for this fault in their character. Resident Temple thus claimed that:

in the Kano Emirate there is a distinctly centrifugal tendency, i.e. the natives have a tendency to be disloyal to the Emir and to each other. In this respect Kano differs from Sokoto. In the latter Emirate there is a distinctly centripetal tendency, and loyalty to the Sarkin Musulmi is the rule and not the exception. Whether this state of affairs always existed at Kano; whether it was brought about by the prolonged internecine warfare between the Aliu and Tukur factions; or whether attempts at direct rule since the Occupation have caused it I cannot say. The fact remains that extraordinary precautions have to be taken by Political Officers in this Emirate to avoid stirring up jealousy and disloyalty among the native officials.4

But it was the British who sent spies into Kano in preparation for their conquest. In fact one young spy, who was later rewarded with a chieftainship in Borno (Askira), was insinuated into Muhammadu Abbas’ own household long before the conquest when he was still the Wambai. In his own translated autobiography, the Chief of Askira Maimaina of Jega, the grandson of the Maigari of Lokoja (who himself had been a slave of H. Barth whom he followed to Britain in the 1850s) stated that:

Anyway, when I got to Kano, I stopped at the house of Muhammadu Mailiyari in the Daganda quarter. He had himself lived for a time in Lokoja. Formerly also he had been a friend of mine and I knew he could keep a secret.

He it was who got me an audience with Muhammadu, the Wambai, the younger brother of the Emir Aliyu, but a full brother, out of the same mother. I bargained with him for my goods. I had taken some small umbrellas, which were very pretty, and some watches. A certain minstrel bought some for him.

When the watch stopped, the Wambai sent for me and told me that the watch had gone wrong. I said, “No, it has not gone wrong.” Then I showed him how to wind it and it started again. Thereupon he brought out his gun. There was nothing the matter with it except that a few screws were loose and sticking. I tightened them up and washed the gun in oil. When I had done so, he put in a cartridge and it fired. From that moment I was his man.
But the real reason I had come to Kano was to find out the truth for the Government in Lokoja concerning the story that the Emir of Kano had trained soldiers. It was said that they were slaves whom he had sent to Lokoja to join the West African Frontier Force, and as soon as they were trained had deserted to Kano, and were now engaged in training his army.
He certainly had a lot of guns and cartridges which he had bought from the Tripolitanians. There were plenty of guns, but no one to train soldiers. It was when I had found this out that I determined to return to Lokoja.5

While this was probably Abbas’ first direct encounter with a British spy, it can be argued that he was not aware of it—at least not at the time. His innocence probably did not last long however, and during his time as Emir he probably became aware that this bright young man who became and remained very important to the British was the imposter who visited him before the conquest. But there were many other spies as well, and many from Kano itself. Two of the most famous are recalled by M. Uba Adamu:

When Moloney came to Keffi to investigate the rumours of Magaji ‘s slave raids, he came along with two of his personal aids, namely Abdu Timtim (so-called for his bulky body and protruded stomach) and Abdu Jarriga. The two aides were natives of Kano from Akwa Quarters, near Alfindiki in the city.6

There were other Kano spies who worked for the British as well, such as Adamu Jakada, and most of these became well known in the first years of the colonial occupation. One scholar has pointed out that:

By 1907 Adamu was a prosperous merchant and doubled as a part-time political informant to the British Administration in Kano. Apparently he relied on his business clients for the information (and gossip) he relayed to his masters. Partly as a result of such information, the British and especially Palmer, talked disparagingly of Emir Abbas of Kano. Adamu, of course, became very unpopular with the Kano ruler.7

Equally obvious were the reportedly large number of Kano people in the invading army, which remained for a long time as the occupying force.
It is impossible that this pattern of British spies who were originally from Kano would have been unknown to Emir Abbas. Nonetheless, the British claimed that this was not their policy after the conquest:

...the first essential, if the Native Administration is to be efficient, is that its members should be loyal to each other....we have firmly discouraged any attempt on the part of headmen or native officials to deal directly with Europeans behind the back of the Emirs.\(^8\)

But is it possible for a cat to stop mousing? In fact in the same report in which the above quote was found the author also asserted that “The Political Agents have carried out their duties satisfactorily.”\(^9\) Who were these “Political Agents”? The context in which this appears (“Native Clerical Staff. Political Agents & Messengers”) makes it obvious that these individuals are in fact British spies. In an earlier report, a different resident had also admitted to using spies and had promised to stop:

I found a tendency on the part of the Police to pry too closely in my opinion into Kano itself and so called secret service agents were employed belonging to a dangerous class. To this I have put a stop. Unless I have instructions to the contrary I intend to leave the interior control of Kano as much to the Emir as possible for the time being.\(^10\)

More quotes are hardly necessary—we know, as Abbas also certainly knew, that the British regularly maintained and depended on an elaborate system of spies and informers. The lesson was clear—the Emir should not participate in intrigue but the British had no intention of stopping themselves. This obviously made a difficult situation even more precarious for the Emir and contributed to the persistence of a climate of mistrust.

**A Climate of Fear and the Threat of Deposition**

The force of established historiography seems to dictate that the British were basically rational and decent and that they behaved in sensible ways. Generations of Nigerian schoolchildren have debated whether it would have been better to have been under the British or the French—and they have naturally concurred with their
teachers that British rule was “better”. M.G. Smith even compares British rule with that of the Sokoto Caliphs:

Though the style, methods and goals of the British Administration unfolded gradually during Abbas’ reign, and though his initial perceptions of these patterns were incorrect in many particulars, being based on his experience of traditional forms of suzerainty and vassalage, these Fulani models were neither entirely inappropriate nor misleading as guides to the new regime.¹¹

This only makes sense if one stresses the autocratic nature of some Sokoto actions, and if one ignores the religious foundations of the Caliphate. The claim that there was such a thing as “the style... of the British” would be difficult to sustain, and in fact there are scholars who have doubted the sanity of Cargill—especially in the light of his destroying so many of his own documents and files.

Even so, Smith seems to have been confident that the proper pattern of behaviour for an Emir was clear:

Under such arrangements Abbas could expect to retain his office and to exercise most of its traditional authority over the Native Administration of Kano as long as he maintained good relations with the Divisional Officer and Resident at Kano, and avoided such offences as extortion, judicial bribery, slave dealing, conspiracy or disloyalty that Lugard punished by deposition.¹²

Even if we were to ignore the climate of distrust that had been established by the British long before the actual occupation of Kano, it is just not true that Abbas had any such expectations—nor was he encouraged by the British to have them. There was not a single day of his reign when he could have been certain that he would not be ignominiously kicked out and exiled to some distant and foreign place. From the very first day, Lugard made it clear that his appointment was conditional and he was put on probation:

I declined to appoint the Wombai as emir until I had returned from Sokoto... judging this period of probation would not be without good effect, while for my own part I was unwilling to act with precipitation....Meanwhile he was left in charge of the town, but was not to occupy the king’s quarters until finally installed.¹³
In theory when he moved into the historic palace of the emirs of Kano he was confirmed in office, but in fact, he was constantly on tenterhooks and was always being threatened with deposition. Without security of tenure it would be very difficult for the emir to guarantee any very deep security in the emirate as a whole.

Abbas’ deep seated feeling of insecurity led him to make the long journey to Zungeru in 1904 just to see if the British really were serious about his being Emir. With regard to this trip Lugard wrote:

A wholly causeless tension appears to have arisen at Kano, rumours circulated among the troops that the emir of Kano was projecting an attack, while the Kano people asserted that the garrison itself was meditating a similar project. The efforts of the Resident and of the emir did not avail to allay this mutual distrust, which had probably been fomented by interested parties. The emir declared his intention of visiting me in person at Zungeru to prove his loyalty...he faced a heavy march of five hundred miles, though warned by all his most trusted advisers that he would never come back alive.\(^{14}\)

This journey has long been remember in Kano oral traditions as one of the remarkable points in its history, for in Rogo District the significant historical dates collected in 1973 by which the age of persons for the census could be computed was the “passing by of the Emir of Kano Abbas on his way to Zungeru.” (“Wucewar Sarkin Kano Abbas da za shi Dungurun” (i.e. Zungeru))(date)1904(age of person)69.)\(^{15}\) Surely the people must have thought that they would never see the emir again.

The threat of deposition was regular and apparently steady, but it increased at the time of the Satiru incident and the outbreak of hostilities in Hadejia in 1906. As a result of these troubles the ruling dynasty in Katsina was changed and a former confident of the D.O. Palmer, Dikko, was installed thus establishing a totally new ruling dynasty. In neighbouring Daura Palmer not only removed the emir and changed the ruling dynasty but reverted the Emirship to the pre-jihad Hausa ruling family. These drastic changes in Kano Province obviously threatened the emir of Kano, and there were concerns of trouble at Kazaure as well. Palmer was not contented with the drastic dynastic changes he had forced on
Katsina and Daura, but also had designs on Kano and even Sokoto. It has been pointed out that:

Besides Adamu Jakada (the spy mentioned above), at least one of the Arabists was also engaged in political intelligence. This was Muhammadu Aminu, a staunch adherent of the Kano ruler’s dynastic enemies and relatives the Tukurawa, many of whom were then in exile in Katsina emirate which fell under Palmer’s jurisdiction. Aminu was sent by Palmer on a confidential mission so that he could report on political developments at the Sultan’s court. His report, like Adamu Jakada’s on Kano, was disparaging."16

The dangers to Abbas position are obvious. The British at times thought of restoring the pre-jihad Hausa ruling family (which had living members in Maradi over the border in Niger), they also thought of restoring the pre-civil war Tukurawa family (which had living members over the border in Katsina), and they also thought of restoring the previous emir Aliyu (who was in detention in Lokoja). There is no doubt that the people of Kano would have welcomed Aliyu back in Kano. The fact that the British had restored Nagwamatse as the emir of Kontogora in 1903, even though he had once been denounced as a cruel slave raider and an evil man and taken to Lokoja in chains, made the threat of a returned exiled emir very possible. The Resident of Kano even suggested: “Some of our most noted raiders and despots of former times have, as a matter of fact, proved our most energetic and capable headmen.”17

These fears of removal were a constant throughout Abbas’ reign. In June 1911 the Emir went to Zaria to be present at a coronation durbar. One again it was reported that:

One of those numerous canards which it is hard to say from whence they arise, spread during the time Emir Kano was in Zaria, it was to the effect that he was being taken to Zaria to be deposed and Aleu brought back. I did not myself hear report until I reached Bebeji on my return journey, but I have since heard it was common gossip all over Province. On making enquiries I am informed that Emir himself paid no attention to it after the Durbar on 22”d. I merely repeat it as an example of how easily a canard can spread."18
Simply describing these rumours and fears as ridiculous was very disingenuous of the British. They not only threatened to remove acting emirs for very little reason, but they actually did it frequently and sometimes without any regard for the ruling dynasty. In fact they even killed the emir at Hadejia.

**Ignorance of Islam and the British Desire to “modernize it”**

Traditionally, much has been made in the school curriculum and in the standard texts of Lugard’s “promise” not to interfere with the religion of the people of the emirates–Islam. There never really was any such promise, and in any event it was all very carefully hedged with conditions so that it meant only what the occupying government power wanted it to mean. The conditions themselves were so insulting as to negate any real promise of tolerance much less of continuing with things as normal. The very idea that the word of Allah can be “inhuman” makes no sense to anyone who really understands and respects Islam. The British, as do most occupying forces, promised anything that they thought would be conducive to their longer term interests of control. They certainly did not mean to put any constraints on their rule beyond the constraints imposed by the conquered people themselves.

In most cases the British political officers had an extremely primitive and incorrect understanding of what Islam is. A quotation from one of Kano’s Residents illustrates this:

> The Native Court of Kano is as satisfactory as any primitive Mohammedan Court can be–‘Koranic’ law is practiced which to use Sir Frederick Lugard’s explanation to this term means that a Mohammedan law as practiced elsewhere in our thirteenth century is in vogue.¹⁹

The basic lack of respect for the religion of Islam by many colonial officers is clear. There are many instances which could be cited to prove this, but here the emphasis will be on the security implications of tax collection and on how the British misunderstanding of Islam led to a situation where the emir of Kano could not do the right thing. The whole basis of legitimacy for any emir of Kano is his adherence to orthodox Islam. If he is seen to deviate from this he cannot be accepted as a legitimate ruler. Equally, the British made it a firm policy that the tenure of
an emir was almost solely dependent on his ability to collect taxes as dictated by the British. The most obvious clash here was the issue of zakkat. The British saw this as simply one source of revenue for the state. Any good Muslim sees the payment of zakkat not as a civic responsibility but as a religious requirement. As such zakkat cannot be collected for or by non-Muslims, nor can the funds be designated for anything but pious works (assistance for the poor, the aid of pilgrims, the assistance of religion, etc.). The British insisted that they had a right to zakkat, and they wanted the grain that they collected as “zakkat” for the use of their horses which were being used for the conquest and occupation of the land.

As suggested in the quote from Festing above, many of these young British officers felt that they acting on their own, could update and “modernize” Islam, and we see many foolish attempts to do this. Temple wrote in 1909:

> With regard to the impossibility of connecting the rent (i.e. tax) for compounds with Zakkat, I see no reason why when this rent and the rent for farms have become proportioned to the area occupied, the two should not be calculated on the basis of 1/10th or 1/20th as the case may be, of the crops that can be produced on such areas, and it could then be strictly termed a Zakkat. I fear that I have dwelt at great length on this subject but I feel that such a reform is not only urgently required but that it would be a most popular move amongst the people.²⁰

What is even worse is that, apparently, piety is actually criminalized. The traditional authorities of necessity must have opposed the collection of anything called “zakkat” by the occupying non-Muslim forces, but they themselves were considered criminals for doing this. Temple concluded in fact that:

> The Zakka actually paid in as I have stated before, roughly 1/100th instead of 1/10th of the crop. I should think that probably an amount about equal to 1/2 of the amount paid in i.e. about £8,000 is embezzled.²¹

Who was doing this massive “embezzling”? The answer is obvious—the traditional authorities of the emirate. It should be clear that even after one paid his taxes to the occupying government one still had to pay zakkat on one’s earnings. If the government collected its “full share” of the zakkat, then this would not leave
sufficient for observant Muslims to satisfy their religious obligations. By being good Muslim leaders the rulers were thus necessarily defined by the British as criminals and embezzlers.

This continued. Festing several years later noted: “It has been calculated that the Government share of Zakka ‘dawa’ (guinea corn) is approximately the amount required for the year’s supply for Mounted infantry horses in the province. The ‘gero’ (millet) is however about three times this amount and more than suffices for the Transport requirements and for the reserve supply of the garrison.”

This lack of respect for and understanding of Islam posed a continuing problem for the traditional authorities, who were damned if they did and damned if they didn’t.

**Ambiguous Policies Toward Slavery and the British Abuse of the System**

The British also had many strange ideas about slavery, and they most often wanted to have their cake and eat it too. They wanted to use slave labour for their construction projects (the railway, rest houses, markets, etc.) but they wanted to pretend that it was ‘paid labour’. They were willing to have the traditional authorities still rely on slave labour on their farms, but they wanted to pretend that they were here to abolish slavery. The role of slave officials in the emirate was also a contradictory, and they even forced the emir Abbas to free a slave official of his (Dan Rimi Allah Bar Sarki, who had been captured in war against Ningi) and to promote him to the rank of Waziri, which necessitated the demotion of the emir’s eldest and favourite son, Abdullahi Bayero to the rank of Ciroma. This led to many real clashes on the streets, and finally the Waziri had to be demoted. It was later discovered that he had continued to wear his slave apparel under the garments of the Waziri, and so he was not shamed when stripped of his noble garments. This meant that he himself did not really accept his manumission although he had been willing to take advantage of it. He thus reverted to his previous position of Dan Rimi.
Professed British Respect for Tradition with Regular Contempt for its Praxis

Most of the developments discussed have demonstrated that the British more often than not gave lip service to their respect for the traditions of the people. Tradition was used as a reason for establishing ‘2Indirect Rule’ in the form they did, but in fact they used whatever traditions they found useful and discarded or altered those that they did not find conducive to their overall agenda.

One example has to do with the very concept of an “emirate”, which in the case of Kazaure they thought of disestablishing:

> Always a troublesome district....The troops were never called upon to coerce the people but a small show of force had a salutary effect upon them, and the place now shows signs of improvement. As has often been put forward, Kazaure having no history has no *raison d’etre* as a separate Emirate. The ruling house is not a royal one, being drawn from the Kano town of Dambata. The district could easily be merged into Kano, Katsena and Daura. 23

Another example is found in the same file where the contempt for the traditional government structure is obvious:

> The abolition of the Emir’s so-called council has formed so important a matter in the Division that I make special note of it here... 24

The arbitrary changes in the king makers’ council also did violence to the traditional constitution of Kano and these changes were to distort the succession when Abbas died. With the inclusion of the new Waziri (Gidado) into the King Makers’ Council, the council was given over to a stalemate, and the resident appointed the emir’s senior brother rather than his eldest son whom he had desired to succeed him.

**The Emir’s Death**

The lack of security of tenure for the Emir Abbas, and the lack of respect for the religion and institutions of the people, were all continuing problems. They continued right up to his death. His death has been reported in many works as sudden and as a result of a short illness. However, C.N. Ubah has actually included in his
work the rumours and stories of the palace about the death of the first emir appointed by the British. He stated:

He was one of the few emirs in the defunct Caliphate who escaped the disgrace of deposition. But in the end the emir met his death at the hands of a British political officer. The story is related how Abbas, summoned to the residency at Nassarawa, became involved in a bitter argument with the District Officer (D.O.) over the general state of the administration. Then at a certain stage the emir reportedly put his hand in a manner which made the D.O. imagine that he was trying to draw his sword from his robe to stab him. So to forestall him he quickly gave the emir a ferocious kick on the stomach with his boot. Abbas stumbled and fell and was carried away to his Nassarawa residence by members of the Kano nobility who had been looking hopelessly on. He died a few days later. This incident does not appear in any official record: the mid year report for 1919 which mentioned the emir’s death dimply states that he died ‘unexpectedly’ after a week’s illness.

The problems which the Emir saw and struggled against every day from his original appointment thus continued throughout his life, and finally he was undone by his very conquerors who claimed that they were supporting him on the throne.

Conclusion
The interests of an overseeing power will always be different than those of their agent, even if the agent is supposed to be an awesome emir. The breakdown of trust as illustrated by the use of spies, the lack of understanding as made clear in the British attempt to pervert Islamic taxation, the continued and regular threat of deposition, all constituted (as they can still do today) to a basically insecure situation. If an agent is to be used there must be trust and understanding, and the colonial situation was not conducive to that. Such dissonance between the over power and the lesser power can breed much danger.

The security of the state, the security of personal self interests, the security of a class, the security of a regime, the security of private property, the security of borders, the security of a particular succession, the security of peace and order, the security of revenue, the security of stores of wealth, the security of government property, and other kinds of security all conflict--and even more so with developments over time. “Security” therefore can, and
frequently does, conflict with change and therefore cannot be absolute. Nor indeed would everyone want us to be secure from change, although it may suit certain interests at a particular point in time.

Notes
2. NAK/SNP/7/472/1909; Kano Annual Report by Major A. Festing, for year ending 31 December 1908, parag. 52.
6. He gives his own sources as: “I got this story of Magaji from my interview with two colleagues of Abdu Tintim and Abdu Jarriga who lived in Mandawari Quarters in the city. They were Mallam Mai Holi, with whom the two Abdus joined the British service the same day at Zungeru, and Magaji Baban Abba, an ex-slave of Sarkin Kano Tukur. Abdu Jarriga died in 1960, four years before I got admitted to the university to start research and so I missed interviewing him personally. I lived with all of them in the same neighbourhood.” Muhammad Uba Adamu (Kantoma), (2003) Magaji Dan Yamusa: A Hero or A Villain? A Kano Perspective. Manuscript chapter submitted for a proposed book on the Centenary of the Death of Moloney in Keffi.
9. Ibid. paragraph 292.
12. Ibid. p.405.
15. Rogo District Office Files: a damaged mimeographed copy of a list of
historical dates presumed to be useful for determining peoples’ ages in the census of 1973. (Title page missing, but the events are followed by a column titled “Age as at 1973”). p.11–Rogo (Karaye).

21. Ibid. parag. 134.
22. NAK/SNP/7/472/1909; Kano Annual Report by Major Arthur Festing, for year ending 31st December 1908.parag. 54.
24. Ibid. parag. 28.

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4. NAK/SNP/3546/191 1 Kano Province Report Half Yearly June 1911 by Mr. G. Malcolm


6. Rogo District Office Files: a damaged mimeographed copy of a list of historical dates presumed to be useful for determining peoples’ ages in the census of 1973. (Title page missing, but the events are followed by a column titled “Age as at 1973”).
The N. A. Systems and Security in the Northern and Western Regions of Nigeria

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Introduction
This paper discusses the factors that influenced the emergence, development and role of the Native Authority/Local Government police forces in the two regions, from early colonial times until the advent of military rule.

Native Authority Police Forces, NAPFs, came into existence either through the adaptation of pre-colonial police organisations of the centralised emirate states of the North and those of the Yoruba and Edo kingdoms of the West or through creation in areas, especially the more acephalous communities of the North, where they had not existed before. Whatever the mode of their emergence, the British colonial administrators aimed to achieve the following objectives. One, they hoped to secure the loyalty of the native authorities. Two, they intended to build up the native administrations. Three, they hoped to keep down the cost of administration. A fourth objective but which was peculiar to the British administrators in the North was the desire to mediate in the alleged war of racial supremacy between the North and the South of Nigeria. The seriousness with which British administrators in the two areas pursued these objectives reflected their commitment to the native administration system of rule. This paper begins with a survey of the pre-colonial police organisations in the centralised states of the North and the West.

The Pre-Colonial Organisations
Among the numerous palace officials in the centralised emirate states of the North and the Yoruba and Edo kingdoms of the West were those who performed the role of police. In the northern emirates they were known as dogarai (s. dogari), but they had no common name in the kingdoms of the West. They were known variously as ilari (in Oyo), emese (in the Ife, Ijesa and Ekiti kingdoms) or aguren in Ijebu-ode. But they had the following
main features everywhere, North or West: (i) they were drawn from palace slaves; (ii) they were appointed by, and were responsible to, the kings; (iii) they had a political head who was a senior official of government and almost always an eunuch; (iv) they had a distinctive dress and/or hairstyle; (v) they combined the triple roles of bodyguard, messenger and executioner; and (vi) they also performed diplomatic and revenue-collecting functions.

Apart from their primary duty as bodyguards to the kings, these slave officials performed other police functions. Smith notes that the dogarai had the duty to ‘capture and discipline offenders, and to guard the town together with warders.’ A.M. Fika and C.N. Ubah in their studies on Kano delve into the multifarious duties of the dogarai in the state. They performed the important police duty of preventing crime or detecting, and bringing into judgement, the criminal after a crime had been committed. They also executed the commands of justice. As part of the judicial process, Fika notes that in civil matters the plaintiff went up to the court and lodged his complaint in company of official orderlies and messengers.

Once the complaint was brought before the Alkali (Muslim judge) and the grievance was formally outlined, a dogari would be directed to summon the respondent. If it was a criminal offence the accused was usually arrested by dogari and brought before the court in chains. In regard to the execution of the commands of justice, Ubah states that where punishment was by mutilation or death, the Sarkin dogarai supervised those who performed the duty. A condemned criminal was tied to a pole in the city market and his head was cut off with a sword by the hauni, a slave official under the Sarkin dogarai. Amputation of the limb was the work of the dan jawal, another slave official.

In the Yoruba kingdoms, the ilari, emese and agunren represented in the eyes of the populace the symbol of legitimate force. Like the emirate dogarai they apprehended and arrested criminals and executed the commands of justice. It is even said that the consent of the agunren was necessary to give the stamp of legitimacy to any Ijebu military campaign.

In both the emirates and the Yoruba kingdoms, these officials bore messages from the chiefly authorities in the headquarter towns to the districts. The Oyo ilari were often ordered by the Alaafin to escort an Oba or Baale-designate from a tributary town
who had gone up to Oyo to get the Alaafin’s approval. Such escort ilari also witnessed the local installation ceremonies.\textsuperscript{7} The ilari were not only the messengers of the Alaafin to the world outside the palace, they were also the collectors of taxes at the city gates.\textsuperscript{8} Law gives specific examples of the role of the ilari as emissaries of the Alaafin outside Oyo kingdom to the Ijebu, Egba and Dahomey territories either to collect tribute or to make peace.\textsuperscript{9}

Fika and Ubah give elaborate descriptions of the processes of assessing, collecting and transmitting tax dues from the districts to the emirate headquarters.\textsuperscript{10} It is quite probable that the dogarai helped in the process by accompanying the official tax collectors known as jakadu of both the Emir and the hakimai, that is fief-holding free-born palace officials who before colonial rule resided in the capital. The dogarai would have, in that capacity provided the necessary security to the men and given the force of legitimacy to their task. They were also involved in regulating the economy, particularly in the markets where they kept the peace, collected tolls and controlled the traffic.

The foregoing survey of pre-colonial palace organisations that performed police duties in the emirates of the North and the Yoruba kingdoms of the West is intended to show that there was a basis for the later decision of the colonial administrators to allow the native authorities in those areas to own police forces. In the next few paragraphs, the process by which members of these pre-colonial organisations became stipendiary officials of the native administrations set up by the British will be considered. It needs to be emphasised that members of these pre-colonial palace organisations were more of personal servants of the chiefly authorities than agents of the community. They played a key role in enhancing and upholding the authority of their employers. They were more of a political than a social organisation. This image was perpetuated in the colonial and post-colonial periods.

\textbf{The Emergence of NAPFs in Western Nigeria}

The first NAPF in Nigeria was created in Abeokuta in 1905; so developments in the West will be considered first.

What was initially known as the “Egba Police” was established in 1905 by an Order-in-Council of the Egba United Government (EUG) passed on 27 July 1905.\textsuperscript{11} Ajisafe records that
the idea of a regular police force first occurred to the Egba administrators in 1900; it arose from a serious menace by robbers, especially at night. As an interim measure, a ‘force’ consisting of members of the Ode (the hunters’ society) was engaged to serve as night guards with power to arrest or shoot the robbers. The measure, which proved effective, must have impressed it on the Egba government the importance of having a regular police force that would be distinct from the hunters’ guild. The force would be specifically assigned to maintain the peace, guarantee the security of life and property of the citizens at all times, and apprehend those who violated governmental directives. In nearby Lagos, the Government had bodies of men, for example, the Rural Police and the V.R. Constables which could be likened to what the Egba authorities were thinking of.

The proposal for a regular EUG police force was first put forward in March 1903 by the Alake and council during a visit by Governor MacGregor. The Governor showed some interest in the proposal but its implementation could not be immediately embarked upon. In 1905 the force was eventually established. The ‘force’ of night guards, which had been constituted from the hunters’ guild from 1900, was replaced by a regular police force of forty men and four officers under an Inspector of Police. The first holder of the post was one J.T. George. He was dismissed from office sometime in 1909 over what appears to be his insubordination to the powerful EUG Secretary, Adegboyega Edun. He was replaced in 1910 by a European officer of the Lagos Government police who was seconded for service with the EUG.

It is significant to note that the decision to engage a European officer as head of the Egba Police was not the popular wish of members of the council. Some councillors feared that the employment of a European head of police would simply mean a greater involvement of the Lagos Government in the administration of the EUG, but as they were not inclined to oppose the Alake in the matter, they allowed his wish to prevail.

When eventually the ‘independent’ Egba state was incorporated into the Southern Nigerian administration as a native administration from 1914 the Egba Police continued in existence under the new nomenclature of Egba Native Administration Police
Force with the seconded European Government police officer from Lagos still at the head of it.

The establishment of NAPFs in the rest of Western Nigeria before 1916 cannot be as definitively traced as in the case of Abeokuta but it is possible to reconstruct the process by which the colonialists might have adapted the pre-colonial police organisations to suit their general scheme of governance. Here, Atanda’s study of the establishment of colonial rule in what emerged (from January 1914) as the Oyo province is of much value.

In his attempt to justify the claim that the British administrators in Lagos practised indirect rule in Yorubaland, Atanda goes into some details about the efforts of Governors McCallum and MacGregor to associate the chiefly authorities in Ibadan, Oyo, Ife, Ila, Ilesa and Ekiti kingdoms with the process of governance. McCallum established the first two native councils in Ibadan in 1897 and Oyo in 1898. A third council was created for the Ilesa and Ekiti areas (known as the North-Eastern District) in February 1900. All the councils had European Residents as their Presidents, a phenomenon that was quite displeasing to the chiefs.

Sir William MacGregor who succeeded McCallum as Governor in 1900 was determined to carry the process further. His package of reforms was embodied in the Native Councils Ordinance of 1901 devised to enhance the prestige and authority of the chiefs for the purpose of administrative efficiency. Under the ordinance which provided for provincial, district and village councils, European officials were no longer to preside over council meetings. The paramount chief of the province or district was the President; the British officer in the province or district was only to assist the council by giving advice.

Incidentally, the best known of those early councils, that is, the Ibadan council, is also the one whose police developments and influence could be best reconstructed. As will be shown later in this paper, the Ibadan NAPF provided the model for reforming NAPFs in other parts of Oyo province while the Oyo Provincial Force, in turn, provided the model that was adopted in the Western Region from the mid-1950s.

Right from the time it was established, the Ibadan council had had among its functions the maintenance of law and order. It also
made rules on a wide range of subjects which included the administration of justice, road making, trade, agriculture and sanitation. In the outlying districts of Ibadan, whose administration the council delegated to the most senior Ibadan chiefs, police duties which included the general maintenance of law and order, the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals were the responsibility of men of the Akoda force. The indications are that this was a pre-colonial organisation composed of men who put themselves at the service of the Baale and senior chiefs as bodyguards and messengers between the chiefs and their tributary towns and villages. They were adapted to the colonial order and it seems appropriate here to quote from an annual report on Ibadan division (some years distant from the period under consideration here) to show the historicity and continuity in their organisation, control and role. It was stated that:

The Akoda (a sword bearer) force is composed of 178 men with one senior Head Akoda (Olori Akoda) and 14 Oga Akodas and 163 men... These Akodas are directly under the orders of the Bale and Chiefs and District Heads and are used for calling in people to the courts and for delivering orders in connection with tribute and the general administration of the division.' (Both parenthetical translations are in the original).

Apart from the Akoda force, a regular police force modelled on the lines of the Egba Police was raised by the Ibadan council in 1906; it was called the iranse force and especially instituted to police ‘the vast city of Ibadan’. The probable influence of Governor MacGregor who had been consulted in the course of raising the Egba Police cannot be ruled out. There is evidence to show that the Ibadan iranse force secured the services of a European Government police officer from 1907 till 1914. The Ibadan council thus had two kinds of forces before 1914: the Akoda and the iranse.

In 1916, the first local government law with national application was enacted; it was the Native Authority Ordinance No. 14 of 1916. This law gave legal teeth to Lugard’s efforts to extend to the Southern Provinces the native administration system that he had fashioned for the Northern emirates.
The recognised native authorities had the primary duty of maintaining law and order, and were also empowered to issue legal orders on a wide schedule of matters bearing on the welfare of the community. Subject to the sanction of the Governor, the native authority could also make rules for the good order and welfare of the persons within the area of its authority, and penalties were stipulated under the law for any breach of such rules and orders. To maintain law and order, the ordinance provided for the employment by the native authorities of ‘any person’ to serve as a policeman.

In the West, the provisions of this ordinance gave legal backing to the activities of organisations like the Akoda doing police duties. But as time went on, and depending on the character of the British Resident in charge of a province, or the District Officer in charge of a division, the Akoda gradually lost the police aspect of their duties as regular NAPFs were raised.

The establishment of NAPFs in Western Nigeria may be associated with the attempts by the colonial administrators in the area to practise the native administration system of rule. It was expedient to allow the chiefly authorities who were associated with governance to continue to use those who had served as police in pre-colonial times. As the native administration system became more systematised, especially after 1916, efforts were made to smarten up the police organisations. But as the discussion which follows in the next few paragraphs will reveal, the establishment of NAPFs in Northern Nigeria was more intimately connected with the propagation of the policy of rule through the native administration system.

The NAPFs in Northern Nigeria up to 1924
At the inception of British rule in Northern Nigeria, Sir Frederick D. Lugard who was the head of the administration decided to adapt the political system that was in existence in the emirates to suit colonial exigencies. The Lugardian doctrine of native administration was founded on the notion that there existed a strong, rather autocratic, Emir or chief whose authority the government could officially recognise and to whom it could delegate some responsibility. Under this arrangement the Emir would be subordinate to the British administrative officer but in
appearance would be made to look like the actual ruler of his subjects.

When Lugard left Nigeria in 1906 the mantle of leadership in Northern Nigeria fell on Percy Girouard. Under his administration there began a shift in emphasis from the administrative principle of ‘rule through native chiefs’ to one of ‘rule through native chiefs on native lines’. This policy shift meant a growing tendency to shield the Emirs and chiefs from all outside influences apart from those of the Resident or the DO. Even the Governor of the Protectorate was surreptitiously denied access to the native authorities and was made to rely on the judgement of the Residents. This administrative coup d’etat was pulled through during the governorships of Percy Girouard (1907-9) and Hesket Bell (1909-12) by senior Residents like Charles Temple, John Burdon and Charles Orr who had active junior collaborators like Herbert Richmond Palmer and Hanns Vischer.

The shift in administrative policy that sought to create the Northern native administrations into near-autonomous entities did not seem to have bothered Lugard much when he again had responsibility for governing the whole of Nigeria between 1912 and 1919; after all the administrators there were his ‘boys’. But his successors, beginning with Sir Hugh Clifford (1919-24), were not as tolerant of the Northern administrators’ separatist tendencies and their little faith in the 1914 political amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates.

It is within the foregoing political context that the formulation of a policing policy for the North can be analysed. The measures adopted before 1925 were aimed at achieving four objectives: one, securing the doubtful loyalty of the Emirs and Chiefs; two, building up the native administrations; three, keeping down the costs of administration; and four, mediating on the side of the Hausa-Fulani in the alleged war of racial supremacy between the North and the South. After 1925, the measures taken were intertwined with the active resistance to the centralising tendencies of the central government at Lagos, which in essence would involve the heads of technical departments in Lagos or their assistants at the groups of provinces’ levels in native administration matters. In the case of the police, the measures
resulted in the marginalisation of the Government Police in the North.

Tamuno has discussed the process of raising a civil Government Police Force in Northern Nigeria between 1900 and 1906 and the re-organisation of the force between 1907 and 1913, which was intended to demilitarise the force.²⁸ He remarks that it was in the course of the re-organisation under Governor Percy Girouard that the indigenous police organisation in the emirates, the dogarai gained recognition as a unit of administration. But there is more to the emergence of the dogarai as a unit of native administration than Tamuno has explained.²⁹

At the point of British contact, the dogarai did not receive immediate official recognition as a unit of administration, though they were not prevented from performing their duties as earlier enumerated. They were not recognised probably because of the initial British attitude to the institution of slavery. Slave offices were among those the British had sworn not to recognise officially. Before a slave could be allowed to hold a public office he must first be emancipated.³⁰ This policy explains why Lugard stated that at the time of his first compilation of the Political Memoranda the dogarai and olopa/irense had not emerged on the scene.³¹

The dogarai did not, however, have long to wait to win recognition. They obtained it in 1907, following a spirited campaign by administrative officers in the Kano province with H.R. Palmer giving the most forceful voice. Palmer had joined the administrative service of Northern Nigeria in October 1904 and his first posting was to Katsina (then grouped within Kano province) as an Assistant Resident.

When a civil Government Police Force, was raised for the North in the first decade of this century, most of the members were not Hausa-Fulani.³² Available statistics show that in 1908, the force was made up of 240 Hausa, 216 Yoruba, 102 Beriberi, 53 Fulani, 25 Nupe and 54 others whose ethnicity was unrecorded.³³ By a simple arithmetical calculation, the force comprised 293 Hausa-Fulani against 397 members of other ethnic groups. It is not unlikely that most of the Hausa-Fulani elements were not deployed to serve in the emirates, a practice that was not incompatible with colonial policy at the time of ‘strangers policing strangers’.³⁴
The presence of this predominantly alien force in the emirates did not seem to have gone down well with the British administrators, if the views of Palmer and his colleagues in Kano province are considered. In the annual report for 1907 on the province, the provincial Resident, Dr. F. Cargill, reported on the conduct of the Government Police quoting approvingly from the comments of both the Kano divisional Resident, Major A Festing, and the Katsina divisional Assistant Resident, H.R. Palmer. Palmer had complained that he was ‘averse’ to using these policemen on tour and that he ‘deprecated’ their use for arrests. He contended that the sight of a man in uniform armed with a rifle caused ‘too much terror and alarm’ for villagers to distinguish between police and soldiers. He advocated the use of ‘men in native dress with some distinctive badge, armed with bludgeons’. He called for the abolition of the Government Police Force; according to him, ‘the disbandment of the Police in this Province will cause no difficulty. Their duties can easily be undertaken by the District headmen’. Palmer’s counterpart in Kano division accused the policemen of having ‘a tendency ... to extort by endeavouring to buy (goods at) less than the market price.

The indications are that the clamour for their disbandment had been on before 1907. But it was in that year that Lugard’s successor as Governor, Sir Percy Girouard, decided on a re-organisation of the police system. There are three discernible reasons for the re-organisation. One, it was intended to remove the predominantly alien Government Police from the emirates, especially those of the northerly provinces of Kano, Sokoto, Zaria and Borno. Two, it was thus intended to secure the loyalty of the Emirs by permitting them the use of their indigenous dogarai as police. This was very much in line with the administrative policy shift from ‘rule through native chiefs’ to one of ‘rule through native chiefs on native lines’ inaugurated by Girouard. Three, it would be cheaper to use the dogarai than the Government Police. In 1908, a wider implementation of the re-organisation was effected. The annual report on the entire protectorate for 1909 further supports the three arguments. It was stated, inter alia, that:

...The policy of ruling indirectly through the Native Emirs and Chiefs, which is liable to be subverted when an executive in the pay of the
Government is employed, is strengthened by the use of ‘dogarai’, and the prestige, and hence efficiency, of the Native Administration is increased. This system has, furthermore, the advantage of being a very economical one. (emphasis added).

Under the re-organisation, it was only from the emirates of the northerly provinces that the Government Police were withdrawn. Those so withdrawn were sent to the southerly provinces which comprised the largely acephalous communities of the Niger-Benue confluence where the government was still actively engaged in ‘pacification’ raids.

When in later years it became apparent that the central government at Lagos had no intention of withdrawing the Government Police from the emirates, however minimal their presence might be, the Northern administrators continued their fight for their marginalisation by other means.

In 1919, Sir Hugh Clifford succeeded Lugard as Governor of Nigeria. He had the ambition to make more real the amalgamation of 1914. His radicalism was reflected in a re-organisation of the technical departments which implied a much greater degree of centralisation than had been possible under Lugard. This aroused great suspicions in the Northern administrators. To check their restiveness, he had cleverly forced the flag bearer of the Northern native administration system at the time, H. S. Goldsmith into retirement before his scheme of administrative re-organisation came into force in 1921. In his place, he had appointed W.F. Gowers, also a Northerner but one who was not inclined to oppose the man whom he perceived as his benefactor having been responsible for his promotion to the high office of Lieutenant-Governor.

But before Goldsmith left office (he was Lieutenant-Governor between 1917 and 1921) he had participated in the controversy about how to police Northern Nigeria. He saw to the fashioning in 1919 of what may be called a ‘code’ to govern the relationship between the Government and the Native Administration policemen. He found a willing collaborator in the Acting Inspector-General of the Government Police Force (North), Capt. A.G. Uniacke who took office that year. The significance of the ‘code’ lies in the fact that it foreshadowed the relationship between the two kinds of force and events in later years hark back to it.
The policy was circularised in a government memorandum to all Residents under the title ‘Cooperation between Dogarai and Government Police’.

The IGP began by stating that he was not in favour of placing NA police in a township under ‘the entire control of a Police Officer’ because it would ‘undermine ... the authority of the District Officer and Native Administration’.

He made six suggestions all of which, in sum, amounted to subordinating the Government policeman to these three people in sequence: the dogarai, the Government policeman’s own superior officer and the District Officer whenever the issue was of a local interest.

Herbert Richmond Palmer assumed office as substantive Lieutenant-Governor of Northern Nigeria in 1925. Palmer and his subordinates decided not only to build up the NA police in the emirates but also to extend its network in the southerly provinces. They began the re-organisation in 1925. Having convinced themselves of the soundness of their policing policy for the emirates, the administrative officers tried to extend it to cover the rest of the protectorate. The problems associated with extending the NA police idea beyond the emirates to the southerly provinces of the North (for all of the years of the existence of the forces) have been comprehensively discussed elsewhere. It will just be noted here that the idea did not have a good soil on which to grow.

The administrative and organisational changes in the North and the West which were intended to enhance the credibility, and boost the efficiency, of members of the NAPFs in the years from 1925 form the focus of the next section.

Reforms and Re-organisation, 1925-1951

Involving Noblemen in the Job for Commoners in the North

This sub-heading is adopted to underscore a significant move by the colonial authorities in the late 1920s in the North that changed the face of policing in much of that territory. It is the involvement of members of the noble class in the job of policing, a function that had been exclusively the lot of commoners. Under the princely-liaison officer scheme, inaugurated in 1928, members of the royal family in the emirates were encouraged to serve either as uniformed heads of the NA police forces or as councillors-in-charge of police.
The re-organisation of the dogarai began in 1925 with Kano as the experimental base. The development was coterminous with the ascendancy of H.R. Palmer to the exalted position of Lieutenant-Governor and the accession of Abdullahi Bayero to the throne of Emir of Kano.\textsuperscript{46} Under the general administrative reform of the Kano emirate in 1924-26, a significant feature was the creation of departments headed by councillors. The Galadiman Kano was the political head of the police department.\textsuperscript{47} The re-organisation of the Kano dogarai resulted in the birth of the ‘Yan Gadi or Kano City Police Force’ with an initial total strength of 151 men comprising ‘a Sarkin Yan Gadi, a second in command, five non-commissioned officers, and 144 rank and file.\textsuperscript{48} But this did not mean an end to the use of the dogarai as police within the Kano emirate for a dogarai force consisting of 100 men was still permitted for the use of the Emir in the districts.\textsuperscript{49} The re-organisation was intended to boost the bearing and efficiency of the NA police.

After two years of the Yan Gadi in Kano, the Palmer administration decided to take the reform beyond Kano. A memorandum addressed to all Residents conveyed the government’s desire to improve the efficiency of the NA police. To that end, it intended to eliminate unsatisfactory personnel, induce the best type of man to join, provide training and ensure improved organisation and control. The government was ready to use blackmail for it warned that the time was fast approaching when ‘either the Emirs must improve the quality and standard of their police work or they will have to accept Government Police.’\textsuperscript{50} At the 1928 Residents’ Conference,\textsuperscript{51} Palmer went to great lengths to impress it upon his subordinates the necessity for a reformed NA police. It would enhance efficiency and credibility. In the latter regard, he suggested the appointment of a member of the royal family in each emirate to be ‘at least the nominal head of the police.\textsuperscript{52} This was the princely liaison officer scheme. It would enhance the prestige of the force and encourage a spirit of loyalty to the Emir or head of the native administration in the event of any serious crisis or trouble. But beyond the issue of credibility, this scheme was part of a larger, long-canvassed, campaign by Palmer to exclude the Government Police from the emirates. If the scheme worked, he would be able to hold the NAPF up as a better option
to the Government Police Force. In a progress report to Lagos sometime after the meeting, the administration laid great stress on the scheme and its immediate gains, top of which was ‘the changed mental outlook which admits of such men undertaking duties which but a few years ago would have been considered much below their dignity.’

By 1929 the scheme had been functioning in the Kano, Sokoto, Zaria, and Katsina native administrations. Tamuno has provided a list of the first set of liaison officers. They include Bunu, the son of the Sultan of Sokoto (1928); Abdu, Sardauna, a younger brother of the Sultan (1929), who was replaced in 1930 by another brother of the Sultan, Abdu Jatau; Mallam Sadu, a brother of the Emir of Gwandu (1930), who replaced Mallam Iliasu, a brother of the same Emir (1929); Usman Nagogo, a son of the Emir of Katsina (1929); Abubakar, a nephew of the Sultan of Sokoto (1931); Muhammad Lawal, a son of the Emir of Zaria (1929-37); Bello, the eldest son of a former Emir of Gwandu (1938); Mallam Faruku, son of the Emir of Kano (1937-39); and the Lamido’s son in Adamawa (1945). Some of these children of the royalty were appointed administrative heads of the forces while some, like Usman Nagogo in Katsina, Muhammad Lawal in Zaria and Aliyu Musdapha in Yola actually commanded their forces. Nagogo was Chief of Police, Katsina NAPF until he became Emir in 1944; and Aliyu commanded the Adamawa NA police from 1945 to 1953 when he ascended the throne as the Lamido. The Lamido celebrated his fiftieth year on the throne in July 2003.

One of the first liaison officers in Sokoto, Abubakar, who was appointed in 1931 became Sultan in 1938 and reigned for 50 years. He commented on the position in a later biographical account. Shortly after the accession of Hassan, his uncle to the post of Sultan in 1931, he made Abubakar the Sardauna, a councillor of the Sokoto native authority. In that position, he was responsible for the police, dogarai and prisons. He had to accompany ‘the District Officer on all visits of inspection to the Police and Prison and in the company of the District Officer, pay occasional visits to Police posts at night.’ He was responsible for the staff of the police and prison departments and served as the liaison between them and the native authority council. The Chief of Police (Sarkin Yan Doka) who was responsible for the discipline of the police and the
allocation of their duties was answerable to him. The posting of policemen to the districts and the selection of new recruits were handled by the Sardauna. Abubakar (as Sultan) further remarked that:

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\text{Sultan Hassan transferred me from Dange [where he had been District Scribe] and made me Sardauna. I was the most important of his advisors as far as local government was concerned. As for Sokoto itself, I looked after all centres of activity, the prison, the workshop, veterinary centre, forestry section and the local authority dogarai (police). I even went to Kaduna for formal police training so that I could liaise with the police more efficiently. (Emphasis added).}^{58}
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In 1938, following the death of Sultan Hassan, Abubakar was appointed Sultan and he reigned for fifty years, dying on 1 November 1988.

There is evidence that some administrative officers in Western Nigeria who later learnt of the scheme tried to interest the local potentates in whose areas they worked but to no avail. One such case was in Abeokuta province where the Resident failed to persuade the Alake of Abeokuta to enlist one of his sons in the Egba NAPF in the 1930s.\(^{59}\)

A committee was set up at the 1928 conference to look into the issue of the training of the re-organised police. It was the committee that raised the question of a nomenclature for the re-organised force. It did this probably thinking that a new name could help obscure the slave connections of policing in pre-colonial times and thus attract more freeborns. It suggested an Egyptian name ‘Ghafir’.\(^{60}\) The government later responded with the title \textit{yan doka} (s. \textit{dan doka}).\(^{61}\) This title was intended for general application ‘except in Borno province where the term \textit{Zubat} should be stabilised.\(^{62}\) There is no evidence that the Kanuri adopted this title: they preferred the term \textit{harisin}\(^{63}\) which was their indigenous name for police which appeared in the records until the 1940s when the term \textit{yan doka} began to occur more frequently in documents originating from Maiduguri.

The year 1930 was significant for the history of policing in Nigeria. That was the year in which the separate Government Police Forces of Southern and Northern Nigeria were amalgamated.\(^{64}\) This was not without considerable opposition from
some administrative officers in the North, led by the Lieutenant-Governor, H.R. Palmer. Jeremy White’s plausible argument is that the Northern administrative officers feared that they might lose their grip on the administrative machine if they had to share their powers with the departmental heads based in Lagos. Palmer, and many of his successors in that post, in league with their long-serving subordinate Residents, were however determined to marginalise the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) especially in the emirates.

Meanwhile, a re-organisation scheme in one of the provinces in Western Nigeria deserves some scrutiny because of its significant immediate and long-term effects.

**The Police Provincialisation Scheme in Oyo Province, 1935-1938**

The provincialisation of NAPFs in Oyo province between 1935 and 1938 provided a model that was copied, with various results, between 1944 and 1955. It also set the pattern for the control that could be exercised by the native authorities. That pattern foreshadowed future management style in the decolonisation and post-independence eras in Western Nigeria.

The discussion here may be set against the background of the politics of administration in the province between the closing years of the 19th century and 1934. Atanda has exhaustively examined the issues involved. The summary of it all is that during that period, the locus of power oscillated between Ibadan, a creation of the Yoruba wars of the 19th century, and Oyo, the capital of a kingdom with a longer history.

Before the residency of Capt. W.A. Ross, Ibadan was the seat of the provincial administration. But when he took office in 1914 he desired to create an emirate-type native administration in the area. Not only did he move the administrative capital from Ibadan to Oyo he also struggled hard to raise the Alaafin of Oyo to the position of a paramount ruler of the whole province. His administrative style caused much disquiet in Ibadan and Ile-Ife. When he left office in 1931 his immediate successor, H.L. Ward-Price set out to assuage feelings by reversing some of Ross’ actions at great cost to his career but not until he had undermined the Alaafin’s influence as conferred by Ross.
While the Ross regime lasted, only the Ibadan NA had made much progress in the development of its NAPF which had been created in 1906. The other native administrations in Ife, Ilesa, Ila and Oyo had Akoda forces. The Ibadan NAPF had at its head in 1924 an Inspector, assisted by 23 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and 95 men.\(^7^0\) The existence in Ibadan of this regular police force had made it possible for the British administrative officers to spot weaknesses in the organisation and discipline of the Akoda forces in the rest of the province. With time, the administrative officers began to resent the police role of members of the Akoda forces because they were, strictly speaking, not policemen.

It was part of the general administrative reform of the post-Ross era that the Provincial Police Force scheme was executed between 1935 and 1938. It was, however, not without protests from Oyo which interpreted it all to mean a subordination of its native administration to that of Ibadan; and Ife which saw in it a replacement of Oyo hegemony with that of Ibadan.

In 1935, the first steps were taken to develop proper police forces, along the lines of the Ibadan NAPF, from the Akoda forces of the other native administrations in the Oyo and Ife-Ilesha divisions. The Ibadan Akoda force which served as police in the districts outside of Ibadan was the first to be affected by the re-organisation process through the absorption of those among the Akoda who were found suitable into the Ibadan NAPF.\(^7^1\) With this development, policemen became distinguished from Akoda who were left to carry on as couriers and bailiffs to the native courts.

By 1936, administrative officers in Oyo and Ife-Ilesha divisions had begun a similar absorption of suitable men from the Akoda forces into the police forces. The nuclei of these forces were created with five men each in Ife and Ilesa and seventeen in Oyo in that year.\(^7^2\) The newly recruited policemen were sent to Ibadan for training, which included drill and lectures on the duties of a policeman by officers of the NPF.

With the separation of the police from the akodu the stage was set for the provincialisation of the forces. The brains behind the scheme were the administrative officers of the Ibadan division. They had hoped that the scheme would guarantee greater efficiency and yield economy of management. There would be a
better coordination of the activities of policemen in the province as there would be a central coordinating body based in Ibadan, the administrative headquarters of the province since 1934.\textsuperscript{73}

It was this element of central control which delayed the early implementation of the scheme. The Alaafin of Oyo and the Ooni of Ife read political meaning into the scheme. The idea of having the headquarters of the provincial force in Ibadan amounted to subordinating their native administrations to that of Ibadan.\textsuperscript{74} Furthermore, stranger elements from Ibadan would be posted to their domains, men whose loyalty and integrity they could not vouch for.

In 1937, a former DO in Ibadan was posted to Oyo. While in Ibadan, this officer had shown much enthusiasm for the scheme. He was therefore able to trick the Alaafin into believing that the principle of interchangeability which the latter dreaded was all to the advantage of the men of his NAPF. They would be sent for training in Ibadan while some trained ones in Ibadan would relieve them. The Alaafin bought the argument.\textsuperscript{75}

That left the Ife Native Authority as the remaining obstacle. The Ooni was later blackmailed into supporting the scheme when the Ife native administration could not provide uniforms for its policemen. It appealed to the Ibadan native administration for assistance. The request was disclosed to the Resident who saw in it an opportunity to hamstring the Ooni into supporting the scheme.\textsuperscript{76} By March 1938, the Ife and Ilesa native authorities had accepted the scheme.\textsuperscript{77}

As if to pre-empt a change of mind by these native authorities the acting Resident wrote to the head of the NPF (he was designated Commissioner of Police then) to solicit NPF assistance in the setting up and supervision of the proposed force.\textsuperscript{78} The reply from the CP, NPF, poured cold water on the Resident’s \textit{élan}. He pleaded that the shortage of manpower in the NPF made it difficult for him to help immediately.\textsuperscript{79} Nothing daunted the Resident wrote to the Secretary, Southern Provinces (SSP), Enugu, to seek government’s approval for the scheme scheduled to take off on 1 April 1938.\textsuperscript{80} This was promptly given.\textsuperscript{81}

This scheme which meant that in the place of a multitude of forces only one would exist in the province with detachments posted to the various native administration areas had grave
implications for control by the native authorities. It wrested control from the native authorities, and gave it first to the administrative officers and later to NPF officers. The native authorities did decry this divestiture of control but their protests availed little, if anything.

The Oyo scheme was not without admiration outside of Western Nigeria. Barely a year after its inauguration, the Resident of the Niger province of Northern Nigeria touted the idea of it to his subordinates. He argued that it would make for economy as he had been told was the case in Oyo province. Also, the interchange of NA police on promotion would make for much increased efficiency. Thirdly, it would make for easier administration.

The Resident received no encouragement from any of the DOs. In the opinion of one, it was unwise and contrary to policy to adopt for use in a Northern province a scheme that had been designed for use outside of the territory. That the seed of such a scheme would find no good soil in which to grow in the North at the time is underscored by the discussions on NA police uniforms at the 1946 (Northern) Chiefs’ Conference at which the Alaafin of Oyo and the Awujale of Ijebu-Ode from the West were guests. The Emir of Kontagora had suggested that NA police uniforms be standardised in the whole territory. This he hoped would make them look smarter and more readily identifiable everywhere. Most of his colleagues were however opposed to the idea. It was therefore resolved that the pattern and colour of uniform to be worn by NA police and warders was a question which each native authority should decide for itself. Uniformity was not essential.

In 1948, an NA Police Conference was held in Makurdi to discuss the affairs of the forces in Benue province. The suggestion was made by the DO of Lafia that NA policemen should be moved around the divisions so that the constraints that family and vested interests imposed on their performance could be checked. But he had no supporter and it was eventually resolved that inter-divisional transfers would not be acceptable to native authorities, and that the difficulties of local prejudice would make the suggestion impossible of adoption or implementation.
Relevant to the issues of reform and re-organisation is training; so, the attempts to provide formal training in both the North and the West will be examined in the next few paragraphs.

The Provision of Training
The need to improve the efficiency of the policemen through training was felt in the North and West and efforts were made towards achieving this goal. Before 1929, NA policemen in both the North and the West were instructed in drill and other aspects of police duties by administrative officers and Government Police officers. The assistance of the Government Police was, however, less sought in the North because of the initial efforts of administrative officers to keep the forces apart. Until the commencement of formal school training at the Police Training School (PTS), Enugu in 1940 men of the Western Nigerian NAPFs had to rely on the convenience of the NPF and administrative officers in charge of the forces for training. There was a fair leavening of these forces by ex-soldiers and reservists who took care of parades and drills.

In the North, however, formal school training for serving members of the NAPFs began at the Police Training Depot (PTD), Kaduna in January 1929. It was resolved that for the moment the facilities were to be enjoyed by NAPFs of ‘the more important native administrations’. For ‘the less developed organisations in the less advanced native administrations’ the Government Police department should be approached for any assistance it could render locally. The medium of instruction at the training school was Hausa, a policy that put the NAPFs of many of the non-Hausa speaking areas at great disadvantage.

At the Residents’ Conference in 1937, the government took a sober look at the training programme in Kaduna vis-à-vis the quality of the products. It admitted to some inadequacies and lamented that its hopes were yet to be realised. But the problem really was with the quality of men sent for training in Kaduna. The majority had had no formal western education to prepare them for the kind of instruction that they were being offered at the depot. So the government’s long neglect of the educational needs of its subjects in the emirates was a major part of the problem. The products of the few schools that were available found ready
employment in the administrative service of the native administrations or with the multinational trading concerns. The government could not, as at 1938, contemplate setting minimum educational standards for recruits as was being done in the case of the Oyo Provincial NAPF in Western Nigeria where the Standard VI certificate was the minimum educational standard required.

Two years after NA policemen had begun training at the PTD, Kaduna, the IGP, NPF, mooted the idea of it for the forces in the South. He had proposed that candidates from forces in the Abeokuta, Ijebu-Ode, Oyo and Ondo provinces would train at the Lagos depot while those from other provinces would train at the Enugu depot. But since the Enugu depot had yet to be established, all candidates would train in Lagos. Two courses of three months’ duration would be held from 1 January and 1 June respectively. Each course would comprise not less than 10 and not more than 20 men.

The syllabus would cover ‘(a) foot drill; (b) the elements which constitute various crimes; (c) the principal provisions of the more important Ordinances with which officers are likely to be required to deal; (d) the duties of a constable on beat, fixed point patrol; (e) the method of making arrests with or without warrants etc.; (f) the control of motor traffic; (g) the taking of statements and interrogation of witnesses; (h) the treatment and handling of prisoners and their property; and (i) the keeping of Police Station records etc. A few of the laws that were enforceable by NA policemen were listed with the remark that it was not considered necessary that the policemen should have more than ‘a very superficial knowledge of some of these ordinances as they are of too technical a nature to permit of this...’ The memorandum was subsequently forwarded to Residents for their comments by the government.

The summary of the reactions from the Residents was that the scheme was too grandiose and sophisticated for the simple minds of the NA policemen. It was noted that a study of the elaborate syllabus proposed confirmed the Lieutenant-Governor’s view that the result of the suggested courses of training would be prejudicial to the whole policy of Native Administration’ because the NA policemen would ‘become entirely alienated from their chiefs and people.
But the opposition to the scheme might also have stemmed from the fact that the Southern administrators did not wish to be seen to be borrowing ideas from their Northern colleagues. In the ruling on the matter, the Secretary, Southern Provinces noted that:

His Honour is aware that it is proposed to hold courses of training for police of the Northern Provinces Native Administrations in Kaduna but it must be remembered that the political atmosphere in Kaduna differs considerably from that of Lagos.93

The course was not just being proposed in Kaduna at the time; it was already on! The tone of the further comment of the Resident of Oyo on the foregoing government’s ruling suggests a snobbery of whatever advancements the Northern Provinces’ government might be making in NA police development. He said,

…I have no further comments to add beyond remarking that in 1906 the Ibadan Native Administration took the steps which were taken in Kano in 1925 and replaced the old irregular native police by a special city police force partly recruited from ex-soldiers who were organised on recognised police lines and held responsible for policing the city and its immediate environs and today they have reached a fairly high standard ... As His Honour, the Lieutenant-Governor remarks, Kaduna differs considerably from Lagos.94

That was how the laudable goal of having better-trained policemen in Western Nigeria was deferred because of the petty jealousies between administrative officers in Northern and Southern Nigeria. Of course, it was not a peculiar problem with Southern officers. In 1939, when the Resident of Niger province touted the idea of a provincial police force along the lines of the Oyo scheme, his subordinates saw it as a heretical suggestion.

The first native administration in Western Nigeria to train men of its force in the PTS, Enugu was the Benin native administration. It sent twenty policemen for a three-month course there in January 1940.95 From 1941, when other native administrations began to send their policemen for the course, it became necessary to regulate the number of men that each participating NA should send since the school could not take more than 25 trainees at a time.96 Unlike in the North, the facilities at Enugu were extended more
equitably to all the native administrations, relative to the numerical strength of their forces and the percentage of literate members.

Besides using the facilities offered at the NPF training schools in Kaduna and Enugu, there was some interest in owning separate NAPF training schools in both the North and the West. The interest was, however, not much sustained in the West; so, only the situation in the North will be considered here.

Feeling dissatisfied with the results of the training programme at the PTD, Kaduna the Residents rose from their conference in 1937 convinced that the training programme could be more effective if the NAPFs had a separate depot that would take into account the peculiar educational disabilities of the emirates. The government in 1938 circularised its intention to build one such school in the near future.97

The government addressed the issue more concretely in 1940. ‘At the Residents’ Conference for that year police training was one of the subjects.98 On the specific issue of a school, the conference resolved that application should be made for a sum not exceeding £2,500 from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund (CDWF) for the construction of buildings for the NA police depot that would be built close to the NPF’s PTD at Kaduna.99

At the 1944 conference it was revealed that the necessary permission to use money from the CDWF had not been got. And, since the matter of building a school for NAPFs was considered urgent it was resolved that native authorities be approached to provide the money.100 This resolution was followed up by contacts with the central government and the NPF headquarters in Lagos with a proposal that the school be a combined training school but with the NAPFs being offered more facilities.101

The Residents were to sound out the Emirs on the idea of a combined school and their willingness to contribute money. To secure the cooperation of the Emirs, they were to be consulted on the architect’s plan of dormitories102 which had actually been prepared with the convenience of the Muslim trainees, some of whom were to be permitted to have their wives around. When, therefore, the central government wrote to urge that regions with NAPFs should intensify their training in anticipation of post-World War II developments it represented a mere meeting of minds in
Kaduna whereas it served as a push in Ibadan. Little wonder that the enthusiasm soon waned in the latter place.

A breakdown of the contributions expected from the various native authorities towards the £35,000 project, out of which £15,000 would be the Northern Nigerian government’s share, was circularised in a memorandum prepared for discussion at the 1945 Chiefs’ Conference. The native authorities agreed to pay their shares with Kano paying the highest sum of £4,400 while those of Kamuku (Niger province), Lokoja and Kakanda-Kupa-Eggan (both in Kabba province), would pay £20 each.\(^{103}\)

From being a joint project, the central government in Lagos decided in 1946 to sponsor it alone at a revised cost of £40,750.\(^{104}\) The new Northern Police College was ready by 1948.\(^{105}\) It could, however, not immediately admit NA policemen owing to ‘unexpected constructional difficulties.’\(^{106}\)

When NA police training resumed on 1 April 1950 two types of courses were mounted: recruit and refresher.\(^{107}\) The following subjects were taught: criminal law and procedure, law of evidence, police duties, station duties, police ordinance and standing orders, motor traffic ordinance and regulations, township ordinance, prevention of crime ordinance, first aid, finger prints, traffic reports, note book, drill and games.\(^{108}\) Recruits were enrolled every month for a six-month course while refresher course students were enrolled twice yearly for a six-month course too. But the latter were enrolled primarily to train as instructors.\(^{109}\) The promise made earlier to allow those on refresher course the company of their wives was honoured from 1951.\(^{110}\)

From 1951 the college began to use NA police instructors for the instruction of the trainees.\(^{111}\) They were in two categories. One served as drill instructors and all the qualification necessary to serve in that capacity was that those chosen should be ‘good disciplinarians with a knowledge of drill,’ so ‘illiterates will do.’\(^{112}\) The other comprised law and police-duty instructors. These were expected to be ‘literates with a fair knowledge of ordinances applicable to N.A. Forces and also Native Court Procedure.’\(^{113}\)

It is clear from the foregoing discussion on training that, on the face of it, the NPF was involved, from 1929, with the training of the NAPFs of the North to a greater degree than it was with those of the West. But that was all the freedom its officers got: that
is, to impart knowledge along laid-down lines. In other spheres of NAPF affairs they were much more marginalised in the North than in the West as will be shown in the next section.

Defining NAPF/NPF Relations

It has been shown so far in this paper that in consonance with the administrative policy in Northern Nigeria, the identity of the NA police was to be protected from the NPF’s overshadowing. On the contrary, there seemed to have been, among administrative officers in Western Nigeria, a tacit acknowledgement of the superiority of the NPF to the NAPF.

In the North, there can be detected an active move towards parity with the NPF after the initial moves to exclude members of the then Government Police Force from the emirates between 1908 and 1915 had failed. In passing, it may be remarked that their elimination from the emirates was again touted in 1929.114

One strong evidence for the claim about the quest for parity was the efforts made by the Northern Nigerian administration between 1928 and 1934 to talk both the native authorities and the central government in Lagos into agreeing to the arming of the NA police. As at that point in time, the non-bearing of arms by men of the NAPFs was the only remarkable difference between members of the two types of force. And a man like H.R. Palmer was quite ready, while he was the Lieutenant-Governor between 1925 and 1930, to reverse himself on the issue of an armed police which he had depreciated in the early 1900s.

The first suggestion to arm the NA police was made at the Residents’ Conference of 1928 by the Residents of florin and Sokoto. They argued that it would help the bearing, credibility and efficiency of the police.115 This initial move was aborted when the Secretary of State for the Colonies ruled against it in 1929. In the letter to Residents conveying the Home Government’s decision, the SNP noted that,

…the Secretary of State has had the matter under consideration and is unable to agree that members of the Native Administration Police should be allowed to carry firearms.116
This was a general ruling binding on NA police everywhere in the country but the Northern administrative officers did not give up easily. If only they could persuade many of the Emirs to show interest between 1930 and 1934, the administrative officers would have re-presented the case for armed police.

If the administrative officers could not achieve parity through the arming of the NA police, they did not give up on the efforts to marginalise the NPF. Initiated through the 1919 ‘code’ (discussed in an earlier section), the efforts were intensified from the 1930s. That ‘code’ governed NAPF/NPF relations until 1936 when it was, in a way, challenged.

In that year, the IGP of the NPF, Major A. Saunders prepared a memorandum on the NPF but with some paragraphs devoted to the NAPFs. He specifically addressed the issue of NAPF/NPF relations, commenting on the terms and conditions under which the services of European police officers should be allowed to NA forces. Earlier in 1932, the Northern Nigerian government had approached the headquarters for the secondment of an officer to help with the general improvement of the Ilorin NAPF. Because there had been no official guidelines on the matter the then IGP, C.W. Duncan, prepared a memorandum for government’s consideration. He was, in principle, not opposed to the idea of secondment and he laid down eleven conditions for it, two of which are of immediate relevance here. One was that officers so seconded,

will receive their instructions from and correspond direct with the Resident of the Province.

This was indeed the very first condition he stipulated. The other was that

an officer seconded to the service of a Native Administration will for the time being be the servant of the Native Administration. Should he desire to address the Inspector-General on any matters relating to himself, he will do so through the Resident.

The central government endorsed the proposals and gave approval to the secondment of a Major Wilson to the Ilorin NAPF. The appointment, which took effect from 1 April 1932 was later
It is contended here that Major Wilson’s secondment was acceptable to the Northern Nigerian government because the two conditions that have been excerpted were in line with the administrative principles in the territory.

The experiment was so successful that many more requests were made from both the North and the West in 1934 and they were granted. Kano, Sokoto and Ibadan NAPFs were some of the beneficiaries. But Duncan’s tenure ended and Major A. Saunders assumed headship of the NPF in 1936. Fresh requests were made from the North and the West for seconded NPF officers.

The request to which he immediately replied in the negative was from the West on behalf of the Abeokuta, Ijebu, Ondo and Oyo provinces. It had been referred to him by the office of the Chief Secretary to the Government, Lagos. He sent a reply that he was unable to help. His reasons were later embodied in the memorandum already cited. He was opposed to secondment but would not mind a loan. Secondment, according to him, had

the police disadvantage of effectively debarring the Inspector-General from exercising any control, supervisory or advisory, over the work of the officer so appointed.

A loan would obviate that disadvantage. The kernel of his arguments on the issue was that for him to cooperate, there must be the assurance that both he and his loaned officers would be allowed a reasonable measure of control: he, of his officers and they, of the NAPFs to which they had been loaned. It may be remarked that between the time of the request to him and the writing of his memorandum, he had been importuned by the Southern Nigerian government to a degree that was at the time unthinkable in the North.

The general reaction of both the Northern and Southern administrations was that Saunders’ proposals were unrealistic because they would mean a subordination of the NAPFs to the NPF, a prospect that ran counter to the grain of native administration principles. But while the Northern officers meant really to call the bluff of the IGP the Southern officers did not actually mean what they said. The officers on the spot in the Western half of Southern Nigeria where NAPFs existed did not
share the government’s views as was evident from their actions both before and after the memorandum had been prepared. It may be recalled that the moves towards the provincialisation of the forces in Oyo had begun at the time and the administrative officers there actively courted the NPF officers for assistance.

The Northern Nigerian government followed up its reaction to Saunders ‘heresy’ by restating the Uniacke ‘code’ of 1919. It warned that it was not the business of the head of the NPF in the territory (an Assistant Inspector-General of Police) to suggest an inspection of the NAPF in any native administration area whenever he was on tour. He was ‘not to seek permission to inspect Yan Doka, but if invited to do so and time permits, to accept the opportunity.’

At the 1937 Residents’ Conference, the arguments on this issue of NAPF/NPF relations boiled down to three. One, there was the acknowledgement that with all the inadequacies of the NAPFs, their men were to be preferred to those of the NPF. Two, if one type of force must give way to the other, it should be the NPF that should cease to function. But three, if at all the NPF must have an upper hand it should be in the acephalous communities, derogatorily called ‘certain backward areas.’

In 1939, Saunders’ successor, Colonel A.S. Mavrogordato again submitted a memorandum specifically on NAPFs to the central government. On NAPF/NPF relations, he was of the view that officers should be ‘detailed’ for duty with NAPFs instead of being ‘seconded’ to them. He was quite vague in his use of these terms but, unlike his predecessor, he was more flexible and showed an awareness of the sensitivity to any suggestion that might tend to imply the loss of control by native authorities of their forces. In the North, his remarks were just noted without comments at the Residents’ Conference for that year. But in the West the memorandum was very warmly embraced. While endorsing the memorandum to the Resident of Oyo province, the Secretary, Western Provinces (SWP) noted that he had no comment except to say that he was very ‘stoutly in favour of a European police officer being detailed for duties with the N.A. Police of the Province.’ The Resident made the same point in his comments on the memorandum. Indeed he was eager to have a European police officer detailed for duty with the Provincial Police Force.
The Western Provinces’ government made contacts with the NPF headquarters in Lagos for such an appointment. In a letter to the Resident, the SWP notified him of the Commissioner of Police’s willingness to permit the Superintendent of the NPF in Ibadan ‘to devote as much time as he can to the control of the NA Police.’ The Resident was asked to work out the details with the NPF officer. This then was the green light to the eventual divestiture of the native authorities in Oyo province of their control over their police. Between that time and 1944 when the fate of the native authorities in the matter of control was finally sealed, the surreptitious moves towards the ultimate goal are worthy of some attention. At the centre of it all were the Resident at the time, H.F.M. White and the Superintendent of Police, NPF, G.A.V. de Boissierre. Some background information on the latter is necessary.

De Boissierre had before his deployment to the South first served in the North between the early and the mid-1930s. A very zealous police officer, he had struggled while in Kano and Zaria for greater cooperation between the two forces without tangible results. Indeed he had on one occasion fallen foul of indirect rule principles and had to apologise for his excess of zeal. In the particular instance, the Emir of Zaria had complained to the DO about the increasing involvement of men of the NPF in matters that were the concern of the yan doka. He attributed the interference to failure on the part of the head of the local NPF detachment, who happened to be De Boissierre, to observe the rules. De Boissierre had to apologise for any inconveniences caused the Emir by his lapses.

It is relevant also to recall the experience of a colleague of De Boissierre’s, Capt. B. F. Sharp, who was on secondment to the Kano NAPF. Sharp had a hard time with the Galadiman Kano who was the councillor in charge of police. The Galadima did not like the way Sharp was by-passing him in the conduct of NA police affairs and he complained to the Resident. This was sometime in August 1935. The Resident had to remind Sharp that he was just an adviser and an education officer; he was not in executive charge. Sharp felt a little peeved and made his feelings known but the Resident, while trying to placate him, still
maintained his stand that commitment to administrative principles took precedence over professional excellence.

This then was the climate within which officers worked in the North. De Boissierre’s transfer to the South and his rapport with the Resident of Oyo province gave him unlimited freedom to operate as a police officer. He took maximum advantage of it and was very happy at the outcome, which was the transfer of control of the NA police by the native authorities to the NPF officers.

The native authorities protested their loss of control. In its own reaction, the Ibadan native authority traced the history of the NAPF in Ibadan and recounted the measures that had been taken in liaison with the NPF, to improve the bearing and standard of efficiency of the men. Doubtful of the sincerity of the Resident, it pleaded that,

we respectfully ask the Honourable Resident not to give chance to the detractors of native administration system in Nigeria to say that after nearly forty years of our police [department’s] existence it has lamentably failed to make progress on the right line.

Some pressure was brought on the council by the Resident who attended a meeting subsequent to this initial reaction. But the council would not budge, arguing that the move was ‘tantamount to the surrender of the elementary principle on which Native Administration has (sic) founded.’ It again pleaded that ‘since the Government have made it plain that nothing under the heaven will move them to destroy the fabric of this institution,’ the Resident should rethink the matter and maintain the status quo. The arguments of the Oyo native authority were very similar to Ibadan’s.

G.A.V. de Boissierre, SP, NPF, headquarters Oyo-Ondo Province, Ibadan assumed control of the (amalgamated) Oyo Provincial NA Police Force in April 1943.

In his first annual report on the NA police prepared in 1944, he could not hide his joy at realising this long-sought but much-denied opportunity, for he concluded the report by saying that:

In conclusion I wish to say how pleased and honoured I am in having being (sic) given the privilege of supervising the N.A. Police and I appeal to the Authorities to let their slogan be where the N.A. Police
are concerned “NO EXPENSE IS TOO MUCH AND NOTHING IS TOO GOOD FOR THE FORCE”.

The year 1944 was very significant in the history of NAPFs in Nigeria. That year the central government in Lagos approved the first set of rules ever to govern matters of appointments into the organisation and discipline of men of the NAPFs. Primarily drafted for the Northern Nigerian forces they were also approved for those of the West. Largely similar, the significant difference was in the matter of control.

The Northern version gave primacy to the native authority, acting in the first instance through its Chief of Police, in matters of discipline whereas the Western version subordinated the native authority to the NPF officer-in-charge of the NAPF. For the North, the rules merely represented a formalisation of the status quo ante. Indeed they were not meant for adoption by all the native authorities because it was considered that only ‘few of the Native Authority Police Forces in the Northern Provinces were sufficiently advanced to administer the rules in toto.

In the West, these rules gave legal backing to the process of divesting the native authorities, especially those in Oyo province where the forces had been provincialised, of their control over the detachments posted to their areas. The efforts to make them sign away their authority and the reactions by some may be noted.

The native authorities were, first, made to adopt the rules. Then, the administrative officers embarked on moves to confer the post of officer-in-charge on the Superintendent of Police, NPF, Oyo-Ondo Province at the time, G.A.V. de Boissiere in October. De Boissiere held the position till 1947 when a full-time NPF officer-in-charge, Captain V. P. Birch was appointed to take over from him. The arrangement endured into the 1950s.

In the West, therefore, the process of defining NAPF/NPF relations was effectively concluded with the adoption of the 1944 rules. They conferred superiority on the NPF and gave them much leverage in the conduct of NAPF affairs. On the contrary, in the North, the status quo ante rules were maintained. Indeed, the more responsibilities for assistance in NAPF affairs the NPF got in subsequent years the less power they got to perform. This
‘responsibility-without-power’ phenomenon did not please the NPF but there was not much they could do to change their lot.

The discussion in this section would be ended by examining the reactions from the North and the West to a Colonial Office document on the future of NAPFs in the colonies. The reactions eloquently underscore the arguments about the greater paternalism of colonial administrative officers in the North and the relative position of strength or weakness of the NPF vis-à-vis the NAPFs of the West and the North respectively.

The document was a report prepared in 1949 by the Inspector-General of Colonial Police based in London after a tour of the colonies. The report was sent by the Colonial Office to the territories in 1950 for comments. It invited special attention to the two paragraphs on NAPFs with a stress on their relation to the central police force and requested that comments on these forces be embodied in a separate communication.

In the main report, the IG of Colonial Police had raised questions about the organisation of these forces and had expressed the fear that they provided ‘no surety of a fair and impartial policing and would be no safeguard against internal disorder.’ As political consciousness grew the tendency might be for the local controlling authorities to put them to political advantage. He therefore recommended that appropriate measures be introduced to provide some guarantee of proper standards of efficiency and impartiality, either by a system of frequent inspection, or by grants-in-aid subject to satisfying the standards required or by a combination of both. One way to achieve this goal, in his view, would be to maintain ‘a Federal Police superimposed upon individual forces related to local authorities.’

The report and accompanying letter were forwarded from Lagos to the regional government in Kaduna from where it was to be circulated to Enugu, Ibadan and the Colony administration in Lagos. As was typical of the relationship between the government in Kaduna and the central government in Lagos—one of intense rivalry bordering on hostility—it took three reminders from Lagos to get Kaduna to respond. The Eastern, Colony and Western administrations had reacted promptly. The Northern administration did not respond until September. The comments of the Eastern and Colony administrations are not important since
the NAPFs did not exist in their areas. The reply from the West opened with a declaration to the effect that

as far as the restoration of law and order is involved -- one of the most vital functions of a Police Force–Native Authority Police are useless and on occasion worse than useless.\textsuperscript{156}

This was why, the government further said, it had always been advocating that the central government should take-over NAPFs whenever possible. In spite of the administration’s conviction however it had not been possible to do so for two reasons. One, the government had not succeeded in persuading the native authorities to relinquish ownership of the forces and the administration did not want to apply pressure because that would violate accepted policy. The activities of the administrative officers in the Ondo province of that region at the time showed that this reason was less than honest. Two, it would be financially impossible to do so at the time. This was a more plausible reason.

The Northern administration had first referred the entire report to the head of the NPF in Kaduna for comments. He had commented on the NAPFs thus:

I regard the present condition of most Native Authority Police Forces as a menace in the future, unless completely fresh ideas are brought to the fore. They are not likely to withstand the impact of propaganda in the future, which will have so much of truth and substance to breed on. Either they must become thoroughly efficient on modern standards or hand over... The past has got to give way to the present, before the pressure of events compels it.\textsuperscript{157}

His views reflected his own and his officers’ frustration in their efforts, ostensibly to improve the standard and efficiency— but really to seize control—of the NAPFs. As he said elsewhere in the report, ‘we cannot progress in teaching the Native Authority Police to be policemen, when the system will not permit them to act as such’.

The thrust of the government’s reply from Kaduna was that the NAPFs were of greater importance in policing than the NPF. For one reason, the maintenance of law and order was primarily effected through the medium of the native authority system and those so saddled with such a responsibility should not be without
The necessary agency. Second, the history of policing in the North showed a poor presence of the NPF such that as at that time, out of a total number of 6,239 policemen the NPF accounted for 1,223 while the remaining 5,016 belonged to the NAPFs. Third, it would be financially unwise to seek to increase the number of Nigerian policemen to enable them assume responsibility for policing the whole of the territory.  

The regional administration then advised that the central government should continue to have a police force whose main functions would be to train the NAPFs with a view to raising their standards and also to provide more efficient and reliable force for the purpose of internal security. So that the latter point might not be mistaken for an agreement with the view of the IG, Colonial Police, the regional administration added that it did not subscribe to the officer’s view that NAPFs generally provided no security.

The final reply from Lagos to London was a rehash of the arguments by the administration in Kaduna; to wit, NAPFs were performing a useful function in the country and it would be politically and financially impracticable to absorb them into the NPF, not to talk of scrapping them. The NAPFs thus entered the era of active decolonisation, from 1952, with an assured future.

**The NAPFs in the Era of Decolonisation, 1952-60**

The discussion in this section is on the impact of the decolonisation process on the NAPFs. It focuses on the degree to which the involvement of elected partisan politicians in governance, either as councillors at the local government level or as parliamentarians and ministers at the regional level, in the run-up to independence between 1952 and 1960, affected matters such as legislation for the forces, their organisation, management and control. There were differences in the orientation of the politicians that emerged in the Western and Northern regions on the general issue of decolonisation, and the local government system specifically. With reference to the local government system, of which the NAPFs were a part, the trend in the West was more for change, especially in regard to representation on councils. The Action Group (AG) government that was inaugurated in 1952 was determined to restructure the largely undemocratic native authority councils to make way for elected majorities. In the North, the
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) government was less inclined to change from the status quo ante especially in the emirates of the northerly provinces from where it drew its strength and support. The few experiments at a more democratic representation on councils were undertaken in the southerly, largely non-emirate, provinces.

The typical reactions to these developments in the West and the North in so far as management and control of the NAPFs were concerned form part of the concern of this section. The developments in the West will be examined first.

Management and control of the forces in Western Nigeria
The discussion here focuses on the role of elected officials at the regional government level in legislating, and formulating policies, for the forces. In practical terms, attempts were made by elected council officials, some of who were also regional parliamentarians, to influence the management of police affairs. The new men of affairs wanted to assert the executive powers they thought they had over every imaginable subject. At times, they acted as champions of the sectional interests of their people where inter-group relations were involved. The restraining hand of field administrative officers (DOs and Residents), which had in the past served a moderating purpose, was whittled and later removed as the march towards independence progressed. But the impact of the councilors’ interference was constrained by factors such as ignorance of the relevant laws and the dynamics of politics. All in all, the developments during this period foreshadowed the future of the local police, especially after the AG schism of 1962. The legal framework and policy orientation fashioned by the nascent AG government will provide a useful background to the discussion.

Legislating for the Forces
The first pronouncement of the AG government on the NAPFs was made in 1952 when the first Minister of Local Government who was also the leader of the party, Hon. Obafemi Awolowo, toured the region to explain the proposed local government legislation to the people. He had said that the NA police would be reorganised and their standards brought up to the level of those of the Nigerian police. They would be made into a ‘Regional Constabulary’. He
expressed the pious hope that unlike the Nigerian police, they
would not ‘strike terror into peoples’ hearts’ but rather help the
citizenry and give them the benefit of local knowledge and of
understanding their language. He concluded by saying that riots
and ditties that required tin hats would be the responsibility of the
Nigerian police.

There is the impression from the minister’s statement of
intention that the forces were to be created into a regional police
force but that was not the line of action eventually pursued when a
law on the police was enacted in 1955. The provisions of the law
were however such that ultimate control of the forces rested with
the regional government and not with individual local government
councils.

Between 1952 and 1955 when the law was enacted, the
NAPFs in the region operated under the 1944 Native
Administration Police Forces Rules. In early 1955, the government
circulated a memorandum on the reorganisation of the forces. In
the spirit of the times, the nomenclature of the forces was to be
changed from Native Administration Police Forces to Local
Government Police Forces and they were to be organised on a
provincial basis. Radical improvements would be made in the
training, organisation, control and working conditions of the
police.

The first step would be the amalgamation of the small forces
in each province into a single provincial force. This would
eradicate anomalies such as varying standards of training, ranks,
and pay. It would, furthermore, remove the difficulties and reduce
the expenses of operating small forces. Larger units would make
for more competitive service, more enthusiasm, keenness and
drive, thus ultimately raising police standards.

In addition to the six provinces of the region where these
forces had existed, namely, Abeokuta, Benin, Ibadan, Ijebu, Ondo
and Oyo the government intended to introduce them in the other
two provinces of Delta and Colony. It should be quickly remarked
here that the government did not proceed with that plan in respect
of the Delta province.

The head of each provincial force would be known as the
Chief Constable (but eventually the title of Chief Officer was
adopted). He would be appointed by the minister (whose ministry
was not specified but invariably it was that of Home Affairs) on the recommendation of the regional head of the forces and with the concurrence of the Provincial Constabulary Committee (PCC) when it had been constituted.

It was also proposed that the regional head of the forces should be designated Superintendent-General (SG) who should be appointed by the regional government. He would be directly responsible to the minister for ensuring that regulations made by the minister were observed in all forces, and for general coordination among all forces. The SG and his staff at regional headquarters would be paid entirely by the regional government, as part of government’s contribution towards the cost of police services.

The replies from the various provinces to the proposals were in general favourable. But the councillors did not fail to notice their very limited role in the management of the forces. They desired to be more intimately involved, and requested an avenue to do so through the creation of Divisional Constabulary Committees (DCCs). A typical response was given by the Ijesa Divisional Council. It made two suggestions. One, it suggested that a DCC be appointed in each political division of the region from which representatives of local government councils would be drawn to serve on the proposed PCC. It hoped that such a committee would be in a position to give direct advice and suggestions to the PCC on subjects such as discipline, and the maintenance of peace and order in the division. Two, it suggested that the relationship between the local government council and the local constabulary force be more clearly defined so as to make the members of the force realise that they had a responsibility to, and a more intimate connection with, the council which catered so much for their maintenance. The DCC would thus be able to watch the interest of the council directly. But as subsequent developments showed, the wishes of the councillors were unrealised.

On 1 September 1955 the Local Government Police Law went into effect. Its provisions reflected very much the contents of the memorandum earlier referred to. But whereas the head of the provincial force had been designated Chief Constable, in the memorandum, the law provided for a Chief Officer. The
regional Commissioner of Police of the NPF was also provided for in the law in an advisory capacity.\textsuperscript{168}

At this point, some comments may be made on the attitude of the AG government to the relationship that should exist between the NPF and the LGPFs. As has been noted in previous chapters, the British administrative officers in the West had always treated the local police forces as adjunct forces to the NPF. The superordinate/subordinate relationship was formalised in the Oyo province from the early 1940s when superior NPF officers began to be appointed as Officers-in-charge of the Provincial NAPF created in 1938. The new AG government endorsed both the scheme and the management style. So that even before it prepared the memorandum that formed the basis of the police law it had got the pledge of the NPF to supply officers who would serve as Chief Constables and the Superintendent-General.\textsuperscript{169}

One notable provision of the police law that theoretically freed the police from undue external influence and guaranteed professionalism was the declaration that members of the forces were obliged to make upon appointment. It stated thus:

\begin{quote}
I do solemnly and sincerely declare that I will obey all lawful orders of the members of the force placed over me and subject myself to all Laws, Ordinances and Rules relating to the force now in operation or which may hereafter from time to time be in operation.\textsuperscript{170}
\end{quote}

Some police officers took advantage of this and the general provisions of the law to defy councillors who tried to meddle in police affairs.

In sum, the law concentrated the powers of control in the hands of the minister in charge of police affairs, the SG and the Chief Officers. Local heads of detachments of the provincial forces also enjoyed some autonomy as they exercised delegated authority.

If the police law was an innovation by the elected government in the region, the rules made in 1957\textsuperscript{171} were a mere adaptation from those of 1944 made by the colonial government in Lagos. But the 1957 rules stated more elaborately the powers of control vested in the SG and the Chief Officers. These two pieces of legislation fashioned by elected officials at the regional level on police affairs left little room for councillors to participate in the management of the forces that were theirs in name. The details of some of the
crises that ensued from the arrangement between elected councillors and the police officers belong elsewhere.  

Just as developments in the West reflected the concern of the emergent power elite in the region, so did they reflect that of their counterparts in the North. But while it may be said that those of the West were obsessed with change, those of the North tended more towards continuity.

Management of the Forces in Northern Nigeria

In general, the NPC government preferred that the management style that had been in existence long before its advent should continue. The native authorities were to continue to exercise operational control of the forces. This disposition is understandable in view of the fact that the elite of the ruling party had been spawned by the native authority system, and still held positions in it. But the new order was reflected in the matters of legislation and policy formulation even when these meant mere reiteration of the status quo ante. The case studies of management developments during the period (details of which are in my fuller study of the forces) emphasise the attempts by some native authorities to consolidate their hold on the main instrument of coercion; the tightening of the screws of control in a vulnerable but significant territory; the perpetuation of the phenomenon of responsibility-without-authority in NAPF/NPF relations; the use and potential abuse of nationalistic fervour against ‘foreign’ domination. In all the cases, the control of the native authority, democratic or autocratic, over its police force remained unassailable.

Legislating for the Forces

Provisions were made for the NAPFs in three pieces of legislation: the Native Authority Law of 1954, the Native Authority (Police Declarations) Order-in-council, 1955 and the Native Authority Police Force Rules, 1959. The absolute control of the native authorities over their forces had never been in dispute and these pieces of legislation did not tamper with it. In the post-1951 period, NPF officers seconded for service with the NAPFs continued to press for a measure of authority necessary for the proper discharge of their enormous responsibility
Taken together, the provisions of the 1954 NA Law, the 1955 Declaration and the 1959 Rules were designed to weld the NA policeman to the native authority that employed him. Unlike his counterpart in the West, he was not an NA policeman only in name but in deed. Their relationship continued to be symbiotic, especially in the larger emirates. Where, because of the more liberal democratic climate in the southerly provinces the NPF adviser tried to grab some power he met with stiff resistance from councillors.

In the three case studies that follow one provides a good example of the extent to which native authorities could go to secure their power base; the other two exemplify the difficulty that NPF officers had in seeking to be more than ‘Advisers’.

The Appointment of Chief of Police in the Kano Native Administration, 1957

The appointment hark back to the princely-liaison officer scheme inaugurated in 1928 to boost the transformation from the dogarai to the yan doka phase of policing. The case confirms that the hopes on the scheme, which included the enhancement of the prestige of the Emir, the upholding of his authority and the exciting of the interest of more respectable citizens in police work, had been realised.

On 28 February 1956, the Kano Chief of Police, Alhaji Kabiru was suspended for some wrongdoing and was eventually relieved of his post. He was Emir Sanusi’s brother. He later bagged the post of District Head, a choice appointment by contemporary emirate standards. The post of Chief of Police was then offered to Kabiru’s immediate junior brother, Ado Bayero who at the time was an elected NPC member of the regional House of Assembly. He did not immediately accept it.

Ado Bayero had won his seat in a by-election in the general elections of 1956 having defeated Malam Babba Dan Agundi of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) – the major opposition party in Northern Nigeria in the era of party politics which was led by Aminu Kano and with its headquarters in Kano - and his own friend, Mallam Ali Abdullahi who stood as an independent candidate. He had made a name for himself in the House by his outspokenness; he must have been among the most
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educated members having just passed out of the Institute of Administration, Zaria and he was probably the youngest at 26. His initial demur therefore might not be unconnected with the allure of parliamentary life in the circumstances.

He, however, yielded to pressure and consented to sacrifice his active political career saying that ‘it is good to make sacrifices some time, and this is the first time in my life that I have made (a) sacrifice.’ But he did not vacate his seat until after his installation which was on 12 April 1957 at ‘an impressive ceremony’ witnessed by a large concourse of people who came from all over Kano. He emphasised the importance of his new office—which was common knowledge—in a later letter of resignation to the President of the House of Assembly. It was one that carried ‘heavy responsibility’ but he neglected to add that it also carried enormous powers and inestimable perquisites!

His appointment was quite popular, even with the opposition NEPU. It was reported that Aminu Kano described it as ‘a good gesture and a good omen for the future of Kano.’ He hoped that his youthfulness, firmness and broadmindedness would reflect well on the NAPF. He saw his resignation from the house and politics as ‘the manifestation of his sincerity.’

In what smacked of compensation for his lost seat in the legislature, Bayero was later rewarded with a board appointment. The official reason for putting him on the board of the Northern Regional Broadcasting Corporation was that he had ‘experience and knowledge of Local Government affairs’!

It is conceded that, as part of the general patronage system and the power configuration in the emirates, appointing a very close member of the royalty to a position of authority in the NA establishment was normative. The peculiarity in the case of Kano at this time attracts attention.

Muhammadu Sanusi became Emir on 1 January 1954 following the death of his father in December 1953. But his antecedents as Ciroman Kano had shown a tendency towards autocracy to cover up his corruption. He had been exposed by the NEPU in 1951 and he had employed all manner of victimisation—including the coercive powers of the police—to retaliate. He would therefore need a trusted person in the office of Chief of Police when he became Emir. The British administrative
officers in Kano must have been hard put to it to get Sanusi to remove Bayero’s predecessor; he most probably consented only when an agreeable successor was found. This contention is based on an analysis of the records on the reactions of the NEPU to Bayero’s appointment and subsequent remarks on his performance which did not radically affect the conduct of his men but all the same showed an improvement on their past.

Ado Bayero was in office until 1961 when he was made Nigeria’s ambassador to Senegal from where he was later recalled to become the Emir in 1963 after the deposition of Sanusi\textsuperscript{184} and the death of his immediate successor.

The next case study emphasises the continued difficulty encountered by NPF advisers in the administration of the forces.

Zaria: The ordeal of NPF Advisers, 1955-57

The point at issue here is the severe limitation on the influence of NPF advisers in their relationship with NAPFs, especially in the larger emirates. The power to hire and fire was that of the Emir and no NPF adviser could force a decision either for or against, however sound the administrative officers might consider his arguments.

Mallam Mamman Sule assumed office as Chief of Police, Zaria NA in 1955. Until he lost office in 1957, Sule was a thorn in the flesh of all the NPF advisers (four of them) who worked with the Zaria NAPF. He was incompetent, corrupt and unamenable to correction, not to talk of discipline. But all the complaints by the NPF advisers were ignored by the NA because Sule was treated by the Emir Jafaru as a son.\textsuperscript{185} Apparently overconfident of the Emir’s support over any wrong that he might be accused of, he overstretched his luck and was eventually removed from office in 1957 for official corruption.

In the period between the elevation of Sule’s predecessor to a district headship and his own appointment, the NPF adviser had been granted operational control of the NAPF (a rare privilege). Sule was appointed in an acting capacity but the NA soon began to press that he be confirmed so that the NPF could cease their control of the force. The Senior Superintendent of Police, (SSP), NPF who was in charge of the NPF detachment in Zaria province was sounded out for an independent assessment of Sule by the
office of the Commissioner of Police. Kaduna. in the SSP’s opinion, Sule was not yet ripe for confirmation.\textsuperscript{186}

He found him ‘considerably wanting in the performance of normal daily duties and responsibilities.’ He cited four cases: one of inept crime detection resulting in irresponsible tampering with the liberties of ten persons he accused of murder but as it turned out he had no shred of evidence; two of absenteeism; and one of laxity in repressing protests by building trade employees in the native authority area. He noted that he had information that ‘he regards his present post as a birthright and of passing interest until his ultimate objective of a District Headship is achieved.’ He concluded correctly but darkly that ‘I consider the ADVICE to be imparted by any present or future A.S.P. posted here will amount to just so much wasted time.’ (Emphasis in the original).

The NPF adviser at the time was Mallam Audu Bako. It is necessary to mention the name because of what he later tried to do in Jos where he had relative freedom to serve. He was the first Nigerian officer to be posted to Zaria province as adviser. As a commentary on Nigeria’s North-South political relations, it may be briefly noted that the NPF authorities in Kaduna had been advised by the Resident in Zaria when it was intended to post a Nigerian there as adviser that he must be a Northerner or the NA would not accept him.\textsuperscript{187}

Sule confirmed his disregard of the adviser shortly after the SSP’s assessment by going on leave without informing the officer. in his reaction to the adviser’s protest, the DO traced the origin of Sule’s closeness to the palace.\textsuperscript{188} He said that Sule, being sure that the Emir would take up the cudgels on his behalf in case of trouble’ would not have bothered to mention his intention to go on leave to the adviser, not even to ‘a European A.S.P., much less to the unfortunate Audu Bako for whom i have considerable sympathy.’ On the extent to which the Emir could go to save Sule’s neck, he recounted the circumstances in which Sule lost his job in 1950 or 1951 as Chief Scribe in the NA office and how ‘the personal intervention of the Emir saved him from prosecution on a criminal charge.’ That was the man later appointed to head the police!

Audu Bako was succeeded in 1956 by a European officer. He, too, found it difficult to work with Sule. He reckoned that if
operational control of the force was granted to him. the standard of
the men could be raised. The Commissioner of Police, Kaduna, put
the request to the Resident, Zaria. He, in fact, blamed the adviser
more for his plight saying that although he was ‘zealous’ but he
was ‘unintelligent’. What with his attempts to indict the NA
councillor in charge of police, who was also a district head, for
appropriating a quantity of building materials available from a
demolished market. He also frowned at the adviser’s wording of
his instructions to the Chief of Police ‘in the tersest of terms.’ The
Resident again stressed the links of Sule with the palace and
soberly admitted that Sule was ‘confident of the support of the
Emir in any disagreements with the A.S.P. or, for that matter,
myself.’

The affected officer later wrote a detailed report on Sule with
proofs of his laziness, uncooperativeness, deceitfulness and
secretiveness. Much more correspondence was exchanged
between the administrative officers in Zaria and the NPF
authorities in Kaduna but Sule continued in office until 1957 when
he lost office.

While NPF advisers chafed under the autocratic setting of the
larger, emirate NAs they at times over-reached themselves in
places where the political climate was more liberal.

Jos: NA Council versus the NPF Adviser, 1956-57

Here, the NPF adviser Audu Bako tried to take an undue advantage
of the favourable climate offered by the democratisation of the NA
system in an acephalous community. But so high had Birom
nationalism risen that the council could not be indifferent.

Bako was committed to professionalism in police matters, but he had served in Zaria earlier when the over mighty Chief of
Police, Mamman Sule reigned. He had chafed under the NA’s
endorsement of Sule’s rascality. His deployment to a province
where no absolute ruler reigned had been construed by him to
mean unlimited opportunity to operate. But the Birom of Jos had
never liked the staffing of the Jos NAPF by Hausa and other non-
indigenes of the area. The politics of the 1950s further aggravated
their discontent. But Audu Bako cared little for political
sentiments.
Two issues generated a row between the council and Bako in 1957. In the first case, the council tried to check the irregularities that attended the payment of salaries to the men of the NAPF. Hitherto, it was the duty of the Chief of Police to collect his men’s salary from the treasury and pay. But he was in the habit of paying in his house instead of the office for some apparently sinister reasons. Many of his men had complained to the hearing of council officials. It is strange that this practice, for which one Chief of Police in Jos and his deputy lost office in 1937 still continued in 1957.

The council notified Bako of its intention to change the mode of payment. With effect from the end of May, an accountant from the NA treasury would supervise the payment of police salaries at their office with the assistance of any policeman of Bako’s choice.

Bako did not like what smacked of dictating to him his duties and political interference in a professional matter. He quoted sections of the rules and the law to back his contention that the Chief of Police was the only one authorised to handle the payment of salaries. The council should therefore not overreach itself.

The second issue was the long-standing agitation by the council to have an indigenous head of the police. The incumbent, Mamman Doso was a stranger. The highest-ranking Birom member of the force, Sgt. Salau Udu had just completed a course at the Police College, Kaduna. He had been sent on the course with a view to taking over on completion. So simultaneously with the proposed change in the mode of payment was a request that the adviser should set the necessary machinery in motion for appointing Udu as Chief of Police while Doso would be his deputy. The council spelt out their duties.

Again, Bako rebuked the council for dabbling illegally in a matter that was outside of their jurisdiction. He enumerated the dangers inherent in their actions which included a fall in standard of discipline and a weakening of morale. He then advised the members to always seek the opinion of the adviser before taking decisions and desist from merely communicating what he regarded as instructions to him.

The council did not take Bako’s reprimands lying low. In a strongly worded reaction, its secretary contended that it had
always endeavoured to keep Bako in the picture of things in spite of his obvious shortcomings. The council asserted its primary responsibility for maintaining the police force and its unwillingness to pay the piper for someone else to call the tune. It castigated Bako for his choice of words which was considered as not being ‘responsible enough’.

The Resident intervened to advise that the council should seek a better working relationship with the adviser.\textsuperscript{201} He observed that the council was in the habit of asking for the adviser’s opinion when decisions had been taken rather than before.

Not long after the row, Bako left office. In his handing-over note, he advised his successor against succumbing to pressure for the ouster of Doso and the appointment of Udu. He even misrepresented the report on Udu at the end of his Kaduna course by declaring that he had been adjudged unfit to head a high grade force like that of Jos.\textsuperscript{202} He lauded Doso for his achievements in spite of all odds and doubted if a suitable replacement could easily be found.

Meanwhile, Doso was becoming most uncomfortable in his post and he applied for leave preparatory to retirement with effect from February 1958.\textsuperscript{203} The DO of Jos sought the advice of the SSP (NPF) on the choice of a relief for Doso, asking him to keep in mind the intractable problem of choosing a Birom to head the police.\textsuperscript{204} He literally dictated the expected reply when he noted that he would only ‘communicate to Jos Native Authority such matters as may be of interest to them’.

The SSP was very critical of Doso in his reply.\textsuperscript{205} He considered him unduly intolerant of criticism from the council and advised that the man should be allowed to go if he was no longer prepared to carry out instructions that he (the SSP) thought were for the general benefit of the force. On the question of a successor, he endorsed Udu’s candidature contending that whereas he might not be rated as the best he was quite good and worthy of a trial. He endorsed the view of the regional NPF headquarters that the post be advertised but Udu should be shortlisted.\textsuperscript{206}

Mammas Doso continued in office until 1958. He was eventually pushed out and Salau Udu succeeded him in 1959.\textsuperscript{207} His regime witnessed a rapid indigenisation of the Jos NAPF, especially its officer ranks, with attendant injustices.\textsuperscript{208}
The Jos episode and the consequent developments in the staffing of the force show the extent to which a group of people resentful of alien domination can go to fight their case. The treatment meted out to some long-serving non-indigenes (who were neither Hausa nor Fulani) which led some to quit the force in frustration shows how much the indigenes over-reacted.

**The Provision of Training Facilities**

In the years between 1952 and 1960, the governments in both regions were committed to enhancing the efficiency of their policemen through training but in varying degrees. In the West, training of the officers and men of the NAPFs continued with the assistance of the NPF at the provincial headquarters of the NPF detachments. Occasionally, some senior NCOs of proven ability were selected for training at the Refresher Course School at Eleyele in Ibadan. The plan by the AG government to build a training school for the forces never materialised.

Two issues are of importance in discussing the provision of training to men of the NAPFs in the North. One is the extension of the scope of training beyond the routine subjects that were being offered at the Northern Police College, Kaduna prior to 1952. In a way, the new subjects reflected the changes in the political climate of the region and they were designed to keep a tab on the activities of political parties that were opposed to the NPC. The other issue is the epic struggle of the regional government to get financial assistance from the federal government for its proposed NA Police Wing at the NPC, Kaduna. Its success in the struggle rubbed off on the West that had abandoned its own request for such assistance.

In early 1953, a government circular was issued on the subject of training programmes for NA policemen. It was noted in the circular that due to ‘increasing political agitation in areas policed by N.A. Forces,’ the Lieutenant-Governor considered that the time had come to train selected NA constables and NCOs in ‘specialised duties’. These would include ‘methods of observing suspects and agitators, reporting on public meetings, recording and making of statements and presentation of evidence.’ Selected NA policemen who were attending courses at the NPC, Kaduna would therefore be given special series of lectures to equip them for the duty of intelligence gathering.
The government had members of the opposition parties in mind and it was determined to secure their conviction for sedition whenever they were arraigned in a court of law. As it was stated in the circular,

The speeches of political agitators are frequently more violent when made in areas in which they know that Nigerian Police are not present to give evidence against them.\textsuperscript{211}

The ingredients for proving sedition it was noted, were as yet beyond the skill of most NA policemen. Such a specialised training therefore would ‘help to fill the need for producing reliable evidence where Nigerian Police are not available.’

The move to establish a separate NA police training wing within the NPC, Kaduna began in 1957. In June of that year, the Secretary to the Government intimated to the Commissioner of Police, NPF, the desire of the regional government to have the buildings at the NPC Kaduna extended so that there could be more facilities for members of the NAPFs.\textsuperscript{212} Detailed proposals were prepared by the Commandant of the college.\textsuperscript{213} They were tabled before the regional Economic Committee sometime in August 1957 and were accepted in principle.\textsuperscript{214} The search for funds then began. The details of discussions between the regional government and the federal government on how to finance the project will not be discussed here. The federal government attempted to dodge responsibility for financing the project on the ground that it had turned down a similar request from the West. The Northern regional government protested, contending that there was no basis for comparing the NA police in the North with those of the West because the Native Authority Police Forces in this region play a greater part in the general policing of the North than do their counterparts in the West.\textsuperscript{215}

The blackmail worked. In its subsequent reaction, the federal government informed the regional government that the matter had been taken before the Police Council. Although there was no unanimity among its members that the federal government should bear full responsibility for the project, majority of members agreed that the FG should bear 50% of the cost.\textsuperscript{216} A final reply would be given when the council of ministers had deliberated on the matter.
Eventually the Police Council’s recommendation of 50% assistance was approved but both the North and the West were to be similarly treated.217

It may be that the Western regional government joined the NPF in a partnership to develop the Refresher Course School in Ibadan but the Northern regional government embarked on the building of the NA police wing within the NPC, Kaduna in 1960 and in 1963 it was commissioned by the regional Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello.218 It was jointly financed by the regional and federal governments to the tune of £254,820.

Managing the NAPFs in the Post-Independence Years, 1960-66
In the immediate post-independence years (up to 1966 when the First Republic collapsed) the administration and training of the NAPFs were guided primarily by the concern of the party-governments in both the Northern and Western regions for survival against the sustained onslaught of political opponents. A key issue in the administration of the forces was the desired relationship between them and the NPF. The two regional governments did not wish that there be any doubt as to who owned the forces. There was, therefore, a great sensitivity to the exercise of any undue influence by the NPF.

In the North, the NPF continued to be under strict watch by the regional government; the status quo ante independence in NAPF/NPF relations was maintained. The boundaries that had been defined in early colonial times continued to be observed. The NPF had been so thoroughly marginalised that whatever political sympathies the rank and file might be suspected to have could not have bothered those in power in the North. There was a vigorous drive towards a better quality force through expanded training facilities, improved conditions of service and the encouragement of more literate personnel in the officer cadres. It should be remarked that the Northern regional government controlled by the NPC was better able to attend to the affairs of the NAPFs because the crises of legitimacy and stability were far less than those confronted by the governments in the West.

Premier S.L. Akintola headed three different party governments in Western Nigeria between December 1959 and 15 January 1966.219 The need to be assured of the loyalty of the
NAPFs was greater in the West than in the North. The preponderance of Eastern Nigerians, generically called Igbo, in the officer and other ranks of the NPF and their suspected sympathy for the NCNC, at all times, did not encourage the Akintola governments, at any time, to vouch for their fairness. Akintola therefore sought, from 1961, to keep the LGPFs free from the NPF’s control, or even influence, through changes in the regional and provincial leaderships of the forces. Even the beneficial liaison between the two forces, in matters of training, was greatly reduced. The Akintola government showed that in a crisis situation such as it was in, systematised training that the LGP enjoyed at the NPF Refresher Course School, Ibadan was not as of much essence as the practical use of the men. Recruits and serving members could make do with whatever training their superiors in the LGPF could provide at the headquarters of the various detachments.

In both regions the desire to provide arms for the NA/LG policemen was expressed; it reached a height in late 1965. The motives, when properly scrutinised, sprang more from the desire to ensure a firmer control of political opponents than of common felons.

Under the military regimes of Maj-Gen. J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi (15 January - 29 July 1966) and Lt. Col. (later General) Yakubu Gowon (from 29 July 1966) the NA/LGPFs ceased to exist. Military rule swung the pendulum in the matter of operational control of the forces in favour of the NPF. In the West, it meant a return to the status quo ante 1961. In the North, it amounted to a Pyrrhic victory in the long-drawn battle between the native authorities and regional government on one side and the NPF on the other.

But the Nigerian civil war and the responsibilities it thrust on the NPF which had a visibly thin presence in the North left the control of the NAPFs very much as it had been. That the integration of the NA police into the NPF in the North was not concluded until the cessation of hostilities in 1970 (it had been concluded in the West in 1968) is evidence of the greater reliance on the forces for internal security in the region.
Increasing Regional Government Control in the North

Prior to independence, the NPC government under Sir Ahmadu Bello had been content to issue general policy guidelines on the management of the NAPFs while leaving the various native authorities with the implementation. But the trend after independence was for the regional government to be more involved in the implementation of policies. The tendency towards greater central control was manifested in the guidelines for the appointment of certain categories of NA police officers; the increasing regional government’s interest in the welfare of chiefs of police; the expansion of training facilities and improvements in the service conditions of the rank and file all in a bid to make them compare favourably with their NPF counterparts; the successful lobby for federal government’s assistance; keeping a tight rein on the influence of, or assistance from, the NPF; and the moves towards provincialisation in 1965. In common with the Western regional government, there was the desire to provide arms for the policemen. It is only the moves towards provincialisation of the forces that will be considered in this paper.

An issue that excited a lot of interest from NPF officers but for which the regional government needed only their professional advice was the proposed provincialisation of the NAPFs throughout the region in 1965. The idea of provincialised forces was not unknown in the region before then. It was first mentioned by the Resident of the Niger province in 1939, following the inauguration of the scheme in the Oyo province of Western Nigeria in 1938. It was not welcome then. Although details are sketchy, but there is evidence that an experimental scheme was approved by the regional government for the Kabba province in 1961. But it did not work; because in the annual report on the province for 1962 it was noted that:

> It is most disappointing to have to record that the Provincial Joint Committee, for Police, although only established in 1961, has foundered owing to the opposition of the Chiefs who felt that their prestige was adversely affected by it.220

The NPF which had been disappointed at the collapse of the Kabba experiment thought they had another opportunity to exert their influence when the government came up with the idea of a region-
wide provincialisation scheme in late 1965. In November, a committee was set up to examine the desirability of merging NAPFs into Provincial Police Forces (PPFs) and make recommendations which would be considered by the government.221

The committee was to pay particular attention to (a) the structure of such PPFs; (b) the authority to which the PPFs should be responsible; (c) the financial relationship between native authorities participating in the establishment and maintenance of any PPF; and (d) the relationship between the government and the PPFs. Members of the committee comprised the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government as chairman; the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the regional Commissioner of Police, NPF, a representative of the Attorney-General and the Principal Assistant Secretary (Security) as secretary to the committee.

The committee met twice in November and thrice in December. The memorandum that formed the basis of discussion was prepared by the NPF regional headquarters department with responsibility for NA Police.222 A combined volume of minutes of the committee’s meetings was forwarded to the government on 10 January 1966.223

A close leading of the committee’s report helps to identify some probable reasons for the government’s interest in the provincialisation scheme. One, it was intended that it would further enhance the influence of the regional government vis-à-vis that of the native authorities in the management of the forces. The supra-native authority nature of a provincial force would leave the regional government much latitude in the choice of the head of the force. The holder of the office had to enjoy the government’s confidence and be transparently loyal. He would be much beholden to the regional government. The principle of inter-native authority transfers especially of Chiefs of Police within a province and inter-provincial transfers of provincial Chiefs of Police would no doubt further undermine local control while enhancing central control.

Two, it was part of the conditions to be met before the federal government would accede to the request for the provision of arms to the NA police. The federal government’s own thinking was that this condition, if accepted by the regional government, would
enhance the influence of the over the NPF over the NAPFs. This would come about because the NPF was expected to keep custody of the armouries of the NAPFs in the first few years of the bearing of arms by men of the forces. While the federal government’s thinking did not quite align with that of the regional government’s, the latter was prepared to stoop to conquer.

Three, the scheme was but a short step from turning the NAPFs into regional forces. The increasing concern of the regional government for the welfare of the forces’ personnel as manifested in the reviews of their salaries and gradings, the divestiture of the native authorities of much of their influence over the forces as was being crystallised in the proposed scheme with the concomitant centralisation of control, and the provision of arms, all considered, show that ultimately the forces were to be built into a formidable security organisation. In such a position of strength, they would compare more favourably, and compete more effectively, with the federal NPF.

As it is, the scheme was like a climax to the various measures initiated since independence to enhance the ability of the regional government to combat the numerous threats from opposition parties to the stability of the regime. The threats and efforts at their containment with special reference to the role of the NA police are examined in my detailed study of the forces. The military intervention in politics, five days after the circulation of the report temporarily halted further discussions of the scheme. When it was revisited later that year it was within different circumstances and from different motives.

Meanwhile, a major row over the management of LGPFs in Western Nigeria will be examined.

**Asserting Regional Control in the West**

While the Northern regional government was endeavouring to increase its control over the NAPFs in the post-independence years, the Western regional government was struggling to assert its control over the forces. The process got the government entangled with the NPF and other vested interests. The crisis centred round the leadership of the LGPFs and the degree of influence that could be exercised by the NPF vis-à-vis that of the regional government. The provincialisation schemes of 1938 (in Oyo province) and 1955
(in the wider region) had subordinated the NAPFs in Western Nigeria to the NPF. The 1955 Local Government Police Law did not only widen the scope of provincialisation, it also reiterated the fact of the subordination. The law provided for the appointment of superior NPF officers as Chief Officers at the provincial level and as Superintendent-General at the regional level. All this was evidence of good liaison between the two forces. But in the changed, and constantly changing, political circumstances of the region from late 1959 the continued subordination of one to the other was clearly unacceptable. The Akintola government harboured the fear of sabotage by these NPF officers, especially the Superintendent-General. They had a double loyalty: one to the regional government and the other to the NPF whose political head was the Prime Minister. At that time Akintola’s AG party was the major opposition party to the NPC/NCNC coalition federal government. To free itself from the encumbrance that the arrangement constituted, the Akintola government effected a change in the position of Superintendent-General in 1961. Not unexpectedly, it met with considerable opposition.

Apparently the plan to whittle down the influence of the NPF had begun in 1960. In that year, the government promoted some LGP officers to the rank of Assistant Chief Officer. These officers were expected to understudy the NPF officers serving as Chief Officers with the hope to take over later. The change of personnel in the Superintendent-General’s post can therefore be regarded as advancement in the government’s plan. With the full knowledge and consent of the NPF regional authorities and even the Prime Minister’s office the government appointed one Chief E.A. Oluwole who retired from the NPF as Senior Superintendent of Police in January 1961 to the post on contract, with effect from 13 February 1961. If the Akintola government felt more comfortable at having somebody who had no extra-regional loyalties in the post of Superintendent-General the NCNC opposition in the West, the NPC-NCNC coalition federal government and even the NPF felt bad. They expressed their disquiet not only in parliament but also in the law court.

The Prime Minister must at least have expected that Premier Akintola would react the way he did. The latter took his government’s case to the press by publishing the correspondence
that were exchanged between his office and that of the Prime Minister before Oluwole was appointed. One of the letters was an apology from the cabinet office to retract an earlier accusation that the Western regional government had breached the agreement on when Oluwole should have assumed duty. In his press statement, the Premier disclosed that he would only allow the NPF to resume control of the LGPFs if the NAPFs in the North were similarly treated. He declared that.

Under no circumstances will I accept an inferior status either in degree of authority or standard of efficiency for the Local Government Police Forces of Western Nigeria.

The controversial appointment, and the general question of the maintenance of law and order in Western Nigeria, formed the agenda at a special meeting of the Police Council held in Kaduna on 16 September 1961. It is clear even from the minutes of that meeting, that the grouse of the Prime Minister (and that of his political associates) was more over the fact that ‘a non-serving Nigerian Police Officer’ was appointed than that the appointment was unconstitutional. The Eastern Nigerian delegation called for the scrapping of the post. The LGP should either be brought under the NPF or be run along the lines of the North. The Premier of the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, promised to make available to his Western counterpart a note on the system of NAPFs and their relationship with the NPF. Premier Akintola welcomed the move and promised to amend the relevant law, where necessary, after due consultation with the opposition. The truce was hailed by a section of the press which adjudged the Northern system the better and called on the Western Nigeria government to borrow a leaf from it. But the note prepared by the Northern regional government could only have strengthened the Western regional government’s resolve to keep the influence of the NPF at a minimal level. NPF officers in the North were ‘advisers’ to NAs on police affairs: they were not ‘controllers’.

Even before the appointment was debated on the floor of the House of Representatives, its constitutionality had been challenged in a Grade ‘A’ customary court in Illesa. The criminal case in which the Superintendent-General was the prosecutor involved an NCNC supporter, Seidu Olajire. The defence counsel was Babatunji
Olowofeyewu, an NCNC member of the House of Assembly. Quoting sections of the 1960 constitution on the establishment of police forces, the counsel held the view that the regional police law that created the office was ultra vires the constitution. He applied to the customary court judge to refer the matter to the regional high court for determination.

The question did go before the high court and was decided by Justice O. Somolu in November 1961. The constitutionality of the appointment was affirmed and the case was remitted back to the customary court for hearing. Oluwole eventually lost the office but it was during the Emergency (May-December 1962) when Dr. M.A. Majekodunmi served as the Administrator. While the Emergency lasted, the LGPFs were put under the operational control of the NPF but there was nobody appointed to the office of Superintendent-General. The office was restored in 1963 when the second government headed by Akintola, under the UPP/NCNC coalition was inaugurated. But Akintola had to bow to the pressures of his NCNC partners in the coalition to pick a serving NPF officer, Joseph Adeola, at the time an Assistant Commissioner of Police. In August 1964, a Chief Officer of the LGPFs, Solomon Olujobi was appointed Superintendent-General of the forces. He held the post until 1966 when the First Republic collapsed.

The rest of this paper will be devoted to looking at aspects of the role of the NA police.

The NA Police, the Maintenance of Law and Order and the Protection of Life and Property
The NA police served as (i) symbols of their employers’ authority; (ii) agents of socialisation; (iii) agents in the control of the economy; and (iv) agents in the fight against crime.

The Police as Symbols of the Authority of their Employers
The police played this role very much in the early years of colonial rule when it was necessary to give legitimacy to the newly-created native authorities, some of whom had no basis in custom and tradition as in the more acephalous southerly communities of Northern Nigeria (for example, the Tiv of Benue province).
A major consideration for recognising the pre-colonial dogarai police organisation in the Northern emirates as a unit of administration was that it would help to secure the doubtful loyalty of the Emirs in the early years of colonial rule. What is more it would help to uphold their prestige. The reform measures embarked upon from the late 1920s were carefully handled to ensure that the police were amenable to control by the native authorities. In the words of a perceptive observer, the dan doka was an individual with the head of a dogari superimposed on the trunk of a Government policeman! In other words, the reformation of the dogarai into pun doka was remarkable only in appearance and not in mentality. The reformed emirate NA policeman still saw himself as the loyal servant of the ruling elite and not of the general public. He swore allegiance to the native authority and not to the force of which he was a member. He was obliged to carry out all lawful commands of the native authority, and not just those of his superiors in the force.

The foregoing remarks would explain the censure of an administrative officer, Bryan Sherwood Smith (he later headed the Northern regional administration from 1952 to 1957) for an act that was considered prejudicial to the authority of the Sokoto native authority in 1928. He had investigated a case of murder within the Sokoto NA with assistance from the Government Police. He had thus undermined the authority of the Sultan (as head of the NA) whose NA police he should have used.215

In 1946, the Emir of Zaria was embarrassed by the action of a magistrate who did not seem to favour the manner in which he had used the NA police to exercise his authority. Sometime in May of that year, the Emir went on a tax drive to the Zangon Kataf district. At Zangon Kataf, a young man was alleged to be inciting people not to give information as required under the Direct Taxation Ordinance and discouraging them from paying to the tax collection authority. The Emir ordered his arrest. But the man was rescued from the NA policemen by some of those present at the scene. Three of the rescuers were later committed for trial at the Kano magistrate’s court sitting in Zaria. The facts deposed at the trial did not support the Emir’s contention that he ordered the young man’s arrest because his activities could lead to a breach of the peace. Because he should not have ordered the arrest in the first instance,
the people who had rescued the young man could not therefore be charged with an offence. The Emir protested that the magistrate’s action had undermined his authority and made his position untenable in regard to the efficient and quick collection of tax and the maintenance of law and order.\textsuperscript{236} The magistrate’s position was endorsed by the Attorney-General’s office which ruled that the Emir had acted rather arbitrarily.\textsuperscript{237} But its arguments did not quite sway the administrative officers who thought that the prestige of the Emir must not be lowered before his subjects. The Emir was conciliated.\textsuperscript{238}

The worst abuses associated with this notion of the police as symbol of authority, in the North, occurred in the southerly provinces in the early years of colonial rule. In those parts the NA police institution was created to give legitimacy to the chiefly institution fashioned by the British as an administrative expediency. As has been hinted in this paper, there was a great apathy to the institution among the indigenes of those communities and for very many years the bulk of the police was Hausa and other non-indigenes. The perception of the force in those communities was that it was a Hausa-Fulani ‘force of occupation’ designed to extend Hausa-Fulani hegemony. This did not only make the work of the police difficult, it also created inter-ethnic antagonism which was unrelieved both during and after colonial rule. But the purpose of colonialism was served. The contrived native authorities won recognition for their position and discharged their primary duty of maintaining law and order through the use of the NA police.

Native authorities in Western Nigeria perpetrated similar abuses with the police that they owned. The Alake of Abeokuta, as head of the Egba native administration, used the NA police to protect his economic interests between 1924 and 1936 in a controversy with women dyers over the use of caustic soda and imported synthetic dyes.\textsuperscript{239} The women’s determined struggle combined with the force of public opinion to make him relent.

Egba women are famous for their skill at dyeing cotton cloth to produce what is known as (dire cloth. In 1924, the dyers organised themselves into a guild called the Egba Women Dyers and Adire Trading Union and secured the services of a Lagos lawyer, W.N.A. Geary, to defend them in a controversy with the
Alake over the use of synthetic dyes and caustic soda. The women had been using these materials from the early 1920s. But their use was prohibited in June 1929 by the Egba NA council on the grounds that they were damaging the cloth and thus the trade. A fine was imposed for violation of the order. The police were empowered to search the premises of any woman dyer day or night. The provincial Resident intervened to limit searches to the daytime only. The Alake’s argument was that the measures had been taken to protect the quality of the cloth and the trade in it. But it was known to the women’s guild that he was secretly trading in dyes and caustic soda and that whoever bought from him could use them without being harassed by the police.

After some years of hardship and unheeded pleas, the traders organised to exert pressure on the Alake. They petitioned the Alake, the Egba NA council, the DO, the Resident, the Abeokuta and Lagos members of the Legislative Council, Lagos. The press, particularly The Nigerian Daily Telegraph, publicised the women’s cause. In reaction, the Alake set up a commission of inquiry in July 1936. It later reported that the reasons for the prohibition order were untenable. The Alake accepted the report and removed the restrictions.

What has been attempted here is to show that those who controlled the NA police were, on occasions, inclined to use the police to demonstrate their authority. This, at times, involved the aggregation of their personal economic interests to the communal ones. But police activities also had impact on the economy in a wider sense as the next section shows.

**The Police and the Economy**

Apart from the maintenance of law and order, the other major concern of the British colonialists was the collection of adequate revenue with which to finance the running of the colony. Taxation was one source of revenue. In his critique of the colonial fiscal system, Onimode remarks that:

...colonial taxes were usually oppressive and exploitative with respect to their absolute rates relative to Nigerian incomes, coercive methods of collection, their functional distribution among social classes and the minimal benefits of taxation ...The violent tax raids, together with the
The involvement of the NA police (at times in league with the NPF) in tax collection occasionally provoked violent reactions from the citizenry because of the use of undue force.

There is not much to be said for the involvement of the police in the collection of tax in the emirates of Northern Nigeria because the payment of tax was no novelty. It may be noted that one of the attractions for Governor Lugard in traditional emirate government was its efficient system of taxation, which he adopted with modifications. Not only the types of tax imposed but also the procedures for collecting them were rooted in tradition. Most emirate subjects, in colonial times, continued to view the obligation to pay tax as deriving from their membership in an emirate. The problem of evasion which would necessitate the use of the police to arrest the evaders was uncommon. It often occurred only in the urban centres such as Kano and Laria. But in the non-emirate, southerly provinces of Northern Nigeria, among the Fulani pastoralists and in all of Western Nigeria, the police played a significant role in creating an awareness of the payment of tax as a civic responsibility.

In Western Nigeria, the Egba NA police were implicated in the outbreak of the famous Adubi war of 1918 because of their ruthless enforcement of the provisions of the Direct Taxation Ordinance of that year and other administrative innovations of the colonial authority. While the commission of inquiry into the uprising sat, the most common complaint by witnesses was that after the men in the districts had been conscripted for forced labour, their homes were inspected by police and their wives were arrested and fined for breaches of sanitary regulations. The men were aggrieved at the crude method of exploiting their women in their absence to raise additional revenue. The imposition of tax had not brought an end to forced labour as they had been made to believe.

For most Nigerians, the early 1930s were a particularly trying period. The global economic recession was raging, farmers got little for their produce because prices had plummeted on the world market scene and there were crop failures due to the vagaries of the
weather. Those who were in paid employment, especially those working for the multinational mining and trading concerns, were retrenched, underpaid, or not remunerated at all.

But notwithstanding these harsh economic conditions, the colonial state must be administered and this involved a rigorous tax drive. The incidence of tax was not reduced and taxpayers were more prone to evasion. Some of the exigent economic practices like the local distilling of alcoholic spirits, theft of mining products, and unofficial sale of farm products that the people resorted to in an effort to meet their tax obligations were considered illegal. Those who engaged in then were heavily fined when caught.

The police (NA and NPF) were intimately involved in tax raids and the arrest of those who engaged in unapproved economic activities. It may be remarked that apart from raising revenue for the government, tax raids were a veritable means of self-enrichment for those who were connected with them -- the native authorities, the police and other tax officials. As should be expected, the masses who suffered as a result of the activities of the police saw them as their primary enemies. But the police and their employers believed they were doing their duty as enforcers of the law. W.R. Crocker provides a vivid description of a tax raid on the village of Effugo in Otukpa district within the Idoma division of the Benue province on 16 November 1933. The district had been assessed to pay £487 12s. 6d, but as at 15 November nothing had been paid. According to Crocker, who was then an administrative officer in the division, the district was one of those Idoma districts where ‘tax was paid only when the British political agent was accompanied by a squad of Police.’ So it was with the combined forces of NA and armed Nigerian police that the village was raided.

Property was distrained and fleeing villagers were arrested. The following day, 17th November, there was an auction of seized property. It took the vigilance of Crocker and some of his porters to prevent the district head from stealing some of the distrained property. But the auction provided the district head, the policemen and their relations an opportunity to acquire property at very cheap prices. Thus, in the process of raising revenue for the government,
the agents of government had acted as predators and enriched themselves. Naturally, the dispossessed were embittered.

There were many requests by local council authorities, especially in Western Nigeria, in the 1950s and 1960s, for police assistance in tax raids in their drive for revenue. If the annual statistical records of the police on tax defaulters are anything to go by, their assistance to the councils must have yielded substantial revenue.

Apart from tax collection, the police also helped to swell the coffers of the councils by arresting those who defaulted in paying the many rates levied by councils. The bicycle was the commonest wheeled means of transport in colonial Nigeria. There were NA bye-laws regulating the ownership and use of this means of transport. It was the duty of the NA police to enforce the provisions of the bye-laws and ensure the prosecution of offenders in the native courts. Usually, conviction was by fine and money so realised went into the coffers of the native administrations. It was not uncommon for the police to abuse their office over an alleged violation of the provisions of the bye-laws but not all of them were lucky to get away with it.

In Oyo province, NA police records for the year 1951 showed that out of 952 cases of default against the NA bye-laws on the use of bicycles, 725 resulted in convictions. In 1952, out of the 682 cases reported, 579 resulted in convictions. In just one weekend in August 1957, the Jos NA police seized over 60 bicycles allegedly ridden without current licences in Bukuru, near Jos. Later, at the Alkali’s court, 20 of the defaulters were fined £1 10s. each and ordered to obtain the current licence before leaving the court. The police raid proved effective because in less than two days thereafter, over 450 bicycle licences were issued out.

The NA police at times helped the process of private capital accumulation by multinational companies or their local subsidiaries. Of course, their employers and higher governmental authorities derived personal benefits or revenue from the companies. The NA police were active in recruiting labourers for the mines, keeping them at work and protecting the products. The tin mining companies in the Plateau province of Northern Nigeria, especially during the Second World War benefited from the services of the NA police. The loss of Malaya to Japan in 1942
meant the loss by Britain of its leading source of supply of tin. The colonial government therefore turned to Nigeria. There was need to step up production and that required a lot of manual labour since it was impossible to import machinery. The government encouraged the use of forced labour although a Forced Labour Ordinance had been promulgated in 1933 which banned the use of forced labour in Nigeria.

The cooperation of the NA system was decisive for rounding up and holding labourers on the minefields. Mine labourers had traditionally been recruited from the Plateau, Bauchi, Borno, Zaria and Sokoto provinces. In the circumstances of the war years, efforts were made to recruit labour also from the Benue, Katsina and Kano provinces.

Because of the poor working and living conditions on the mines, there was a high rate of desertions, especially by labourers from the non-traditional sources of supply, that is, Benue, Katsina and Kano provinces. The highest incidence was among labourers from Katsina who were infrequently caught because the Emir was himself averse to forced labour.248

Those from Benue province, made up largely of Tiv, were not so lucky. In October 1942, a special request was made by the Resident to the government in Kaduna for an increase in the number of Tiv NA policemen so that the recruitment of miners, and the holding and arrest of deserters could be better assured.249 The request was duly granted but the government asked for a report on the problems of recruiting and desertion.250

The reply, prepared by the DO of Gboko shed much light on the sub-human working conditions of the mines at the time.251 It was revealed that the aversion of the Tiv to mine work was borne out of past experience when those recruited had been poorly clothed, fed and housed. And the pay was too little to compensate for the hardships suffered. Many Tiv had enlisted in the army not so much because they liked military service but because it provided an escape from conscription as mine labourers. The only way to meet the allotted provincial quota of 8,000 men out of which the Tiv would constitute 5,380 was by coercion in recruiting and holding those recruited on the mines. The DO indicated that his suggestion, made to the Administrative Director of the Mines on the Plateau, that Tiv NA police should supervise conscripted
Tiv labourers instead of the mines managers had been accepted. A similar scheme was being put together by the DO of Jos.

Desertion was also not uncommon among labourers from the traditional sources of labour, like Bauchi province. In September 1942, the DO of Gombe requested his counterpart in charge of Bauchi division for a joint operation of the NA police from the two divisions against thieves in a border village between them. The DO of Bauchi regretted his inability to spare policemen immediately because they ‘are so busy catching runaway labourers, and escorting others to the Mines.

Labourers from the Plateau province were officially classified as ‘voluntary’. But as Bill Freund has rightly contended, the so-called volunteers were actually often the product of strong-arm methods on the part of native authorities. It was common for mines managers to bribe chiefs to augment the labour supply.

In 1947 the Superintendent of Police, NPF, Jos and the Resident put up a case for an increased pay for men of the Jos NAPF. The main thrust of their argument was that unlike the NA police in other provinces, the Jos NA police were in large part responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the mining camps, the protection of mine products and the security of the Europeans. In the words of the Resident,

it should not be forgotten that Government derives very large revenues from the tin mines and it should, I consider, bear at any rate the major part of the cost of policing them.

The government granted the request. Modern currency came with colonial rule. The British administration encouraged the adoption of modern money in three ways. One, it demonetised commodity-currencies. Two, it paid its expanding labour force in European coin. Three, it insisted on receiving taxes in cash rather than in kind. The demonetisation of commodity-currencies, the shortage of British coins (silver and alloy), and the initial unpopularity of currency notes with the public and trading firms, all combined to encourage the counterfeiting of approved British coins.

Counterfeit coining was an economic crime which the government attempted to stamp out by using the police. It had been
detected in the Ijebu province of Western Nigeria in the late 1920s. Its incidence among the Ijebu, who were utilising their skill in smithing, was heightened by the economic depression of the 1930s. The Resident, H.M. Brice-Smith, described the province as the ‘cradle of counterfeit coining.’ Incidentally, the Ijebu among whom this economic crime was most prevalent had a great aversion for police work and the few who showed interest were not recruited in those early years. So the NAPF which comprised mostly strangers had the unenviable task of combating the crime. Many of the people saw them as tyrants and that was not without some justification. They mixed bribery and undue force with their primary duty of preventing the commission of the crime, or where it had been committed, of bringing the culprits to justice.

When Sgt. Gbadamosi Alao (an indigene of Ilorin) who was the head of the Ijebu NAPF CID was convicted and dismissed for what is described, in the records, as ‘breaches of discipline’ in 1929, he drew no sympathy from the local people. He was the scourge of counterfeit coiners but he was notorious for his corruption and oppression.

Counterfeit coining was not a problem in the North. The few coins found there were traced to traders, especially cattle dealers who traded to the Southern provinces. All the same, the police were instructed to destroy any counterfeit coin ‘found in possession of a native.’

In all of the foregoing, police activities have been shown to be significant economically, only to the extent that they helped to improve the revenue base of their employers. Tax raids, court fines and fees imposed on apprehended defaulters on council rates, assistance with the supply of labour to needy mining companies, and the apprehension of economic saboteurs such as counterfeit-coiners might have helped to generate some revenue for the employers of the police. However, it may be argued, that the activities served the ends of social control more because they derived from the enforcement of certain laws and regulations. They did not significantly impact on the level of production (except in respect of the supply of mines labour) nor did they affect the consumption pattern of the community. The enthusiasm for their duties was not without the hope of personal gain through bribery and corruption. Yet the policemen were supposed to play a
socialising role, one that called for the best in their moral attributes.

**The Police As Agency of Socialisation**

A historian of the police in an ex-British colony has observed that the colonialists expected the police to serve as an agency by which the colonised peoples could be brought closer to what the colonialists called civilisation. But this was really no more than the acceptance of the colonisers’ norms of order and regularity. In this perspective, members of the police force(s) would themselves imbibe all the attributes desirable in a ‘good citizen’, and then act as conduits carrying to their fellow subjects desired colonisers’ notions of discipline, order, regularity and so forth.

The British expected the two types of police force (NAPF and NPF) that existed in colonial Nigeria to perform such a role. But it is doubtful that they achieved any significant measure of success. In respect of the NA police, which form the object of this paper, some limiting factors can be identified. The norms of behaviour desired by the colonialists were codified in a plethora of laws, ordinances and regulations some of which were adopted as bye-laws and regulations by the native authorities. The police were presumably socialised into the norms through their training programmes. They were expected, thereafter, to use their position as agents of the state to bring the citizenry into a similar awareness.

It is doubtful that the police were sufficiently enlightened, through training, to perform their expected role. For one thing, the calibre of men recruited was very low. If western education is used as the yardstick, the standard of education attained by the average NA police recruit was Standard IV in Western Nigeria and Standard II in the North. The reference here is to those who enlisted in the forces from 1940. Before then, NA policemen were drawn from illiterate members of the population and leavened with demobilised soldiers and reservists from the First World War. A greater consideration was given to the recruit’s physique than his mental capability which was rarely tested. Even after 1940 when more western-educated recruits began to enlist, the complaint about the quality of men sent for training in the training schools, especially in the North, persisted. Not even the fact that greater
emphasis was placed there on literacy in Hausa than in English could remedy the situation.

Colonial laws and ordinances were written in English and couched in legal terms. While the few literate trainees might have had a smattering knowledge of the laws, the majority could not have grasped the essence. Yet they had the duty to enforce the laws and ordinances. These policemen worked in a largely illiterate society, whose members treated them as an ‘enlightened’ group. The policemen were prone to exhibit knowledge of the laws in a manner that left their victims bewildered. But the truth is that many of them were as ignorant as their victims. The mutual ignorance was often exploited to the advantage of the policemen and the discomfiture of their victims.

**The Police and Crime Control**

Theoretically, the police are merely the agents of society in identifying and apprehending offenders to whom the courts consequently apply the appropriate sanction. In fact, the police play a mediating role in determining which offences will be taken most seriously. Effective crime control by the police requires the mobilisation of their human and material resources. These must be complemented by a good measure of public support.

The NA police benefited from formal training in crime work either at the training schools or the CID units of the NPF in the headquarters of their provinces. Training in crime work included taking of finger-prints for detection of criminals, aspects of the criminal laws keeping of a crime diary, inspection and reports of scenes of crime, description of wanted persons, preparation of case files, interrogation of suspects, care and despatch of exhibits.

In the North, the NA police enjoyed more formal, better organised, school training which was complemented by attachment to the CID units of the NPF in their areas of service. In the West, where formal police school training developed late and even then in fits-and-starts, training in crime work was more by attachment to the CID units of the NPF in Lagos and the headquarters of the provinces. If the evidence of the NA policemen is to be believed, they profited much from the training they received in crime work. In the case of the North, the fact that instruction, especially at the Police Training School, Kaduna was given in Hausa (spoken over
a wide area and made into a lingua franca by the colonialists) helped the process of understanding the concepts that would otherwise have made little sense in their English equivalents.\textsuperscript{266}

There is not much to be said for the provision of equipment for the NA police, especially the means of mobility. Colonial Nigeria was not a motorised society. The bicycle was the commonest wheeled means of transport and the cheapest. Mobility is of essence in crime control work but most native administrations could not provide the necessary quantity of bicycles or motorcycles for their policemen. Ownership of these means of transport was seen as a mark of status within the force.\textsuperscript{267} Beat duties were done on foot. This was irksome, especially for policemen in the more urban settings, because of the areas they had to cover.

There were a few exceptions in regard to the provision of equipment. The wealthy Northern native administrations like those of Kano, Bornoro, Jos, Zaria and Katsina provided communication facilities for their forces. Kano deserves special mention. Its efforts at providing communication facilities for its policemen reached a height in 1957 when it acquired two Volkswagen buses. One of them was fitted with two-way radio, a siren and extra police lamps. In all, the force had seven vehicles in its fleet that year.\textsuperscript{268} In subsequent years, efforts were made to increase the facilities and maintain existing ones.\textsuperscript{269}

Notwithstanding the material handicaps, the NA police achieved some measure of success in crime control. Indeed they are acknowledged to be more effective than their better trained and better-equipped NPF counterparts. Their greater success is generally attributed to their better knowledge of the local environment within which they worked. Because of the knowledge of the culture and norms of the people, it was easier for them to investigate crime and trace criminals than it was for their NPF counterparts who comprised more strangers. Perhaps because of the familiarity with their environments the NA police are reputed to be more daring in the pursuit of criminals than their NPF counterparts. This is in spite of the fact that they were unarmd.\textsuperscript{270}

Quite early in the history of the Sokoto NAPF, the men achieved the feat of controlling the menace of a fugitive robber, Modendobe. Between 1907 and 1910 they did a running battle
with him. He was a jailbird but each time he broke jail they promptly re-arrested him. In March, 1911, men of the same force effectively checked the menace of a gang of robbers on the Kano-Sokoto road. They caught two members of the gang whose conviction at the native court ensured peace for travellers on the road and for citizens of the two villages of Kwotorkoshi and Chafe located on the besieged highway.

Contemporary records on Western Nigeria show that, in 1925, the NA police in Ibadan division of Oyo province successfully prosecuted 614 out of 767 criminal cases taken before the provincial and native courts. The provincial annual report for 1929 was full of praise for the good work of the NA police in crime detection. As stated in the report,

The statistics of crime give some idea of the work that fall to their lot and the peace and good order give testimony to the respect in which they and their duty are held. It is not suspected that much serious crime goes on undetected.

The painstaking trail of a thief in July 1953 earned one constable Jacob Ojo of the Ilesa detachment of the Oyo Provincial LGPF an award of 10s. from the Police Reward Fund. Ojo had acted on a complaint by a trader in Ilesa that he had lost four packets of cigarettes valued at £35. 14s. 4d to a thief. Ojo’s painstaking investigations and zeal took him to Ipetu-Ijesa, which was some distance away from Ilesa. There, he arrested the thief and three others who had, received the stolen goods. The accused persons were later tried at a NA court. The principal accused got six months in hard labour while the three accomplices were fined £3 each or three months in hard labour.

The Borno NA police actively and successfully participated in an international man-hunt for a highway robber in July 1957. Musa Gonimi Tubo had been declared wanted by the French authorities in Chad since 1955. He had allegedly killed 12 French soldiers who attempted to arrest him when he escaped from Chad. He was also said to have attacked 40 persons on the highway before he crossed the border into Borno province. The French authorities promised a reward of £50 for anyone who captured him. A squad of Borno NA police led by Sgt. Alhaji Goni successfully did at a village between Gajiram and Kukawa at about 3a.m. on an
unspecified day in July. He was first taken to Maiduguri from where he was to be handed over to the French authorities.²⁷⁶

The Kano NA police successfully tracked some of those behind the theft of a stock of 43 sheep from Hadejia, early in 1965. Hadejia was the headquarters of the Hadejia emirate within the then Kano province but very far from Kano. The theft had occurred when the boy rearing the sheep was lured into thicker bush and then chased away by the thieves. The sheep owner traced them to Kano and with the help of the NA police recovered 24 of the stock at the Sabon Gari market. Four persons who were arrested for the crime were tried at the Urban Area Court and were sentenced to six months in hard labour each.²⁷⁷

**The NA Police and the Conduct of Politics, 1951-66**

The worst fear that those who have spoken against the creation of State Police Forces harbour is that the officers and men of such local forces will be used to tyrannise political opponents. The ready example these antagonists of the idea cite is the misuse of the NA police by politicians, in the old Northern and Western regions during the First Republic. The commentators who include retired or serving NPF officers, journalists, and public affairs analysts comment as if misuse of the police was a peculiar phenomenon with that type of police organisation. Or as if the phenomenon was unknown during the Second Republic when there was only the Nigeria Police Force. Or as if it has been unknown since the commencement of the Fourth Republic on 29 May 1999.

I have in other writings addressed, in some detail, the issue of the involvement of the police in the conduct of politics in Nigeria from the early 1950s to recent times.²⁷⁸ In this paper, the emphasis is on a few general remarks about the reasons for the involvement of the police (especially the NA police) in the conduct of politics in Northern and Western Nigeria between 1951 and 1966.

A major attribute of a policeman is that he has legitimate access to force; he possesses the sanctioned potential for applying a non-negotiable coercive force in his role as the ‘custodian of official order’. The police are used to undertake the coercive ‘goal attainment’ role of imposing upon groups of the population various objectives perceived by those who wield political power as those aggregating to a desired condition of ‘order and regularity’.²⁷⁹
The involvement of the NA police in politics in the two regions then can be set against the background of the political configurations in each of them. In the North, the governing party was the Northern Peoples Congress, NPC. Significant opposition to the party came from the Northern Elements Progressive Union NEPU, the United Middle Belt Congress, UMBC and the Borno Youth Movement, BYM. In the West, from 1951 and until May 1962, the Action Group, AG, controlled the government. Opposition was from the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (from 1961, National Council of Nigerian Citizens). NCNC. Following the AG crisis, an Emergency was declared by the Federal Government during which an Administrator ruled the Western Region. When constitutional government was restored in January 1963, a faction of the old AG which had regrouped as the United People’s Party, UPP, led by the old AG Premier, S.L. Akintola, formed a coalition government with the NCNC. By 1964, a faction of the NCNC teamed up with the UPP to form the Nigerian National Democratic Party, NNDP. The opposition during these years comprised the old AG between 1963 and 1964, and from 1964, a faction of the NCNC with the old AG.

Politics and government in the pre-and post-independence years were characterised by alliances and coalitions. In the North, the NEPU allied with the NCNC while the UMBC and the BYM allied with the AG. In the West, the NPC, from 1963 allied with the UPP/NCNC coalition and their successor, the NNDP. At the federal level, the NPC formed a coalition government with the NCNC between 1959 and 1964. The coalition government took in elements from the Western NNDP from January 1965. Two grand coalitions emerged on the eve of the 1964 federal elections. One that comprised mainly the NCNC, the AG, the UMBC and the NEPU was called the United Progressive Grand Alliance, UPGA. The other that comprised mainly the NPC and the NNDP was named the Nigerian National Alliance, NNA.

Against the foregoing background of the nature of politics and government, the factors that predisposed politicians in power and members of the various police forces, that they had control of, to mutual dependence will be highlighted.

Politicians in power were inclined to use the police, first, because of the socialisation processes that the successor-elite had
undergone under colonial rule. The colonial state was an authoritarian one, largely intolerant of opposition and the elite had inherited the state along with the authoritarianism. Second, it was necessary for mediating the intra-elite struggle for political power and economic privilege by the political class. Third, it was necessary for the protection of the ethnic power bases of the ruling elite from intrusion by other ethnically-based political parties. Fourth, it was used to show off power to the supporters of the opposition parties. They were made aware of the powerlessness of their members vis-à-vis the capability of the power holders who could utilise such an important state agency for good or evil. Fifth, it was useful to guarantee for the bodyguards or thugs of the power holders immunity from the long arms of justice whenever they committed illegal acts. Sixth, it was ultimately vital for the perpetuation of the governing elite in power.

The amenability of policemen to use by politicians was influenced by one, conformity with their general duty of maintaining law and order. Two, the operational control of the police forces. Three, the desire of opportunistic policemen to advance or secure their careers. Four, the offer of immediate material rewards by politicians. These could be in form of cash, unsecured bank loans, cars, etc. Five, the sympathy of the individual policemen for the ideals of the party in power or for individuals in the party hierarchy to whom the policemen might be related by blood or secret cult membership.

The congruence of the two sets of factors impacted upon the strategies or forms of control exercised by the police. The policemen served variously as spies, controllers of rally or party meeting permits, agents provocateurs, terrorists and active party members.

Not unexpectedly, the activities of the police drew reactions from sections of the citizenry. Opposition party leaders enlisted the services of thugs and bodyguards for their personal protection. Supporters of the opposition parties countered police harassment with violence on the police, their politician-mentors and other agencies of government. Some among the policemen were unwilling to be governmental agents of tyranny. Their inaction was construed to mean sabotage and those who were caught, or so accused, were punished through denial of promotion, threat or
outright loss of job. In the case of Malam Ado Bayero, Chief of Police, Kano NA it meant promotion out of office to the enviable rank of Nigeria’s Ambassador to Senegal in 1962.

Conclusion
The NA police forces were abolished in the late 1960s after the collapse of the First Republic. The memory of them that most Nigerians have retained has been the unwholesome use of the officers and men by the political governing elite to constrain political opponents. In this paper, I have attempted to show that there is a lot more about the history of those forces worthy of note. Beginning with the circumstances of their creation in early colonial times, the paper has highlighted significant issues in their management and control. It has also addressed the various roles they performed. In the analysis, care was taken to compare and contrast aspects of the organisation and control of the forces between the two regions that owned them.

This paper is a much-distilled summary of my book, *The Police in a Federal State: The Nigerian Experience* which is a detailed general history of the forces. Further research work can still be done on individual NA police forces, studies that will dwell significantly on the role of the police in crime control, a duty that those forces performed very creditably when they existed. As the debate about the best approach to the policing of a multi-ethnic, federal nation-state like Nigeria rages on more detailed knowledge of the organisation and role of those forces can be very helpful. My contention is that if the forces had not been abolished, they would have formed the basis for developing the community policing idea that is the vogue in the more settled democracies of the world now.

Notes
5. Ubah. ‘*Administration of Kano Emirate*’. 42
7. Law. *The Oyo Empire*, 101
9. Law. *The Oyo Empire*, 135-6, 139. 166
18. Atanda, *The New Oyo Empire*, 93
20. The name *akoda* is derived from their habit of strapping swords (a-ko-ida) whenever they ran errands or went on missions for their overlords. It appears that it was a peculiar Ibadan organisation. It became widespread in other parts of Yorubaland at the advent of colonial rule and the inauguration of native courts. They served as messengers to the courts but also doubled as policemen until the late 1920s. Atanda cites them twice in his *The New Oyo Empire* (204, 212) and only as agents of the Baale of Ibadan. Interviews with ex-police officers and local chiefs in Oyo, Ife and Ilesa, 1988-89. Many of the interviewees stated categorically that the use of the name akoda came with the establishment of native courts in these towns in the colonial period.
22. NAI. CSO 26/12723 Vol. IV, Annual report, Oyo province, 1929, pg. 82. *Iranse* is messenger/police as most official records translate the term.


37. NAK. Annual Reports on Northern Nigeria, 1900-1911, report for 1908-9, 683

38. NAK. Annual Report for 1909, 694.


42. Okonjo. *British Administration*, 126.

43. NAK. ZarProf. 1858, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 17 December 1919.

44. NAK. ZarProf. 1858, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 17 December 1919. The IGP’s comments were embodied in the memorandum.


46. On the general re-organisation of the central authority in Kano, see Fika, *The Kano Civil War*, chapter VII, esp. 219-229.


48. NAK. KanoProf. 278/1926, Annual report, Kano province. 1926, pgs. 59 & 60. Interview with Mallam Ibrahim Shira, Kano, rtd. NA & NPF officer, 1 September 1988. He linked the label of *yan gadi* with the people’s initial perception of the new uniformed men. They were seen more as night watchmen and were treated and called so. But the people
later came to the awareness that the men did more than keeping watch at night. They arrested offenders against the law and prosecuted in the courts. Gradually, the people began to use the more appropriate label of yan doka (s. dan doka), apparently after 1928 when the government in Kaduna adopted it. Another informant, Alh. Tanko Yakasai, Kano described a reformed dan gadi/dan doka as a man with the head of a dogari superimposed on the trunk of a Government policeman. In other words, what changed was the name not the mentality. The dan gadi/dan doka still saw himself as the employee of the Emir, just like the dogari!

49. NAK. KanoProf 278/1926, Annual report, Kano province, 1925, pg. 63.
50. NAK. MinProf. 17/1928, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 12 February 1928.

51. Okonjo, British Administration, 151-6. Okonjo traces the evolution of this (in 1925) and the Chiefs’ conference (in 1930) as consultative organs in the North. The Chiefs’ conference ended with the creation of the House of Chiefs in the Northern Regional Assembly in 1947. The Residents’ conference continued till the late 1950s. These conferences provided a useful forum for the harmonisation of views on any subject. The Residents’ conference had no equivalent in Southern Nigeria but an imitation Conference of Chiefs was inaugurated for the Western groups of provinces in 1937.

52. NAK. CFR 3/1, Record of proceedings of conference of Residents, Northern provinces, 1928, Lagos, Government Printer, 1928, Subject No. 1, pg. 2.
53. NAK. MinProf. 17/1928. SNP, Kaduna to CSG, Lagos, 27 November 1928, pgs. 2, 4 & 5. In the interview with Mallam I. Shira (already cited), he said that the initial apathy of freeborns to serve as policemen wore off as the Emirs encouraged their children to join the re-organised police. The phenomenon of the son of our Emir is doing the job, let me go and join in it!’ caught on. He further said that the scheme worked also because no Northern Emir felt confident enough to put somebody whose loyalty he could not vouchsafe in charge of the security of his emirate.

54. AHAK. Annual reports on the Northern provinces of Nigeria, 1929, Zaria province, pg. 233.
57. Boyd, Sir Siddiq, 5
58. Boyd, Sir Siddiq, 6; Sultan Abubakar’s reminiscence quoted here was first carried in the Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, No.3, March 1939.
59. NAI. CSO 26/20546/S.2, SSP, Enugu to CSG, Lagos, 13 June 1936.
60. NAK. CFR 3/1, Record of proceedings of conference of Residents, 1928, “Appendix A” - report of the committee on training, pgs. 10 & 11.
61. NAK. MinProf. 17/1928, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 15 October 1928,
The British administrative officers most probably translated the English expression of an ‘enforcer of the law’ into Hausa to derive dan doka (singular) and yan doka (plural). Interviews with Alh. I. Kurawa, Kano (already cited); Mallam I. Shira, Kano (already cited); Alh. Tanko Yakasai, Kano (already cited); Alh. M. Abbas, Zaria (already cited) and Alh. M.B. Wali, (Deputy Inspector-General of Police, NPF, last Chief of Police, Kano NA), 51; Lagos, 8 October 1988.

62. NAK. MinProf. 17/1928, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 15 October 1928.

63. Harisin is Arabic for “eyes”; figuratively, it means “spies” or “informers” both of which relate to policing. Interviews with Alh. Z. L. Mamadi (Commissioner of Police, NPF, Plateau state command; last Chief of Police, Borno NA), 48; Jos, 6 September 1988; Halima Mohammed, (Shuwa Arab, Postgraduate history student, ABU, Zaria), 25; Kaduna, 17 September 1988.

64. For details, see Tamuno, The Police, 63-69.

65. White, Central Administration, 48, 144, 152-3


68. Atanda, The New Oyo Empire, 106-122. Ross had been based in Oyo town as District Commissioner for Oyo since 1 May 1906.


70. NAI. CSO 26/12723, Annual report, Oyo province, 1924, pg. 132.


73. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. I, Resident, Ibadan to DO, Ife, 18 May 1936. The transfer of the headquarters from Oyo in October 1934 was one of H.L. Ward-Price’s anti-Alaafin actions. See Atanda, The New Oyo Empire, 273-8. The headquarters was again moved back to Oyo in 1938 apparently in anticipation of the new status of Ibadan as headquarters of the Western provinces from 1939.

74. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. I, DO, Oyo to Resident, Ibadan, 18 August 1936. He conveyed the Alaafin’s reservations.

75. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. I, DO, Oyo to Resident, Ibadan, 6 July 1939.

76. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. I, DO, Ibadan to Resident, Ibadan, 14
September, 1937. Resident, Ibadan to DO, Ibadan, 16 September 1937.
77. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. I, Ag. DO, Ife to Resident, Ibadan, 7 March 1938.
78. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. I, Ag. Resident, Ibadan to CP, NPF, Lagos, 9 March 1938.
79. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. I, Ag. CP, NPF, Lagos to Resident, Ibadan, 14 March 1938.
80. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. I, Resident, Ibadan to SSP, Enugu, 31 March 1938.
81. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. I, SSP, Enugu to Resident, Ibadan, 12 April 1938.
82. NAK. MinProf. 1728 Vol. 2, Resident, Minna to DOs, 24 June 1939.
83. NAK. MinProf. 1728 Vol. 2, DO, Bida to Resident, Minna, 30 June 1939.
84. NAK. CFR 2/3, Northern provinces Residents’ and Chiefs’ conferences 1946: summary of proceedings, Kaduna, Government Printer, 1946, subject no. 5
85. NAK. MakProf. 57/S.4, “Proceedings of the conference on NA Police, Benue Province, November 1948”.
86. NAK. CFR 3/-, Record of proceedings of conference of Residents. 1929, subject no. 1.
87. NAK. KatProf. 2533, Record of proceedings of conference of Residents, 1937, subject no. 1.
88. NAK. SokProf. 2040 Vol. II, Minute by Provincial Superintendent of Education, Sokoto to DO, Sokoto, 21 August 1937.
89. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. I, DO, Ibadan to DO, Oyo, 14 April 1938. Interviews with Alh. S.A. Elekuru, Ibadan; Chief D. A. Ajagbe, Osogbo; Alh. S.A. Ayansola, Ibadan; Mr. W. Ajani, Ibadan; Chief I.A. Akinyemi, Oyo. All of these men joined the Oyo Provincial NAPF between 1938 and 1941 (Elekuru in Nov. 1938 and the rest in Nov. 1941). Apart from holding the Standard VI certificate, Ajani and Akinyemi also had secondary school education. Ajani attended Ibadan Grammar School from 1934-36 while Akinyemi attended the Baptist Boys’ High School, Abeokuta from 1931-34. They recollected the anxieties of their older, less literate colleagues who had been in the force before them. Those others felt very insecure and considered the more literate ones as those who had come to chase them out of the force.
90. NAI. OyoProf. 2/1, Oy. 2627, IGP, NPF, Lagos to SSP, Enugu, 27 January 1931.
91. NAI, OyoProf. 2/1, Oy. 2627, SSP, Enugu to all Residents, 13 March 1931.
92. NAI. OyoProf. 2/1, Oy. 2627, SSP, Enugu to Residents, Abeokuta, Benin, Ijebu & Ondo, 28 May 1931.
93. NAI. OyoProf. 2/1, Oy. 2627, SSP, Enugu to Residents, 28 May 1931.
94. NAI. OyoProf. 2/1, Oy. 2627, Sur. Resident, Oyo to SSP, Enugu, 11 June 1931.
95. NAI. BenProf. 1/336 Vol. II, Resident, Benin to SWP, Ibadan, 4 January 1940. Interview with Chief E.A. Oke (rtd. CSP, NPF), Ibadan, 29 July 1988 & 6 June 1989. He was seconded to the PTS, Enugu from 1940 Nov. - 1942 Nov. primarily to train NA policemen. He had had his own basic training as a Nigerian police recruit at the school in 1937.

96. NAI. AbeProf. 2/1782 Vol. II, SWP, Ibadan to Resident, Abeokuta, 3 June 1941.

97. NAK. SokProf. 2040 Vol. II, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 21 July 1938.

98. NAK. JosProf. 3665, Record of the proceedings of the Conference of Residents, 1940, subject no. 6.

99. NAK. JosProf. 3665, Record of the proceedings of the Conference of Residents, 1940, resolution 10.

100. NAK. CFR 2/3, Record of the proceedings of the Conference of Residents, 1944, subject no. 11, the resolution.

101. NAK. SokProf. 2040 Vol. II, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 2 August 1944.

102. NAK. SokProf. 2040 Vol. II, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 14 August 1944.

103. NAK. ZarProf. 3803 Vol. II, Record of the proceedings of the Conference of Chiefs. 1945, Appendix to subject no. 10.

104. NAK. MinProf. 1728 Vol. II, Ag. CSG, Lagos to SNP, Kaduna, 14 September 1946.

105. Tamuno claims that a Southern Police College was built at Ikeja, Lagos about the same time. See Tamuno, The Police, 179. It may be remarked that until the late 1950s NA police from Western Nigeria were not allocated places at the Ikeja school.

106. NAK. ZarProf. 4125, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 4 July 1949.

107. NAK. MinProf. 1728B Vol. II, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 6 May 1950. Among those who attended the refresher course within the first two years of its inauguration were Mr. P.M. Tiyi (last Chief of Police, Jos NA.), 68; Cocin Church, Kuru, Jos, 8 September 1988; he attended the course between July and December 1950; Alh. M. Abbas, Zaria (already cited), attended in 1951; Chief C.I. Agum (rtd. ACP, NPF; last Chief of Police, Tiv NA), 62; of Tsar-Mbaduku, Vandeikya, 14 September 1988, attended in 1952. Within the same period, the following had their recruit training there: Malam I. Shira, Kano, attended between June and Dec. 1952; Alh. Ibrahim Kurawa, Kano, attended between Dec. 1951 and May 1952; Mr. T.A. Yusuf, Makurdi, attended in 1952; Mr. 1.Y. Ihundu (ex-NA police officer, Tiv NA), 54; Tourist Lodge, Adikpo, 14 September 1988, attended between June and December 1951.

108. NAK. ZarProf. 4125, The list of subjects has been compiled from some report sheets prepared on some Zaria NAPF candidates.


110. NAK. MakProf. 57/S.2 Vol. II, Commandant, NPF, Kaduna to all...
Residents, 15 August 1951
111. NAK. MinProf. 1728B Vol. II, Commandant, NPC, Kaduna to all Residents, 30 March 1951
112. NAK. MinProf. 1728B Vol. II, Commandant, NPC, Kaduna to all Residents, 30 March 1951.
113. NAK. MinProf. 1728B Vol. II, Commandant, NPC, Kaduna to all Residents, 30 March 1951. Mr. T.A. Yusuf, Makurdi served in that capacity while he served in the Jos NAPF, before he transferred to the NPF in 1963.
114. NAK. CFR 3/-, Record of the Conference of Residents, 1929, subject no. 1.
115. NAK. CFR 3/-, Record of the proceedings of the Conference of Residents, 1928, subject no. 1.
116. NAK. MinProf. 80/1928 Vol. I, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 12 August 1929.
118. NAI. CSO 26/3/20546/S.2, IGP, NPF, Lagos to CSG, Lagos, 25 February 1932: ‘Secondment of European police officers to native administrations.’ The first paragraph in this memo is a summary of the request from Kaduna.
120. NAI. CSO 26/3/20546/S. 2, SNP, Kaduna to CSG, Lagos, 21 November 1932.
121. NAI. CSO 26/4/3 1 86 1 Vol. I, IGP, NPF, Lagos to CSG, Lagos, 4 June 1936.
123. NAI. CSO 26/3/20546/S. 2, SSP, Enugu to CSG, Lagos (no date). The Secretary, Southern Provinces was literally begging Saunders, through the office of the CSG, to have mercy.
125. NAK. MakProf. 57/S.2, SNP, Kaduna to all Residents, 3 December 1936.
126. NAK.CFR 3/1, Record of the proceedings of the conference of Residents, 1937.
127. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. II, CP, NPF, Lagos to CSG, Lagos, 18 March 1939.
130. NAI. OyoProf 1/1078 Vol. II, Resident, Oyo to SWP, Ibadan, 6 June 1939.
131. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. II, SWP, Ibadan to Resident, Oyo, 7 November 1939.

132. This assessment is based, primarily on information from archival records on the man. It is also endorsed by those who worked with him that I spoke with in the course of my oral interviews. Interview with Chief D.A. Ajagbe, Osogbo. He worked closely with de Boissiere in Ibadan between 1942 and 1947. Ajagbe regarded the man as his professional mentor. Many of Ajagbe’s colleagues with whom I spoke also mentioned de Boissiere’s love for Ajagbe. Also, S.A. Elekuru, Ibadan; I.A. Akinyemi, Oyo; and S.A. Ayansola, Ibadan, all recalled de Boissiere’s zeal for professional excellence.

133. NAK. ZarProf. 1858, DO, Zaria to the CP, NPF, Zaria, 14 July 1934.

134. NAK. ZarProf. 1858, CP, NPF, Zaria to DO, Zaria, 19 July 1934.

135. NAK. KanoProf. 795/S.6, The account here is a summary of unreferenced minutes on the row between Sharp and the Galadiman Kano.

136. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. II, The Olubadan-in-council to DO, Ibadan, 7 May 1940.

137. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. II, The Olubadan-in-council to DO, Ibadan, 7 May 1940.

138. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. II, The Olubadan-in-council to DO, Ibadan, 23 May 1940.

139. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. II, DO, Oyo to Resident, Oyo, 12 June 1940; also minutes of Oyo native administration council meeting of 24 June 1940.

140. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. II, SP, NPF, Ibadan to Resident, Oyo, 2 July 1943.

141. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. II, SP, NPF, Ibadan to DO, Ibadan, 31 January 1944.

142. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. II, SP, NPF, Ibadan to DO, Ibadan 31 January 1944.

143. It will be cited as Native Administration Police Forces Rules, 1944.

144. NAPFs Rules, 1944. Paragraphs 28, 29 & 35 were amended in the Western version to confer the native authority’s powers on the NPF officer-in-charge.

145. NAK. CFR 2/3, Summary of the proceedings at the conference of Residents, 1944, subject no. 13.

146. G.A.V. de Boissiere was transferred back to the North in that year. He reportedly felt bad at being posted back there. Interview with D.A. Ajagbe, Osogbo. By the way, Ajagbe disclosed that de Boissiere spoke fluent Hausa and had a Hausa houseboy but he could not speak Yoruba. There is evidence from archival records that he was in Kano between 1951 & 1953. Another informant, who served only in the NPF, told me that de Boissiere died in Jos in the middle or late 1950s. Interview with Mr. T.T. Oketunji (rtd. CP, NPF), 65, of Illobu Rd., Osogbo. 19 July 1989.

147. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1078 Vol. III, SP, NPF, Ibadan to Resident, Oyo, 20 January 1947. Just as Ajagbe found in de Boissiere a professional
mentor, so did S.A. Elekuru, Ibadan consider V.P. Birch. Elekuru’s living room is adorned with photographs of the man. Elekuru earned two accelerated promotions under the man in March (from constable to corporal, skipping the rank of Lance-Corporal), and June (to Sergeant), 1947. The certificates of commendation are glazed and displayed in the living room.


149. NAK. MIA 701. The full report is not available but the section on NAPFs was attached to the letter cited in n. 148 under the title, “Extract from Report on Colonial Police Forces by Inspector-General of Colonial Police. Organisation of Police Forces and Native Administration,” pgs. 48-49.

150. Paragraph 48 of the report.

151. Paragraph 49 of the report.

152. Paragraph 49 of the report.

153. NAK. MIA 701, Ag. CSG, Lagos to SNP, Kaduna, 2 June 1950.

154. NAK. MIA 701, SEP, Enugu to CSG, Lagos, 3 June 1950; Commissioner of the Colony, Lagos to CSG, Lagos, 27 June 1950; also SWP, Ibadan to CSG, Lagos, 29 July 1950.

155. NAK. MIA 701, SNP, Kaduna to CSG, Lagos, 11 September 1950.

156. NAK. MIA 701, SWP, Ibadan to CSG, Lagos, 29 July 1950.

157. NAK. MIA 701, ACP, NPF, Kaduna to SNP, Kaduna, 8 July 1950.

158. NAK. MIA 701, SNP, Kaduna to CSG, Lagos, 11 September 1950.

159. NAK. MIA 701, Governor, Nigeria, Lagos to Secretary of State for the Colonies, London, 23 April 1952.


162. This was part of the reform of the local government system in the West. For details, see Gboyega. Political Values, chapter 3.

163. NAI. IfeDiv. 1514 Vol. VII, Ife District NA Council, minutes of meeting held on 28 May 1952 with the Minister of Local Government, Hon. Obafemi Awolowo.


165. NAI. OyoProf. 1/6206, Secretary, Ijesha Divisional Council, Ilesha to
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice and Local Government, 14 May 1955.

166. NAI. Published in the Western Region Gazette No. 40 of 1 September 1955 as the Local Government Police Law 1955. Hereafter cited as LGP Law, 1955.

167. LGP Law, 1955, Part V, s. 23.

168. LGP Law, 1955, ss. 2 & 19.

169. NAK. MIA 728, Ag. Deputy-Governor, Western Region to Secretary to the Government, Western Region, Ibadan, 31 December 1954; Commissioner of Police, NPF, Ibadan to Inspector-General of Police, NPF, Lagos, 2 January 1955.

170. LGP Law, 1955, s. 22.


174. AHAK. Nigerian Citizen, 23 February 1957. News item carried in a column on Kano affairs by ‘Maigani’. The reason for Kabiru’s loss of office was not stated. But in the course of my oral interviews within and outside of Kano, I gained some privileged information about why Kabiru lost office.

175. Kabiru had himself, most probably, succeeded a cousin. My assumption here is based on information contained in the Nigerian Citizen issue of 25 February 1949. A short news item carried therein indicated that the Chief of Police, who was ‘a nephew of the Emir (i.e. Abdullahi Bayero, Kabiru’s father) was indisposed. The inference here is that the post had been a royal family privilege for quite some time.


177. AHAK. Nigerian Citizen, 17 April 1957.

178. AHAK. Nigerian Citizen, 17 April 1957.

179. AHAK. Nigerian Citizen, 5 June 1957. Banner headline titled, ‘Police Chief of Kano NA resigns from Assembly.’


181. AHAK. Nigerian Citizen, 26 October 1957.


183. AHAK. SNP 15/ACC.349, Resident, Kano to SNP, Kaduna, 8 July 1951; ASP, CID (NPF), Kaduna to SNP, Kaduna and SSP, Special Branch (NPF), Lagos, 10 July 1951. Glimpses of the character of Sanusi as Croman Kano can be gleaned from these letters.

184. For details of the charges against Emir Sanusi, see Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition, 279-82.
185. ZarProf. C.5/1953 Vol. I, DO, Zaria to SDO, Zaria, 30 December 1955; Resident, Zaria to CP, NPF, Kaduna, 6 March 1956. These two letters contain the bio-data of Mamman Sule. I got another insight into Sule’s character from Alh. M. Abbas, last Chief of Police, Zaria NA, already cited. He admitted that Sule was insubordinate to NPF advisers and generally arrogant. But he credited all that to the fact that Sule was a product of the elite Katsina College and he was very intelligent. He, therefore, tended to resent taking instructions from people he considered he was superior to intellectually. He considered himself, and was made to feel that he was, an asset to the administration of the emirate. Abbas could not remember the facts about Sule’s removal from office; but he remembered that Sule gave him his letter of resignation to type.


193. I can make this claim on the basis of comments by informants in Kano, Zaria, Jos and Kaduna where Bako worked. Informants included I. Shira (Kano), M. Abbas (Zaria), S. Udu (Jos), Alh. M.D. Yusufu, Rtd. IGP, NPF, (Kaduna), 12 September 1988. Yusufu, however, added that Audu Bako was later, as Governor of Kano state, very reluctant to have the NA Police merged with the NPF, in the years between 1967 and 1968. The NPF authorities had to threaten him with removal from office to get his cooperation.

194. NAK. JosProf. S.71, Ag. Admin. Secretary, Jos NA to ASP (NPF) Adviser, Jos, 16 May 1957. In the interviews with Messrs. Salau Udu and P.M. Tiyi, they admitted that there were irregularities in the payment of salaries. These two men were the consecutive successors to the post of Chief of Police after Mamman Doso against whom the complaints had been lodged.

195. NAK. JosProf. S.71. Ag. Admin. Secretary, Jos NA to ASP (NPF) Adviser, Jos, 16 May 1957.

196. NAK. JosProf. S.71. ASP (NPF) Adviser, to Admin. Secretary, Jos NA,
Jos, 20 May 1957.

197. Doso was Hausa from present-day Niger Republic. Oral interviews with S. Udu, P.M. Tiyi and T.A. Yusuf. Yusuf, a Yoruba man served in the Jos NAPF from 1951-63 when he joined the NPF from where he retired as Deputy Commissioner of Police in April 1988.

198. NAK. JosProf. S.71, Admin. Secretary, Jos NA to ASP (NPF) Adviser, 16 May 1957. Udu was not aware of the details of the correspondence between the council and the adviser. But he was well aware that the council was determined to get rid of the alien Chief of Police. He spoke with passion on the domination of the NCO posts in the force by non-indigenes. He confessed that he reversed the trend after he got the post in 1959.

199. NAK. JosProf. S.71, ASP (NPF) Adviser to Admin. Secretary, Jos NA, 20 May 1957.

200. NAK. JosProf. S.71, Admin. Secretary, Jos NA to ASP (NPF) Adviser, Jos, 28 May 1957.

201. NAK. JosProf. S.71, Resident, Jos, to Admin. Secretary, Jos NA, 1 June 1957.

202. NAK. JosProf. S.71, Handing-over note by A. Bako to his successor dated 12 July 1957. A contrary version of the report on S. Udu was given in SSP, NPF Jos to DO. Jos, 22 October 1957.

203. NAK. JosProf. S.71, DO, Jos to SSP, NPF, Jos, 17 October 1957

204. NAK. JosProf. S.71, DO, Jos to SSP, NPF, Jos, 17 October 1957.

205. NAK. JosProf. S.71, SSP, NPF, Jos to DO, Jos, 22 October 1957.

206. NAK. JosProf. S.71, SSP, NPF, Jos to DO, Jos, 22 October 1957.


208. S. Udu enumerated the steps he took while in office between 1959 and 1965 to indigenise the force, especially the NCO cadres. They all amounted to denying justice to some deserving non-indigenes. T.A. Yusuf linked his transfer to the NPF to frustration. He mentioned two other non-indigenes (a Yoruba and an Igbo) who had to retire on the rank of Sergeant. P.M. Tiyi tried to correct some of the injustices when he was Chief of Police, 1965-70. He successfully pushed the case of two Igbo members who had been prevented from attending refresher courses in Kaduna while Udu was in office. Udu attributed Tiyi’s magnanimity to ineffectiveness, claiming that it was because of Tiyi’s own inadequacies that he sought to elevate those who were doing the job for him!

209. One of my ex-NPF officer informants, Chief E.A. Oke, first had a teaching stint there in the 1950s. He later served as the commandant from Oct. 1960 - June 1961 and Feb. 1965 - Jan. 1966 when he retired from the force. All my ex-NA police informants trained there.

210. NAK. JosProf. S.71, Civil Secretary, Kaduna to all Residents, 5 March 1953.

211. NAK. JosProf. S.71, Civil Secretary, Kaduna to all Residents, 5 March 1953.
212. NAK. MIA 712, Secretary to the Governor, Kaduna to CP, NPF, Kaduna, 7 June 1957.
213. NAK. MIA 712, CP, NPF, Kaduna to Secretary to the Governor, Kaduna, 20 June 1957.
215. NAK. MIA 711, Memo by Minister of Finance, pg. 7.
216. NAK. MIA 711, Ag. Governor-General, Lagos to Governor, Kaduna, 24 October 1959.
217. NAK. MIA 711, Governor-General, Lagos to Governor, Kaduna, 30 November 1959.
218. NAK. MIA 702 Vol. II, Speech by the Premier, Northern Region, delivered on the occasion of the opening of the Native Authority Police Wing of the Northern Police College, 30 November 1963.
222. NAK. MIA 707 Vol. II, Memo titled ‘Provincialisation of the Native Authority Police Forces,’ prepared by ACP, Dept., NPF’. Mallam Audu Bako who signed the memo had been a campaigner for closer NAPF/NPF cooperation since the early 1950s. The committee met on 17 & 29 November; 3, 21 & 28 December 1965.
224. Oral interviews with D.A. Ajagbe, I.A. Akinyemi and S.A. Elekuru. Ajagbe was one of those appointed. The others were S.A. Olujobi, J.L. Alao and J.A. Oloyede.
225. Daily Times, 1 September 1961. Premier Akintola’s correspondence with the office of the Prime Minister and the replies on the subject of Oluwole’s appointment earlier in the year were published in this issue of the paper. They were released to the press by the Premier in reaction to the Prime Minister’s comments on the floor of the House of Representatives on 29 August. See also Western Nigeria Gazette, Vol. 10, No. 14, 23 March 1961. In the interview with Chief Oluwole, he saw the
controversy as mere politicking.

226. House of Representatives Debates, 29 August 1961, columns 2437-2471 for the comments of members for and against the motion.


231. NAK. MIA 702 S.1, ‘The System of the Northern Nigeria Native Authority Police Forces and their relationship with the Nigeria Police Force.’


233. 1961 WNLR 286. Olowofoyeku later served as Minister of Education (1963) and Minister of Justice and Attorney-General (1964-66) under Premier Akintola. In the course of my interview with him, he could not initially recall the case. But as it turned out, his ‘memory-failure’ was a result of his deliberate effort to shut the events of those years from his consciousness. He seemed to have had a particularly raw deal in the hands of Justice Somolu in the aftermath of the fall of the First Republic. Somolu was chairman of the committee that investigated the assets of some key government functionaries in Western Nigeria.

234. Interview with Chief Adeoye Adisa, Ibadan, 25 June 1989. He was the Minister of Home Affairs in that administration. He lost office in 1964 when the NNDP was formed because he declined to renounce his old NCNC allegiance.


236. NAK. ZarProf. C. 14/1946, Resident, Zaria to SNP, Kaduna, 23 August 1946.

237. NAK. ZarProf. C. 14/1946, Crown Counsel, Kaduna to SNP, Kaduna, 2 September 1946.

238. NAK. ZarProf. C. 14/1946, SNP, Kaduna to Resident, Zaria, 24 October 1946; Crown Counsel, Kaduna to Resident, Zaria, 6 January 1947; Minute by Resident, Zaria to Mr. C. Williams, Zaria, 24 January 1947.


243. Crocker, W.R. *A Critique of British Colonial Administration*, New York,
244. NAI OyoProf. 1/1589/7, Oyo Province Local Government Police, Annual report covering 1 January - 30 November 1951.

245. NAI. OyoProf. 1/1589/7, Oyo Province Local Government Police, Report for I December 1951 - 30 November 1952.

246. AHAK. Nigerian Citizen, 17 August 1951.


248. Freund, Capital and Labour, 141.

249. NAK. MakProf. 4/1, 2945, Resident, Makurdi to SNP, Kaduna, 31 October 1942.

250. NAK. MakProf. 4/1, 2945, SNP, Kaduna to Resident. Makurdi, 3 November 1942.

251. NAK. MakProf. 4/1, 2945, DO, Gboko to Resident, Makurdi, 11 November 1942.

252. NAK. BaProf. 382. DO, Gombe to DO, Bauchi. 18 September 1942

253. NAK. BaProf. 382. DO, Bauchi to DO, Gombe. 29 September 1942.

254. Freund, Capital and Labour, 143.

255. NAK. MIA 2/42, R.1923, Resident, Jos to SNP, Kaduna, 2 August 1947.

256. NAK. MIA 2/42, R.1923, SNP, Kaduna to Resident, Jos, 29 December 1947.


261. TNAI. IjeProf. 4/J.567 Vol. I, The staff list of Ijebu NAPF for 1932 shows no Ijebu out of the 22 members.

262. NAI. IjeProf. 4/J. 306 Vol. I, DO, Ijebu-ode to Resident, Ijebu-Ode, 6 March 1929.

263. NAK. MakProf. 4/1, 1036, Minutes of Government Police/NA Police Conference, Kaduna, 22-23 September 1934; 24-25 February 1936.


266. All the ex-NA policemen that I have chatted over the years have claimed to have benefited much from their formal training in crime work.

267. In 1949, the Chief of Police, Ilorin NA, Sule Share was dismissed from office by the Emir. He had become disgruntled and derelict in his duty because his employers did not honour his request for a motorcycle loan. Nigerian Citizen, 4 March 1949.
269. Interview with B. Wali, last Chief of Police, Kano NA.
270. All the officers of the NPF, some of whom served either as advisers or officers-in-charge of the NAPFs in the North or the West, remarked that the NA police were better at crime detection. Interviews with Chief E.A. Oke, who was officer-in-charge of the NAPFS, Abeokuta province, 1955-57; Ibadan/Oyo provinces, 1958, Benin division, 1959; Chief E.A. Oluwole, oversaw the Ondo province NAPFs, 1951-53; Mr. T. Pam, was Adviser to the Kano NAPE, 1963-4.
271. NAK. SNP7/1851/191 1, ‘History of Sokoto from it’s (sic.) conquest by the Administration to 3 1 March, 191 1 : Summary of Major Events,’ Report for 1910.
274. NAI CSO 12723 Vol. VII, Annual report, Oyo province 1929, pg. 64.
275. NAI. IleDiv. 1/1, 1207 Vol. Ill, Officer-in-charge, Oyo to Ijesha NA, 21 July 1953.
277. KDL. Daily Comet, 4 March 1965.
278. See. for example, Rotimi, K. The Police in a Federal State, Chapter 5 & Postscript.
280. For information on these parties, see Dudley, B.J., Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, London, Frank Cass, 1968.
Local Authority in Gombe Emirate with particular Reference to the Creation of the District Head System, 1902-1920

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Introduction
This paper discusses the creation of the District Head system in Gombe by the British. This system can be said to have become firmly established by 1913. However, the paper takes us up to 1920 because this was the period when some of the title-officials retained in the District-Head system after 1913 were finally phased-out. This was also the time when the Emirate capital was transferred to Gombe-Doma, a transfer, which had among other effects, some bearing on the subsequent development of the District Head system during the later colonial period.

In establishing their own type of local government from 1902 onwards, the British undertook the following steps: (i) They created homologous Districts by merging together all the villages within a particular area, thus dividing up the Emirate. (ii) They based authority on territory and subordinated everyone within a given area to the same official. This official was called a District Head. (iii) They also appointed a single tax-gathering authority (the District-Head) in each given area (i.e. District), thereby drastically reducing the levels in the tax-gathering hierarchy. Thus, the British integrated tax-collection and administration. In undertaking these measures the British not only greatly reduced the number of the 19th century participants in the political system but also the number of participating units—ethnicities, families and clans.

Immediately the British completed the conquest of the capitals of the Emirates of the Sokoto caliphate (including Sokoto itself) and even while the pacification of the towns and villages in the Emirates was still going on, the British began to establish their administrative control over the former Caliphate area. The process
involved the creation of different levels of administrative structures.

The first major administrative step was the grouping of Emirates into a number of provinces. These provinces, including Borno and many other areas that did not fall under the Caliphate, were named the Northern Provinces. Secondly, each of the Provinces was broken into Divisions, and the headquarters of the Emirate within each Division became the headquarters of the Divisions. Thirdly, the various Divisions were, for effective administrative control, broken into homologous Districts. However, during the first two decades of colonial rule, the British created in most of the Emirate what they referred to as ‘Sub-Districts’ with the aim, principally of phasing-out the numerous title-holders, Kofofi, Jakadu and slave officials. By the 1920’s in Gombe, for example, most, if not all the Sub-districts had been phased-out and what were left were what were called “Main Districts”. Lastly, in each Main District there were villages that were grouped together. Each village was regarded as an administrative unit and had a village head. Each large village or town was also divided into smaller administrative units called wards.

The following were the titles of the various officials who were in-charge of these levels of government; the British, of course, were first and foremost the ultimate authority.

At the Regional level the British instituted the office of High Commissioner, later known as Lt. Governor. The Sultan (formerly Amir al-Mu’minin or Caliph) of Sokoto who in the 19th century had been the overall authority for the whole of the Caliphate, was reduced to the position of an Emir even though the British still, nominally, regarded him as the highest indigenous authority within the Indirect Rule System.

At the Provincial level, the colonial government instituted the office of Resident, while a first class Emir (so termed by the British) in a given Province, was regarded by the British as the highest indigenous authority. At the Divisional level within each Province, the British placed a Divisional Officer (popularly called a D.O.), while an Emir of an Emirate within a Division was the highest indigenous authority. It is necessary to point out here that, as far as the colonial government was concerned, the divisional
level was the lowest of posting of the colonial political or administrative officers. The remaining levels of administration had indigenous officers as their authorities. Thus, in the various Districts (which the British, of course, had created) that formed each Division, the colonial government appointed District Heads. These in turn had under them officials termed village Heads. Lastly came ward heads who were in charge of the smallest administrative units. The various indigenous authorities from the Emir to the Ward Head while they were known by official titles also had traditional titles, which varied (and still vary) from one Emirate to another, and from one locality to another within a given Emirate.

Having discussed the various levels of administration established by the Emirate, we wish to point out that this paper is concerned with one particular level, that is the creation by the British of the District Head system in Gombe from 1902–1920.

The Structure of Gombe Emirate, Division and Bauchi (Formerly Central) Province

This section deals with how Gombe emirate was grouped under Gombe Division and also under Bauchi province. It also deals with the problem of the boundary of the Emirate on the eastern parts of the Gongola River, which continued to shift towards and away from Biu Division (Borno Province) between 1902–1936. An understanding of these developments is necessary because this will enable us to know precisely the position of Gombe Emirate within Bauchi Province during the period under discussion.

After the occupation of the Sokoto Caliphate, the British re-organised and in some cases altered the boundaries of the former Emirate when creating the various Provinces and Divisions, even though each Emirate was made ‘independent’ and ‘metropolitan’. Sokoto was constituted into an Emirate, with the sultan as its Emir. In some cases new Emirates were created out of a single Emirate and often assigned to different Provinces. For example, three additional emirates were carved out of Zaria (Zazzau) namely Keffi, Nassarawa and Jama’a, and put under Nassarawa Province. However, none of the areas of Gombe Emirate was constituted into a separate Emirate and Gombe Emirate itself became part of Bauchi (Central) Province. But Bauchi Emirate itself did not
escape Colonial Government reorganisation. Two additional Emirates were carved out of the Emirate: one, namely Wase, was put in Muri Province.\textsuperscript{4} Up to 1920, Bauchi the parent Emirate, was, along with Gombe and the formerly independent kingdom of Ningi, constituted into a Bauchi Province.\textsuperscript{5} In this Province were also included the Independent’ Tangale and Waja Districts. In 1926, Katagum, Misau and Jama’are Emirates (which until then were grouped with other Emirates as part of Kano Province), were transferred to Bauchi Province.\textsuperscript{6}

In the 19th century, all the Emirates and their Emirs were regarded as equal by Sokoto however small or large, wealthy or poor; there was therefore no ranking of Emirs. However, under the British, the Emir of Bauchi was classified as “First Class Emir”.\textsuperscript{7} Thence, he was the paramount indigenous authority in the Province. The Emir of Gombe was categorised as Second Class and was not made a First Class Emir until 1953, though even after that, he remained subordinate to the Emir of Bauchi by virtue of the Provincial grouping, under British Northern Nigeria. The ostensible reason for the grading of Emirs by the British was in general based on tax revenue considerations and population of the Emirates that formed a Province, although this general policy was not always strictly observed.

In August, 1903 (after the defeat of Attahiru I in July of the same year at Bormi) Gombe Emirate was placed under the political charge of Mr. C.L. Temple, Resident, (stationed at Bauchi), and was incorporated into Bauchi Province.\textsuperscript{8} In October, 1904, Frederick Lugard, the Lt. Governor of the Northern Provinces, visited the Emirate on his way to Borno. He passed through Gombe-Abba to Nafada and then proceeded to Gujba (in Borno).

It is most likely that it was at the time of this visit by Lugard that the British fixed the Emirate’s boundaries with Borno and Yola Provinces. The Gongola River was roughly taken, as its Northern Boundary,\textsuperscript{9} and most of the areas on the left bank of the river (from Nafada-east and Southeast) were put in Borno and Yola Provinces. Thus, the Tera Villages (Gwani, Shinga, Wade, Hina etc), which, though they had not been incorporated into Gombe Emirate in the 19th century (they had actually paid some nominal allegiance to Gombe and later Bormi) were merged with Borno
Province. Areas like Shani, Gulani and so on were similarly not incorporated.

It is necessary to state here that all the Tera areas (such as Gwani, Shinga, Wade and Hina) on the left bank of the river Gongola, continued to be shifted to and from between Biu and Gombe Divisions until 1936 when they finally remained as apart of Gombe. For example, between 1902-1906/7, the areas were put under Gujba in Borno Province. In 1907/8, the areas were returned to Bauchi Province and placed under Gombe Emirate. Then during the 1926 major boundary adjustments in Northern Nigeria, the Gongola River was again taken as the boundary between Biu and Gombe and so the areas were put under Biu division (Borno Province). Ten years later (in 1936), the areas were finally returned to Gombe.

In 1906, Gombe Emirate, with the Tangale and Waja, Tula, Awok, Dadiya and Cham areas were formed into an administrative division called Gombe Division. Later, Tula, Ture, Tangaltong and Cham Districts were constituted out of these that had been merged with Gombe Emirates as a Division.

Between 1902–1919, Nafada was the British Military Station and also served as a European trading centre. In fact it was also the Headquarters of the British Colonial Political Officer (the D.O.) in the Emirate. For two years after Attahiru I’s battle with the British at Bormi (July, 1903), the British stationed a Military detachment at Gwani, probably to ward-off potential revolt from those who continued to flock around Gwani–Bima Hill area, an area very close to Bormi.

Gombe-Abba remained the Emirate’s administrative headquarters from 1902–1914 when the Emir Umaru was moved to Nafada. In 1919, the colonial government finally moved the headquarters of the Emirate to Doma and then raised it Gombe-Doma, which has remained the capital to data. The former 19th century capital, Gombe-Abba, since then has remained just a village headquarters!

In official British administrative nomenclature, Gombe Emirate, like all other Emirates of Northern Nigeria, was designated a “Native Authority” (N.A).
The Evolution of the District Head System 1902-1920

In this section we are going to discuss those aspects the British found most trouble–some about the pre-colonial system of local government in the Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, when they came to evolve their own system of local government.

The period of the evolution of the District Head system in the various Emirates of Northern Nigeria varied from one Emirate to another depending on, among other things, how effective or otherwise, each Emirate government was at the time of the British conquest, and the complexities of the pre-colonial local government systems in each of the Emirates.

In Gombe Emirate the extension of British control to the towns and villages or the formation of homologous districts, started after two major events in the area between 1902 and 1903. The Emirate capital can be said to have been occupied on 25th February, 1902 with the submission of Emir Umaru to the British. But the Mahdist-state within the Emirate, that of Bormi under Mallam Jibril also had to be occupied. On 15th March, 1902, Jibril was captured after a battle at Toungo and exiled to Lokoja where he died in 1907. On 15th March, 1903, the British took Sokoto town and the reigning Caliph. Attahiru I left Sokoto on Hijra to the holy lands of Islam Mecca and Madina via Kano and Gombe. The British in their bid to prevent this attempt at Hijra, fought the Caliph and his followers on Gombe soil–at Bormi, the Mahdist centre. It was only after the killing of the Caliph together with over Seven Hundred of his followers that Gombe Emirate and indeed the whole of the former Sokoto Caliphate can be said to have been finally occupied by the British.

To fully understand the changes introduced by the British in the Pre–existing administrative and political structure of Gombe Emirate, it is necessary to discuss in some detail what the British said to have disliked about the Pre–existing system of local administration in the Emirates of Northern Nigeria in general. After this we will also consider the principles and philosophy, which the British used to develop a system of homologous Districts.

Lugard in his Political Memoranda identified three problem areas, which he referred to as ‘evils’ (to colonial government interests) inherent in the Pre–existing system. These were: - (a)
absentee rulers (b) tax–gatherers (Jakadu) and (c) disconnected areas of jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{11}

Absentee rulers were referred to by Lugard as “Fief–Holders”\textsuperscript{12} who resided at the capital of Emirates. These were in fact the Emirates titled–officials (including the Kofofi, and Ubandakuna) who had various communities of the country–side attached to them for the purposes of tax–collection. In Gombe Emirate, these titled–officials were certainly not the rulers–as Lugard claimed–of the communities attached to them. Lugard identified various reasons, which he suggested were responsible for these so–called “absentee rulers” having to reside at the capital of the Emirates. Among such reasons was that there was:

\[\ldots\] A natural tendency for the Fief–Holders fearful of sinister influences which might rob them of their precarious titles, and anxious to share in the councils of their overlord to reside as much as possible at the capital, and to leave their territories to be misgoverned in their absence by a Deputy (Jakada). The Emirs on their parts were not less desirous to retain their powerful vassals at the capital, lest, they should grow too independent in a distant Province.\textsuperscript{13}

It should be noted that the Gombe titled–officials, in the 19th century were central government officials. They resided at the capital in order to perform central government duties.

As for the tax gatherers–the Jakadu–who were agents of the title–officials, it seems the ‘evil’ Lugard pinpointed in the system was in the manner of their appointment, the powers they wielded and the distribution of the tax collected. The tax–gatherers were appointed not by the Emirate government but by their masters (the titled officials) and such a system was certainly against British interests and their concept of local government. The tax–gatherers also wielded considerable power and influence in the country–side since they alone had the ears of the titled–officials. In addition the tax–gatherers were the first to take a portion of whatever tax revenue was collected and handed over to them by the local authorities.

Concerning the last–mentioned ‘evil’–the disconnected areas of authority–the problem the British faced centred on how in the Pre–colonial period the titled officials had held jurisdiction over and claimed taxes from and number of areas that were frequently
not homologous.\textsuperscript{14} Lugard claimed that the areas under the titled–officials were:

\begin{quote}
(...) Detached areas situated like islands in the heart of another jurisdiction. This state of things necessary increased the evils of absentee rulership and caused a conflict of authority.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

It needs to be pointed out here that in reality, the titled–officials in Gombe (many of whom were Fulbe Clan Heads) had jurisdiction (based on personal allegiances) and collected taxes not on territory basis but from the various communities who were attached to them, many of whom (for example the itinerant Fulbe Clan Groups) were found in different areas of the Emirate at different times of the year.

Thus, what the British considered most troublesome about the pre–existing system of local administration were the titled–officials who resided at the capital of the Emirates of Northern Nigeria, the *Kofofi*, the slave–officials, the *Jakadu* and the discontinuous matter of authority and responsibility. It seems therefore that the problem of the British centred on the entire basis of authority.

In the Pre–colonial system, authority was frequently personal (e.g. to clan head or to a particular individual). The British however, wanted to base authority on territory, so that everyone within a given area would be subordinated to the same official. The British obviously could not base their system on personal allegiances–most especially since these generally worked against their interests. The British wanted to have a system where the tax–gathering authority was the responsible official and they integrated, of course, tax–collection and administration.

For the British, the function of local government was first and foremost for tax–collection, and they saw taxes as the sign of allegiance.\textsuperscript{16} As Perham has noted:

\begin{quote}
No branch of administration demands a more realistic relationship between the government on the one side and the people upon the other than the collection of revenue.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

She also remarked that in order to “(...) cleanse and regularise the methods of taxation in the Emirates, reform into the whole
administrative system had to be undertaken”.

The reform of the Pre-colonial methods of taxations thus brought about the formation of homologous districts.

**The Formation of Homologous Districts**

This section discusses how Districts were formed in Gombe between 1902–1912 and how those that had been created by 1912 were amalgamated into three Districts in 1913. Also discussed are the methods actually followed by the colonial government in creating the Districts and in amalgamating them in 1913.

The British undertook the formation of homologous Districts gradually because as Lugard put it:

> ...The whole object of this (new) system of taxation (and administration) is that it should be based on Native Tradition and custom to an extent probably hitherto untried in any Colony or Protectorate.

Therefore, the colonial government first issued The Land Revenue Ordinance of 1904” in which the Emirs were to pay over one-quarter of their revenue to the Government. Meanwhile political officers were instructed to begin an assessment of the value of production in the various Emirates and also to inquire into the methods of Pre-colonial tax collection. It was through this inquiry that the British discovered the discontinuous matter of authority and jurisdiction and the multiplicity of tax-gatherers. They also discovered that neither the titled-officials in whose names the taxes were collected or their agents were the administrators of the rural communities attached to them.

In 1906 therefore, the government took a further step. A proclamation in that year authorised the Residents to assess the taxability of the people (of the Emirates), appoint District-Heads and Village Heads who were to collect taxes and punish evasion and extortion. To do this, the three ‘evils’, which Lugard referred to, had to be abolished.

The new local government as such took the following form. To make the new system resemble the traditional or pre-colonial local government system, the British appointed some of the title-holders as District Heads, and made them reside in their Districts and be responsible to the Emir for their administration. Because
the Jakadu the tax–gatherers, were so disliked by the British, they were all dispensed with. Their responsibilities were taken over in part, by the District Heads, who collected the tax from each village in accordance with his assistant, in part by the village Heads, who collected from individuals. The detached areas of jurisdiction were eliminated and the District under each District Head was made self–contained or homologous. The task of eliminating detached areas of jurisdiction in Gombe, however, like in most Emirates was done gradually over a period of some years.

With the above arrangement, therefore, the British decided to source their aims by outlawing extra–territorial lines of organisation and the family or patriarchal conception of authority, by rigorously upholding territoriality as the basis of controlling the towns and villages of the Emirates of Northern Nigeria. Inevitably this entailed the subordination of some traditional authorities to other authorities with whom they had previously been of equal status. It also entailed a large–scale withdrawal of recognition from the title–holders, Kofofi, slave–officials, Jakadu etc, since a necessary corollary to the territorial rationalisation of the system was a reduction in the number of participants in the political system. Hence, the exercise was bound to meet with resistance in one form or another and the British realising this went rather cautiously about carrying out their reforms.

In Gombe Emirate, the British did not face serious problems over forming homologous Districts as they did in some Emirates such as Kano. This is because, the British took over an area where the machinery of state had effectively ceased to exist. Therefore, the way was more open for the British to do what they wanted since there was virtually no effective administrative system to oppose them.

The following extract from a report by T.F. Carlyle, clearly illustrates the point made above that there was virtually no effective administrative system in Gombe.

Having regard to the broken state in which the Administration found Gombe Emirate, the Rulers without following, and the Rulers and people alike stricken by poverty–the natural sequence of anarchy (accentuated, it is true, a blight which in the years 1904 and 1905, had brought severe famine) it could not have seemed unjust if the
administration had ignored the claims of small Fief–holders and cut the Emirate forthwith into substantial districts.27

However, the British still decided to be cautious as Carlyle himself quickly added:

It was thought well, however, to proceed cautiously because of the conservative nature of the people, who had no truer conception of our aims and because the capacity and temperament of the various native officials were yet unknown quantities.28

Because the British were not faced with any opposition when they began to experiment with their theories of administration, they not only amalgamated the Twelve Districts they had formed by 1912 to just three in 1913, but they also drastically reduced the number of ‘noble’ families with authority to only four. The questions to be asked here therefore are: How exactly did the British go about doing this: And what happened to the other ‘Noble’ families (including slave officials and the Non-Fulbe)?

In evolving homologous Districts in Gombe, the British took into consideration such important factors as territorial contiguity, ethnic grouping and the historical connection between the various communities. In the appointment of District–Heads most were selected from among the title–holders who had various communities attached to them for tax collection. The idea was basically to make the new arrangement appear ‘traditional’. The following were the officials the British found holding office in 1902 and whom they (the British) categorised into two broad divisions according to whether an official was in-charge of many or few towns and villages. Table 1 illustrates the categories:
Table 1: Titled-Officials and the Towns attached to them at the time of the British conquest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category (a) officials with many towns and villages</th>
<th>Category (b) officials with few towns and villages</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarkin–Dabe</td>
<td>Damburam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarkin–Magi</td>
<td>Santuraki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madawaki</td>
<td>Waziri</td>
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<tr>
<td>Galadima</td>
<td>Magajin–Gari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarkin–Yaki</td>
<td>Ardo Na’i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciroma</td>
<td>Alkali Gombe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yerima (also Akko’s Kofa)</td>
<td>Turaki (Kofa to Madawaki, Sarkin–Magi and Ardo Maituta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajiya (Kofa to Sarkin–Yaki, Sarkin–Dabe and Ardo Walama)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first change made by the colonial government in their drive towards the formation of homologous Districts and the appointment of District - Heads, was concerned with communities or towns and villages attached to Ajiya Hama Seyo. Before the imposition of British rule, the Ajiya in addition to being a Kofa had the following towns and villages attached to him for tax - collection purposes. These towns included Zaune, Malala, Kalam, Dukku, Birnin Bolewa, Birnin Fulani, Nafada and Jagali together with all their outlying hamlets. What the British did was to take Nafada and its adjoining hamlets away from the Ajiya and leave them under Sarkin - Nafada who was then appointed District - Head. To Nafada was also added a strip of land taken from Biri (Bolewa). The reason for this, according to the British, was the hostility the people of Birnin - Bolewa had shown towards them during the Bormi war with Caliph Attahiru I.30 Sarkin - Dukku was also made the District Head of Dukku. At this time Kalam together with the remaining part of Birnin Bolewa and the whole of Birnin Fulani were retained by the Ajiya who was then made a District–Head.31

In the Northeast of the Emirate, the activities of Mallam Jibril Gaini, had forced many of the predominantly Fulbe communities to concentrate in a few towns and villages particularly Toungo and Dukul. Other settlements were Jillahi and Ribadu. In all these towns were found an admixture of people following diverse titled officials. The British created three Districts out of these towns.
These were Jillahi (including Ribadu), Toungo and Dukul Districts. These Districts were then placed under Turaki, Sarkin Magi, and Madawaki respectively as District Heads. Bage, which was before the coming of the British attached to the Shettima, was now constituted into a District and Sarkin Bage Bubakari was appointed as its District Head.

It can be observed here that during this early period of the British drive towards homologous Districts in Gombe, many, if not most of the Districts created, were in fact single towns and in some cases, at best, towns together with their outlying farmlands and hamlets.

In the Eastern parts of the Emirate, the Tera areas East of the Gongola River, which were put under Biu–Borno Province in 1904 and transferred to Gombe in 1906, were amalgamated into a District with the Sarkin Gwani as the District Head. As for the Tera, West of the river, such as Deba, Lubo, Zambuk and so on, together with Akko and Pindiga and other Jukun Villages, they were made into a District with the Galadiman Akko as the District Head. The plain Waja areas were also made into a District and the Sarkin Yaki appointed as the District Head.

As for Central Gombe, the predominantly Bolewa towns of Gadam, Bojude, Kafarati and Kom-Fellata were made into a District under the Santuraki as District Head. The towns North of the Gongola Lafia, Zauna, and Malala were made into Malala District and the Magajin Gari was appointed District Head.

Between 1908 and 1911, the entire District mentioned above underwent some re-organisation, and a number of those appointed District Heads by the British lost their positions. The slave–officials in particular were all dispensed with.

The first District–Head and Emirate title–holder to lose his position was the Ajiya who was relieved of his post. Kalam, which was his main area, was merged with the Dukku District. Biri and Jillahi Districts and the towns of Wawa, Beledigga, Keffiwol were formed into one District and put under Yerima Jalo.

In 1908 the Waja district was taken away from the Pre-colonial Sarkin Yaki family. This was brought about by a proposal made by the D.O. in December, 1907 in which it was reported that “the Sarkin Yaki, placed in-charge of the Waja District, has not hitherto proved himself capable of doing his work and it was
proposed, the following year, to substitute for him the *Yerima* Jalo*. However, in 1903 the District was given not to *Yerima–Jalo*, but to Musa a son of the Late Emir Kwairanga by a Waja mother, who subsequently, acquired the title of Sarkin Yaki as well. This was not all happened to the former *Sarkin Yaki* family. Kunde, the family’s slave–farm was merged into the Dukku District. Dabewo, the headquarters of *Sarkin Dabe*, was also merged with Dukku, while the Sarkin Dabe was required to take charge of Gombe Abba town and later Hashidu—across the Gongola on the left bank. By the end of the colonial period, Hashidu had been placed under Darazo (in Bauchi).

By 1912, the British had been able to form the following homologous Districts in Gombe Emirate.

*Table 2: Districts and their Heads as formed by the British by 1912*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Districts Head</th>
<th>Identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Dukku</td>
<td>Sarkin–Dukku</td>
<td>Pullo–Geno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Malala</td>
<td>Magani–Gari</td>
<td>Pullo–Royal Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Gadam</td>
<td>Santuraki</td>
<td>Pullo–Royal Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Nafada</td>
<td>Sarkin–Nafada</td>
<td>Pullo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Biri And Jilla</td>
<td>Yerima</td>
<td>Pullo–Royal Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Bage</td>
<td>Sarkin–Bage</td>
<td>Bolewa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Toungo</td>
<td>Sarkin–Magi</td>
<td>Pullo–Magi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Dukul</td>
<td>Madawaki</td>
<td>Pullo–Tara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Gwani</td>
<td>Sarkin–Gwani</td>
<td>Tera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Akko</td>
<td>Galadiman–Akko</td>
<td>Pullo–Gona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Waja</td>
<td>Sarkin–Yaki</td>
<td>Pullo–Royal Family</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It may be observed here that by this period only one the Yerima out of the three former Kofofi had been retained, and three town rulers or leaders, Sarkin Dukku, Sarkin–Bage and Sarkin–Gwani, had been elevated to District Headship positions. In addition, all title–holders of slave–origin had been discovered. Hence, the powerful Ajiya and Turaki from then on restricted to palace functions only. However, it is important to point out here that the office of the Ajiya again came to have a territorial responsibility attached to it from 1950 onwards.
In 1913, however, the twelve districts were amalgamated into three main districts only, and were named Dukku, Nafada and Akko under Sarkin–Dukku, Yerima and Galadima–Akko respectively. According to Carlyle:

In regard to the special wish of the Emir (Umaru) the Dukul district was left in status quo; but it was clearly understood that this District should merge into the main Nafada District on the death or deposition of the present Madaiki.37

This simply shows that the British tried to accommodate of social class which they used as collaborators and they were willing to pay the cost of so–doing, even though this compromised their reorganisation policy.

The amalgamation was defended by the Divisional Officer in Gombe as follows:

This amalgamation was not planned arbitrarily but based on good reason. In the first place Burunde, Galadiman Akko, Haruna Sarkin Dukku and Yerima Jalo had proved themselves by far the most efficient Headmen.38

The quotation above mentioned that the Headmen were efficient. The question which should be asked is: efficient in doing what? Presumably in collecting taxes and turning them over to the treasury–since these were the things the British were concerned about.

The D.O. in addition to commenting on the District Head also tried to rationalise the composition of the new Districts. Concerning Dukku District, he wrote that:

Dukku District as now formed, represents (roughly speaking) the old Kalam Kingdom (sic) in its entirety, and, on the conquest of the Kalam Bolewa by Buba–Yero, their decadence and the continuous occupation by the Dukku Fulani of the greater part of their territory, may be fairly based on a claim by the present Sarkin–Dukku, Lineal descendant of Ardo Abdu, full and elder brother of Kottokore, to have supplanted the Bolewa dynasty.39
As regards Nafada District, the issue was about the appointment of the *Yeriman* Gombe as the District Head. The Divisional Officer defended his decision as follows:

Yerima Jalo, too, by Gombe Custom applicable to *Yerimas* in relation to their own immediate *Sarki*, is presumptive successor of the Emir of Gombe and it would seem right, under the control of an impartial Administration, that the most broken and difficult of the amalgamated Districts, Nafada, should be set aside as the training ground of future Emirs.\(^{40}\)

The new residential status of the District–Head is discussed later in this paper. The establishment of an *Alkali* court, the appointment of district staff, and the construction of a palace, as well as the salaries of the District Head themselves were immediately under taken by the Colonial government.

In the case of Nafada, the British combined the succession tradition of Gombe Emirship with a practical method of training future Emirs of Gombe. In the 19th century, the *Yerimas* of Gombe had been given training principally by greater participation in the *Jihad* were and in the central administration, for example, representing the Emirs in various functions including visits to Sokoto. With the British conquest, most of such functions were no longer tenable. But the British also seemed to wish to test the capabilities of those who aspired to become Emirs. Therefore, it was only logical for the British to assign to the *Yerimas* the District they considered most fragmented and likely to be difficult to administer.

Why Nafada was the most difficult of the amalgamated Districts to administer may be explained by the fact that it contained the most volatile areas in the history of the Emirate–Bormi, Bajoga etc. these had been the strongholds of the Mahdists under Jibril Gaini, and also the area (Bormi) where the Sokoto Caliphate had taken its bitter and final organised Military stand against the British. Close to Bormi also, was the Bima–Hill (at the foot of it is the Tera Town of Gwani), where many legends, both Muslim and Non-Muslim, connected with the Bima–Hill area were, and still are current. These legends include, belief that the Mahdi would first appear in this area before moving to the East!
To this day, the people of Gwani believe that certain supernatural occurrences regularly take place in the Bima–Hill area. For example, someone may suddenly appear out of nowhere leading a ram, or bright lightning may flash in a clear sky. Should anyone witness these happenings, it is though that this prayer will be answered. On Akko District, the British were of the view that:

The merger of the Gwani and Waja Districts into Ako (Akko) presented the least difficulty of all, for the Sarki-Gwani was but an exalted Village Headman and Musa Sarkin Yaki, who owed his present officer and-title youngest, and after Yerima Jalo, the most promising of Koiranga’s sons, might look, with confidence, for better things in the future.”

It is clear from the above comments by the D.O. that the British were more concerned about the District-Heads they appointed than the problems of administering the communities of the Districts. The British were wrong in considering the well being of the ruling class instead of considering the real problems of governance. As from the 1930’s the Gwani and other Tera areas and Waja, both in Akko, became problem areas for the British in lace of Nafada, which they earlier thoughts would be the most difficult District to administer. In fact Akko District was the first to face fragmentation even before Nafada and Dukku. The British themselves as early as 1915, just two years after the amalgamation of the Districts, removed Waja from Akko and even made it a District independent of Gombe Emirate.

This proves that the initial merger was not without difficulties. In 1926 Gwani and other Tera towns east of the Gongola River, which were part of Akko district were also transferred to Biu Division of Borno province. But, when these areas were finally returned to Gombe Emirate in 1936, Akko District not only lost the Gwani areas, but also all Tera towns West of the Gongola, to the newly created Yamaltu District.

To conclude this section, we have demonstrated how by 1913 the British had reduced the number of participants in the local authority system, or the number of “noble families” with power and authority until ultimately there remained:
a. The ruling family (with Emir and Yerima)
b. The Fulbe Genno and Fulbe Detibe/Dembo (Dukkan)
c. The Fulbe Gona (two branches)—Akko

In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the number of participating units (ethnicities, families, clans and so on) were also reduced. The reduction in participating units was undoubtedly one of the factors leading to the new politics of the 1950’s and 1960’s when, particularly after independence, there developed a re-awareness of ‘ethnicity’. The next questions which we have to deal with then are: what happened to slave-officials and also to the non-Fulbe?

The Fate of the other Districts Heads
This section discusses the fate of the District Heads whose areas had been amalgamated into three Districts by 1913. Initially they were all retained as Sub-District Heads to be phased-out gradually. By 1919 their fate had been decided. Some of them were phased-out (through death or retirement) while others were reverted to the position of village heads. At the time of the amalgamation of the Districts whom were former title-holders) whom they had to redeployed or dismiss. Table 3 shows the nine Districts-Heads whose districts were merged into the three main Districts in 1913:

Table 3: The nine District Heads appointed between 1902-1912 whose District were merged into the three main Districts in 1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>District Heads Title (Holders)</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Local Ties Title holder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Madawaki</td>
<td>Pullo</td>
<td>Pullo Tara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Magajin-Gari</td>
<td>Pullo</td>
<td>Pullo Janafulu Royal family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Sarkin–Dabe</td>
<td>Pullo</td>
<td>Pullo Dabe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Santuraki</td>
<td>Pullo</td>
<td>Pullo Janafulu Royal family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Sarkin–Magi</td>
<td>Pullo</td>
<td>Pullo Magi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Sarkin–Yaki</td>
<td>Pullo</td>
<td>Pullo Janafulu Royal family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Sarkin–Nafada</td>
<td>Pullo</td>
<td>Ruler of Nafada-Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Sarkin–Bage</td>
<td>Bolewa</td>
<td>Bolewa Ruler of Gwani-Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Sarkin-Gwani</td>
<td>Tera</td>
<td>Ruler of Gwani - Town</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The British considered them as divisible into title-holder, while the second group (n.7-9) were according to the British:

Territorial leaders by origin, but who had attained the position of District Headmen under the Administration rather by fortune than by merit, and whose good fortune had not been shared by other headmen (not District Headmen) or like nature such as the Sarakuna Biri, Pindiga and Deba among others.43

From T. F. Carlyle, we get the following information:

Though some of 2nd class (7-97) are indeed or Fulani origin yet by prescription and the practical absorption of the Habe (non-Fulbe) element, they (Assarkin Dukku) may fairly be conceded – to stand in the shoes of the old Habe chieftains whom their ancestors ousted.44

We may state here that there is no oral or written evidence from the colonial administrative records on the reactions of these District Heads (or title holders) over their fate. Judging form the reports of the colonial administrators, however, it can be inferred that the problem of what to do with these officials was a major concern of the British at the time.

The British deemed it unwise to suddenly discard too many of the former title-holders and therefore, some of these were retained for some time (as sub-District Heads) while others were so restored to their former position as rulers of towns or villages and categorized by the British as Village Heads.

This happened without any reported violent reaction! Those that were permitted to remain as sub-District Heads were phased-out gradually. They however, retained their former salaries (when they were district-Heads between 1902-1912), which were based on taxes collected by them. The salaries of the three were fixed (on same amount) and not related to the taxes or population of their Districts. The following were the salaries of the sub-District Heads in December 1912.45
The three officials who became District Heads of the three main Districts in 1913 had the following as their salaries during the same period (1912):

1. Yerima–Biri Jillahi £170
2. Sarkin Dukku–Dukku £300
3. Galadima–Akko £290

The British seemed to have temporarily retained the sub-Districts not because they wanted them or feared chaos. This can clearly be discerned from the comments of the Resident Bauchi, who observed that:

The salaries to those should prevent cause for intrigue and dissatisfaction, which factors have to enter largely into re-organization schemes. In return for their salaries, they should help the (three) District Headman in whatever way they were required to do.\textsuperscript{46}

The following additional comments by the British further reveal some of their personal prejudices about the local government, which perhaps explains why the sub-district heads were quickly eliminated by attrition. The Resident Bauchi noted that:

The majority of the present sub-district heads are of little used: and some of them are highly paid. For some item, however it will be preferable to thus employ personages who otherwise might be mischievous as idlers. To title holding (Sarauta) idlers, I am entirely averse.\textsuperscript{47}

In 1915, the Resident of Bauchi summed up the whole problem by remarking that the sub-district heads were:
Superfluous and their retention was, as noted, only an act of policy; the holders had been clearly warned of their positions.58

In effect what this means is that the British were willing to seize the slightest opportunity to dispense with anyone of these officials. Such a situation had arisen as early as the period 1915-1916, barely two years the amalgamation of the Districts. In June, 1915, the Resident Bauchi reported that:

Three of them (the Sub-District Heads) finally proved the indivisibility of further retaining them in office. These were, the Madaki, head of Dukkul Districts, Sarkin-Magi, Subhead of Tongo, and Sarkin-Dabe Subheads of Gombe group (...)? the two heads (Madaki and Sarkin Magi were implicated in an extortion case and were offered as an act of grace the choice of resigning or standing trial. They rendered their resignations, which the Emir (or the British?) accepted. They will not receive pension.50

Thus, the two were dispensed with, Dukku, which earlier on had been kept as a District on the personal request of the Emir, was merged, as originally intended with Nafada main District. As for the third person, Sarkin Dabe, the British claimed that:

...The age and uselessness of the third were found to be retarding progress, and the emir agreed (or the British decided?) that he ought to retire.51

The British, however, admitted that the Sarki-Dabe was not found guilty of any irregularity and therefore allowed him to have a maintenance allowance of £36 p.a.52 and this is a clear testimony that the British just wanted to dispense with these officials, no matter by what means.

In June, 1916 it was reported again that “The unsatisfactory conduct of the Head of the Nafada sub-District of the Nafada District caused the reduction of his salary from £120 to £96 p.a”.53 The fact that the British used these vague wordings goes to further confirm the point we have just made above concerning the real intentions of the British. In the same year it was reported that the sub-district head of Bage died, His successor son Waziri Hammadu was appointed Sarkin-Bage but just as a village Head.54
In 1917, the D.O. of Gombe mooted a suggestion on what would happen to another sub-district head. Reporting to the Resident of Bauchi, he suggested that:

(...) If the Magajin Gari were to again show disrespect to Sarkin-Dukku, his deposition would mean a saving to Revenue and the proper and salaried village, Headmen–Sarkis Zaune, Malala, Lafia and Tali would come” into their own.  

In 1919, a natural opportunity arose with the death of Damburam Gombe. The D.O reported to the Resident Bauchi that:

I have advised (or instructed?) Santuraki should take over Gombe (Abba) group now his brother Danburam is dead and Dagam (Sub-district of the Santuraki) merger with Dukku take effect forthwith.

It is clear that by the time of the transfer of the Emirate capital from Nafada to Doma in 1919, the rest of the sub-districts were merged with the three main districts and their heads either phased out or some of them, like Sarkin Nafada, appointed village Heads or at best Heads of a Village Group area. In their places, the British put local headmen who were from the localities. The plan for this was clearly stated at the time of the amalgamation i.e. that “the Sub-Districts retained as such by Magaji, Sarkin-Dabe and Santuraki, should gradually be eliminated in favour of less arbitrary sub-divisions under local Headmen (with less presentation).” Therefore, each village Headman subsequently became directly responsible to the District Head instead of first to the Sub-District Headmen. It needs to be added here that all these reflect the British interest in efficient tax collection and nothing else; they saw each stage as a change for “Corruption and embezzlement” (and of course, each stage was traditionally where the various title-holders got their revenue). The British were quite right when they stated that they did not want a proliferation of pompous of indirect rule, and a great many Village Heads (i.e. tax collectors, which is what a Village Head actually was).

To conclude this section, the D.O. Gombe reported in 1920 that “The Heads are now shown as Sub-District Headmen.” From then on, in all the quarterly, half-yearly and annual reports, references were made only to Districts and Village areas.
The Three Main Districts Composition and Character

The discussion on the composition and character of the Districts (Dukku, Nafada and Akko) is confined to the capital of the emirate from Nafada to Gombe. This is to enable us to see how and why they were split into more three districts between 1936 and 1960 - the year of Nigeria’s independence. The latter aspects are outside the scope of this paper.

The Headquarters of the Districts

It was the policy of the colonial government that District Heads must always live in their Districts. In the case of Dukku and the Galadiman Akko as District Heads, they automatically solved the problem of sitting the headquarters of those Districts, since both officials were resident in those areas and in the towns after which their Districts were named. Thus, Dukku and Akko towns became the headquarters of the two Districts. However, Akko did not retain that position for long.

But as for Nafada, it was not the Sarkin- Nafada who was made the District Head. The British appointed Yerima-Jalo, who by 1913 was at Biri--which was part of the amalgamated Nafada District. Neither Nafada town nor Biri were made headquarters of this districts, but Bajoga, the second largest town in the District after Nafada town. It may be easy to argue that Bajoga was made the headquarters of the Yarima’s District because the Emir, Umaru, was forced to transfer from Gombe–Abba to Nafada in 1914 (after which the former capital became just a village Area headquarters). One of the polices of the colonial Government in Northern Nigeria at the time was that when the principal town in a district was the residence of the emir, the District Head would reside elsewhere. The Resident of Bauchi province when reporting to the Secretary Northern provinces in August, 1914 on the transfer of the Emir and the residences of the District Head of Nafada stated that “The presence of the Emir and political officer (The D.O in Nafada) renders the Yarima’s residence in Nafada unnecessary.” But it is doubtful if these were the real reasons for sustaining the Yerima at Bajoga, or making Bajoga the headquarters of that District. In fact Lugard’s policy was not rigidly adhered to; it was not followed in many parts of the
Northern provinces. After all, if this policy had been strictly followed by the administration, the headquarters for the district would have been moved back to Nafada town after the transfer of the Emirate capital headquarters throughout the colonial period. Moreover, when Nafada was the temporary headquarters of the Emirate (1914–1919) the Emir’s residence was not constructed within the town, but some kilometres east of it.

Before we discuss the most likely reason for the stationing of the Yerima at Bajoga, it is important briefly to attempt to give the reason for the transfer of the Emirate capital or the British insistence that the Emir should move from Gombe –Abba to Nafada. The most likely reason is that the Emir was transferred to the British base in order to strengthen the British position to send for the emir–at a period when there were no paved roads and no motor cars. The Resident at that time clearly stated one of the reasons when he observed that “The emir and the political officer were stronger than ever before.” It can be assumed that from the comments of the Resident on the movement to Nafada, the Emir was against the idea. He states that “I am not apprehensive at all in the matter (the transfer), for the Emir and Yerima have everything to lose by an outbreak of disloyal fanaticism.” Thus the second reason for the transfer, was to ‘nip in the bud’ any possible revolt by the people of the former Mahdist strongholds, Bajopa, villages around former Bormi town and so on, all in Nafada District. And this comment gives us a clue into one of the main reasons why the Yerima’s headquarters was sited at Bajoga. Therefore, because of the importance of the area, particularly Bajoga a town next in importance to Bormi—to the former Mahdist followers, the colonial government may have felt that a higher indigenous authority next to the Emir, should be stationed there.

One possible explanation for not making Nafada the district seat is the old standard one about the corrupting influences of the city especially the colonial town and the “wicked” traders (Niger Company in this case) Perhaps the District imagined (in-correctly, as it turned out) that Nafada, because it was the first trading town in that part of Nigeria would expand like, some of the other trading areas (Sabon-Garis, Lokoja, Onitsha, etc) and that the “traditional” nature of the local people should be protected from these
corrupting influences” hence even the Emir was kept out of the town.65

On the other hand it is likely that Bajoga was made the headquarters of the District because of British fears across the border to form military territory of Niger. Niger was at this time influenced by Ottoman Turks (who were to be opposed to the British in world War I) and in fact during the war, there was a Tuareg uprising (though not Sanusiyya) in Agades in 1919.56

We should perhaps point out here that foremost of the colonial period, Bajoga and other areas, such as Gwani, Bima-Hill areas (just about fifteen kilometres west of Bormi) remained the most closely watched by the British political officers. And most of the monthly Intelligence reports form Gombe Emirate dealt with these areas. The numerous colonial intelligence reports on the areas and visitors to them, are testimony to the anxieties of the British. It is said that right up to 1976, and beyond the North Eastern State Military government had a special security watch over these areas.

Earlier in this section, we mentioned that Akko town did not retain its position as headquarters of Akko District for long. Akko town, which had been the residence of the Galadima Gombe for most of the 19th C. (since the 1920’s) shared, its position as headquarters of the District with Deba from shortly after the amalgamation of the three Districts in 1913. Thus, from about 1913 to 1936 when Galadimas of Gombe had two capitals, Akko and Deba. However, for most of the period 1913-1936, the Galadimas were more present at Deba than Akko. This was particularly so with Galadima Barunde who was for most of the time on tour of his District. He had temporary residences in almost all the major towns or villages of the District, such as Gwani.

The question, which needs to be asked here is: what made Deba important as from 1913? Deba was important strategically during the years 1913-1918 because of the European war. Towards the end of the 19th Century, Deba became a major slave market. With the British conquest, Deba as border town between Gombe and Adamawa became one of the major stopping points on the British troops supply line particularly during the First World War. Deba was also closer to the Gongola River than Akko. The first road constructed by the colonial government, using forced labour, which linked Bauchi with Gombe and then Yola (using the 19th C.
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trade routes) passed through Deba, until a new one via Gombe-Doma-Kumo-Billiri to Numan was constructed after 1920.

A number of reasons were put forward for the transfer of the dual headquarters of Akko district between 1913 and 1939. When reporting in 1959 on the agricultural potentialities of the various Districts of Gombe Emirate, A.M Krzywon claimed that the transfer of the headquarters of Akko permanently to Kumo was caused by a great scarcity of water in and around Akko. We cannot regard this as an appropriate reason since it was put forward in 1959 and moreover its main emphasis was on the transfer to Kumo in 1936. In addition despite the so-called water scarcity, Akko had been a headquarters since the middle of the 19th century.

One account, which deals with the question of transfer to Deba, has it that when the First World War started, Deba was made a stopping place for the Germans at Garoua. The colonial government realized that the village head of Deba was not strong or influential enough to take charge of the town. Therefore, the District Head himself (Galadima Barunde), who was a very strong personality, was ordered to transfer his headquarters to Deba on a Semi-permanent basis in ca. 1913/14. This reason is similar to the one given for the transfer of Emir Umaru from Gombe-Abba to Nafada about the same time.

Another account puts it that the British advised Galadima Barunde to move from Akko into ‘his’ Tera ‘subject’ areas, which were the least peaceful. The Galadima was said to have chosen Deba; the largest Tera town at that time. This source also indicates that the time when the Galadima was asked to move to Deba, was the time when a road was being constructed through Gombe emirate to Adamawa and thence to the Cameroon’s border to provide a means of reinforcing British troops during the first world war. The road went through Deba, and Barunde supervised the Akko District section of the road. The Galadima’s supervision of the road construction was presumably the organization of forced labour. The claim that the village head of Deba was not strong or influential is an indication of the failure of a popular local figure to get the required forced labour for the British.

What emerges from the accounts are that Barunde was transferred (on a Semi-permanent basis) to Deba principally to help in the First World War efforts. The headquarters of the
District was finally transferred from Akko when Tera towns and villages on both sides of the Gongola river were in the process of being reconstituted into a new District - Yamaltu.

At this point let us discuss the composition and character of the three main Districts.

_Dukku District_

Dukku District derived its name from the town of Dukku. It consisted of scattered Fulbe Villages with a few comparatively large towns. It contained most of the Bolewa towns and villages, in the Emirates together with their main centers like Kalam, Gerikom (Kafarati) Gadam Bajude etc.

The sub-districts retained in the District at the time include that of the Magaji (Zaune, Malala, Ifai and Tali), Sarkin Dabe (Gombe-Abba and later Hashidu), and Santuraki (Bajude, Gadam, Karfarati and Kwoin-Fellata). With the transfer of the capital of the emirate in 1914, Gombe-Abba, became just a village area headquarter under Dukku!

By the beginning of the 20th century, the Bolewa had become predominantly Muslim and they and the Fulbe had nearly integrated into one community. However, Gadam and Bellediggo remained at that time, typical Bolewa towns. As regard the office of the District Head, the policy of the British, that the appointment of a District Headman should as far as possible be from the locality (i.e. District) and also from the same family was followed. There were two reigning houses: that of Genno (Batuke) Abdu and Kottokore respectively: who were full brothers. The list of the Sarakunan/District Head of Dukku is given schematically in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: Sarakunan/District Heads of Dukku

Geno (Butake) House

Detibe/Dembo (Dugge) House

Nafada District

Nafada District was named after Nafada town, but as indicated earlier, the headquarters of the District was at Bajoga. Why Nafada was chosen as the name of the District may be connected with the prominence of the town before the colonial period when it was the
most important market centre on the ancient trade route to Borno, It was in this town that the British established their military station, administrative centre, and Nafada became a major European trading centre being on a bend of the Gongola, where up to 1930, steamers from the Benue were able to reach.

The District consisted of the Sub-districts of Nafada, Bage, Biri, Jillahi, Bajoga and Wakkaltu, the villages of Wawa and Komi, west of Biri and Sarkin Magi’s sub-District, which comprised the town of Tongo, Ribadu, Kupto with their respective sub-hamlets, and Jilde and Bodol.73

The town of Nafada was predominantly inhabited by the Bolewa. However, it had a substantial Kanuri population who had moved into the town for trade. But, in many of the towns and villages of the District, the Fulbe were in the majority.

On the succession to the office of the District Headship, we have already noted that Nafada District was set aside by the British for the training of the future Emirs of Gombe. Since by tradition, there was always an ‘heir apparent—the Yeriman Gombe, institutionalised by Modibbo Buba-Yero, then, it meant that whoever was the Yeriman Gombe during the colonial period up to 1985 was also the District Head of Nafada and was also always the Yerima Gombe.

It is necessary to mention here that Nafada District was the one district in the Emirate where, up to the end of the colonial period, someone not from the District was appointed District Head. The following is a list of the District Heads of Nafada or Yerimomin Gombe during the colonial period (to 1960).

**District Heads of Nafada District**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Yerima Haruna</td>
<td>Reigned for three months only, then appointed Emir of Gombe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Yerima Jibril</td>
<td>1921–1932(Deposed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Yerima Abubakar Mazazu</td>
<td>1957-1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Yerima Muhammed Mazazu</td>
<td>1935-1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Kwarianga</td>
<td>1957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first and second Yerimas were brother – sons of Emir Muhammadu Kwairanga (1844-1882). The third, fourth and fifth Yerimas were also brothers (and sons of Emir Umaru).

**Akko District**

Akko District was so named after the town of Akko, about twenty kilometers southwest of Gombe-Abba about twenty kilometres South of the present capital (Gombe-Doma). The name was retained throughout by the military government up to 1976, when it became Akko Local Government. At the time of the amalgamation of the District, the district comprised most Tera land (such as Gwani, Shiga, Wade, Deba, Zambuu and so on). In the District were also a Deba such as Jagala, Pata and Gasi. There were also the towns of Panda and Kalshingi which were of Jukun origin in the Waja areas, the Jukun centre in the Emirate- Pindiga and its hamlets such as Dolli and Kanuri. In addition there were a number Fulbe and Kanuri towns on the Bauchi border with the District and many other Fulbe hamlets east of Ligi (on the eastern outskirts of Gombe-Doma). There were Doma, Kundulu--an important pre-colonial market centre; and so on.

Succession to the office of the Galadima Akko (and that of Gombe Emirate) was and still is, from the Fulbe Gone family, which through the years has become divided into the first Galadima who was of the Kalshingi house. According to an account, 80 of Ahmadu Gona’s were from the Pindiga house. The list of Galadimas of Gombe is given in Fig. 2.
Fig 2: The Galadimomin/District Heads of Akko

Kalshing (Gomina)

Mumun

Sule...

Ahmadu (1)

Hussain (2)  Atiku (4)  Abulkace

Barunde (14)
1903-1906
1908-1929

Muhammad  Sambc (15)  Umaru (1)
* He held office three times: 1894-1899; 1901-1903 and 1906–1908.76

Finally, in this section, the transfer of the capital of the emirate from Nafada town to Doma in Akko District in 1999 did not alter the composition or the number of the districts in the Emirate immediately. The three districts remained intact until 1936 when Akko District underwent a series of major re-organisation, the details of which are outside the scope of this paper.

The new Capital Gombe-Doma became a District itself, but this took place much later. This happening is also outside the scope of the paper. This because up to 1936 Gombe-Doma was referred to in the administrative reports as a village area headquarters under a Village Head—the Magajin Garin Gombe.

It is, however, important at this point to discuss very briefly the most likely reasons for the transfer of the capital from Nafada to Gombe-Doma. It is significant to observe that the transfer took place immediately after World War I. The war was now over and the threats felt by the British on the part of the Ottoman Turks (the allies of the Germans) were checked and the areas formerly under the Germans had been partly handed over to the French (the French Cameroons) and partly to the British, to the area that later became Sardauna province). Feeling secure, the British moved
their station at Gujba up into Borno proper making it no longer a strategic point.

In addition, during the second decade of colonial rule, a new road (Jos-Bauchi-Gombe-Billiri-Kaltungo-Numan) was proposed, and in fact construction started. Therefore, it was decided that the emirate capital should be sited the major road, or very close to it. By moving the capital Gombe-Doma, the new capital was certainly at a central location where any part of the Emirate could be reached in a day, if on horseback, and in some few hours by car. This therefore may have reduced the cost of communication and shortened the journeys (tours) made by the Divisional officers and other local authorities.

Conclusion

We have examined in this paper the principles used by the British in re-organizing the pre-colonial local authority system in the Emirates of Northern Nigeria with Gombe Emirates as a study case. In evolving their own system of Local Government, the British created the District Head system. We have demonstrated how the new system was fundamentally different; in almost every respect from the pre-colonial local authority system. In the pre-colonial system for example, authority was given to a family or clan head. But under the British, authority was based on territory. Also in the pre-colonial period, the Emirate titled-officials resided at the capital and performed central administrative functions, they relied on their servants (Jakadu) for the tax—collection. However, as we have examined in this paper the British made the District Heads reside in their Districts. Also the District Heads were made to collect the taxes due to the government from all the communities of their Districts. Since in the new pattern of local authority, the British required the District Heads to reside in their Districts and be responsible for tax collection and administration, it meant that a large number of participants and participating units in the pre-colonial political system had to be reduced. Hence, by 1913 the British drastically reduced the ruled units and the number of noble families with authority to three only.

It seems that in the emergence of the pattern of local authority under the British where there were fewer ruling families and fewer units, lay the foundations of widespread political discontent which
began to be evident with the emergence of political party activities in Northern Nigeria in the 1940’s and 1950’s. The struggle by various families and ethnicities for participation in the running of the local government became even more during the colonial period. Many of the pre-colonial ruling families were reduced or denied authority in the local government system. For example, the creation of so many Districts and Local governments in many parts of Nigeria during the second Republic (October 1979-31st December, 1983) and on a larger scale since then was certainly an attempt to change the character of the local government system created during the colonial period.

From 1920, the British began to notice the need to increase the number of local authorities in the various Districts of Gombe. They decided to increase the number of the Districts to six before Nigeria’s independence in 1960. This resulted in an increase in the number of families with authority. Superficially this may look like a reversal of the earlier British policy. But in reality, it was again dictated in part by an imperial policy on the re-organization of Native Administration in non-Muslim areas, and in part by attempts by the British to ‘improve’ the administration of certain areas.

Notes
1. “...Senior Government official in the Province and represents the Lieutenant Governor in all administrative matters...” Lugard, L. (1970) Political Memoranda, Revision of Instructions to Political officers on subject chiefly political and administrative (1913-1918) Third Edition Frank Cass p. 11.
2. Performed Political and Administrative duties and acted assistant to the Resident. For details of continued the role of the D.O. see Ibid p. 12 - 13
5. Ibid p. 209.
7. Perham, M. 1937, Native Administration in Nigeria, Oxford University Press p. 48
9. Ibid p. 32.
14. Lugard, L. Political Memoranda, p. 181
15. Ibid, p. 181
16. Lugard, L. Political Memoranda p. 181. See also Perham, M. (1937) 
Native Administration in Nigeria, O.N.P., p. 52.
18. Ibid p. 52.
22. Ibid P. 53.
24. Tukur, M.M. 1979, “the Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the 
Sokoto Caliphate...” PhD ABU Zaria p. 344.
25. Ibid p. 344.
26. For such problems See Hill, P. 1977, Population, Prosperity and Poverty: 
Rural Kano 1900-1970. Cambridge University Press p. 36–42 and Fika, 
27. NAK, SNP I0, 445 P1914 Carlyle, T.F. Gombe Emirate History, of p. 1, 
part III.
29. NAK, SNP 10. 445 P/1914 Carlyle, T.F. Gombe Emirate History, p. 1 -2 , 
Part III.
III.
31. Ibid, p.2
32. NAK, SNP 10, 445 P/1914 Carlyle, T.F. Gombe Emirate History, p. 3.
33. NAK, SNP 7, 781/1908 F. Goward Resident, Report on the Bauchi 
Province for December 1907.
34. Op. cit p. 3
36. Carlyle, T.F. P. 4, Gall, F.B., Gazetteer Bauchi Province. Compiled in 
1920, P. 3 See also Map 1 and 2 showing proposal amalgamated Districts 
including Dukku.
38. Carlyle, T.F. P.5.
40. Ibid p.5
PhD ABU Zaria p. 169 172; Muffet, D.J.M 1964 Concerning Brave 
Captains, p. 145-46.
42. Carlyle, T.F. History of Gombe .. p. 5.
44. Ibid P. 6
45. NAK, SNP 17/7245, 1912 Resident F.B. Gall, Report No. 3, Central
Province, for quarter ended December 1912.

46. NAK, SNP 10, 445/1914 Comments from Resident Bauchi Province F.B. Gall 30th June, 1915.


48. NAK, SNP 10/381 1915 Resident Gall F. B.


50. ibid

51. Ibid

52. Ibid


54. Ibid


56. Ibid

57. Carlyle T.F. Précis of Silent Matters of facts and Policy

58. Ibid

59. Lugard L. *Political Memoranda*. p. 314


61. See comments of the Resident Bauchi on Carlyle T.F. *History of Gombe* -- comments 23 parag. 57.

62. Carlyle’s *History of Gombe*, comments 20 Parag. 81

63. Ibid P. 81

64. Carlyle T.F. *History of Gombe*, p. 32.

65. My thanks to Prof. P.J. Shea–BUK, for drawing my attention to this point.


67. Krazwon, A.M. 1959 *Agricultural Note Book on Gombe Emirate*, p. 3.


71. Lugard L. *Political Memoranda*. p. 314

72. NAK, SNP 10/445, P/1914 Carlyle T.F. *History of Gombe*.


74. Carlyle T.F. *History of Gombe*, p. 27

75. Ibid P. 3 I

76. Carlyle T.F. *History of Gombe*, p. 34

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5. NAK, SNP 17/7245/1912 Resident F.G. Gall, Report No. 33, Central Province, December 1912.

### Oral Interviews
Cooperation between Religious Leaders and Traditional Authority in Kano

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Kano is situated within a fertile open Savannah area; this greatly facilitated the movement of people and ideas into it from the early period of its history. The period of Bagauda (999-1063) saw the development of the concept of Sarkin Kasa (King of the Land), a centralised political figure. The religion of Islam, which has the greatest impact on the lives of the people of Kano, came into Hausaland through Borno. The Wangarawa traders and scholars who came from Mali and later the Fulbe (sing. Pullo) scholars played a leading role in the spread of Islam in Kano. By the 13th century A.D. a number of indigenous and foreign Muslims can be found in Kano city. And by the 15th century A.D. during the reign of Sarki Muhammadu Rumfa (1463–1499), Islam had become the State religion. His active support of the religion and its scholars earned Rumfa the title of a reformer. Among the most important Muslim scholars residing in Kano then were the Algerian jurist Muhammad B. Abd al-Karim al-Maghili, described as a Scholar of International repute, and the Malian scholar Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Zaite.

From then onwards, Kano rulers continued to patronise the services of Muslim scholars and Islamic scholarship so as to be able to rule according to the Shari’ah. Indeed after the 19th century jihad, the qualifications for appointment as the next leader of Kano were piety and knowledge. When the leaders of the jihad in Kano under Malam Danzabuwa visited Shaykh Usman b. Fodio (d. 1817) at Gwandu and asked for his help in the appointment of a new leader in Kano after the defeat of Sarki Alwali (1781-1805), the Shaykh instructed the Kano delegation to appoint the most pious and knowledgeable man among them to be the Emir (Amir) of Kano. It was based on this that they appointed Sulaiman b. Abhama.

The relative security provided by the elaborate political system in Kano, the establishment of the protective city wall
locally known as Badala or Ganuwa which was carried in several stages over a period of time\(^5\), the abundance of food, the strategic local and international trade routes within Kano and across the Sahara to North Africa, in addition to the ability of the Kano rulers to attract and cooperate with different groups of people who reside within the city and its environs over the time, served in no small measure in enhancing the prominent political and economic position of Kano in Hausaland in particular and the savannah region in general. These groups include Muslim religious leaders.

**The Period of Sokoto Jihad 1807-1903**

During the period of the Sokoto Caliphate the Qadiriyya Sufi order—which was introduced into Hausaland towards the end of the 15th century - was the only order in existence. Shaykh Usman b. Fodio and the other Jihad leaders were members of the order. With the spread of the jihad and expansion of the Caliphate, the order also expanded to all areas within the Caliphate.\(^6\) Although the Tijaniyya order\(^7\) was introduced around the mid 19th century, it had very few followers during this period while the Mahdiyya movement, which appeared in the late 1880s, was never officially recognised by the leaders of the Caliphate.\(^8\)

In Kano Emir Sulaiman (1807-1819) and his counsellors were scholars. They engaged in teaching as part of their responsibility in administering the post-jihad Kano. Latter Emirs of Kano lacking their predecessor’s depth of Islamic knowledge patronised the services of scholars and religious leaders to make up for that defect.\(^9\)

In spite of the fact that Sokoto did not officially recognise the Mahdiyya, the Kano region had followers of the movement (the Ansar or helpers) right from the time of the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad b. Sayyid Abdullah al–Mahdi (d. 1885). The Ansar who were both among the ordinary people and scholars came from areas such as Gaya, Dutse, Birnin Kudu, Tudun Wada, Gwarzo, Danbatta and Gumel. Among the scholars were Imam Ya Musa who was detained and exiled on the orders of Sokoto, and Malam Abubakar Salmanu who died while fighting against the combined forces of Katsina, Daura and Kazaure. He persuaded the Emir of Kano Abdullahi Maje Karofí (1855–1883) on the validity of Muhammad Ahmad’s claims. The Emir was intending to discuss
the issue among other things in Sokoto when he died on his way at Karofi in Katsina.\textsuperscript{10}

**Cooperation between the Traditional Leaders of Kano and the Qadiriyya, Tijjaniyya, and the Mahdiyya from 1903-1960**

During the period of British Colonial rule in Nigeria they recognised Qadiriyya brotherhood as the official order, suspected the Tijjaniyya brotherhood and outlawed the Mahdiyya. According to Paden, the coincidence of the Mahdiyya with the coming of the British in Northern Nigeria, especially after their bitter experience with the Mahdi in the Sudan, was fundamental in shaping British policy towards all other religious orders other than the Qadiriyya.\textsuperscript{11}

This view was reflected in a confidential report written by Captain Graham Callow the Assistant Commissioner of Police on 20th August 1926. He wrote:

> The majority of the Muslims have followed the Qadiriyya form of worship. It appears to be by far the most lenitive sect of the three (Qadiriyya, Tijjaniyya and Mahdiyya) and perfectly harmless to the state. I think it would be quite impossible to arouse followers of this sect to any fanaticism. They take their religion much too easily, rather in fact like the average Englishman of today who reserves his devotional exercises for Sundays–if it is too wet to play golf. … The last named is undoubtedly one of the dangerous tendencies and I consider it should be observed with great care.\textsuperscript{12}

Though this was far from being the true representation of members of the Qadiriyya order, the Colonial administration believed in it, as the words of one of their top security officers has shown above and they acted accordingly.

The Kano establishment which adopted the official attitude of Sokoto towards the Mahdiyya was traditionally also following the Qadiriyya order. But during the Colonial period which began under the leadership of Abbas b. Abdullah (1903-1919)\textsuperscript{13} the Emir was initiated into the Tijjaniyya order in the 1910s by Sharif Abd al-Wahid Ujudud, a Berber described as a descendant of Ahmad al-Tijjani (d. 1815), founder of the order. Since then the Kano traditional leaders became members of the Tijjaniyya order. In 1937, the son and successor of Abbas, that is Emir Abdullahi Bayero (1926-1953) renewed his *Silsila* (Chain) from Shaykh Ibrahim Niass of Senegal which made many followers of the
Tijjaniyya in Kano to shift their allegiance to Ibrahim Niass or what has been termed as the reformed Tijjaniyya. And by the time of Emir Sanusi (1954-1963) the official identification of Kano establishment with the reformed Tijjaniyya was completed. All the officials serving in the Emirate were members of the order. Indeed Nasuru Kabara leader of the Qadiriyya order was dismissed from his post of adviser and was replaced by a member of the reformed Tijjaniyya.\(^\text{14}\)

Although, Malam Nasuru Kabara was dismissed from office, he continued to be one of the two Tafsir readers in the palace during the month of Ramadan, a position that is still occupied by his son and successor Sheikh Karibullah. Even though, the relationship between the Tijjaniyya and Qadiriyya were sometime strained especially over the issue of conversion from one brotherhood to the other, there has been no significance conflict of a physical nature between them. There was a mutual respect on both sides. The policy of the traditional leaders of Kano towards the Qadiriyya was based on the necessity of cordial relations.\(^\text{15}\)

The leader of the proscribed Mahdiyya Movement Sa’id b. Hayat was arrested, detained and deported by the British from Potiskum to Kano in March 1923. He was taken to other places such as Abinsi in Benue, Buea in British Cameroon and back to Kano in March 1946, where he completed the remaining term of his detention up to October 1959. When the Colonial administration decided to return Sa’id b. Hayat to Kano several traditional leaders in the North were consulted if any of them would accept him to reside in their territory. The Emirs consulted were those of Bauchi Yakubu II (1907-1941), Fika Moi Muhammadu Disa (1922-1975), Kano Abdullahi Bayero (1926-1953) the Shehu of Borno Umar Sanda Kiyarimi (1937-1969) and the two Sultans of Sokoto Hassan b. Muath (1930-1938) and Abubakar III (1938-1988). They were each asked twice in 1939 and 1943. They all refused to have him in their territories with the exception of Abdullahi Bayero, Emir of Kano, who agreed to have him.\(^\text{16}\) This was why he was transferred back to Kano in 1946.

The relationship between Sa’id b. Hayat (d. 1978) and his host Emir Abdullahi Bayero (d. 1953) at both formal and informal levels was cordial, and continued under their respective successors. This is remarkable if one considers the position of Sa’id b. Hayat
under the Colonial administration. Similarly his relationship with the Ulama of Kano was cordial; some of them visited him such as Malam Nasuru Kabara, despite the fact that he was unable to reciprocate such visits for being under detention.\textsuperscript{17}

The rise of the Mahdiyya Movement towards the end of the 19th century A.D. made certain Muslim scholars in Kano as well as ordinary Muslim members of the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya orders to abandon Sufi brotherhood affiliation in the belief that Mahdism has superseded Sufism. But this development did not affect the cordial relationship that existed between Sa’id b. Hayat and the traditional leaders of Kano. Indeed in the early 1950s when a misunderstanding between the Ansar of Birnin Kudu area occurred leading to their split into two factions, and the case was brought before the Emir of Kano Abdullahi Bayero. The Emir referred the case to their leader Sa’id b. Hayat to settle their differences.\textsuperscript{18}

In the 1950s when party politics began in Kano, members of the reformed Tijaniyya joined the opposition party NEPU (Northern Elements Progressive Union) while members of the Qadiriyya joined the NPC (Northern Peoples Congress). Followers of the Mahdiyya did not participate in party politics because their leader was under detention and the Colonial Authorities had outlawed the movement. However, there may be cases of individuals acting on their own.

**Relationship between the Traditional leaders of Kano and the Leaders of the Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya and Mahdiyya in the Post-Colonial period 1960 to Present**

The mutual conflict between the Qadiriyya leadership under Malam Nasuru Kabara and the Tijaniyya championed by Shaykh Abubakar Atiku over the question of conversion from one order to the other continued in the post–colonial period, with both leaders backing their arguments by writing pamphlets. On this issue, Malam Nasuru Kabara of the Qadiriyya wrote *Al-Nafaha* (The Aroma) while Abubakar Atiku of the Tijaniyya wrote *Risalah fi tahdhir Al-isabah* (Epistle on warning the Group) and *Al-Sarim Al-Mushrafi* (The Yemen Sword).\textsuperscript{19}

The Emir of Kano Muhammad Sanusi (1954-1963) who was the temporal ruler and spiritual leader of the reformed Tijaniyya
was active in its evangelisation. His political and religious rivalry with Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of Northern Nigeria, who was a member of the Qadiriyya order and the NPC, brought him into confrontation with Kaduna, the seat of power in the North. He resigned his Emirship in 1963 and was succeeded by his brother Ado Bayero since 1963.\textsuperscript{20} The new Emir maintained the mutual relationship between the traditional leadership of Kano and the various religious leaders. During this period Sa’id b. Hayat was released from detention and was allowed to travel abroad. Indeed he was in the Sudan when the new Emir was appointed. He wrote a letter to Ado Bayero congratulating him over his appointment.\textsuperscript{21}

In 1972 Abubakar Mahmoud Gummi then the Grand Kadi of Northern Nigeria wrote an anti-sufi book entitled \textit{Al-Aqidah Al-Sahiha bi Muwafaqat Al-Shari’ah} (The right belief according to the Shari’ah). And in 1978 an anti-sufi organisation the \textit{Jama’at Izalat al-bid’a wa iqamat as Sunna} (The Organisation for the removal of heretical innovation and the establishment of the Tradition) simply known as the \textit{Izala} was founded by Malam Isma’ila Idris, a disciple of Gummi at Jos. The emergence of \textit{Izala} with its anti-Sufi views improved the strained relationship between the \textit{Tariqah} members by bringing the Qadiriyya and Tijjaniyya closer together to fight a common enemy, the \textit{Izala}, through lectures and writings.\textsuperscript{22} For example after Gummi has published his \textit{Al-Aqidah}; Muhammad Sani Kafinga wrote a treatise on behalf of the Tijjaniyya and its followers refuting it. This was \textit{Al-Minah Al-Hamida fil–radd ala fasid al-Aqida} (The praiseworthy gifts in the reply to the one who is corrupted in his faith). Nasuru Kabara also wrote, on behalf of the Qadiriyya, \textit{An Nasiha as Sariha fil-radd ala Al-Aqida as-Sahiha} (The frank advice in the reply to \textit{Al-Aqida as Sahiha}). The relationship of Gummi with the leaders of the Qadiriyya and Tijjaniyya at Kano became strained, and their reactions towards Gummi and his \textit{Izala} group based in Kaduna became very active sometimes even with clashes between members of the two opposing groups.

Sa’id b. Hayat and the \textit{Ansar} maintained a low profile in both politics and other official activities in Kano. But when a committee of forty-six Malams was constituted under the Chairmanship of Waziri of Sokoto Alhaji Junaidu, six of them were from Kano
including Sa’id b. Hayat in his capacity as the leader of the Mahdiyya. But the relationship between Gummi and Sa’id b. Hayat during this period became lukewarm and the latter’s reactions towards Gummi’s new identity remained passive. Sa’id b. Hayat and the Ansar did not participate in the verbal and written arguments for and against Sufism. This was partly because Sa’id b. Hayat stayed aloof from politics when he was under detention and even after he had been released from detention. And partly because Gummi had never openly challenged him on the Mahdiyya. Indeed it was only in 1986 that Gummi openly expressed his views over the validity of Muhammad Ahmad’s Mahdship to an Ansar scholar, Malam Ibrahim Khalil Malumfashi based at Tudun Nupawa in Kaduna. However according to Shehu Muhammad Shanono, Abubakar Gummi informed him in an interview while writing his B.A. Dissertation in Islamic Studies in 1976, that members of the Nigerian Mahdiyya were not following Islam correctly. According to Shehu Muhammad, Abubakar Gummi said:

…one may need to have a look into some books of Qadiriyya and see some unbelievable supernatural powers attributed to Shaykh Abdulkadir. One should again look at Mahdiyya and see the corruption in it especially here in Nigeria…

This criticism cannot be taken seriously for two reasons: first Gummi knew Sa’id b. Hayat from his school days in the Law School in Kano. And this was not a casual acquaintance because Gummi married the eldest daughter of Sa’id b. Hayat Maryamu (not Fatima) Diddida. Although Maryamu and the male child she bore for Gummi both died in the early 1950s, he later married two women, Hajiya Halima and Hajiya Amina Bintu, from the Ansar community (of Maine in Niger Republic and Mashiyo in Yobe State) in Sa’id b. Hayat’s house in Kano. They bore him five and eleven children respectively and were among the four wives that survived him. If followers of the Mahdiyya were corrupt in their Islam one would not expect Gummi (who by implication is following Islam correctly) to be so close to them. The second reason was by 1976 Sa’id b. Hayat, leader of the Mahdiyya was still alive. There was no indication from written or oral sources that Gummi had ever directed this or similar criticism to Sa’id b. Hayat
or any other Ansar for the thirty years (1946 to 1976) he came to know the Mahdiyya and its leader.

In my opinion, it seems that Abubakar Gummi made the alleged criticisms for his personal ambition. From the mid 1940s to the mid 1970s three main patrons could be identified in Gummi’s life: Sa’id b. Hayat leader of the Mahdiyya, Ahmadu Bello the Sardauna of Sokoto, and the Saudi Arabian government. Since Abubakar Gummi hailed from Sokoto he was a member of the Qadiriyya order, but after his contact with Sa’id b. Hayat he joined Mahdiyya, even though he had never acknowledged that publicly. It is difficult to speculate the type of influence that Sa’id b. Hayat and the Mahdiyya would have continued to have on Gummi after the death of his wife Maryamu and her child. What was certain was that he would never get any political appointment under his first patron, Said b. Hayat.

The emergence of party politics in Northern Nigeria in the early 1950s led to the formation of the NPC under Ahmadu Bello the Sardauna of Sokoto. The Sardauna and his party formed the government in the North. Gummi’s first contact with the Sardauna in office was in 1955 during the hajj. He served as an Arabic interpreter for the Sardauna with the Saudi Arabian officials. This initial contact and the subsequent ones with the Sardauna benefited Gummi enormously. He was appointed into several positions such as first Nigerian Pilgrims Officer in Jidda in 1956, Deputy Grand Khadi and Grand Khadi of Northern Nigeria from 1962-1975. While occupying these offices, the Islamic Law was reformed, Sharia Courts set, Jama'atal Nasrul Islam organisation established, and Gummi accompanied the Sardauna on his trips to the Arab world during which period he established his close contacts with the Saudis and other Arab nations. After the foundation of the Muslim World League in 1962, Gummi served on behalf of the Sardauna and held several other positions in the League. By the time the Sardauna was assassinated in 1966, Abubakar Gummi had already consolidated himself in Northern Nigeria, and with the Saudi Arabian government.

It is interesting to note that it was after the death of the Sardauna that Gummi launched his anti-sufi book. The close ties he developed with Saudi Arabian Government over the years earned him the singular position of being the most trustworthy
religious scholar from Nigeria through whom money to Muslims in Nigeria was distributed.\textsuperscript{28} The influence of the Saudi government on Gummi culminated in the establishment of the \textit{Izala} in 1978 in Jos, an organisation that was in line with the \textit{Wahabiyya} or \textit{Muwahiddin} ideology of Saudi Arabia. Indeed Gummi himself was reported to have declared that he preferred the Hambali School of Law which is followed in Saudi Arabia because they support their views with Quran and Sunna.\textsuperscript{29} The activities of Gummi in his consolidated position after the demise of the Sardauna made some of his over zealous disciples to call him a \textit{mujaddid} (reformer) and others to write against Sufism.\textsuperscript{30}

\section*{Conclusion}

The prominent position occupied by Kano in Northern Nigeria in particular and the Savannah region in general was made possible by a number of factors: the elaborate political system, the rich fertile land, abundance of food, the availability of various professionals and industrious community, the existence of strategic local and international trade routes including the railway line and international airport, and above all, the ability of the traditional leaders to treat the various groups of people especially religious leaders who reside in the city with compassion. In the Colonial and Post-Colonial period Kano witnessed the emergence and settlement of different religious leaders and their followers notably Malam Nasuru Kabara of the Qadiriyya, the reformed Tijjaniyya under the traditional leaders of Kano and Sa’id b. Hayat of the Mahdiyya.

The traditional rulers of Kano had been members of the Qadiriyya order, but from the time of Emir Abbas (1903-1919), they joined the Tijjaniyya order, but also continued to cooperate with the other religious leaders. The conflict between the Qadiriyya and Tijjaniyya over the conversion of their members did not affect the mutual cooperation between them and the traditional authority. Sa’id b. Hayat who, for the most part, was kept under detention remained passive as far as political and other official activities were concerned. He, however, maintained cordial relations with the traditional authorities of Kano and the other religious leaders. Indeed according to Paden, he was held in the highest respect by the Kano Malams.\textsuperscript{31}
In the post Colonial period other religious groups emerged such as the Izala and the Shi’ah. The vocal anti-Sufi views of the Izala brought the members of the Qadiriyya and Tijjaniyya order closer while fighting it. But the traditional authorities of Kano in their usual magnanimous attitude accommodated all the religious groups. This cooperation between the religious leaders and traditional authority enhances the peace and security that exists in Kano even today.

Notes and References

This is a revised version of a commissioned paper, presented at a National Conference to mark the 40th Anniversary of His Royal Highness the Emir of Kano Alhaji Ado Bayero on the throne, in Murtala Mohammed Library Kano on 14th October 2003.


3. For more on him and his activities see H.I. Gwarzo (PhD 1972) The Life and Teachings of Al-Maghili SOAS, University of London.


6. For more information on the Qadiriyya order see: A.F. Ahmed (PhD 1986) *The Qadiriyya and its Impact in Nigeria* Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies University of Ibadan.


9. Among the Emirs of Kano who succeeded Sulaiman only Emir Aliyu Babba (1894–1903) was described as a scholar. He wrote two books one of which was in the defence of the Qadiriyya brotherhood. See H.I. Sa’id; PhD 1978, p. 354.


15. J.N. Paden; PhD, pp. 420-421.


23. The other Malams from Kano were: Malam Nasuru Kabara (Qadiriyya), Malam Tijjani Usman, Malam Sani Kafinga, Malam Shehu Maihula (Tijjaniyya) and Malam Shehu Galadanci (Principal S.A.S.).
24. The Debate is on cassette in possession of Late Malam Ibrahim.
27. For details see R. Loimeier; pp. 153-159.
28. See Shehu Muhammad B.A. p. 38
Traditional Security Structures among the Polities of Northern Jos Plateau in North-Central Nigeria

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Introduction
The area referred to as Northern Jos Plateau lies on the northern tip of the present day Bassa Local Government in Plateau State, Toro Local Government in Bauchi State, Lere and Kauru Local Governments in Kaduna State. A very close look at the language map of Nigeria shows that the area consists of a complexity and diversity of rural communities. Among these polities are the Abin (Binawa), Abisi (Piti), Akurmi (Kurama), Amap (Arno), Anapanawa (Bujel), Anaboze (Buji), Anarbunu (Ribina), Anoloro (Loro), Agbiri (Gurawa), Anirago (Kahugu) Atsam (Chawai), Atunzu (Duguza), Ashanga (Sanga), Ashiwa (Rishiwa), Azelle (Jere), Azura (Chokobo), Dinani (Dingi), Gba, Fiti (Surubu), Igbiri (Gure), Janji, Kibollo, Kinugu Kitimi, Kinono, Kono, Namoro (Lemoro), Nfachara (Tariya), Shineni (Shine), Tirumaruma (Ruruma), etc. Most of these polities speak mutually unintelligible languages though some are closely interrelated. Despite the linguistic and cultural differences, they share many things in common, particularly with respect to security matters. Out of consideration for amicable coexistence, over many generations of cohabitation, they have developed well established and effective internal security structures against social and natural forces.

Towards a Definition of Traditional Security Structures
Traditional security structures here simply refer to the internal local arrangements organized by the different polities of Northern Jos Plateau for the purpose of protecting and maintaining themselves against natural and social threats. It is the traditional local machinery or structures devised by these societies to guarantee their freedom from danger. Such structures ensured the existence of a conducive atmosphere for the societies to operate and pursue their legitimate interests develop and promote their cherished values and the wellbeing of their citizens. In essence, the organs within such local structures had the capacity to deal
squarely with those tendencies that undermined and threaten the internal cohesion, corporate entity and existence of the polities. With such internal structures well established, the polities were quite capable of confronting and dealing effectively with any external threats.

Putting it more succinctly, internal security has been defined as:

*a totality of a nation’s equilibrium state which needs to be maintained so that the nation can carry out its normal functions without unnecessary interruptions from anywhere. Internal security involves government co-ordination of all those actions that would ensure that the equilibrium of the State is maintained or quickly brought to normal wherever and whenever it is threatened by any form of civil disturbances- students, political or religious. In another vein, internal security could also mean the citizens’ expectation of government to make provision for the protection of life and property and safety from criminals and armed robbers.*

**Security Today**

Today, the word security has taken much wider dimensions than it did just half a century ago. Modern technology has made it increasingly more difficult for governments to provide adequate security for their individual citizens. Thus security has assumed different meanings for different individuals. In other words, security today calls for a redefinition. As if to respond to this call, Mark Golsby of the American Society for Industrial Security aptly defined the term as:

…protection, assurance, a state or sense of safety or certainty, and not being exposed to danger. Security implies a stable, relatively unchanged atmosphere in which individuals or groups may pursue their ends without disruption or harm and without fear of loss or injury.

Just as the security needs of the individual has continued to increase by geometric proportions so have the security needs of nation-states. In his *Theory and Reality in World Politics*, Libensraum states:

While the need for international security multiplies it calls for supranational control in the areas of modern/nuclear weapons (what today, is generally referred to as weapons of mass destruction), the accelerated pollution of the biosphere and the exhaustive exploitation of natural
resources to the point of depletion, the global organization that was
designed to secure peace and welfare for the world community has
been sabotaged by the arrogant posture of a type of political
organization which duly demonstrates its obsolesce as the chief
instrumentality of human security and welfare.4

Libensraum went on to state very emphatically that “... the doctrine
of mass retaliation constituted the basis of American policy as far
back as 1954.”5 This policy was applied directly against member
countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 20
years later in 1974, and has remained so applied till today.

The strategy according to Ayagi, has been to “exploit the
main weakness of the inherent corrupt tendencies known to exist
among the leaders of the Third World Countries through
inducement to misleading investment and expenditure
programmes; and the imposition of the International Monetary
Fund ... and the World Bank.”6 The impact of this has been
devastating on the Third World Countries. The economies of these
countries have been in shambles while their political environments
have been rendered almost permanently unstable. Their present
predicaments were sequel to the Saudi Arabian embargo on crude
oil exports to the United States in 1973; this singular but crucial
step in the interest of the Third World Countries really threatened
the social security of the western nations. Moreover Deutsch has
stressed that:

> Among the many goals which individuals and governments pursue, the
brodest and most common is security. It is the basic mode in which
most other values, such as wealth, wellbeing, affection and “the rest”
are enjoyed with the expectation that they will last for at least some
time, and to many people it is also a value in itself. But since it is both
a manner and a condition for enjoying many other values, its meaning
is often ambitious.7

Deutsch further explains that the most obvious modern
interpretation of the concept of security is the safety of “life and
limb for individuals and their loved ones.” Thus security may be
equated to peace and the maintenance of peace. But security
extends into the sphere of protection for wealth and property even
where wealth should be based on a “partial but real conflict of
interests.” Conflict, indeed, with the potentials for escalating to
intensity of latent wars, is inevitable between say, creditor and debtor, landlord and tenant, employer and employee. In another vein, security may pervade into the sphere of protection for an ideology or a culture, the claims for respect or self-esteem. To the modern man some or all of these may be worth defending. The sad fact, however, is that the modern nation-state is “manifestly inadequate to safeguard all of them.” Deutsch then concludes, “To preserve security thus means to control and organize power and hence to have the capacity to influence the allocation of many values and the pursuit of many purposes.”

The point that is being elicited here is that security today calls for vigilance in both socio-economic and political spheres of our national endeavours. By implication, the intricacies of modern-day security are such that the policies (both foreign and domestic) of all nation-states are predicated on security projections. Security today determines the levels of individual and group interrelationships and interactions hence it can be identified as a key factor in the way we design our houses, the way we travel, the way we conduct our businesses, the way we marry off our children, the way we organize our markets, where we send our children to school, where they go to work, where we play our international games or carry out our sports tournaments and so on and so forth. Indeed, today religion is being used as a reason for aggression as a means for securing its practice. Security today is truly pervasive and, as such, totally controls human thinking and behaviour.

The role of security in today’s society is, thus, much more vital than it has ever been before. So much so that every adult member of the society requires security (much the same way that a vehicle needs fuel) in order to function efficiently and effectively. Whether as an employer or employed, a boss or a subordinate, a participant or observer, indeed whether one is a leader or a follower, every productive citizen needs security for optimum productivity. Once security is lacking or threatened productivity stops or reduces in direct proportion to the level or extent of the security threat. Constant security threats result in or, actually, breed apprehension, fear and distrust and, if continued beyond this point, may finally give vent to aggression and disintegration.
Although the issue of the relevance of security in our present day society can be said to have been addressed only briefly, suffice it to say that it has been exploited sufficiently to alert us to the fact that it has been, it is, and shall ever be the basic ingredient in the survival strategies and development plans of any given society. The question being articulated here is not why security but how a society like ours, with its peculiarities traceable to our historical development and cultural plurality, can provide the security needed to motivate each and every constituent sector of our economic and social endeavours to optimum level of productivity for effective national growth and development. In attempting to address this all important question, it is pertinent to examine as a case study, the main pattern of pre-colonial security structures that existed among the polities of Northern Jos Plateau, this is with a view to providing a background of analysis for the paper.

**Pre-colonial Security Structures**

Security requirement like the desire for food and shelter was very crucial for the survival of the pre-colonial polities of Northern Jos Plateau. In virtually all spheres of their existence, such as economic, social and political, every activity was conducted within the framework of efficient and effective security system. Like elsewhere, right from the beginning, there was division of labour on the basis of sex or role assignment based on gender among the different polities. While the men were engaged in the more strenuous activities demanding muscular power, the women were confined to relatively less strenuous feminine jobs. Hunting, cultivating, building and thatching of houses, clearing the bush, the protection of the life and property of the inhabitants were the preoccupation of the men. Considering that women at certain periods required special attention for conception, labour and maternity, they were thus confined to domestic chores such as food processing, cooking, the burden of carrying all kinds of loads such as fetching of water and firewood. All of these were in addition to their primary responsibilities of nursing and training children from birth until they were weaned.

The basis of division of labour was also replicated in their social and political organization. The patterns of social and political structures were basically similar among the societies. In
virtually all the polities, their social and political lives were organized along generational lines. For the proper maintenance of law and order and the protection of the community from all forms of external threats, the polities were organized into four main age-grades. These were the children age-set (1-14 years), youth (15-24 years), adult (25-49 years) and elders (50 years and above). To prevent generational tensions, each age-grade was expected to succeed the next only when it became older. The mere numerical size of the polities in the area makes a group by group study very wieldy and cumbersome. Therefore, a description of the pre-colonial security structures as a typical case study for the polities of Northern Jos Plateau is attempted immediately in the following.

**Children Age-Grade (1-14 years)**

Generally, children are the most inestimable gift to humanity. Within the perspective of security among the polities of Northern Jos Plateau as in most societies, children are regarded as a gift from God, and are likened to arrows in the hands of warriors. Any one whose quiver is full of them is indeed a blessed and happy person. In essence, children are the foundation and perpetuation of every society. Though they are helpless and implicitly dependent on adults for their security, children have always been considered the basis of future strength and hope of the human race.

The significance of this age grade as a basis of future security among the polities of Northern Jos Plateau can be seen right from the birth of a child among the Buji for instance. Though both sexes were important and highly prized for security consideration, certain rituals were considered very essential on the naming ceremony of all newly born male children. All normal and healthy children were named on the seventh-day of their birth. On the naming ceremony of a male child, he was tied to the back of a little boy who was given a bow and arrow. He was then instructed to aim his arrow and shoot at a clearly marked object while reciting the following:

> As you [pronouncing the child’s name] grow from childhood into adult life. The bow and arrows are your weapons of defence.  
> Our survival as a people has depended on our use of them.  
> When in danger use these weapons to defend  
> And protect the family, clan, the feeble and the community.
In your powerful and skilful hands  
Bring abundant meat from the bush  
To feed the family, the aged and friends

Indeed as they grew, the children were gradually instructed in the careful and skilful techniques of using these weapons. Among the play toys provided for the children in their growth were bows and arrows.

Within the childhood phase is the age of puberty (11-14 years) which marks a transition from childhood to the youth age. At this phase the children accompanied their parents to engage in various economic pursuits like cultivating, reaping, hunting etc In this way they learned to practice what the adult do for security and survival. For instance, while in the bush with the adults, children practiced the proper use of the bows and arrows as they shot at game. One important practical way by which children gained skills in the use of these weapons was to send them to guard farm crops against the destruction of birds and wild animals. The children were sent at specific times of the day such as early morning and evening during which birds and monkeys were expected to come to the farms for their breakfast and dinner. The ability to scare animals like the monkeys devouring farm crops required some amount of courage and boldness on the part of the children as these beasts were known to be very brutish and stubborn.

The Youth Age Grade (15-24 years)

In the social and political organization of Northern Plateau polities, the Youth Age was very crucial in the training of young boys in all aspects of their defence and security. The youth were introduced to the actual technique of making tools and weapons. They were taught not only how to handle but also the art of fashioning some of the tools such as rope weaving for the production of slings, small site bow and arrows, clubs etc. The ability to use these weapons was achieved through both informal and formal training.

Informal training of the youth in the proper use of weapons of defence was acquired through participation of the young in adult activities. Though hunting was considered merely as a major hobby, it did provide one of best ways in which the youths in the societies were informally introduced into the skilful methods of
using the bows and arrows. Hunting was organized at two main levels—individual and communal. In either case, the youth accompanied the adults whenever they went out on hunting expeditions. Some polities like the Abisi (Piti) used horses during such expeditions. While the game was an important source of protein requirement of the polities, the skins of the animals were used for various purposes: body cover, shields, quivers, drums and a host of other handcraft products. Ultimately, the object in hunting was to train children to be capable of providing the future security needs of the polities.

Rites de passage

The formal training of the youth to adult life was attained through initiation ceremonies—rites de passage. The length of time and the interval of the ceremonies differed from one polity to another. While rites de passage were performed annually in some polities such as the Binawa, Kinono and Kuzamani, others performed theirs at the intervals of four, seven and eight years. For example, while the Gusu and Lemoro performed their initiation rites after every four years, the Amo, Bujel, Buji, Ribina conducted their rites in every seventh year, and the Jere do theirs after the seventh year. Whether these rites were annual, septennial, etc. the objective in all the polities was the same. The main purpose was the training of the youth in preparation for full adult responsibilities, particularly in the key areas of defence strategies and tactics.

Most rites de passage take place during the dry seasons, usually between the months of March and May. During these months the youth were taken to a camp site in the bush where they remained in ritual seclusion for seven weeks. While none of the societies practiced female circumcision, it was during this period that all male children of the same age set were circumcised. The seven-week period of ritual seclusion in the bush was to allow for sufficient time in which the circumcision wounds were completely healed. While in seclusion, the parents of the youth prepared foods, drinks and other provisions at home and these were taken to them by young women at a designed spot near the sacred camp sites. The initiates were taken care of by those who were previously initiated into manhood, called the aghare in Buji. Throughout the
seclusion period the initiates wore no clothing and were never expected to be seen by any females. While animal skins were the main attire of the aghare, the initiates wore very beautiful woven leaves, machau, round the girdles of their waists.¹⁴

Although rites de passage were aimed at providing formal training for the youth in all spheres of adult life, more emphasis was placed on security and defence. While the main activities of the initiates took the form of games and sports, the objective was to drill them to be proficient and competent in the management of accidents and to deal with external aggression. The youth participated in activities such as hunting, wrestling, swimming, ighada (traditional hockey), mock battles, etc. Strategies and tactics of warfare were taught to them in mock battles. In these ways, the youth were drilled on how to defend their societies when attacked by enemies.¹⁵

Early in the morning before breakfast, dodon jankai (a masquerade) would appear bringing plenty of whips or rods (sisaro) to the camp ground. These whips were used in drilling the youths. The youths were all lined up at uwaru (square) and ordered to raise hands on their heads as two lashes of sisaro were administered to each of them. They were expected to show no sign of pain when and after the lashes were administered. Any youth who dared to show the signs of weakness, was returned for more lashes until he learned to acquire the spirit of bravery and perseverance. The purpose was to drill the youth in the acts of bravery and endurance when faced with extreme danger and pain. The end of the ritual seclusion was marked by a grand celebration to welcome the initiates back home. Festivities for such occasions lasted at least for seven days after which the initiates were accepted as adults and the aghare for the next rites de passage.¹⁶

The significance of rites de passage was not only in drilling the youth for future responsibilities but it was also the period when every polity took accurate census and assessment of the health of its most productive population. By implication, after this period every polity had some ideas about the potentiality and capability of its military strength. In this context the future hope, safety and security of the polities were ensured and guaranteed.
Adult Age Grade (25-49 years)
The adult age grade was one of the most important security structures in the pre-colonial polities of Northern Jos Plateau. Membership into this age set was strictly through rites de passage. Non-initiates, no matter their ages and status were not considered as members of the adult set unless they had gone through the initiation rites. It was only then that such people could participate in public discussions and decision making processes of the society.

The main functions of adult age grade were in the organization, administration or execution of most decisions affecting the security and welfare of the polities. They were involved in the organization and supervision of rites de passage. When attacked by enemies, the bulk of the fighting forces were mobilized from the adult age and from the agbare. Every member of this age set was expected to be married and capable of establishing and being the head of a family.

Members of this age set settled most cases arising within its members and those below it. Disputes between the members of the youth were settled by any member of the adult age set. Major criminal cases such as murder, homicide, infanticide, robbery were however tried by the council of elders. Cases of adultery, theft, quarrels and witchcraft, within its members and between them and those below them, were decided by the adult grade set. The leader and head of the adult age grade was called Sansamari.

This age grade enforced the norms, customs and regulations of the societies. The juniors in the societies were all expected to give due respect to their seniors. Acts of defiance or disrespect by any member of the juniors attracted severe punishment. Punishments were administered according to the gravity of the offence or crime committed. In cases of adultery and theft, the offenders were asked to pay a fine of specific number of goats to the affected persons or return the equivalent of the stolen items. Some of the fines were paid with chickens and some of these were reserved as sacrificial offerings to appease the ancestors and gods of the land. The meat offerings were reserved for members of the adult age involved in the palaver. Since the security and prosperity of the polities depended on the good conduct of the adult in every community, members of the age grade took their work very seriously. Suggestions by members of the youth age on security matter were
reviewed and considered for appropriate action by the adult age set.

The Elders Age Grade (50 years and above)

Members of this age grade constituted the highest governing body in the pre-colonial security structures of Northern Jos polities. The social and political structures of these polities varied greatly. While some of the polities were village based others were clan based organizations. Regardless of the structure of their social and political organizations, on account of their age and experience in life, the elders in every polity constituted themselves into a council concerned with legislation, decision making and administration of the societies. The elders in every community were respected for their honesty, boldness, firmness and fairness. On the basis of their position especially as the living representatives of the ancestors, the council of elders derived whatever authority they exercised over the polity from the spirits of the ancestors, and the Supreme Being or God. The polities of Northern Jos Plateau like many others believed that the general wellbeing of their societies depended on the amount of favours bestowed upon them by Heaven, through supernatural beings, their ancestors. Misfortunes, and general crises like famines, epidemics, and so on were taken as indexes of the displeasure of these supernatural beings. To avert such and any form of disaster, the root causes of the crises were ascertained and appropriate propitiations were offered to appease the supernatural beings. This was done through festivals and sacrifices of animals.

In most cases, members of the elders’ council were heads of families in charge of their own household shrines to which sacrifices were offered for peace and security. All matters relating to the security and wellbeing of the families, villages and clans were brought to the council of elders for discussion and final decision. The council tried appeal cases brought by members of the adult age grade. Disputes involving members of different polities were tried by the council of elders. Cases of arson, witchcraft, robbery and murder were all settled by this council. When proven guilty, the culprits were fined or required to compensate the injured. High level security issues such as going to war when the
polities were threatened by enemies were discussed and final decisions were taken only at the council of elders.\textsuperscript{19}

Within the council of elders there existed a stratum of religious and secular leaders and heads of different occupations. Among the Buji the \textit{Chope} was in charge of rituals, \textit{Ogomo} (in charge of the mundane), \textit{Ogom bore} (in charge of hunting), \textit{sekeze} (in charge of war), \textit{barje vara} (in charge of agriculture) etc. In the course of time the positions of the first two became hereditary to certain families, but the rest of the professional posts were by ascription and open to the most capable persons in the polities. Depending on the polities, the \textit{Chope} or \textit{Ogomo} presided over all meetings convened by the council of elders. In some societies the \textit{Chope} performed both religious and political roles, but in others there was a distinction in the functions of these two posts in which the \textit{Ogomo} was the secular chief. In the anthropological literature, where the \textit{Chope} or the \textit{Ogomo} combined the two functions, the ruler is referred to as the Priest-Chief.\textsuperscript{20} In their various settings, these traditional institutions formed the bedrock of security structures among the polities of Central Nigeria.

**Look-out Points**

Look-out points were used by the different polities in question for the purpose of security. The peaks of hilltop were used as look-out points for nucleated hill settlements while giant tall trees were used by the inhabitants on dispersed plain settlements. Some polities constructed temporary or permanent huts at sites of the look-out points. These huts were known as \textit{mahanga} where security scouts were stationed to watch out in all direction of the advance of the enemy. On sighting the advance or the presence of the enemy forces, the alarm was raised by blowing a flute which produced a very sharp and penetrating sound. This sound was a call for the warriors to take up their arms and move in the direction of the enemies to protect the settlements. All routes leading to the settlements were blocked while women, children and the aged took refuge in nearby caves and rock shelters.

In the pre-colonial security structures of Northern Jos Plateau polities, law-making for adjudication of all cases were legislated by the council of elders. Issues needing legislation were brought before the council for exhaustive deliberation. After debating on
the issues, the final decision was then promulgated to the people. No law was considered for promulgation except it had to do with maintaining the equilibrium, cohesion, security and welfare of the entire polity.

**Other Traditional Security Measures**
In addition to the main traditional structures there were other forms of security measures that provided further security and peace for the pre-colonial polities of Northern Jos Plateau. Like the case of the main structures examined above, there existed many kinds of practical security measures which have left their landmarks on the history of the area. Among these were stockades of euphorbia or cactus (*ijaron* in Buji), look-out points (*mahanga*), military alliances, and *amana* relations.

**Stockades**
Stockades of euphorbia plants were constructed round the compounds of individual families as well as around most compact hill settlements. These stockades provided impenetrable defences for the pre-colonial polities of Northern Jos Plateau. The latex of *ijaron* when cut without much care could poison the enemies with blindness. Stockades of *ijaron* therefore were a source of fortification especially against surprise attacks by enemy forces. A casual visit to any of the abandoned ancient hill sites and some plain settlements by an observer will enable one to notice isolated *ijaron* scattered here and there.

**Military Alliances**
One of the mechanisms for maintaining peace and security against any external threats was through the formation of military alliances. During the second half of the nineteenth century, for the purpose of maximum security, different kinds of military alliances were formed by the non-Muslim polities of Jos Plateau and between them and some vassal states in the emirates of Bauchi and Zazzau. There were several accounts of such military alliances. One of such cases was the alliance between the vassal state of Toro in Bauchi emirate and the *amana* polities of Loro and Ribina against the invading forces of Ningi in c.1871. In this year, Dan Maje, the ruler of Ningi Chiefdom undertook a large scale military
40th Anniversary of the Emirship of HRH Alh. (Dr). Ado Bayero

expedition against the polities to the south of his chiefdom. He was noted for his military depredations against the established emirates of Bauchi, Kano and Zazzau. His depredatory raids constituted a serious threat to the security of the life and property of these established emirates as well as those of the non-Muslim polities of Northern Jos Plateau.

News of the advancing expeditionary force caused fear and panic to the ruler of Toro vassal state. As the indiscriminate attacks of Dan Maje were not going to spare any body, it was absolutely necessary for the Muslim and non-Muslims to unite together against a common enemy. In the face of this impending doom, the Ardon Toro sent an urgent request for military assistance from his immediate neighbours, the polities of Loro and Ribina with whom there were mutual pacts called Amana in Hausa, derived from the Arabic word, aman (trust). Loro and Ribina polities responded positively by sending their contingents. The combined forces of Toro and the Amana polities took advantage of the intimate knowledge of their environment and lured the invading forces to Salarma valley. During the ensuing encounter, the combined contingents converged on the enemy forces and inflicted a heavy defeat against the Ningawa, killing Dan Maje in the battle.\(^{21}\)

In another case, it was the military alliance of mainly non-Muslim polities against the forces of emirate power. In 1873 the emirate of Bauchi which had entered into Amana relations with the Anaguta polity decided to wage war against the latter on account of cin-Amana (breach of trust). The Anaguta had refused to honour their obligation to pay the annual tribute of slaves demanded by the emir of Bauchi, Mallam Ibrahim. In the face of the impending war, the Anaguta sought the military support of their neighbours, the Afizere, Arno, Berom and Buji all of whom sent the much needed military assistance. During the encounter, the Bauchi forces were routed by the combined forces of the non-Muslim polities of Jos Plateau.\(^{22}\)

From these two cases, it is clear that military alliances took different forms among the polities of Northern Jos Plateau. In one case it was a combination of both Muslims and non-Muslim forces against a common enemy. Yet in another case, it was mainly the non-Muslims against the emirate administration. There is no doubt that several other cases existed but such will have to await future
investigations of the different polities. It was therefore not simply a matter of non-Muslim versus Muslim polities. Such kind of misleading generalizations abound in the available literature and this regrettably has been accepted by many people. A history of inter-group relations in the area has attempted to correct such misleading impressions. The study has stressed the significance of *Amana* relations between the emirate administration and non-Muslim polities in the North-Central Nigeria.  

**Amana Relations**

Following the declaration of the Sokoto Jihad at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the successful establishment of the emirate administration throughout Hausa land and in many parts of Central Nigeria, there was need for a clear definition of the conduct of Muslims living in *dar al-Islam* and non-Muslims in *dar al-harb*. Within the boundaries of *dar al-Islam* there were large pockets of non-Muslim communities like the Maguzawa in Hausaland. Also within the demarcations of *Dar al-harb*, there were minority Muslim communities. There was little if any, problem of peaceful coexistence between the Muslims and non-Muslims in the pre-jihad period. However, after the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, the security of the non-Muslims in *dar al-Islam* and the safety of the Muslims in *dar al-harb* required some basic guidelines for the peaceful conduct of both Muslims and non-Muslims in the two Dars. In consideration of the need to promote peaceful coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslims, the Shehu Usman Danfodio encouraged the emirs to enter into *Amana* contracts with the non-Muslim societies. The procedure for this was well known to the emirs.

The procedure for granting *aman* is that the *harbi* must first request it. Once the intention is known, the *harbi* merely say a word in any language and the *aman* is granted. If the believer did not intend to give an *aman*, but by inference aman is understood, *aman* is valid. The *aman* is usually granted with condition attached. *Harbi* messengers that:

> carried requests for aman to the Imam were allowed to enter into *dar al-Islam* under diplomatic immunity. Without proper letter of credentials, messengers were liable to be killed.
In compliance, emirates with non-Muslims within their territories as well as those that shared common borders with non-Muslims, went on to establish *Amana* relations with many of the polities. It was certainly within this context that the following declaration was issued by Shehu Usman Danfodio instructing the emirs on appropriate actions regarding the security of the non-Muslim communities within the frontiers of dar al-Islam and those outside the frontiers:

…to make war upon the heathen when peace has been granted is unlawful by assent; wrongfully to devour their property is unlawful by assent, and to enslave them is unlawful by assent.\(^{25}\)

While many of the polities of Northern Jos Plateau entered into *Amana* relations with the emirate of Bauchi and Zazzau,\(^{26}\) quite a large number of polities in the rest of Jos Plateau had nothing to do with it. In principle, all polities in *Amana* relations were expected to enjoy immunity from attacks by emirate powers, but in practice, it was not always safe for non-Muslim to cross into the borders of dar al-Islam without a guide. Legally, the emirate states were however free to wage the jihad against the non-*Amana* polities in the process of which they could acquire slaves and other booties. In concluding this sub-section it should be noted that the existence of many *Amana* polities stressed the significance of security mechanism adopted in the promotion of peaceful coexistence between Muslims and non-Muslim societies in the pre-colonial setting of Northern Jos Plateau.

**Adopting Traditional Security Structures to Modern Security Needs**

The recognition of the peculiarities of Northern Jos Plateau both as corporate entities and as an amalgamation of unique ethnic nationalities is of prime importance if the attempts at security enhancement for the nation are to be meaningful. One such peculiarity was identified by the sixteen-member panel of a Political Bureau headed by Dr J.S. Cookey in the following words:

Nigeria’s political misfortunes in the past and the failure to evolve a united, prosperous, and just nation can be blamed partly on inadequate and defective structures and institutions as well as on the orientation...
which British colonialism bequeathed to the young nation at independence, and the reluctance of succeeding Nigerian governments to tackle these problems decisively. Among these are: an unbalanced federation; regionalism and sectionalism; alienation of the populace from the institutions of governance and major apparatuses of state (judiciary, police, army, etc.); and the conception of the state as an instrument for exploiting the people, rather than as a vehicle for the promotion of their welfare and development.27

In other words, both the colonial legacy and the “reluctance” of our leadership to tackle its concomitant problems have given rise to the existing state of near-total insecurity in all aspects of our socio-economic and political struggles.

The relevance of security in the search for political identity and national growth has been stressed above. However, it has also been noted that the sine qua non of efficient and effective security is the acceptance of cultural peculiarities and historical antecedents as basic requirements in the articulation of sustainable security strategies. It is important therefore that each constituent polity of our larger society should be aided to evolve a security system based on its trado-cultural background and its present-day peculiarities. In essence, each of the polities would acquire the security it needs and deserves and then all the micro-security systems should be knitted together and coordinated into a national security system that would at once be unique to Nigeria and effective for all communities. A kind of partnership between government and the communities in which our traditional institutions play a vital role.

As the polities of Northern Jos Plateau in North-Central Nigeria had actually succeeded in developing well established and effective internal security structures against social and political forces, we may as well identify the characteristics of those effective structures for the purpose of adopting same for efficient and effective modern security systems. Some of the characteristics so identified include:

1. total participation or involvement of all initiated males;
2. the use of social cells in the organizational structure of their security systems,
3. the bureaucratic hierarchy of age-grades’ children,
youth, adult, council of elders, village and clan based with all the social trustees or ancestral oracles. and, finally, the local chiefs and religious priests

Within this perspective, modern day internal security can be organized along similar lines. Implicitly, by raising the level of security awareness through attitudinal reorientation we can progressively increase the participation or involvement of all and sundry towards or final goal of an all-out involvement. We can then organize the electoral wards or administrative districts of our local governments into working units or cells of modern security setups. Ultimately, we can establish a bottom-up organizational hierarchy that would go from unit to local government council to the state and finally federal government.
## Appendix

List of amana and non-amana polities of Northern Jos Plateau

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amana Polities</th>
<th>Non-amana Polities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Binawa**</td>
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<td>Bujel*</td>
<td>Buji villages of Gurum and Jan</td>
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<td>Tudu</td>
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<td>Buji village of Ekokong**</td>
<td>Kitimi</td>
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<td>Chawai **</td>
<td>Kono</td>
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<td>Chokobo**</td>
<td>Kinugu</td>
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<td>Dingi**</td>
<td>Kurama villages of Kudaru, Maigamo, etc</td>
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<td>Duguza*</td>
<td>Janji</td>
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<td>Gha*</td>
<td>Jere</td>
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<td>Gura*</td>
<td>Rishiwa</td>
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<td>Gure*</td>
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<td>Gusu*</td>
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<td>Kibollo**</td>
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<td>Kinono**</td>
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<td>Kurama villages of Dan Alhaji, Garu, Tidere, Tudai, Woba, etc**</td>
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<td>Kuzamani **</td>
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<td>Shine**</td>
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<td>Zul*</td>
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* Amana polities within the spheres of the emirate of Bauchi

** Amana polities within the spheres of the emirate of Zazzau

### Notes

2. The information for this section is based on the research of my brother in-law, Emmanuel Dariya, Jengre, whose contribution to this study is highly appreciated.


5. Ibid.


8. Ibid.

9. Cf. Psalms 127.5


13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.


16. Ibid.


18. Ibid.


26. A list of the *Amana* and non-*Amana* polities can be found in an appendix at end of the study.


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Psalms 127:5, The Holy Bible.
The Role of The Attah of Igala in the Security System of Igalaland, c.1800-1940

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Introduction
The history of the Igala is a very long one. The development of institutions (the state, kingship, kinship, clan organization and occupation and religious institution) has been a slow process which involved adapting to the environment, borrowing from and lending to neighbours far and wide. Before the 19th century, a powerful kingdom with a complex and hierarchical political organizations and elaborate rituals had already developed in the region of Igala. The Igala kingdom evolved a considerable ideology, intricate rituals of kingship, elaborate administrative machineries and organizational structure based on clans and lineages. The territorial structure and the economic basis of the control and exploitation of resources provide the basis for the analysis of politically and economically significant groups, competition for power between segments of the society and the mode of incorporation of the subject peoples. The Igala before the 19th century inhabited the entire triangular tract of territory on the banks of the Niger and Benue rivers. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Igala Kingdom extended over parts of Yoruba, Nupe, Ebirra, Loma and other ethnic groups. In the 18th century, more areas were included in the kingdom as a result of her expansionism.

The Role of the Attah of Igala in the Provision of Security, c.1800-1895
In the 19th century, the political life of the Igala Kingdom was, in so far as possible; determined by the ruling elite with the Attah at the apex. Traditionally, the Attah was the spiritual leader and his powers were enhanced by beliefs and rituals, which surrounded his person and were reinforced by strong inter-clan ties. Security in the Igala Kingdom was manifested through certain clan heads like Abokko, Agaidoko and Omogbaje, and sometimes individuals like Onupia, Olimene and Akubo as well as families like Abutu Eje.
Equally, local officials policed the highways and controlled specific markets. There were also religious sanctions and political controls in terms of the fertility of the land and the confirmation of appointments. Indeed, the Attah, apart from being a ritual figurehead and a constitutional monarch was constantly engaged in balancing power.

One of the means through which security was provided and guaranteed by the Attah was Masquerades. In the western sense, the word masquerade is sometimes used synonymously with anything disguising or concealing the face. In the African context, a mask or masquerade is a masked being, conceptualized to originate and belong to the world of the dead. The concept and practice of masquerades are rooted in and inextricably interwoven with the religion and cosmology of African peoples. The Igala see masquerades as the ancestors of the people with corrective objectives aimed at purifying or re-ordering the disorganization created by the living. Among the Kalabari-Ijo in the Niger Delta, masquerades visit the living as representatives of the gods. In many African societies, masquerades are used as agents for consolidating power and authority, and disciplining intransigent citizens. There had existed a close relationship between the masquerade and leadership in traditional authority and they became institutionalized for social and political organization.

Masquerades were part of the Igala way of life. Egwu were also used as agents for consolidating power and authority, especially in societies like the ‘gala with organized political and monarchical set ups. Theoretically, all Egwu belonged to His Royal Highness, the Attah of Igala, who was the spiritual, cultural and political leader of the Igala people. In addition, the Attah possessed twelve masquerades under the custody of favoured men. They only came out during state festivals or activities involving the Attah. They were identified with and were embodiment the person, royalty and honour of the Attah. They defended and safeguarded the personality of the Attah and accordingly prevented all potential threats to the existence of the Attah’s institution. Indeed, masquerades were part and parcel of the monarchical authority.

Each of the royal masquerades had a specific function to play and a duty to perform within the framework of governance in the Igala kingdom. The Awe was the head of all the masquerades, and
its position, role and function among the masquerades symbolized the position, role and function of the Attah as the leader of the Igala people. The Ekwe was a visible manifestation of the ritual authority that is vested in the royal ancestors, and it portrayed dramatically the ancestors’ watchful interest in the affairs and conduct of their descendants. The Ekwe equally disciplined the Attah himself since he maintained the ritual purity of the palace and of the Attah’s own person. The awe also symbolized the ritual sanction behind the Attah’s authority over his clansmen. The Ekwe was a majestic royal masquerade of the Attah which preceded him in any procession and had the power to speak openly to him or to strike trouble makers with the stick it carried.

The role of the Ekwe in the enforcement of law and order in the society was not unique or limited to the Igala kingdom alone, but was widespread throughout most of Africa. In Calabar, the Ekpe made and enforced law and adjudicated disputes between wards and carried out decisions through proclamations, ostracism of offenders or by execution. It could prohibit anyone from trading and had the power to impose fine, arrest and detain offenders by decapitation and destroy debtors’ property. It was an instrument of inter-group authority with political power. Several Obong of Calabar had the Ekpe highest title of Eyamba, and they used it to proclaim decrees and enforce them. Among the Ibibio-Efik, the Ekpe was a leopard society which enforced customary law, recovered debts and generally protected life and property. The Ekpe was dominated by free men, especially the heads of the principal lineages, who utilized it to reinforce their monopoly over credit facilities and of commercial and political patronage. As an agent for debt collection, it ensured the viability of the credit system. In Old Calabar, commercial elite used it to repress the growing number of slaves and defend themselves against the Blood men. In Congo, the embroidered bell on the Ekpe gown was symbolic of authority and power. It should be stated that while the Ekpe had operated as a secret society and even a cult in Calabar and among the Ibibio-Efik, it was not in the Igala kingdom. However, they shared similar symbols such as leopard skin, bells and charged sticks.

Apart from the Ekwe, other masquerades were equally responsible for security in the 19th century Igala kingdom.
Masquerades were sometimes directed to publicly discipline thieves, adulterers, indolent people and the haughty. Disciplinary measures were in several forms. For example, talking masquerades such as Egwu-afia, Amuda or Ajamalede could publicly rebuke erring members of the society, calling out their names, cursing and warning them. The Egwu-afia (long masquerade and structurally with an elongated conically-shaped head), was symbolized the ancestral shrine under the Onu (District Head). The ritualized Egwu-afia chants and warnings were taken very seriously because it was believed that its prophecies and curses very often came true. It represented the resurrected spirits of a dead elder, played a protective and regulatory role in the affairs of the living and provided social stabilization in the society. The Egwut-afia dealt with cases dealing with witchcraft, extramarital relationships and other committed acts considered detrimental to the land. Names of offenders were called by the masquerade, offences committed mentioned and a fine in the form of cash or livestock and locally-brewed beer, ote-ekpe, was levied. Specifically, it governed the laws which were irrevocable and punishable by death. The functions of the Egwu-afia were the same as those performed by the Muo-afia in Onitsha and the Alekwu-afia in Idoma.

The Antuda masquerade was known for its mystical and clairvoyant powers. It ‘diagnosed’ illnesses and provided remedies and medicines for their cure. The Ajamalede, very often, used proverbial words to psychologically chastise offenders. The cane-bearers of the highly respected masquerades like the royal masquerades, the Olagenyi and the Ogede masquerades could publicly flog erring members of society. The Abide masquerade was an instrument of social control against evil practices especially witchcraft and sorcery, considered as crimes against the earth deity and capable of bringing misfortune to the community. The Abide came out from time to time in connection the land festival to warn householders to be ready or punish any man whose behaviour during the year consistently fell short of the standard set for a member of the community. The Abide also came out on special occasions if a succession of accidents or crop failures indicated that the land was ritually polluted. In extreme cases, the Onu could order a person to leave the land, and employ the Abide to expel him if he refused to leave. On the whole, the Igala masquerades,
by their nature and connection with the world of the dead and by their mystical and proven prophetic powers acted as constraints to acts that would, otherwise, be detrimental to security, stability and peace in society.

The Attah of Igala provided security for and control of the riverain area, over river trade and markets. In the river trade, various clans and/or a collateral of their clans served as customs and security officials as well as inspectors of trading goods. Security and control were vested traditionally in a group of titles, revolving around the three major offices of Abokko, Agaidoko and Omogbaje. Relations between the three leading riverain clans were intensely competitive and the division of functions between them represented a balance of power rather than an institutional delegation of power and responsibility. It was the duty of the clan heads, as the Attah’s chief lieutenants, to keep peace, provide canoes for the Attah’s services and act as intermediaries between the Attah and foreigners that used the river for trade. The clans operated in different directions, which were regionalized from their bases at Idah, the capital of the Igala kingdom and the seat of the Attah of Igala. Their residence at Idah was required so that the central government could oversee their actions and power, control their influence, restrain their power and for them to perform their political functions as sub-chiefs.

The Abokko clan head policed and exercised control over river trade from Idah to the confluence of the Niger and Benue. He looked after the movement of goods, levied duties on traders and trading items, provided security for the traders, informed the Attah of the development in trade and procured for him essential goods like firearms, ivory, horses and slaves. He also spied for the Attah of the opportunities in and threats to trade and policed the river.

The control of and provision of security over trade southwards (along the Niger from Idah to Asaba in Igbo) were undertaken by the Agaidoko clan head. In addition to this, the Agaidoko leader together with Onupia, Akubo and Olimene\(^{10}\) exercised absolute control over aja-Attah (Attah’s market) to the north-east of the royal palace at Idah. These officials took charge of security along the internal trade routes and also inspected the various goods from the hinterland markets which were first taken to aja Allah before reaching the Idah river port. The location of official compounds of
these state officials around the royal palace at Idah had institutionalized purposes, while their gates reflected their functions.¹¹

Security was provided and state control exercised at the various ports along the Niger River and at the fringes of the Igala kingdom where oversees goods such as guns, gun powder and sometimes cloth, ivory and salt were obtained. The most important port where Europeans, Nupe, Igbo, Hausa and Delta traders exchanged trading items was

Ogbega (Idah water-side), and this was managed by the Omogbaje clan. High charges were demanded from visiting canoe owners and traders. The Attah's monopoly in certain exports such as palm oil, ivory, slaves and horses was strictly enforced by the Omogbaje clan head. Security and control over trade at Itobe, Gbobe and Amagede river ports were undertaken by the Abokko clan head, Anaja of Gbobe and the Abuteje family respectively. The Anaja and Abuteje controlled and inspected trading goods from the Benue valley before they were allowed into the Niger and the hinterland trading systems.

In the vicinity of Idah, the Abokko and Omogbaje clan heads manned two landing customs posts at Egori and Olife.¹² River crafts from the north to the south were checked at Olife by the Abokko clan head, whilst those going up north from the south were checked at Egori by the Omogbaje clan head. Toll stations were also erected at Amagede, Aara, Gade and Adenekpa for the dual purpose of collecting duties from traders and reporting suspects promptly to Idah. In addition to these systems of control and security, the royal house at Idah had the Odogo ‘a tall building’ in the palace ground. It was utilized for spying on enemies and traders on the Niger and procuring customs duties from the northern merchants trying to reach the south and the sea. The Odogo is thought to have originated in the 16th Century.¹³

The residence of the most important nobles and chiefs at the centre enabled the Attah to keep a close watch over them. This type of arrangement had the advantage of preventing the nobles and chiefs from building extensive power in large consolidated areas. In addition, though a new title holder ordinarily inherited what his predecessor had controlled, still the Attah had absolute
right to redistribute fiefs, and he used this as a powerful political weapon.

The residing of town chiefs (atnonu-ane) in their areas of jurisdiction had a balancing effect: opposing them to the palace chiefs and increasing Attah’s authority. The atnonu-ane controlled most of the villages and the Attah was dependent on them for tribute, labour, troops and support against the palace chiefs. Despite their power, they were depended upon the Attah since their titles were-in his gifts and any subject could aspire to them. Their rise to power was not only because of their enterprise, but also due to the Attah’s favour. Although the Attah depended upon them for the general administration, their holdings were deliberately kept fragmented and they were subject to the Attah in matters like homicide and succession. Moreover, frequently, palace chiefs entered and interfered with the district administration while on specific royal assignments.

The Amoma-ajata (18 Royal Councilors) powers were limited by two major factors: they had limited tenure of office and were subject to trial by the Attah. Revolt by any individual or group of them carried the penalty of execution. Such executions were frequent at the court at Idah and the offenders were “prostrated and suffocated by a stick across the throat”, because blood should not be drawn from a member of the royal family. Non-royal execution involved the cutting of the throat and by beheading at crane, ‘the land shrine’ or at ere-Inikpi ‘Inikpi ‘s shrine at Ogbega ‘Idah water-side’.

The Attah also controlled and disciplined the ordinary Igala citizens through many officials who performed ‘police’ functions. Punishment was often effected by means of summary punishment, frequently execution. Some examples illustrate how this system worked. Crowther claimed to have witnessed an execution of a run away slave of Ameh Abokko who was convicted of stealing and selling slaves. He was caught on December 15th, 1850 and was executed by being “staked in a public road, after he had been stunned by a blow on the head and was exhibited as a warning to others”. On the following day, Crowther was told that the Attah suspected a slave of stealing and ordered his execution during the night.
Apart from these arbitrarily demonstration of power, the Attah further kept her citizens in check through established traditions. Kidnappers and incorrigible thieves were executed by *eduyokpa* ‘impaling’, while offenders against the Attah such as adultery with his wife were punishable by clubbing and the throwing of offenders from the cliff at Ubiga in Idah.\(^{19}\) Other laws included an ordinary thief to be sold as a slave, murder—punishable by death and seduction of a virgin punishable by selling nine members of his family, including the offender himself.\(^{20}\)

**The Role of the Attah of Igala in the Provision of Security, c.1896-1940**

1896 marked the beginning of the conquest of the Igala Kingdom. The conquest itself witnessed three main struggles: Idah–1896, Dekina–1903 and Ankpa–1904/05. The process, course and the brutal nature of the conquest are not our concern here, as these have been discussed extensively elsewhere.\(^{21}\) Although Idah was conquered in 1896, the political authority and the security were still in the hands of the Royal Niger Company (RNC). This was partly the result of the long drawn negotiations between the British Government and the RNC over the conditions and compensation for the revocation of the RNC’s Charter.\(^{22}\) In 1900, the British gradually began to take over effective political and security control of Igalaland. In the same year Attah Amaga (1876-1900) died. In 1901, the first colonial Attah, Ameh Ocheje, was directly appointed by the British and installed by the first British administrator in Igalaland, Charles Partridge, without following the traditional processes of electing an Attah. Between 1900 and 1940, the provision of security was gradually but effectively taken over by the British administrators in the area, through the use of the West African Frontier force (WAFF) stationed in Lokoja and Akwacha (a few kilometers to Dekina). In 1905, a WAFF garrison was stationed at Ankpa where it remained until 1933, when it was relocated to Enugu. But the police remained until 1940.

Attah Ocheje died in 1903, and the British once again appointed and installed Attah Ocheje Onakpa. However, unlike his predecessor who was accommodative, the new Attah refused to cooperate with the administration which allowed him virtually no powers. As a result of conflicts of definition and expectation, Attah
Onakpa was charged by the British in late 1903 with stubbornness, conspiracy and acts of disturbing peace. He was deposed in 1903 and exiled to Asaba. The central point is that by making the Attah cross the river, the British guaranteed that he would not be accepted back because of the strong Igala tradition that an Attah should not travel over water. It also demonstrated that he was no longer the Chief Security Officer of Igalaland. Attah Onakpa died within months and Achor Obaka, who had originally accompanied him into exile, brought his body back for the traditional burial.

Between 1903 and 1905 no Attah was appointed by the British, partly because they were pre-occupied and engaged with the conquest of Ankpa (1904-1905), in campaigns throughout the north such against the Tiv, in Kano, in Sokoto and against suspected Mahadists as well as the war in Ashanti and the South African War. Late in 1905, the British again for the third time appointed and installed Attah Oboni with limited powers. Within a year he found his area limited to Idah and located in the Southern Provinces as a result of the proclamation of the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Provinces. In 1906 when the Protectorates were proclaimed, Igalaland was partitioned: Idah Division (in which the Attah resided) was placed in Onitsha Province in the South and Dekina and Ankpa Divisions in Bassa and Munshi Provinces in the north respectively. The partitioned which continued until 1918 further reduced the powers of the Attah because the various Onus in the “Northern Provinces’ were cut off from under his ‘jurisdiction’.

In 1919, the Igalaland was re-unified and became fully part of the Northern Provinces. A new Attah, Atabo: 1919-1926, was appointed by the British. He was now in the north and his powers and authority (certainly not the security aspect) were partially restored. The re-unification and the restoration of the Attah’s power was meant to serve specific purposes: to enhance the administration, to facilitate easy collection of taxes and the provision of forced labour. According to report, “the difficulties of effective ‘Indirect Rule’ administration are greatly enhanced by the fact that the paramount chief of Igala and ‘Akpoto’ tribes resides in the Southern Nigeria”. Indeed, to Palmer and many of his colleagues, “a chief enjoying extensive powers was sin-qua-non for any real system of ‘indirect Rule’.” Palmer actually saw the
inclusion of the Attah in the north as a useful policy to be pursued and through which “the Attah speedily re-built his authority to the extent that he could produce, without government intervention, all the labour which the government asked from him for the construction of the railway”.  

The Eastern railway line was under construction from 1913 to 1932 and so labour recruitment became central, while the railway virtually determined the relationships between the Residents and Chiefs. “An Emir who produced enough workers for the railway was not interfered with....”

Despite the ‘return’ of the Attah to the north and the ‘increase’ in power, the provision of security was taken over by British officials.

The organization of the ‘Native’ Police, in the Northern Provinces was effected in 1908. In Igalaland, between 1900 and 1918, the police duties were the responsibilities of the WAFF forces stationed at Ankpa and Akwatcha. The Resident, Bassa Province, stated in 1906 that, “a company of the Second Northern Nigerian Regiment has been posted throughout the year at Akwatcha...to promptly punish overt acts of violence within reachable distance of headquarters”.

With the re-unification of Igalaland, the WAFF became inadequate to maintain and enhance authority. In 1919, the first sets of police were recruited in Igalaland. Generally speaking, the police was meant essentially to maintain authority and prestige of the local rulers. “The Native Administrations are able to maintain their authority and the danger of damaging their prestige among the people by maintaining a police force.” The police facilitated the prompt suppression of uprisings since their jurisdiction now spread over the people within specified areas including even the market places. Jointly, the police and the WAFF became the means by which security was provided up till 1933 and the police alone from 1933 to 1940.

**Conclusion**

The period from 1800 to 1895, was one in which the Attah of Igala was the real Security Officer of the Igala Kingdom and his role in security provision was clear and effective. The provision of security by the Attah was effected through masquerades, certain clans, officials, families and individuals. For the whole of Igalaland, the period between 1896 and 1940, over 44 years, was
one in which the traditional machinery of government was disorganized and abandoned. The Attah of Igala’s political, economic, and security powers were eroded, thereby making him a nominal leader with only religious and spiritual powers.

Notes
3. When the *Ekwe* in all its glory and honour symbolically hit the Attah three times with its cane, it was purifying the Attah as well as the inseparable bipartite relationship between the Attah’s ancestors.
10. Onupia, Olumune and Akubo were individuals with titles, but not leaders of any clan.
12. The customs posts were about a mile apart.


33. NAK/SNP 10, tile No. 564, *Munshi Province, Dekina Division, Dekina District Assessment Report*.

34. Annual Reports: Northern Nigeria, p.503.

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Annual Reports: Northern Nigeria, 1900-1911.


Introduction
Security is central to the successful administration of any polity. Incidents of insecurity can constitute a serious impediment to the smooth running of a state or domain as well as impede the implementation of any meaningful socio-economic project. Security should, however, not be viewed from strategic/military or policing perspective alone but also from a socio-economic development dimension. National Security, for example, has been defined as the capacity of a nation state to protect its citizens and territorial integrity from physical and socio-economic dangers’.1 This is because a people who are unemployed, hungry and sick pose a serious security threat to the government or polity.

Atta Ibrahim assumed office in Ebiraland under circumstances that were quite strange to the existing traditional order and was conferred with a degree of power by the colonial authority that was contradictory to the traditional norms of the people. These phenomena coupled with his ‘strange’ methods of implementing or consolidating his power created a continual source of security problems to his administration. Even his effort to provide socio-economic security for the people was most of the time misunderstood. As long as he enjoyed the confidence and support of his mentors, the colonial administrators, so long was he able to surmount the problems; but when he lost their support, he was consumed by the problems.

This paper examines some of the security challenges of the Atta’s administration and the various approaches he employed towards resolving them.

Socio-Political Setting of the Ebiraland and Maintenance of Security Before 1900
Ebiraland is bordered to the North by Lokoja and Kabba to the North West. It shares boundaries with the present Edo State to the South and has the River Niger on its Eastern border.
On arrival in their new locations from across the Niger in about the late 17th Century, the Ebira settled according to clan groups. Ebira tradition indicates five original clan groups which included Eika, Okehi, Adavi, Okengwen and Ihima. The Eganyi group developed distinctly from the other groups. For the purpose of identification from other Ebira else where, these Ebira are usually referred to as Ebira ‘Tao’, using their most popular form of greeting. The other Ebira groups, who share the same language but with some dialectal differences include Ebira Igu, Koton Karfī and Ebira Mosum (Kogi State); Ebira Toto and Umaisha (Nassarawa State); and Ebira Etuno, or Igarra (Edo State). The basis of the socio-political organisation of the Ebira started from the family unit under the eldest member of the family. A group of related families formed a clan with the eldest male member as its leader. He was assisted in running the affairs of the clan by a council of elders chosen from the families constituting the clan. His judgement was determined largely by the consensus of elders of the clan who gathered for the purpose. The third socio-political level was constituted by paternally related clans. The clan group was headed by a priest chief whose duty it was to look after the spiritual, social and political affairs of the group. The priest chiefs included Adeika of Eika, Asema of Adavi, Ohindase of Okengwe, Obobanyi of Ihima and Adogu of Eganyi. Each priest chief, in consultation with the council of elders, ensured compliance with societal norms and rules. All the clan group chiefs together with selected powerful elders usually met at a central zone (a market place) to deliberate on matters that affected the entire clan. ‘there was no single individual that could impose his will on the entire people. In the 1860s and 1870s, when confronted with the threat and reality of Jihadists raids spearheaded by the Nupe Emirate. it was these priest chiefs and the leading warriors that planned the strategies which effectively checked the incursions. Prior to the British occupation, beginning from the turn of the century, therefore, matters relating to the security of the Ebira were the responsibility of the family heads, clan heads and the clan-group priest chiefs, depending on the magnitude of the problems.

To find effective remedies to security threats like theft, external invasion, drought, disease etc. these leaders, being traditional religionists were to resort to the assistance of divination
usually carried out in the ireha (public shrine). Each clan chief had his own ireha. In security matters that affected the entire people consultation was conducted at the Ireha ododo at Okehi. Diviners and priest chiefs met annually at this ireha to predict on security of the land, rain fall, and health and to recommend the necessary sacrifice and measures required to avert calamity or attract positive results. Eku institution or masquerade was employed to enforce decisions of the priest chiefs.

This was in sum how Ebiraland was governed before the British occupation set in from 1902. The people did not evolve centralized system of rule but they were democratic in their approach to taking decisions on social, political and security matters. The imposition of the British colonial system of administration with Atta Ibrahim as the principal dramatis personae, which was done in contradistinction to the existing social order, created complex and enormous security challenges that tasked the ingenuity and will of the Atta, supported by the colonial security apparatus, to overcome.

The British Colonial Administration in Ebiraland Before 1917
The British forcefully occupied Ebiraland in 1903 and it was made a district of Kabba Division in a phenomenon that “engendered social disorderliness and political disequilibrium” in which, according to Mr. Greaves, the then Divisional Officer (D.O.), each segment of the social system was suspicious of other segments and of the British invaders. According to Mr. Greaves, virtually each family became a law on to itself.

The British quickly recognised the priest chiefs especially those who had collaborated with them including Atta Omadivi (nominally regarded as the District Head of Igbiirra District but whose actual control was limited to Okene), Akpata of Ihima, Owuda Adidi of Eika and Ozigizigi of Obehira, and gave them the responsibility of collecting taxes in their respective areas and to be paid direct to the Divisional Officer in Kabba beginning from 1904. The issue of taxation was central to colonial rule as it was meant to finance the administration and enhance the economic exploitation of the colony.

Taxation in the form it was introduced and the mode of its collection and payment (in British sterling) beginning from 1909
was not only strange to the people, but also harsh and unfair. It therefore attracted greater resistance manifested in occasional riots and public disturbances. It was such riots recorded at Adavi and Okengwe in 1914 which necessitated the establishment of a permanent police post in Ebira land and the eventual transfer of the Kabba Divisional police head quarters to Okene between 1915 and 1916. The presence of this police force did not deter the people from demonstrating their abhorrence of taxation. This anti tax sentiment was to pose one of the immediate Security Challenges to the Atta beginning from 1917. The British also introduced courts in each district under the respective clan group heads. Atta Ibrahim’s later attempt to reorganise this arrangement created a serious crisis which almost cost him his throne as discussed below.

Between 1904 and 1917, Atta Omadivi, the maternal grandfather of Atta Ibrahim, was the spokesman of the colonial officers to the people. Although tagged as the “District Head”, he did not exercise any authority beyond Okene as indicated earlier. Ibrahim Onoruozia was the son of his daughter, Zainabu Iyebe, a very powerful and successful business woman. Ibrahim was brought up in the compound of Omadivi who, probably through the influence of his daughter, was said to have requested the white men to prepare the young Ibrahim towards succeeding him. Ibrahim, having accompanied his mother on trading missions to Yoruba land, Kukuruka (now Edo state), and Nupe, became more exposed than the average boys of his age. He could speak a bit of Yoruba, Nupe and Hausa. In 1916 he was recruited as a tax assessment Mallam accompanying the white officers on tax assessment and collection exercises. It was in 1916 that the colonial government came out with a policy on how to effectively administer the non-centralized societies of Northern Nigeria through the grouping of villages or communities under an influential local figure towards implementing the indirect rule system in the areas. The local colonial officers soon identified Ibrahim as having the potential for the position of central chieftain for Ebiraland. He proved intelligent, honest and courageous. Unknown to the clan group chiefs, the colonial officers had started training Ibrahim to succeed his grandfather with even greater powers. It was towards this end that J.C. Walker, the Assistant District Officer in 1916, took him on tour of some Emirates of the North, particularly Katsina and
Bida as well some Kukuruku towns to familiarize him with the implementation of the indirect rule system in the areas. The experience he gained from these tours greatly assisted him in his later administrative career.

The 1916 Native Authority Ordinance re-confirmed the Northern chiefs as presidents of their respective judicial councils, putting public order of their respective domains under their custody with powers to appoint and depose subordinate chiefs and officials with the approved of the provincial Residents. The Atta was later to employ this ordinance in his attempt to create a conducive environment for the success of his administration.

**The Appointment of Ibrahim Onoruoiza as District Head and Sole Native Authority**

In January, 1917, Atta Omadibi died and the struggle for his position immediately started. The candidates for this central position included Ohindase Adano, Ibrahim Onoruoiza, Ozigizigi Opoh of Obehira, Ajokaiye of Eika and Opata of Ihima. After the District Officer in charge of Kabba division, Captain Byng-Hall, had given them three opportunities to come out with a consensus candidate and they failed to produce one, he decided in December, 1917 to impose Ibrahim Onorunoiza as the District Head of Igbirra. Ibrahim was the youngest of all the contestants, barely 30 years old, and he was not a title holder. Byng–Hall confessed in 1918 that this was really the first time there had been any sort of one man administration in the district. This was a correct observation because, for first in the history of the people, Ibrahim was the first Ebira to command authority that extended over the entire land. He could sit down in Okene and summon any man from any part of the land, no matter his status or age, before him, and the man had to appear as ordered.

The process of centralizing the Ebira polity thus began with Ibrahim’s appointment in 1917. In 1923 Capt. Byng-Hall, the Resident of the newly reconstituted Kabba province officially presented Ibrahim with a third grade staff of office and made him the sole Native Authority of the Division. The colonial authority put at his disposal the coercive security apparatus of police, court and prison to enable him create a conducive environment for effective exploitation. Ibrahim appropriated the title of his
maternal grandfather, Atta, as his official title in the new dispensation, a move that attracted opposition from the clan of Atta Omadivi and created a serious security problem for the Atta.

**Reaction to Atta Ibrahim’s Appointment and the Security Implication**

The first security threat to his reign stemmed from the negative reaction of the elders of the society including the priest–chiefs with whom he had contested for the post. The elders could not believe that the entire Ebiraland was to be ruled by one chief, and worse still a mere boy. They surely could not see how a youth could rule the elders.

To them it was an abomination and a crime against the tradition of the people. They could not understand the basis or the circumstances of his appointment as the chief of all Ebira. But he had the white man’s support and the white man was powerful. His appointment came through personal hard work, loyalty and services to the colonial authority. His education, service as a messenger and tax assessment scribe had by 1917 commended themselves to the political officers. Some of the elders soon started to organise clandestine activities to destabilise his rule, while some others vowed never to recognise his authority.

This negative reaction to his rule was not unexpected, and therefore did not apparently take him by surprise. The Atta’s intelligence, ingenuity and determination to succeed were thus challenged. However it appeared that some of his measures towards consolidating his power led to creating other security problems for his administration.

The Atta started by adopting some diplomatic measures to win over his opponents. His mother, Zainab, made efforts towards uniting the people under her son’s rule. She, with some of the supporters of her son in collaboration with some Yoruba elements introduced a society called *Egbe* to which they invited all influential people of Ebira land. The objective of the society was to “convince all its members to sink their political differences and to come together peacefully under the leadership of Ibrahim”. The society failed to achieve its aim as many of the influential personalities rejected its membership. However, throughout the
existence of the society, it waved fear into the minds of the people because of the secrecy surrounding it.\textsuperscript{16}

One of the leading contestants to the central chieftaincy, Ohindase Adano, a highly respected priest chief of Okengwe, was suspected of fomenting underground opposition to the Atta. The latter decided to use him as an example for potential trouble makers like him. Traditionally it was an abomination for the Ohindase to step on the land of Adavi where melon was cultivated. It was widely believed that if he did so he would be afflicted with great misfortune. The Atta exiled him to Adavi where he later died.\textsuperscript{17} The leader of Eziogu clan, (the clan of Atta Omadivi) Okino, and Ichimiri who believed that Ibrahim did not qualify to use Atta title having hailed from Ezi Idu clan were also driven into clandestine activities. They continued to be a source of concern to his administration up to the 1940s. He employed the services of the police, court and prison to deal with them.

The chief priest of Ihima, who also contested for the central leadership, on hearing about the appointment of Ibrahim in 1917 felt that he could not remain to serve under him and went on self exile to an unknown destination. The Atta quickly seized the opportunity to appoint his own junior brother, Yakubu, as the District head of Ihima. The appointment attracted the hatred of the people of Ihima who felt insulted and cheated. This sentiment and the high handedness of Yakubu later created a big security crisis for the Atta.

**Otumakere Incident**

When the British occupied Ebiraland at the beginning of the twentieth century they still met certain effects of the Jihadists’ invasion of the late nineteenth century. The wars had exposed some of the powerful people to the evil of the trade in human beings which motivated them to organise slave raids on the neighboring villages outside Ebiraland. When such raids became difficult under the new colonial dispensation they employed the form of a supposed nocturnal animal called Olumakere (werewolf) to capture fellow young Ebira for sale across the borders of Ebiraland.\textsuperscript{18} These practices created serious insecurity for the Ebira both at home and on the farms. The former had to barricade their homes at night to prevent the Otumakere from breaking in while
the latter had to maintain armed scouts on top of trees to keep vigil at night for possible Otumakere raids.

Atta Ibrahim inherited this security problem and he succeeded in putting a stop to the nefarious activities through diplomacy and prayers. He reportedly identified those believed to be behind the ‘mask’ and enjoined them to cooperate with him and stop the obnoxious activity or face the wrath of his administration. Some of them ran away while some others cooperated.  

Atta Ibrahim was a good Muslim and believed in the efficacy of prayers. He was the first Ebira to graduate in the recitation of the Qur’an and on assuming office invited Muslim scholars from Ilorin, Lokoja and Nupe into his domain, some of whom he appointed into his administration. In the face of any serious crisis he used to invite them for prayer, and he also used to organise annual prayers for the peace and stability of his domain and financed the prescribed Sadaqa. The Atta employed Islam to facilitate security in his domain. He encouraged the village Heads, District, Heads and even civil servants to embrace the religion. Islamic identity soon became the vogue and even non-Muslims preferred to take Muslim names. The Atta established an alkali court while Islamic scholars were appointed as scribes in Native courts. He encouraged the establishment of Qur’anic schools and ensured that only Islamic religious instruction was taught in the N.A. schools. Throughout his reign, Muslims from all the corners of his domain converged at the Okene central Mosque for Friday prayers and at the Okene Eid praying ground for the two annual Muslim Sallah festivals of *Eid el-Fitr* and *Eid el-Kabir*. He normally seized the opportunity to address his subjects on current issue including security matters. He also used to ask the Christians to pray for peace in their own ways and sought the counsel of elders who understood the history and culture of the people. This approach assisted him in overcoming some of the security problems of his administration including the Olumakere incident.

**Incorporation of Lokoja into Igbirra Division 1923–1947**

Atta Ibrahim was given additional responsibility in 1923 when Lokoja was made part of Igbirra Division. The political history of Lokoja between 1870 and 1921 was one of internal strife and
jealousy between those aspiring to rule and those in power. A detailed discussion on the crisis is beyond the scope of this paper. The internal political instability of Lokoja created a vacuum in the leadership of the town between 1921 and 1922, and in March 1923, the town was brought under the supervision of Atta Ibrahim with the hope that the internal jealousy plaguing the political administration of the town might give in to a neutral outside leadership.

Atta’s efforts towards resolving the crisis did not go down well with the people. He made it a rule that every stranger had to report his arrival and departure to his representative (Wakili) in Lokoja and also attempted to monitor the movement of the residents in the town. These measures created displeasure among some of the residents. He first appointed a Hausa friend of his, Dauda Musa Maigari as his representative but later replaced him with his own brother Yakubu. The people of Lokoja complained against the high handedness of Atta’s Wakili and organised opposition against the over lordship.

Although the Atta held sway over Lokoja up to 1948, Lokoja’s problem became partly responsible for his downfall since the town became the seat of propaganda during the Oibo Arimo crisis of 1924/25 and the political revolution of the 1940s and 1950s which saw him out of power.

Centralization of Authority and the Reaction Against it
As indicated above the appointment of Atta Ibrahim as District Head in 1917 and his subsequent promotion to the status of Sole Native Authority in 1923 gave him power over the entire Ebiraland and the non–Ebira area like Ogori Magongo, Ajaokuta and Lokoja. Administering this complex and vast community posed a serious challenge to the ingenuity of Atta. He had to introduce measures that would ensure his effective controls over these areas. Some of these measures went against the existing order and, therefore, led to serious political crisis in 1924 and 1925.

The Atta decided to appoint his own trusted individuals as agents in the different villages, districts, or towns under his jurisdiction instead of dealing with the existing leaders whom he knew did not welcome his appointment. Some of his new appointees were either his relations or his friends. For example, as
earlier pointed out, he appointed his junior brother Yakubu as the chief of Ihima after the disappearance of Apata in 1917 in protest against Atta’s appointment. He also appointed Akaba, who was of the same clan with him and an old childhood friend to take charge of Eganyi and its surrounding villages, thus side lining the Adogu of Eganyi. Another bosom friend of his called Apasi was put in charge of Agassa village, and for Adavi he appointed a member of his clan and a good friend, Meyaki, as the Asema. The new chiefs remained loyal to the Atta who gave them all the needed support to enable them to function well.

The process of centralization was extended to the rearrangement of the courts and to the reorganization of tax collection which further alienated the traditional chiefs. Previous to 1917 there had existed village based courts and clan -- group courts presided over by the village heads and clan–group chiefs respectively. Beginning from 1918 all such courts were abolished leaving the one at Okene, elevated to a senior court under the presidency of the Atta and a junior court at Obehira headed by Ozigizigi opoh. The centralization of courts meant that most, if not all, cases had to be brought to the Atta’s court. This policy attracted considerable disaffection in the villages and districts.

Atta’s court was promoted to the highest Native Appeal court in 1929 which could retry all cases decided by other courts. He was given the power of appointment and dismissal of the members of his own court and all the other courts within the division. This extensive power was exercised in suppressing agitation, complaints or opposition no matter how genuine as all the courts had to do his biddings.

The Atta, in order to monitor the day–today events in his domain for effective control, established a net-work of intelligence agents which worked very well for him. They were to monitor the performance of his appointees, and report on strangers or strange happenings. The network was so effective that people believed that there was no house–hold without Atta’s secret agent or that he could use a brother to spy on another brother. The Atta also reformed the method of taxation to make it more systematized. The N.A police, courts and prison were effectively employed to check tax evasion. People generally regarded the new methods of tax assessment and collection as oppressive. They abhorred taxation
and everything related to it. The people’s resentment to taxation and centralization of powers were the major causes of the Oibo Arimo crisis, and the Obangede riot of 1924 and 1925 respectively.

Although a detailed description of this crisis is beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that complaints against the new political dispensation spearheaded by those who had contested the leadership with the Atta or who disliked his methods attracted the sympathy of the colonial officers only in 1924 when the arch supporter of the Atta, Byng-Hall, went on a six month leave. Those who spearheaded the crisis included Arimo, Onukaba, Ajokaiye, Ozigizigi and the Roman Catholic Mission. It led to his temporary suspension from office and subsequent trial at the provincial court in Lokoja on a five count charge in September 1924.

Atta Ibrahim was acquitted of all the charges, except one for which he was fined ten pounds. He was reinstated as sole N. A. in December the same year. This judgment led to a further crisis and created a security problem for the Atta. In reaction to the reinstatement of the Atta, two strands of opposition emerged. One of them consisted of those who decided to remain at home and fight the Atta until he was defeated. These included Adaniu Aremo, Onukaba, Ajokaiye and Father Cermenati of the Roman Catholic Mission. Using Ihima and Obangede as the centre of their activities they organized rebellion against the payment of tax to the Atta in 1925. When the Atta with the U. O. went to Obagende for tax assessment an attempt was made on his life and policemen were invited from Lokoja to quell the riot. Aremo, Onukaba and Ajokaiye were arrested and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Father Cermenati was deported from Nigeria.

The second group of opposition was made up of those who fled to Idori in the present Akoko Edo Local Government Area in Edo State, out of fear of the aftermath of the return of the Atta to power. They included Okino, Ozigizigi opoh, Ohikere Ebiya and Gabriel Omaku. From their camp at Idori they engaged themselves in hunting and menacing those Ebira traveling to their farms or to Ososo on trading missions. The Atta employed both diplomacy and force to bring this group to order. He sent emissaries to appeal to them to return home and promised them amnesty. Some of them responded positively to his call and were reintegrated with their
respective families in April 1927. Those who remained behind had to suffer a surprise police raid in November 1927. With the permission of the D.O at Auchi, the Idori exile settlement was raided and sacked. Most of the exiles were brought back to Okene, rehabilitated and reinstated with their families. Some few others, including Ozigizigi, escaped to neighbouring villages in Akoko Edo particularly Ososo.

**Atta Ibrahim’s Innovative Security Measures and their Impact**

The Atta realised the enormous security challenges posed by the people’s resentment to his rule. He knew that the support of the colonial authority and the ‘modern’ security apparatus at his disposal needed to be complemented with his own personal initiatives for him to succeed in assuaging the situation. He, therefore, introduced certain measures which yielded some positive results in terms of maintaining peace and security in his domain.

One of such measures was his deliberate efforts to use marriage as a means of reconciling his relations with his opponents or the enemies of his administration. He would either marry from the families of his opponents or give one of his daughters in marriage to them. An instance was his marriage to the daughter of Ozigizigi Opoh of Obehira one of his staunch opponents. This did not only attract support from some members of the family but gave him insight into the activities within such families.

One of the diplomatic initiatives of the Atta towards reconciling with his opponents was paying unexpected visits to them at night to personally talk to them to see reason why they should reconsider their stand. A good number of such visits were said to have yielded positive results.

Apart from his intelligence network discussed above, the Atta himself used to undertake night surveillance. He was reported to usually disguise himself moving from one part of his domain to another to personally detect some strange happenings in his domain. One of his surviving sons, Shehu Atta now in his eighties, said he used to accompany him on some of the surveillance visits. The District Officer in charge of the division in the 1950s Mr. A. T. Clark confirmed that one of the reasons for the successes of the Atta in maintaining effective control over Ebiraland was that he did not use to sleep all night but used to move around during the
nights to discover anti-social activities himself. The D. O. himself adopted that policy.\textsuperscript{34}

One of the major sources of interpersonal disputes or inter-clan feuds was the activities of night and day time masquerade activities during the annual festivals of ekuechi or echane which used to attract multitudes of people especially from the farms and neighboring towns and villages. On the approach of the festivals the Atta used to caution against abusive songs and violence. During the festivals he used to personally go out in disguise to watch the activities at night. Any artiste found guilty of violating the rule would normally be suspended. At the end of the festival he would encourage the people to return to their farms without much delay to avoid the evils of idleness.

Atta Ibrahim was a great hunter and farmer. He employed the avenues of both occupations to informally relate with the ordinary subjects of his. Most of the meat realized from his hunting activities was shared with the ordinary folk on the farms or passers by. This greatly endeared him to them. He killed an elephant in 1951. He could spend up to five days on his farms which were located in different parts of his domain where there were large concentrations of farmers at Adu, Zariagi, Iruku Obege, Osara and Bogiri. While on the farm he prohibited formal salutations and used to share food with the farmers in the neighborhood. He interacted freely with them.\textsuperscript{35}

After the turbulent period of 1924 to 1927, there seemed to be relative peace and security in his domain. He therefore, with the approval of the colonial authority embarked on an extensive tour of the northern emirates in 1928. The emirates he visited included Zaria, Kano and Katsina. His interaction with the emirs and visits to various projects in these emirates influenced his later administrative focus in his domain. During the visits he gave one of his daughters, Maimuna, in marriage to Malam Kabir, the brother of the Emir of Katsina. His friendly relations with some of the Emirs later created a conducive atmosphere for some of his subjects who chose to make the north their second home.

Ebiras were generally farmers and by the hilly nature of their environment lacked adequate land conducive for agriculture. This and the introduction of colonial taxation pushed them out into the neighboring Yoruba country and Afenmai in the 1930s. Atta
Ibrahim maintained good rapport with the rulers of such areas to ensure security for his subjects who were their guest farmers. If he received information on the disappearance of any Ebira farmer, he would quickly get in touch with the ruler of the area concerned to locate the missing individuals. Such Ebira in diaspora, therefore, greatly felt secured wherever they might find themselves. They would also report any incidents of oppression from their hosts to the Atta for his quick diplomatic intervention.

The Atta was a man with a sense of justice. He would not hesitate to punish lesser officials, no matter how close they were to him, either for cheating people or for official misconduct. He once sentenced one of his sons who was a revenue collector together with his colleagues to three months imprisonment over a mission tax revenue of one pound ten shilling in their custody. Another of his sons was sentenced to 3 weeks for failure to account for ten shillings. This policy made other officials to be committed to their public responsibilities.

Socio-Economic Developments Under The Atta and their Security Implications

The Atta through the Native Authority initiated a number of progressive projects that put his domain far ahead of the neighboring communities whose rulers lacked similar initiatives. In spite of this, the people either misunderstood his intention in embarking on some of the projects or detested the methods he adopted towards realising them.

He believed strongly in education as an instrument for the development of the people and the country at large. As early as 1923, the first Native Authority school was founded in Okene and he made extra efforts to convince the Colonial Authority at the provincial headquarters that his domain was the most convenient for establishing provincial post primary institutions. He promised free land and some incentives for the teachers. Thus the Provincial Middle School was located at Okene in 1933 and in 1944 the only Government Teachers College for the province was also established in Okene. This brought education to the door steps of young Ebira whose parents would not have been able to sponsor them to places outside home. He was reputed to have called on his subjects not to keep all their children on the farms but send some
of them to school. However, a good number of parents hid away their own children to prevent them from being dragged to school because they did not know what the Atta was going to do to them but instead sent their slaves or the orphans under their care to school.

When the Atta started to sponsor his own children to the best schools in Yoruba land, Ghana and the United Kingdom, even though it was obvious that he was using his personal resources, he was accused by those who had benefitted from the schools he had attracted home of not extending the largesse to every one.

The colonial authority laid emphasis on the construction of roads especially to areas where raw materials and markets were located. The Atta embarked on road construction within his domain and linking it with neighbouring towns. He demonstrated an immense ability to organise labour for this and other projects. Between 1917 and 1927 the major towns and villages within Ebiraland were connected with motorable roads while it was also linked with Lokoja, Kabba, Owo and Auchi. The people detested the use of forced labour in the construction efforts. But the roads made it easier for them to bring their farm products to the markets and encouraged more people to take to long distant trading activities. It also promoted Okene to becoming the commercial centre for all the neighboring towns and villages including those in Afenmai.

The Atta quite appreciated the high security risk which shortage of water, especially during the dry season when local streams ceased to flow, posed for the people living in Okene and it’s environs. He was widely travelled and had seen the Lagos water projects while on his way to Hajj in 1929. Through the D.O. and the Resident, Kabba Province, he was able to get the Secretary of the Northern Provinces to approve the construction of water works for Okene. The project which included a dam and treatment plant was completed in 1937 with a capacity of about 47 million gallons. Pipe borne water thus became available to the residents of Okene and the neighbouring villages throughout the year. However, the people were not again appreciative of the methods of executing the project. Since the government was not going to provide all the funds, the Native Authority had to make the people
pay a special levy. The people hated this and the water rate which they were later made to pay.

On the advice of the health officials the Atta made it unlawful to urinate or defecate in the immediate environment of the water works. The most hated policy related to the water project was the establishment of a public burial ground, Oganya in 1937. This was done on health considerations to prevent seepage of underground water through the buried corpses into the dam. The people of Okene were thus prohibited from burying their corpses in their houses as was the custom except at the public cemetery on the outskirts of the town. This policy attracted serious resistance from the people for social and religious reasons. The Atta stood his ground and caused the rule to be enforced. In reaction, several people migrated to neighbouring villages in Afenmai like Umorga, Ososo, Ekunu, Ibillo or neighbouring Yoruba towns.  

Another important project which the Atta executed that assisted in protecting the health security of the people was public toilets. These were located in strategic quarters of Okene town and they were regularly cleared by the officials employed for that purpose.

**The Demise of The Atta**

The Atta was sustained in office largely by the support of the colonial authority. Between 1917 and early the 1940’s he was an ideal ruler for the British. His apparent autocratic approach, in spite of the pockets of resistance from the people, was very helpful in enhancing the indirect rule programme of the colonial authority. The changing climate towards democratisation especially after the Second World War coupled with the Atta’s aggressive educational pursuit for his own children and some of his progressive ideas during debates in the House of Chiefs as well as his sympathy for the call for independence turned him into a recalcitrant ruler. The colonial authority decided to gradually withdraw its support for him and even worked in collaboration with the opposition elements in his domain to get him out of office.  

Opposition to the Atta was spearheaded by the returnees from the Second World War who were mostly R.C.M. products. They had not forgiven him for refusing them appointments into the N.A. service. In collaboration with the exiled Ebira in Lagos and other
places they formed the Igbirra Tribal Union and sent a series of petitions against the Atta to Kaduna accusing him of imposing heavy taxes on women among other things and demanding democratic reforms. Their petitions attracted positive response from the colonial government and elections were held in 1951 and 1952 which reduced the Atta’s status to that of chief and counsel. He apparently could not adjust to the new democratic dispensation and had to abdicate in 1954.

**Conclusion**

The Atta, throughout his reign was confronted with a variety of security challenges and problems. Those mostly emanated from his efforts to implement a centralized political system in a society that had hither-to operated a free and democratic political tradition. He succeeded in surmounting some of the security problems or at least suppressing others through the use of colonial security apparatus at his disposal, the support of local colonial officers and his own personal initiatives and will to succeed. He also made efforts to provide social and economic security for his people through projects that could lead to improving their lot. His methods of implementation did not go down well with the people and therefore created more enemies for his administration.

As soon as he started to lose the confidence and support of the colonial authority, beginning from the mid 1940’s, his ingenuity and courage alone could not sustain him in power against the forces of his opponents who now attracted the full support of the colonial administration. He thus abdicated in 1954.

He succeeded in unifying the Ebira to a reasonable extent and in integrating the various peoples within his domain. His progressive social and economic projects had posed a challenge to those who caused his removal from office which they failed to ever meet.

**Notes**

4. Y.A. Ibrahim, Interview, Zaria, July, 2003
5. NAK LokoProf. Kabba Division Annual Report 1910 quoted in A.A.
Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria

6. Ibid
7. Ibid. p. 298.
10. Ibid p.54
11. NAK Lokoprof 3050/538, Ohindase, District Head of Igbirra
12. NAK Lokoprof. 2668/1917, Kabba District, Amalgamation of
13. Kabba was reconstituted into a province in 1922 and Igbirra became a
division.
15. Ibid, P.132
16. The death of the Atta’s Mother in 1926 put an end to the existence of the
Society.
17. A. A. Okene (1990) P.57
20. Ihima was the only exception. It founded its Friday mosque in 1952. There
are now over 50 Friday Central mosques in Ebiraland. For details on the
Atta’s role in the promotion of Islam in Ebiraland, see A.R. Mohammed
(1987), and A.R. Mohammed (1986).
22. NAK Lokoprof, ACC 30, Izard, Lokoja Historical Notes
23. For detail ref. A.R. Mohammed (1986), p121-124 and M.D. Suleiman
24. M.D. Suleiman (2001), Ibid. p.80
25. Ibid.
27. A.A. Okene(1990), p.80
29. Father Cermenati of the RCM disliked the Atta for his refusal to convert to
Christianity or employ graduates of RCM Schools in the N.A. Service. He
also believed that the Atta had greater sympathy for the rival C.M.S.
church.
31. NAK Lokoprof 137/1927 Resettlement of Igbirra in their villages.
32. Alh. Momoh Jimoh Aliyu, Kano Sept. 2003; Alh. Yahaya Saraki Okene,
Sept. 2003
34. Mr. Clark disclosed this to Alh. Sadiq Yahaya who was a clerk in his office
and who used to escort the D.O on his night surveillance visits.
35. Aliyu Abdulmalik, Kano, Sept. 2003
37. NAK Lokoprof 195/1922, Lokoja -- Okene Road and 22/21927 Annual
38. NAK Lokoprof, 1/1937, Okene Water Supply.

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2. NAK Lokoprof 137/1927, Resettlement of Igbirra in their villages NAK Lokoprof, 195/1922, Lokoja Okene Road

Informants
1. Alh. Y.A. Ibrahim, A Retired University Registrar, and a Historian, Zaria September, 2003
6. Alh. Yahaya Saraki, a retired Judge, Okene, September, 2003
The Native Authority Police and the Maintenance of Law and Order in Kano Emirate, 1925-1968

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Introduction
The Pre-colonial policing arrangement in the Emirates of Northern Nigeria was highly formalized. Here, Emirs possessed a group of bodyguards called Dogarai who performed policing function on full time. The Dogarai were maintained from the tributes gathered in cash or kind by the Emirs. These Dogarai forces were more or less personal to each Emir and were controlled by him. Thus, up to the time of the final conquest of Northern Nigeria by British Colonialists in 1903, the Emirs, especially in the big Emirates of Northern Nigeria, were responsible separately for the maintenance of law and order through the use of their Dogarai.¹

With colonial conquest and the establishment of colonial rule, there were two major lines of development, which were not exclusive especially after 1920s. The first was that the operation of the already existing British–fostered Police Force should be extended over the whole territory, inland from its original settled area on the coast. The other was that whatever organization the African rulers might already posses for maintaining law and order in each locality should be developed and turned into efficient local Police Forces, responsible not to the Central Government but to Local Authorities.²

The translation of these two principles into practice in British African Territories differs in characters. In Nigeria, the British employed both methods. In the Eastern part of Nigeria, where centralized government was uncommon and where law enforcement organization of the types found in the Northern and Western part of Nigeria were lacking, the British colonial government adopted the first option in policing the area. In the Northern and Western part of Nigeria, the central government controlled the Nigeria Police Force (N.P.F.), while the Native Authorities were allowed to establish the N.A. Police Forces. Thus, in the Northern Emirates and some parts of Western Nigeria, the
Nigerian Police Force operated side by side with the Local Police Forces as from 1930-1968. However, it is to be pointed out that whatever the mode of their emergence, (Local Police Forces) the British Colonial Administration aimed to achieve the following motives, firstly, they hoped to secure the loyalty of Native Authorities. Secondly, they intended to build up Native Administration. Thirdly, they hoped to keep down the cost of administration. These motives reflected their commitment to the Native Administration system of rule.

This paper studies the origin of N.A. Police and its role in maintaining law and order and in enhancing the socio-economic development in Kano Emirate within the period 1925-1968. The paper is significant in both understanding the contributions of N.A. Police in colonial Nigeria and in shedding some light on the present crises in policing Nigeria.

The Nature of Pre-Colonial Administration in Kano Emirate by the 19th Century

Kano Emirate together with the other Emirates, constituted the Sokoto Caliphate under the sovereignty of the Caliph. The Emir was therefore responsible to, and derived his (Spiritual) authority from the Caliph. On the other hand, the Emir in the Emirate conducted his administration with the help of various title-holders and officials who were all subordinates to and derived their authority from him. The Emir also appointed resident village heads whose duties included among others the day-to-day administration of the village. This was essentially a bureaucracy which comprised titled members of the ruling family, the clan leaders and a few clients or servants of the ruler. The largest group in this category of titled dignitaries was the ruling family, namely the brothers, cousins, and nephews of the ruler. They were known as Masu-Sarauta. These royal clan and client titled leaders were by no means the only freeborn state officials. There were also territorial and extra-territorial Chieftains known as Hakimai or Masu Gari.

Between these Hakimai were members of the council of nine who advised the Emir and acted as the electoral college of the Emirate, like the Sarkin Bai, Madaki, Sarkin Dawaki Mai Tuta etc. Affairs of the Emirate were taken to the powerful three for
“onward transmission” to the Emir. The freeborn Hakimai controlled the administration of the Emirate on behalf of the Emir. Their offices were hereditary, Hakimai were assigned Gundumoni to administer, usually in areas, which their clans had conquered in the early part of the 19th century during the Jihad. The Gundumoni were basically administrative units, they were not economic units personally belonging to the Hakimai. The Hakimai delegated the administration of their Gundumoni to Jakadu who were assisted by their slaves known as Yara or Wakilai. These along with the Dagatai (Village Heads) took decision on the Administrative, Political. Judicial and other problems of their areas, on a daily basis.

The third parallel order of titled state officials comprised the slave functionaries. These were collectively known as Cucanawa, they were palace officials (whose forebears/ancestors were slaves). The use of these palace title holders, who were for the most part recruited from among the people whose fathers were at one time of slaves origin, was a device, no doubt, to ensure their loyalty since as slaves neither they nor their descendants had any legal entitlement to the offices they held. Such officials included the Dan Rimi who was the Emir’s most important slave official; all Emirate weapons were in his custody. While Sallama was the go-between the Emir and any visitor or official who wanted audience with the Emir. The Shamaki was in charge of all slaves in the palace and the horses of the Emir. The Sarkin Shanu (lit. Chief of the cattle), the Sarkin Samari (Head of the young slaves) and the all-important office of Sarkin Dogarai (Chief of the royal bodyguards) a post introduced by Muhammad Kutumbi (1623-1648), are other important functionaries in that respect. With the coming of the British, most of the powers of the Sarki were either abolished or taken over by the new system. The Sarki himself was placed on a salary and made answerable to the resident. In this situation the role of the Sarki, (who was the chief of security) which was executive and judiciary, was curtailed. The Sarki gradually lost his symbol of power with the transformation of some of his Dogarai as Yan Gadi.
The Establishment of *Yan Gadi* in Kano Emirate 1925

As a first step towards achieving the above desired aim after the colonial conquest of Kano the new Emir Abbas was disarmed and prohibited from raising troops. Although there was the desire to abolish the *Dogarai* force as law enforcement agents, due to a number of problems such as lack of personnel and adequate funds to maintain the new police force, this desire did not materialize immediately. So when the Emir of Kano accepted British rule in 1903, the British authority only disarmed the *Dogarai* but did not abolish them totally. In fact, the British government to a certain extent strengthened the role of *Dogarai*, through which the Emir exercised control over his territory. Up till the 1908 Police reform, the *Dogarai* were responsible for policing Northern Nigerian Emirates.

By 1908 the desire to transform and re-organize the police arrangement was restated by Sir Percy Girouard, Lugard’s successor, who was of the idea that the police arrangement in the Northern Nigeria was misguided and needed to be revisited. This decision together with other advantages such as good quality of *Dogarai* work especially those stationed in strong Muslim Emirates, paved the way for the 1907/1908 police re-organization scheme in Northern Nigeria.

Under the colonial administration, the 1907/1908 scheme was an important landmark as far as the *Dogarai* institution is concerned. This was not only in Kano Emirate but also almost in all the Northern provinces. In this scheme, the *Dogarai* were approved as police and the only police to police Muslim communities while the constabulary were completely withdrawn from these areas and re-stationed in the purely “pagan” communities with an established record of perpetual rebellion. Similarly, the constabulary was separated from prison department as it was thought that the utilization of the police to convict guards was a drain on the resources needed for pacifications.

The 1907/1908 police re-organization scheme provided for the first time in the history of *Dogarai* force, a uniform dress for them. In Kano the *Dogarai* were provided with a distinct uniform in the indigenous style—a red turban and a brightly multi-colored native gown. But still the *Dogarai* were not allowed to carry firearms.
The 1907/1908 police re-organization scheme enabled the colonial government to consolidate its administration over the provinces by relying on the Emirs and their Dogarai for the maintenance of general security, law and order. This was done so as not to undermine the Emirs’ prestige among their subjects. This sort of support from the colonial government lasted for about 20 years before they began to reconsider the role of Dogarai institution in the colonial administration. It is also true to assume that the essence of this 1907/1908 police re-organization scheme was an indication that the colonial government was incapacitated both in resources and manpower to effectively police the colonial state without the support of pre-colonial social structures and institutions.

With the 1907/1908 police re-organization scheme, many Native Authorities either established Dogarai forces or expanded existing ones voluntarily. This expansion started in Kano, Katsina and gradually spread to other provinces of Northern Nigeria. In these areas Dogarai forces were well organized and served as the main agency for general security maintenance and crime control. By 1909, the Acting Resident of Kano province, Mr. R.G. Matthew reported on the activities of Dogarai in the province:

The native police Dogarai are working remarkably well. There is no difficulty at all in effecting arrest in any part of the division. I have had very few complaints against them, and these were only of trifling nature. There are 100 detailed, for work in the town. They are paid one pound per month from Beit-Mal. They are much more effective and far less liable to commit acts of extortion than the former constabulary.

On a similar note, by 1910, the Resident of Bauchi province, Mr. E.C. Duff while reporting on the efficiency of Dogarai forces in Bauchi and Gombe area States that:

The Bauchi and Gombe Emirates are divided into districts, each with its own resident district Dogarais, and effect all arrests and report to the Emir. Emirs of both Bauchi and Gombe have their own town Dogarais who effect arrest in the towns only. The police in the province are used solely as prison and special guards, and as escorts to political officers. No arrest is effected by them. I am altogether in favour of making the Emir and his chiefs solely responsible, for the detection and suppression of crime and strenuous efforts are being made to improve their efficiency.
However, in some provinces in Northern Nigeria the *Dogarai* did not prove comparatively more efficient than the constabulary in dealing with criminals and in enforcing law and order. For example, in 1910, the Resident of Bornu province Mr. A. McClintock, reported that:

There is a body of paid men in Bornu corresponding to the *Dogarai* of Kano. Order in the Capital (Shehuri) is maintained by Murima or native goaler and his boys. The Local headmen make arrests throughout the province and their followers. For cases of emergency, Shehu details six horsemen to be always ready at a moment’s notice, to move to the scene of any robbery or murder etc to make enquiries and effect arrest.\(^{11}\)

In Yola province, the Resident W.S. Sharpe commented negatively on the activities of the *Dogarai* in his province, especially, the one that was operating in Yola town. Sharpe pointed out that:

Far more extortion is practiced by them and it is far more difficult to detect them when civil police are used.\(^{12}\)

Similarly, in other provinces such as Kabba, Muri, Nassarawa, Kontagora and Ilorin, it was generally felt that the time was not ripe for the small corps of Native Police to effect crime control and perform other duties without the collaboration of the constabulary.\(^{13}\) Thus, between 1910/1918, the level of efficiency and organization of the *Dogarai* forces in Northern Nigeria varied from one province to another. In bigger and richer provinces like Kano, Katsina, Bauchi and Gombe there were well–organized corps of uniformed and salaried *Dogarai* forces that operated independently of the constabulary and under the strict control and maintenance of the Emirs. The constabulary which later was called Northern Nigeria protectorate police operated in such provinces that were outside the N.A. control, mostly called Sabon Gari and military cantonments. Thus, in these places the efficiency and powers of *Dogarai* were practically limited to these areas that were dominated by Muslims or Natives that is *cikin gari* or city wall.

Like the police re-organization scheme of 1907/1908, by 1916, there was the police ordinance (NO 14 of 1916).\(^{14}\) which re-
emphasized the powers and functions of the traditional rule in the
country. In the Northern part of Nigeria, the Emirs were confirmed
in their position as Presidents of their respective judicial councils,
which were once more designated as the highest legal institutions
in the provinces, and with full executive powers of law
enforcement. Hence, like the 1907/1908 police re-organization
scheme the Emir, by this ordinance, was made a custodian of
public order in their respective domains with almost complete
jurisdiction over natives residing in their territories. They might,
Furthermore, appoint and/or depose subordinate Emirs and officials
with the approval of the provincial Residents. Similarly, by this
ordinance each ruler was empowered like before to appoint native
police such as Dogarai to help him in carrying out his lawful
orders. The British political officers were enjoined to give all the
necessary support and aid to the Emirs in the exercise of their legal
functions. The 1916 police ordinance remained the basis of local
government legislation in Northern Nigeria until the 1960s.
By 1918, the colonial government also established another
police ordinance of 1918. This ordinance like the one before it re-
emphasized the power of the Emirs in the area of maintaining law
and order and formalized their responsibility of employing
assistance in doing so. In view of such demands made on them as
indicated in 1908, 1916 and 1918 police re-organization
scheme and native authority ordinances, the Emirs attempted through
various means and manners to meet these demands. However these
duties could not be performed by them single–handedly, they
employed the assistance of their Dogarai in enforcing law and
order in their areas of jurisdiction. But because of a number of
reasons such as lack of qualitative working materials, urbanization
and shortage of manpower, and others, these Dogarai proved to
be inefficient, unorganized and untrained to be of any service to
the standard required of them by the colonial state.
Thus, beside the problem of quality and quantity of the
Dogarai forces the 1920s and 1930s witnessed an increase in
infrastructure as a result of further roads and railway lines
constructed. Consequently several towns including Kano became
targets of people seeking new economic and social frontiers. Many
urban towns in Northern Nigeria received new migrants, some of
who were not of the same ethnic stock with the indigenes. When
the government realized that this circumstance imposed serious hardships on the Dogarai forces in the townships, the colonial government encouraged the Emirate to initiate police reforms in their respective areas of jurisdiction. In addition to the expansion of cities, the need for reforms of the Dogarai forces in part of Northern Nigeria were confirmed by the patent abuses of the Dogarai forces in some township. Such complaints at times were sent to the Residents and other colonial officers. For example in Kano province, the Acting resident E.J. Arnett described the Dogarai forces in his province by 1924 as:

Untrustworthy, undisciplined and extortionate

Similarly in 1920 the resident of Kontagora province reported that:

These men were in all 114 for the province. I am not much impressed by the class of those I have seen in the Kontagora Emirate. The system prevailing in this province of placing certain number in out-districts normally to assist the District Head in arrests, escorts of prisoners e.t.c. is full of danger. It is certain that they live upon the country pay for nothing and extract in every possible way-one man was found by me at a certain town who had been sent by District Head to bring in the tax - until the District and village administrations become stronger, it is most advisable to restrict the activities of this class as marauder.

In Bida province the colonial officers have described their Dogarai in 1931 not only as “primitive” but also as:

Inexperienced, unreformed, untrained, some showed crude and uncivilized forms of police force that should be done away with and replaced with more modern, well trained and equipped police who will reflect in his behavior and actions the much cherished British model of police.

Similar criticism of Dogarai came from Sokoto province in the period between 1919-1920. Here the Dogarai of Sarkin Musulmi were equally described as both corrupt and undisciplined.

The problems faced by Dogarai forces throughout Northern Nigeria in the 1920s and 1930s as discussed above left the colonial government with two alternatives for dealing with the imperfections which it had noticed in the organization, training,
control and discipline of the existing Dogarai forces in Northern Nigeria and the comparable Akoda forces in Western Nigeria.

The first option was to disband all the Dogarai forces throughout Northern Nigeria and the Akoda forces throughout Western Nigeria and replace them with its own better-trained and better-equipped police. The second alternative had to do with improving the organization, training, discipline and efficiency of whatever organization the African rulers might already possess for maintaining law and order.

The British employed both methods. In the South-East where centralized government was uncommon and where law-enforcement organizations of the types found in the Northern and Western Nigeria were lacking, the British colonial government adopted the first method in policing the area. In the North and West, the idea of taking over the Dogarai and Akoda in totality and replacing them with a purely colonial police although had the advantage of promoting quality and efficiency, raised serious political and economic problems. This is because to police all the villages and hamlets of Northern Nigeria and Western Nigeria with better-trained and better-equipped men would cost the government a great deal when there was not enough revenue to support large-scale development projects.

More so the existence of the indefinable central authorities and the existence of police organizations in these areas encouraged the British colonial authorities to rely more on the second option in policing these areas. In addition, the second option was selected due to its agreement with the system of indirect rule. The arrangement equally made more sense to the British authorities who were familiar with their own history of separate country and Borough police forces controlled only indirectly by the Home Office.

Thus, in the Northern and Western Nigeria, the British adopted the idea of only improving and re-organization of both Dogarai and Akoda with a view to ensuring the continuity of the system of indirect rule and enabling the government to rely on the services of cheaper local police in the Villages and hamlets so as to reduce political and economic problems.

Between 1925 and 1944, the colonial government vigorously pursued such idea of police re-organisation and reforms of
Dogarai forces in various provinces in Northern and Western Nigeria. In the North the Dogarai, after training, became the Yan gadi or Yan doka. Similarly, in Western Nigeria their pre-colonial law enforcement agency such as Akoda transformed and re-organized to become the Olopa as they were known in Western Nigeria. In every Native Authority, the trained section of the Dogarai constituted the N.A police, while the untrained section was gradually phased out in most provinces with the exception of Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Bornu and a few other provinces.25

Kano Emirate championed this transformation of Dogarai into Yan gadi or Yan doka in 1925 under the leadership of Resident H.O Lindsell. Here, a new local police force, called the Yan gadi (Watchmen), was formed out of the Emir’s Dogarai force. The establishment of this Native Police in the name of Yan gadi not only resulted in the Dogarai being reduced in number but also saw to some extent the reduction of their power26 Yan gadi was the precursor of Yan doka in other provinces. Their job was to help the N.A in the task of general security, law enforcement, the prevention of crime and the maintenance of law and order in the increasingly cosmopolitan capital.27 Similarly, the force of Yan gadi was used as an opportunity to boost the prestige of the Emirs and serve the colonial administration.28

As organized in July 1925, the Kano Emirate Yan gadi consisted of a body of 151 men. Of these 100 men were former Dogarai and 50 ex-soldiers from the Northern Regiments of the West African Frontier Force who had good discharge testimonial.29 The remaining one was Musa Birnin Keffi, the Sarkin gadi, and a retired Sergeant-Major of WAFF. The position of Sarkin gadi refers to the head of the force. He was assisted by five non-commissioned officers, (constables), out of the 150 Yangadi.30 With the creation of Yan gadi the strength of Dogarai was reduced from 275 to 100 men. Out of these 100, seventy (70) rode on horse while thirty (30) were on foot. The Sarkin Dogarai was retired on pension and replaced with the former Galadiman Dogarai as the new Sarkin Dogarai.31 By’ the retention of these 100 Dogarai, the colonial government in a way had designed a scheme of maintaining both the good will of’ the Emir and the retained Dogarai who have had no satisfactory arrangement by which they could earn a living.32 However, with all this gesture, Emir Usman
was unhappy with the change, but had to abide by it.\textsuperscript{33} And Emir Abdullahi Bayero, in his attempt to secure the throne, had to consent to giving Lindsell a definite promise, which aimed at reorganizing the Emirate to the likings of the colonial authority.\textsuperscript{34}

The creation of \textit{Yan gadi} especially in Kano Emirate, although reduced the number of \textit{Dogarai}, did not in totality destroy the force. While the \textit{Yan gadi} remained the city force the \textit{Dogarai} on the other hand, served in the districts. The \textit{Dogarai} were employed to ensure payment of taxes by the colonial subjects.\textsuperscript{35} The posting of \textit{Dogarai} to the Districts was certainly to smoothen and ensure the speedy collection of taxes from defaulters.\textsuperscript{36}

From the foregoing therefore, it is clear those colonial policies on one hand, and the duties assigned to the institution of \textit{Dogarai} on the other hand continued to change as circumstances of the time warranted. So with the creation of \textit{Yan gadi} out of \textit{Dogarai} and their placement under a fixed salary, the colonial government changed greatly their status, \textit{Dogarai} from operating as an executive and purely indigenous institution under sole and direct control of the Emir of Kano, to the position of N.A. Staff as mere courtiers and escorts. These \textit{Dogarai} were also posted to most railway stations within the Emirate and at some centers of the groundnut trade during the season to keep law and order.\textsuperscript{37} The duty of arresting criminals by the \textit{Dogarai} was reduced to the arrest and harassment of persons who could not pay up their poll\textsuperscript{38} or community taxes and levies. Since the emphasis now is maximum economic exploitation of the colonies and their subjects, the \textit{Dogarai} were largely used to achieve this motive beside their role in the palace.

By 1925, the institution of \textit{Dogarai} beside other duties enumerated before played ceremonial roles. These functions were notably performed during the two Eids (Fitr and Adha) as well as during Friday prayers and any other occasion which warranted the Emir to ride on horse back around the town. Among their duties like in the pre-colonial days, were to sing praises to the Emir, clear the way for him, fan him, intimidate his opponents and enemies, guard traditional and important places and attend to some domestic work.\textsuperscript{39}

The creation of \textit{Yan gadi} to a large extent reduced the dependence of internal security of the Emirate on the personal
guards of Emirs but placed security matters on the *Yan gadi*, who although were equally under the Emir but were supervised and advised by a European Police Officer. This supervision and advice was an infringement upon the powers of the Emirs. By 1936 the *Yan gadi* of Kano were controlled by two men. Where as the Sarkin Gadi was a professional Police and Head of training, the Danburan of Kano by name Faruku was appointed head of the force with this additional title of *Wakilin Doka* and was in charge of Policy making; he was the Liaison Officer between N.A. Police and the Emir of Kano.

**Role of N.A. Police in Maintaining Law and Order in Kano Emirate 1925-1968**

The establishment of Native Authority Police Forces, NAPFS. in Northern Nigeria. was an essential part of the imposition of British colonial rule in Nigeria. The Forces came into existence through the adoption although with modification of the pre-colonial *Dogarai*. In every Native Authority, the trained section of the *Dogarai* force constituted the N.A. Police *Yan gadi* or *Yan doka*, while the untrained section was gradually phased out. Where they were retained they were placed under the Emirs as their personal servants. But through whatever way the *Yan gadi* emerged, the British colonial administrators aimed to achieve the following objectives. One, they hoped to secure the loyalty of the Native Authorities. Two, they hoped to keep down the cost of security expenditure. Three, they intended to build a network of police agency that was to he used to maintain colonial law and order and boost the image of both traditional rulers, and colonial officers as they executed colonial policies and directives. These policies were related to the operation of the colonial economy, labour mobilization, tax collection, land control and Agricultural production.

By 1925, the Kano Native Authority had three separate Police Forces, which were working side by side. There were the traditional *Dogarai* Forces who were reduced to one hundred (100) men. These one hundred *Dogarai* were of two categories, the footed who were seventy (70) and the mounted who were thirty (30) in number and both placed under the new Sarkin *Dogarai*. There was also the newly established *Yan gadi* placed under Sarkin
Lastly, there was Northern Nigeria Police, which metamorphosed into the Nigeria Police Force in 1930.

The roles of Dogarai (especially the footed) during the colonial rule were restricted to services to be rendered to the Sarki and the District Heads. In the district they were mainly reduced to the position of mere courtiers and escorts between Kano and the Districts. Equally, they were also posted to most of the Railway stations within the Emirate and at some centers of the groundnut trade during the season.

The mounted Dogarai patrolled the border areas especially the Nigeria-Niger boundary at Gumel and Hadejia. They were instrumental in stopping foodstuff from leaving the country. It was in one of these patrols that a Dogari was once killed in an attempt to arrest a dangerous criminal. Similarly, groups of Dogarai were stationed during the harvest season on the Bornu border in order to prevent friction over the damage of farm products by Fulani cattle rearers. These new roles were in addition to their old roles as stated above.

Prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals were not the only roles performed by the N.A. Police. It also partake in the rigorous task of maintaining law and order in the society. Though this task of maintaining law and order was an exclusive preserve of the District Heads, the N. A. Police was the law enforcement agency charged with the responsibility of ensuring public peace. Specific directives were usually transmitted from colonial district officers to Emirs, to District Heads who then execute these with the support of the N. A. Police. It was only in few areas that were significant to the colonial economy that the Nigeria Police Force complemented the work of N. A. Police in maintaining law and order in Kano Emirate.

Therefore, it is significant to point out that during its period of existence the N. A. Police and other N. A. Machinery consisting of Native courts and prison operated the basic framework of the maintenance of law and order in the society. The duty of maintaining law and order was in fact the basic and primary work of N. A. Police as stated during its formation:

The principal duties of the Yan gadi are policing and keeping of order in Kano city and Fagge. They represent the first attempt at organized
police control. The city has been divided into patrols and regular beats laid down for day and night.\textsuperscript{48}

It has been argued elsewhere in this work:\textsuperscript{49} that colonial rule was weak in resources, when the British super-imposed their rule on the people of Nigeria. At the beginning of the twentieth century they sought to utilize the existing machinery of governance which they found in operation, with some modification though.\textsuperscript{50} To this end, traditional rulers were given relative autonomy to run the local administration of their various areas.\textsuperscript{51} This system of indirect rule through indirect means\textsuperscript{52} turned the traditional rulers into mere local agents of colonial officers.\textsuperscript{53}

Similarly, it is argued too that the Native courts ordinance of 1918\textsuperscript{54} gave district officers slide powers of supervision, revision and appeal over Native courts. The district officers were able to gradually transform the Native court from informal tribunals into formal courts, with documentation of records, courts officers and predefinition procedures.\textsuperscript{55} A district officer exercised his supervisory powers over Native courts and Native chiefs in the course of his periodic visits. Morris and Read pointed out that:

During these inspections the whole native administration machinery was brought under his watchful eye, but it was to the standard and the nature of the chief’s court, so essential part of the apparatus of indirect administration that he usually devoted most attention. Here the chief’s ability and effectiveness could well be judged from the administrative standard of his court: his general attitudes towards enlightened policies and progress as understood by the District Officer, could be assessed from his judgments; and careful scrutiny of the records and the complaints of litigants would likely reveal corruption, if such existed.\textsuperscript{56}

In general, the district officers in Northern Nigeria took a lot of pride in the Native court. They noted that these courts were chaired by indigenous chief \textit{Alkali} who administered customary law or Islamic law known to the people, and their procedure was simple, their justice cheap and quick.

The judicial system in Kano under colonial domination was a British creation and functioned through their direct supervision and at their will.\textsuperscript{57} Although the justice these courts administered was cheap and speedy. Emirs that presided over them were answerable to political officers. Similarly, the laws they administered were not
completely customary. These were debasement of the Emirate system of justice. Litigants to the courts had to pay fees, which was not only contrary to Emirate justice but to Shari’a itself, so were its harsh fines, severe imprisonment terms that had the effect of scaring potential litigants away.\textsuperscript{58} In spite of this limitation however, the fact that this system of Native Administration was modeled after existing pre-colonial structures made it far less objectionable to the indigenous populace in the Emirate than elsewhere in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{59} Hence, the colonial government operated an administration in the Emirate of Northern Nigeria and to a lesser extent with a moderate success in the area of maintaining law, order and stability.\textsuperscript{60}

The moderate success which the colonial administration achieved in adopting and modifying pre-colonial structures in the Emirate to maintain public order and aid colonial administration led to the description of the Emirate as “scared” and of its people as superior to others in Nigeria.\textsuperscript{61} For this reason, the colonial administration tried to maintain a policy of separation between immigrants in Kano, and the indigenes. According to Fika, the creation of Sabon-Gari, the colonial government viewed as an action that would accord the Emirates a measure of protection against possible disintegrating influences from elsewhere.\textsuperscript{62} Immigrants to Emirate cities, mainly southern artisans, clerks and traders settled in these stranger settlements were carefully watched by the police to prevent any breach of peace and maintain law and order.\textsuperscript{63}

In Kano province, Sabon-Gari initially was administered within the township.\textsuperscript{64} It was incorporated into the township administration in 1918 under Regulation No.89 of 1918.\textsuperscript{65} With this regulation the township, was responsible for administering the settlement and its markets and for regulating land tenure.\textsuperscript{66} The settlement was also directly under the executive head of the township, the station magistrate, who was assisted by a committee, the Kano Township Advisory Board. Thus, it was beyond the jurisdiction of the Emir’s administration and Dogarai and later Yan gadi. Up to 1940 the Sabon-Gari was entirely outside the jurisdiction of local security agents whether Dogarai or Yan gadi.

An important event in the history of Sabon-Gari took place on 1st April, 1940. This was the transfer of its administration and
policing arrangement under the Emir’s and his Yan gadi’s jurisdiction. Hence it was no more under station magistrate or NPF only.67

With this new innovation the police arrangement was equally altered. As from 1940, the N. A. Police now complemented the Nigeria Police Force in maintaining law and order in Sabon-Gari. The Sabon-Gari was divided into zones, each under a headman. Each headman possessed a sketch showing all allocated plots and details of their occupants. He noted particularly the identity of the household heads, their trade and their rent. It was the duty of the household head to report the arrival of every new occupant to the headman.68 The N. A. Police had an arrangement whereby a constable visited the headman weekly to note the arrival of any stranger for crime and public order.69 As a mark of its determination to regulate the Sabon-Gari, the government gave special grant to N. A. Police with large Sabon-Gari population to control. The grant for policing stranger settlements was thirty pounds (as from 1940) per policeman. However, in 1957 the amount was reduced to fifteen pounds per policeman.70 Kano Emirate as stated earlier benefited from this grant in view of its large Sabon-Gari settlement.71

As from 1940, the Yan gadi were faced with two additional problems. One was the additional problem of policing Sabon-Gari. The other was the reduction of police personnel as a result of World War II (1939-1945) which resulted in re-calling of many of the ex-soldiers for active service.72 In view of this, Kano N. A. released all ex-soldiers who could render useful service to the army.73

Their war-time responsibilities (Yan gadi) included dangerous frontier patrols in such areas as Katsina, Gumel and Sokoto provinces which lay exposed to attacks from the richly-controlled governments operating in French West Africa.74 The N. A. Police (Yan gadi) also tried to cope with such additional War Time schedules such as checking trade permits, motor traffic control75 and the distribution of “allotment cards” to the dependents of soldiers.76 In a nut shell, the role of N. A. Police Yan gadi by 1939 could be summarized as follows:
The *Yan gadi* are employed mainly in Kano and its immediate environs. A few small detachments are also stationed at the larger towns along the railway and traffic control post. They are also maintained at certain key points along the main roads. The latter have been very effective in controlling overloading of motor lorries and smuggling from the French territory. Several rewards for the detection of smuggling were made during the year. 77

Although the impact of the Second World War partly eased unemployment as many hitherto jobless people volunteered for active service, in a way it also increased such problems as racketeering, inflation and excessive migration into cosmopolitan cities like Kano and brought new and unfamiliar responsibilities upon the N. A. Police. This period of social and economic distress led to a higher crime rate, general restlessness and general insecurity. 78

This became more glaring when the total numbers of the personnel in the Force were taken into account. For example, the numbers of *Yan gadi* by 1938 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emirates</th>
<th><em>Yan gadi</em></th>
<th>Dogarai</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazaure</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadejia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumel</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1939, the 3158 members of the N.A. Police Forces of the Northern Nigeria (Kano had only 338 N.A. Police by 1939) were charged with the responsibility of policing an area of 275,724 square miles and protecting the lives and property of about 11 million people.

The Nigeria Police complemented them only within few occasions. 79 It was in view of their excellent work and commitment that by 1952 the Kano Emirate *Yan gadi* were acknowledged as very efficient and reliable. The appreciation runs as follows:

Despite the variety of political parties and their innumerable rallies and processions there have been no serious disturbances and the N.A. Police are to be congratulated on their handling of large assemblies. 80
The role of Kano N. A. Police in the field of enforcing law and order had its limit when one examines the way it handled the 1953 Kano riot. The riot broke out on May 16, 1953 and lasted three days. The Kano riot was an attempt to stop the Action Group delegation led by Chief Samuel Akintola from publicizing their party's position on the question of decolonization. In a speech to the Kano N. A. Workers, Alhaji Inuwa Wada, who was then the N. A. Information Officer emphasized that the riot started because:

Having abused us in the south, these very southerners have decided to come over to the north to abuse us, but we are determined to retaliate the treatment given us in the south. We have therefore organized about 1,000 men ready in the city to meet Force with Force.

However the inability of the N.A Police to restore order within the two days into the riot brought in the Nigeria Police Force: as re-enforcement. Among them was the Commissioner of the Nigerian Police Force who directly handled the Police operation. 130 special constables who provided patrols and escorts helped the Police. The soldiers who intervened used wire to separate the groups of rioters.

After three days the Yan gadi together with the Nigeria Police Force were able to put down the riot and restore normalcy in Kano. But this was not without some hard effects, for in all fifteen (15) Northerners and twenty-one (21) Southerners were killed. The number of people injured was one hundred and sixty-three (163) Southerners and seventy-one (71) Northerners. However, no policemen were killed but seven (7) were wounded. A lot of valuable properties including cattle were lost during the riot.

Another effect of the Kano riot on the N.A. Police could clearly be seen from the report of a commission appointed by the government to investigate the causes and effects of the disturbances. Although the commission appreciated the efforts of the N.A. Police, it noted strongly a defect, which needed correction.

It has become obvious that, to be effective under circumstances of danger and difficulty, the Native Administration Police should he officered an approximately the same basis as the Nigeria Police. Each Nigeria Police Anti-Riot unit of fifty men is led by an officer: the entire
Kano Native Administration Police Force, of whom over 350 men became engaged, has only one officer. Following some adjustments within the Force that tallied with the commission’s recommendation the N.A. Police was able to improve in its performance. This happened in 1956 in Kano City during a disturbance between the supporters of NEPU and NPC. It was in this year 1956 the Kano N.A. Police Force demonstrated itself as second to none in the entire Northern region. For this action they were commended as follows:

> It the end of March, the Nigeria Police and Kano N.A. Police Force combined well together to suppress the rioting which broke out in the city. Much of the credit for the fact that the disorders lasted only one day is due to their resolute in handling of crowds.

The same report of 1956, added that:

> Later in the year, the Native Authority Police again had to intervene after the disorder in Tsakuwa and Harbo. In addition to these outbreaks, there was serious tension between the main political parties during the abortive elections in the city. But Police Forces have emerged with credit from an exacting and arduous year.

The most critical stages in the N. A. Police effort to preserve public safety and maintain law and order came between 1960 to 1965 when rivalry between political parties degenerated into bloody disturbances. The increased tension during the immediate post-independence period in terms of party rivalry and the increasing tendency on the part of Nigerian Politicians to win and retain their supporters through patronage and their refusal to accept defeat at the polls increased their readiness to adopt strong arm politics. This resulted or paved the way for:

> Clashes which have taken place in a number of districts as a result of rivalry between political parties.

Similarly, the activities of armed thugs and robbers who menaced public peace raised serious problems for the N. A. Police in Kano emirate especially in the post-independence period. In view of these problems especially the use of police against party
supporters, the *Wakilin Doka* resigned his job in 1962. He was particularly critical of the use of police (N. A. Police) by the ruling party NPC in intimidating and harassing the opposition party (NEPU). If there was ever any doubt about the use of the N. A. Police in intimidating political opponents, that doubt was removed after the resignation of the *Wakilin Doka* of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero.

The politicians in power especially in Kano Emirate were aided by the N. A. Police to victimize, harass or arrest political opponents in the name of maintaining law and order as well as public peace. This was especially true with the members of Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU). Thus, the period in reference 1960–1966 posed serious questions on the role of N. A. Police in the field of maintaining law and order due to their involvement in party politics.

**The Contribution of Alhaji Ado Bayero to N.A. Police of Kano Emirate 1957-62**

On 28 February 1956, the *Wakilin Doka* of Kano N.A Police, Alhaji Kabiru Bayero was relieved of his post. He was later appointed to the post of District Head by the then Emir of Kano Sir Mohammed Sunusi his brother. The post of *Wakilin Doka* was then offered to Ado Bayero, Kabiru’s immediate junior brother who at the time was an elected N.P.C member of the regional House of Assembly. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) which was the Political Party Alhaji Ado Bayero was resenting drew support from the entire Native Authority Structure including the N.A. Police Forces. Thus, it was a conservative formation which was in support of the exploited nature of the N.A. structure. However, although the young Ado Bayero was part of this political party (NPC) he was seen by the NPC to be charting a different course. He was seen as a royalist with a difference, a gentleman, consistent, diligent, upright and earnestly devoted with the hope and desire to serve the masses of his Emirate and Northern Nigeria in general. For these reasons his party therefore branded him “a radical” and some party leaders even schemed to get him out of the way. In their opinion he was too close to the masses to serve the objectives of the establishment of NPC. After three years as an Honourable Member of the House, Ado resigned to become the
chief of the Kano Native Police *Wakilin Doka*. He was sent to Ryton Dusmore College and Scotland Yard, both in the United Kingdom, and Kaduna Police College to prepare him for this new position.

His appointment was quite popular even with the opposition NEPU. It was reported that Mallam Aminu Kano described it as “a good gesture and a good omen for the future of Kano”. He hoped that his youthfulness, firmness and broadmindedness would reflect well on the N.A. Police Force. He saw his resignation from the house and politics as the manifestation of his sincerity.\(^94\)

Indeed this hope vested on Ado Bayero as *Wakilin Doka* was never dashed. During his period as *Wakilin Doka* of N.A. police of Kano 1957-62 there was a radical transformation of the three. The N.A. Police of Kano were the largest and consequently the most powerful N.A. Police throughout Northern Nigeria. The first step taken to improve the force was in the area of finance. In the era of Alhaji Ado Bayero the Kano N.A. Police was through his efforts properly funded, maintained and managed in comparison with other N.A. Police forces in not only Northern Nigeria but also among other Local Government Police Forces of Western Nigeria, who in most cases had crises in management of funding, administration and or control.\(^95\)

In addition to adequate funding there was good infrastructure and working facilities. For example in 1956/1957 Kano N.A. Police Force had among other things an excellent fleet of two modern and highly efficient Bedford steel-bodied lorries, two radio equipped land rovers, one radio equipped Volkswagen bus, one Volkswagen without radio, one Vauxhall velox Police car fitted with celebrated speedometer, and a Police siren.\(^96\)

Similarly, during his era there were barrack accommodations for 249 policemen of Kano N.A police force. Within the same period 6000 pounds was released for the construction of inspectors quarters. Working materials for the force were fully available and adequate such as tear gas, gas mask, helmets, batons and shields.\(^97\)

The most important impact Alhaji Ado Bayero made as *Wakilin Doka* was in the area of improving the condition of service of the N.A. Police. Generally speaking by 1957, the salary structure in most of the provinces did not exceed that of Kano province. In fact within that period Kano N.A. laid down scales of
pay for N.A. Police similar to those enjoyed by Nigeria Police Force. In addition to that through the efforts of Alhaji Ado Bayero Transportation loan was expanded to cover a number of N.A. policemen.  

It is important to conclude here that the period when Alhaji Ado Bayero was the Wakilin Doka of N.A. Police of Kano Emirate was a blessing to the force and the masses of the Emirate. There was adequate funding, infrastructure, high and regular payment of salaries, as well as quantitative and qualitative Policemen. Thus, with all these the morale and deep contentment of the Policemen were boosted. These were reflected in their work. By 1957, the annual report re-emphasized the contribution of N.A. Police and the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) in the discharge of their duties including of course, Crime Prevention, and enforcement of law and order, it continued:

Once again, the Police of the province, both the Nigeria Police force and the Native Authority Police Force, gave excellent services and have steadily improved in every branch of their onerous and difficult work.  

Similarly, the N.A. Police were commended in 1958 under Alhaji Ado Bayero. The 1958 annual report reads:

The Nigeria Police, force and the Native Authority Police in the province continued to work together closely during the year. This co-operation was successful and there was far less criticism.

Indeed, it was not a hidden fact that the NPC was able to gain great advantage from its control over the N.A. Police and used its control to victimize NEPU members, as stated by late Mallam Lawan Dambazau, a legal adviser for NEPU:

The Police were in the hands of the Chiefs, and the prisons were in the hands of the Chiefs and courts were in the hands of the Chiefs, and the chiefs were N. P. C members. So you see if you had a political disagreement, he (the Chief) would put his police to arrest you, take you to his court and, if convicted you were taken to his prisons.

This was the system Alhaji Ado Bayero decided to change. His starting point was to formulate a set of rules that forbade any suspect to be charged to an Alkali court without such suspect
having been personally interviewed by the *Wakilin Doka*. A few examples from Alhaji Sidi Ali’s book will illustrate this point.

In one of such interviews, a NEPU member was brought from Jahun tied by an N.A. Police, to his office. Ado enquired what the man did. He was told by the policemen that the man abused the Emir. Ado said, “remove the chain from him. The Emir is my father, I forgive him.” He gave the man 50 kwabo to pay for his transport back home. He enquired why another man from Ringim was brought to him. Another N.A. Policeman said he put NEPU badge and put it on his own chest, Ado removed the badge and put it on his own chest, and said to the policeman, “*Kama ni*” which means arrest me. And the man was released by the *Wakilin Doka* unpunished.

Prince Ado was said to have bitterly cried when a NEPU toiler Mallam Tsalha Dankasa was physically dragged from his home on one afternoon and beaten to death by political thugs in the city of Kano. These were only a few of the many things that Alhaji Ado Bayero, a unique and impartial prince, had to introduce which gave N.A. Police structure and a human feeling.

In a nutshell Kano N.A. Police to a large extent benefited from the experience, good work and commitment of Alhaji Ado Bayero. The masses on the other hand saw his tenure as *Wakilin Doka* as a Godly era in which he checked the abuses done to them by the N.A. Police. N.P.C therefore set out plans to remove Ado “without rocking the boat” so as not to lose political fortunes in Kano Emirate. Consequently the N.P.C maneuvered to have him appointed as Ambassador to Senegal. With his appointment he resigned as *Wakilin Doka*. It was from the post of Ambassador that he was appointed Sarkin Kano in 1963, the post he has been holding for forty years now.

**Conclusion**

The period between 16th January 1966 and April 1970 when N. A. Police Forces ceased to exist nationwide is generally not remarkable in the history of the Forces. In broader terms, the period witnessed the subordination of the Forces to the Nigeria Police Force. The probable reasons for the abolition of the N.A. Police Forces include the general climate of opinion in the country which was against the continued existence of the Forces, the
unwillingness of the NPF to continue to share power with the forces, the disposition of some members of military ruling elites especially after General Yakubu Gowon had assumed power, the presence in the Federal Executive Council of some former politicians (largely opponents of the old regime) who, or whose followers, had suffered in the hands of the N.A. Police Forces of Northern Nigeria, and local government Police Forces of Western Nigeria. These politicians included Mallam Aminu Kano, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro and Joseph S. Tarka. This and many other reasons led to the merger of N.A. Police Forces with the Nigeria Police from 1968 and which ended in 1970. It is to be concluded here that despite their shortcoming, they played dynamic roles in the maintenance of law and order in Kano Emirate specially and Northern Nigeria in general.

Notes
1. Alhaji Hassan Adamu Sarkin Dogarai, 70 years, 25-12-95.
5. NAK SNP Zaprrop 5193/1908, p.1.
15. Native Authority Ordinance, 1918.
16. Tamuno, The Police…, p.97
19. NAK Annual report, Bida Province, 1931, BID IV/B 718.
20. NAK Annual report, Bida Province, 1931, BID IV/B 718.
21. NAK Sokoto Province, report for fifteen months ending 31 March 1921, pp. 45-46.
42. NAK SNP 7 KANPROF 16687 Vol. 11931.
43. NAK SNP 7 KANPROF 16687 Vol. 11 191.
44. NAK SNP 17 KANPROF 37005 1941.
45. NAK SNP 17 KANPROF 14686 Vol. 11930.
46. NAK SNP 7 KANPROF 37005 1941.
47. NAK SNP 17 KANPROF 14686 Vol. 11930.
49. See Chapter Three of my forthcoming book for a detailed discussion of this work.
50. For a detailed analysis regarding the modification, re-structuring of the pre-colonial socio-political structures in the colonial days, see also A.E. Afrigbo, “The establishment of colonial rule 1900 1918” In .1..A Ajayi and M. Crowder (eds) *History of West Africa*, Vol. II Longman 1974.
52. For details, P.I. Shea “How indirect was indirect rule: A documentary approach to an Administrative problem” Paper presented to Historical Society of Nigeria, HSN, BUK Students’ Branch, 1983.
54. Native Court Ordinance of No 5 of 1918 in Kingdom (1923 pp. 78-85).
57. Not provided.
64. NAK R.H.L. Ms. Aft. S. 1489 "personal thoughts on the Administration and progress made between 1919 & 19 39" by Commander J. Carrow.
65. NAK KANPROF. 6121 Sabon-Gari legislation under Native Administration, 1933-1954.
69. Ahmad Najal, Ward Head of Sabon-Gari, 55 years, 3/8/97.
70. NAK GRA/ 19/Vol. II.
71. For details see Chapter Four of my forthcoming Native Police and Security in Kano, 1925-68.
72. NAK SNP 17 KANPROF 3512/1940.
73. Annual report for Kano Province 1940. See Page 104 for the Number of “Yan gadi in 1940 of my forthcoming book
75. NAK SNP 17 I:APROF 37005/1941 Annual report for Kano Province 1941.
76. Tamuno. The Police..., p.105.
77. 77 NAK SNP 17 KANPROF 32098/1939 Annual reports of Kano Province 1939.
78. 78 Tamuno. The Police..., p.191.
80. NAK SNP 17 KANPROF 43495/1952 Annual report for Kano Province 1952.
84. Report on the Kano disturbances, 16/19 May 1953, pp. 21-23.
85. Report on the Kano disturbance, 16/19 May 1953, p.32.
86. Musa Guza NA Mamuda NEPU activist 63 years 7/8/97.
89. ANK SNP 17 KANPROF 5741/5.4 1961 Annual report for Kano Province
40th Anniversary of the Emirship of HRH Alh. (Dr). Ado Bayero

1961.
93. Rotimi, *Federalism and Policing* … p.84.
94. See Chapter Four of my forthcoming book.
95. NAK SNP 17 KANPROF 3512 Annual report for Kano Province 1956/57.
96. See Chapter Four of my forthcoming book.
97. See Chapter four or my forthcoming book.
98. NAK SNP 17 KANPROF 3512 Annual report for Kano Province 1956/57
100. NAK SNP 17 KANPOROF Annual report of 1958.
Session 2

The Present
Authority and the Power of New Knowledge in Hausaland, 1800-2000 AD

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This essay explores, firstly, the relation between “authority” and “force” in the recent history of Hausaland and then, secondly, the way youth can seize upon new ideas as an opportunity for overturning the structures of traditional authority as wielded by their elders. In offering this tentative analysis, I hope to raise for discussion issues relating both to the nature of contemporary authority and to the inclinations of those in power to use brute force. Ultimately it is how we can better understand the various cultures of Hausaland, past and present, that is the subject of this essay, even if my only contribution is to ask questions about items that other scholars have overlooked.

A. The Unusual Strength of Traditional Authority

I wish to start with a problem. In Birnin Kano in the 1820s, there was estimated to be a population of 30-40,000. At the time a group of North African merchants living in Kano suggested, in a discussion about the ratio of freemen to slaves, that there were 30 slaves for every free person. If that figure is applied to urban Kano, it implies they thought there were only about a thousand free people in Birnin Kano. If “40,000” represents the total population, then it implies there may have been (in their minds) as few as 200 free adult men in Birnin Kano (and 800 free women and children). I suspect, however, that the slave:free ratio of 30:1 is based on the north Africans’ knowledge of both rural and urban Kano, and the calculation included the residents of rumada and gandaye, entirely slave communities sometimes of considerable size. Remember, this is the 1820s when the jihad had already been strikingly successful and Ibrahim Dabo was consolidating his control with several campaigns.

My purpose in raising this is [1] to show how, at the time, Kano residents were aware of the huge disparity between slave and free; and [2] to ask the question: what was the authority of the tiny Kano ruling elite that inhibited a slave revolt - or simply stopped
slaves from running away in such large numbers that sarakai could never have halted the haemorrhage? The question can be asked of Sokoto too, where the Birni’s population in the 1820s is put at 120,000.\(^2\) If the 30:1 ratio is applied there, that makes 4,000 free people and some 116,000 slaves; or perhaps 500 free adult males. It’s not entirely implausible. In the 1820s Waziri Gidado’s brother lived on a farm alone with his 70 slaves; he had 16 concubines in addition to his four wives. We know that North African merchants slept in fear of being murdered at night by a concubine (a fear justified by at least one murder).\(^3\) We know too that some masu sarauta later slept in tents so as to conceal their whereabouts at night from would-be assassins.\(^4\) So could not a determined ‘resistance movement’ that mobilised both male slaves and concubines in a concerted attack (at night?) have dealt with, say, the 500 free males in Birnin Sokoto or the 200 in Birnin Kano? If not night-time mass murder, surely a coup d’état might have been possible. We know that they never tried: why not? What was the authority that held them, passive, submissive, “tamed”?

The question can be put differently - not in terms of free over slave, but of Fulbe over non-Fulbe. We do not have figures for the 1820s, but for the 1850s Heinrich Barth estimated that in Birnin Kano there were 4,000 Fulbe, including women and children, in a total population of 30,000.\(^5\) Again, if his figure of 4,000 Fulbe is plausible, then it implies there were only some 450 Fulbe adult males in Birnin Kano (assuming that, on average, for every adult Pullo there were two women and four children). So again the question is, this time, not about freedom but about Hausa ‘nationalism’: why were the Fulbe “conquerors” - such a small minority - able to get away with their dominance over a Hausa majority which was up to ten times larger in number? What was the “secret” of their authority?

A core item of my argument is that their authority was not based on coercive force, militarily, neither the category of free men nor that of “Fulbe” was large enough, on its own, to win out against quite such enormous odds. In a sense, the jihad itself had been a ‘miracle’; it is reckoned that 70 mujahidun on horseback captured Birnin Zazzau, admittedly in a surprise attack on a Saturday morning. The flag-bearing units of mujahidun are said, again in the 1820s, to have been as little as 50 strong.\(^6\) Nor was
there always a battle: even Birnin Kano itself fell to the mujahidun without a fight. Whatever the case, street-talk in the 1820s did not recall massive jihadi armies and long sieges; the mujahidun won against all odds. Indeed, the effectiveness of the jihadi authority over a Hausa urban population and the rural peasantry was a source of wonder even to contemporary Hausa. For what talakawa did talk about was not an over-powering force-of-arms but to them something more sinister, as Richard Lander reported in the 1820s. The Houssans have often declared to me that the strength and inclination to “shake the spear!” were denied them; they had no will of their own - their hands fell powerless by their sides and they felt as if they had been touched by the finger of a god, or were under the influence of an eastern talisman. Abandoning their wives and children to the mercy of the invaders, they contented to lose their liberty and fell like “silly sheep” into the snare that had been laid for them with so little art; not even attempting to struggle with their oppressors; or if so, making efforts as puny and ineffectual as the fluttering of a fly in a spider’s web'.

We do not know Lander’s sources for this, though one source might well have been his ba-Gobiri servant, Abu Bakr, a stocky sixty-year old, who had fought against the jihad with the Gobirawa and had later been kidnapped one night by “Felata” and sold to coastal slave-traders. I don’t think we should ignore what Lander relays to us of the sort of gossip that Abu Bakr and other Hausa talakawa passed on to him; Lander was himself a servant, albeit Nasara, and he clearly mixed more with the non-elite and spoke with them in Hausa (Abu Bakr could probably speak English, having been a seaman awhile). What comes out of this street-talk (if such it is) is that the Shehu had enormous “authority” that was unique. It was more than baraka, more than girma or martaba; it conferred iko upon others but wasn’t itself iko. It was, people implied, derived from Allah, a karama. Shehu himself, however, denied he was a wali, he wasn’t the Mahdi; he could hear jinns talk but didn’t converse with them. He was, it seems, troubled by the throngs of ‘pilgrims’ making ziyara to his residence first in Sifawa and then, when he was ill, to his new compound on the edges of Birnin Sokoto. These ‘religious tourists’ collected his hair, to put it into gold and silver boxes; they went to gaze at his tent. For the Shehu’s compound included his tent [laima] as well as a mud-
made room. A tent may have symbolised his ‘arabness’ or an attempt on his part to keep up his old sense of deep-rural transience even when living in the midst of a 120,000-strong city - he was, by the end of his life, a disturbing figure, melancholic and hyper-anxious about all the Muslim deaths he had caused. The tent may have been, for him, the one place where he could be secluded and meditate. Anyway, it set him apart: no palace (like Bello’s) for him, a sufi who’d not go out on Thursdays as his one gown was being washed in time for Friday; no stallion to ride, but a mare appropriate for a mallam - he never fought in battle, though he did once go out to the battlefield when called at a critical point in the fighting. He is portrayed as a Shaikh who cared for his followers; in his karamat (listed long after his death by Waziri Gidado) he was described as hearing the prayers of those in distress and going out to them (miraculously), delivering them from robbers or whatever was the peril they were in. In short, the Shehu was a man whose authority was not based on force or violence. Admittedly, he had young men who had done his fighting for him, once the Prophet had in a vision given Shaikh ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jailani the saif al-haqq to hand to the Shehu for him to use. Admittedly, too, it was the Shehu who sent the first Emir of Kano a knife, symbolically thus instructing him to use (the threat of) force against fellow mujahidun who ignored his orders. But it was the authority of the Shehu, as Allah’s servant, that had made their puny forces effective and given them all their unexpected victories.

The authority of the Shehu, then, was of an order all by itself. It was unique to him. He was like a horse-whisperer; he ‘tamed’ the Hausa jarumai as no one else had done. But the question is, once that ‘miracle’ had occurred, how did the successors of the mujahidun manage to hold onto power? We can accept that the jihad itself was a case of “shock and awe”, but whence came the continuing “awe” that sustained the masu sarauta for a century or more, even during the times when their government was oppressive and their justice unfair? In Sokoto, as soon as the Shehu was dead, Hausa malamai and almajirai, veterans of the jihad though they were (men such as ‘Abd al-Salam and Dan Buya), nonetheless rebelled; so did the Gobirawa and Kebbawa. Muhammad Bello did manage to regain control, but only just, by
force of arms; but to do this, he had to have the implicit co-
operation or at least the passivity of all the captives and non-Fulbe
who so outnumbered his own people. Admittedly Bello terrorised
his opponents by massacres and leaving the bodies out to rot,
skewered on stakes. His Muslim opponents countered by killing
any Fulbe males they caught, and cutting off the hands of Fulbe
women and children, as if they had been thieves to be punished
under Shari’a law for their complicity in the theft of Gobiri land
and livestock. In the midst of such mayhem, why did not the mass
of slaves go over to the rebels and simply terminate, once and for
all, the rule of the new jihadi/Fulbe elite? Why, for example, did
the 70 slaves on the gandu of Gidado’s brother simply stay put?
What, then, was the authority that the successors of the Shehu in
Sokoto and the Emirs beyond Sokoto still exercised over those
within the restricted area of their jurisdiction?

One could argue, in response, that being a slave was not too
bad in these early years of the caliphate: as a new captive, you
might not be so discriminated against by your owner, who needed
both your labour and your support (since he could scarcely coerce
you). And it might be better to be part of the new Islamic caliphate
than outside it, exposed to even greater insecurity; as a slave you
might even have a family (though it seems, at least later on, that
marriage among slaves was very limited) and so be reluctant to
give up that way of life, even for ‘freedom’. I admit that I am
reluctant to accept any argument that suggests that ‘slavery was
benign’. Bauta had a stigma to it, a humiliatingly de-humanising
aspect to it that turned a person into a ‘thing’ which could, in the
event of any trouble, be simply sold (as the ba-Gobiri Abu Bakr
had been); even as a child slave, you had to learn to be the ‘loser’
in any game you were playing with a free child. It is easy
for us who have never experienced slavery to discount its impact,
just as “whites” are notorious for discounting the experience of the
white racism aimed at “blacks”, or males’ failure to understand the
sense of oppression that women can feel at men’s hands, or -
finally - imperialists’ fantasies that colonialism wasn’t really so
bad for the colonised after all! Nonetheless many of Sokoto’s or
Kano’s captives may have made a strategic decision to wait and
see how their fate as slaves turned out, willing to accept a new kind
of subordination for the earlier kind they had been experiencing
before capture. In which case, there need be nothing remarkable about the ‘authority’ of the ruling elite. Submissiveness on the part of the ruled is simply a rational response to their situation. But I am not wholly convinced of this.

One could argue, alternatively, that there is a spiritual element to the authority of a Caliph or an Emir, and that spiritual element is embodied in symbols, rituals and the everyday behaviour that mark out the *fada* from the rest of the city. Furthermore, the spiritual element may be also encapsulated in *tsafi* of various kinds within the palace or on the Emir’s person.  

*Tsafi* and *asiri* certainly figure in people’s talk about authority; they are recognised as part of the paraphernalia that an ordinary *mai gida* may keep in his room - often items inherited from the ancestors and not necessarily fully understood by their current custodian. Such items (for example, the *dirki*) were famous for being destroyed in several Hausa palaces in the 1790s as part of the pre-jihad reforms; their destruction was seen as having weakened the *sarauta* and the Birni’s defendability, and having thereby facilitated the later Fulbe conquest. Items might be buried in the walls of the Birni or built into the foundations of a palace, in such a way that they could never be found and removed. Or they were kept in a room so unremarkable that no stranger would notice it. Again, I personally do not wish to subscribe to the actual efficacy of such items in securing power and endowing a *mai sarauta* or a *mai gida* with special authority; but I do accept that their presence is widely known and recognised as efficacious, and this recognition can reinforce both popular acceptance of an individual’s authority and that individual’s own confidence in his invulnerability. But it is striking how in the historical record such “material” sources of authority simply do not work automatically: the Caliph or the Emir - let alone a *mai gida* - has to be a person who has “earned” that extra spiritual authority by specific personal attributes.

Lastly, one could argue that such authority is really just an attribute of an office, of a specific and rather special *sarauta*, and has little or nothing to do with the incumbent’s own personality. Again, I think the historical record shows us individual office-holders who simply did not have the great authority that some others achieved. Undoubtedly, an office such as Emir or Sultan imposes on the newly appointed individual a certain style and
manner. The palace slaves train him in that manner, and insist upon it. The holder is indeed gradually transformed by the office and people’s requirements of him, to such an extent that the standard epithets found in traditional “lives of the rulers” became, I think, ultimately true of each holder - appointees were in some degree moulded by the demands of office, with greater or less success. The longer the reign the more substantial the moulding process. I suspect that king-making councils recognised this: by appointing as Emir one of the younger candidates in whom they could see the potential for becoming a ‘great’ ruler, they ensured that in time the Emirate would have at its centre a man of great authority - and this was deemed necessary for the well-being of the system as a whole.\textsuperscript{17} Great authority held over time brings a deep stability to the community. If this is so, then competition for high office in Hausaland is not governed purely by politics and considerations of self-aggrandisement: an individual’s potential for great authority, as recognised by the electing councillors, may be another factor we need to include in our retrospective analyses.

I have been discussing the Shehu’s authority here because it is, I believe, the archetypal authority that both his successors as Amir al-mu’minin and his flag-bearers, such as the Emirs in Kano and elsewhere, are imbued with. But in the historical record such authority did not come automatically by inheritance or appointment. As I have said, the Shehu’s son, Muhammad Bello, had to struggle against rivals and rebels as soon as the Shehu died. By the time of his own illness and death in the mid-1830s, Bello may well have acquired the necessary authority, though his contemporaries, al-hajj ‘Umar al-Futi and his Borno rival Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi, were not at all in awe of him; ‘Umar al-Futi thought Bello was old-fashioned and his state in ruins (he married Bello’s daughter, though), while al-Kanemi challenged Sokoto’s very legitimacy.\textsuperscript{18} Nonetheless it seems in the history of the Sokoto caliphate that a long reign plus old age can bestow an authority that is never associated either with just a short reign or with mere old age. The deep public respect that bestows an aura of authority requires other characteristics: a certain simplicity (as distinct from wealth and finery), a modesty in comportment and voice that requires reticence, almost seclusion, yet also a readiness both to listen to individuals of all ranks when
they come to him (usually very early in the morning) and to give wise advice and perhaps even help through his network of contacts. Great learning is not a pre-requisite of authority, but rather a piety that demonstrates that even an Amir al-mu’minin is but a slave of Allah. It was interesting, in the early 1960s, how people could make a joke about the Sardauna and there would be laughter, but not about the Sultan - there was no hint of even a smile, let alone a laugh; the Sardauna may by the end of his life have attained something of the authority that the Sultan had. The Sardauna had power, of course, but that wasn’t enough. It’s almost as if the special authority, which a man like Sultan Abubakar had, had to be without power. It radiated a sense of ‘well-being’, not obedience or fear that power conveys.

A comparable quality in the British system might be ‘majesty’. The Queen’s ‘majesty’ has increased (at least until recently) as the actual power of the sovereign has decreased. In the early 20th century (let alone the 18th century), the monarch was never the object of veneration in a way the present Queen became for many of her subjects; interestingly, her family’s misbehaviour has diminished her majesty, which suggests that the ‘aura’ surrounding authority is vulnerable. I think that the Shehu’s authority may similarly have been damaged by the way the jihad was hijacked by the military (hence ‘Abdullahi dan Fodio’s disgust at his fellow mujahidun in 1805-6; but consider too the trouble Sokoto had in disciplining its amir al-jaish, ‘Ali Jedo). The stories that were circulating in the 1820s about the Shehu’s nervous breakdown ca. 1815-6 and about his remorse for being responsible for ‘his’ Muslims killing so many other Muslims suggest that his authority was no longer what it was; some people at least were no longer so in awe of him - he was ‘mad’. I am not sure what the label ‘mad’ might mean in the context of the 1820s. It is possible the story was put about by north Africans who had been attracted to Sokoto by their expectation of reward but were disappointed; it may have been cynical gossip among themselves, to belittle the Shehu and the achievements, and this gossip was passed on to Clapperton. We do not know. But the Shehu’s madness was not ordinary: he was “religiously mad” - his anxieties were focused on hell and on his possible past wrongdoings. To me and perhaps to others, these concerns prove his ultimate greatness: the leader of an
extraordinarily successful jihad, he could still question his actions, he could still have remorse for the deaths of ordinary people he didn’t know. He had the quality of tausayi, a quality that I think people deeply respect in the powerful (in recent times Malam Aminu Kano, among others, was noted for it).

My conclusions for this section of the essay can be summarised thus:

1. that there is within the political cultures of Hausaland, a recognition that some individuals have acquired an authority that is superior to ‘power’ and does not in itself depend upon coercive force; indeed it inhibits displays of violence.
2. this authority is a compound of many attributes but at an everyday level, it can be found in the ideals surrounding the traditional role of the elderly mai gida; it is built up over time - since time ‘proves’ the truth behind a person’s character.
3. after the jihad, the tiny ruling elite were able to use the unique authority of the Shehu, so long as he was alive, to maintain the acquiescence of a huge population of newly made captives and slaves, effectively to ‘disarm’ the opposition.
4. once the Shehu had died, his successors - ‘Abdullahi dan Fodio, Muhammad Bello - had no such authority at first; Muhammad Bello was forced to use often extreme military methods to sustain the new government’s control of the Sokoto area, whereas ‘Abdullahi, an older man, retired into being a scholar and a dattijo, rather than return to being an active commander of troops. So there were basically two models for great authority: one was based upon the Shehu and his essentially non-violent spirituality; the other, a very different model, sought to imitate the political career of Muhammad Bello. Improbable though it may seem to political science, the Shehu’s authority was in practice efficacious in a way Muhammad Bello’s was not. It remains the ‘gold standard’ by which to assess this particular political (and social) phenomenon within Hausaland.
5. the basic ingredient in great authority can be summed up in the term ‘knowledge’ - esoteric knowledge above all, knowledge in the deepest sense. It involves access to ‘knowledges’ that no others have, whether from the ancestors or from Allah direct or from His servants; it takes time to be given it, and hence elders tend to have it. And this ‘knowledge’ is superior to force; force is what youth has, and they use it because they lack ‘knowledge’. But when ‘knowledge’ sanctions force, it can transform the political landscape - as the Shehu did two hundred years ago.

B. The Power of Youth: The Challenge Posed to Authority by New Knowledges

A question commonly discussed in northern Nigeria today is why great authority is now so rare, why the public do not grant that level of respect - or, in practical terms, why a community’s elders are rarely held in such awe that they can cool a dispute, let alone “tame” a potentially violent crowd. In the second half of this essay I wish to argue that this is not such a new phenomenon. Indeed the displacement of elders from their positions of power by a new generation of young men has occurred in quite distinct contexts in the past.

My hypothesis is that whenever new knowledge and/or a new technology have become available in Hausaland, the young have seized upon it and used it to transform their world; through the new knowledge they have taken over power, and side-lined their elders. What is particularly interesting is that in the past the newly empowered young have been able to retain their control of the new knowledge over time, and have grown old in power. Today it is not clear that the newly powerful young will be able to retain their power; instead they will be ousted in their turn by further cohorts of young seeking power - in which case the community will not experience the same stability ensured by the way earlier generations of powerful young retained their power into old age (and hence achieved the great authority the community respects).

Let me briefly mention here a further dimension to the relationship between elders and youth. In the past, the young were sent out from the core to man the margins. The core - the great
cities of Sokoto, Katsina, Kano and Zaria and their hinterlands - was the site where the jihadi ideals and scholarship were maintained collectively by the elders, while the margins - the ribats and the frontier emirates - were where the militarily active young could develop their careers and expend their energies in accumulating wealth. Some, once they were more senior, would return to the core in their turn and take over the positions of authority. Just as young men build their rooms on the edge of their fathers’ compounds or the young settle in the suburbs outside the birni, so too youth occupied the caliphate’s borders. By contrast, in recent decades, however, it has been the quarters where the urban young live that have tended to dictate the ethos of the newly expanded metropolises. The ‘circulation’ of young men, out from the centre to the periphery and then back again in old age, has not entirely ceased; but more commonly now it is young men from the peripheries who head for the cities and stay there. One important factor underlying these changes, I suggest, is the nature of the new knowledges that have come available to the young.

I will therefore look briefly at four occasions when new knowledge has entered Hausaland, with the concomitant political changes marked by youth’s coming into power. The first is ca 1800 and the jihad of the Shehu; the second is ca. 1900 with the arrival of the Nasara or British colonial over-rule; the third is the period of politics (zamanin siyasa) in the 1950s when political parties were created, followed from the late 1960s on by military regimes; the fourth is 1990s when oil-revenues enabled the young elected officials on the new LGA councils to alter the patterns of power.

I. The Shehu’s Jihad

The ‘new knowledge’ here is the reformist Islamic zeal, organised into the ‘new’ form of a mass sufi brotherhood (the Qadiriyya), with its greater attention to knowledge of Arabic and the texts, and offering justice to all in the form of Shari’a law. The Shehu preached to the young and initiated them into these modern ways: he attracted more sons than fathers. His ideas were taken up by the young first in Zamfara and then all over Hausaland, and in issuing their own radical call to Islam, the young side-lined the Muslim Hausa establishment - both masu sarauta and malamai - that ruled such great cities like Alkalawa, Birnin Kebbi, Birnin Katsina,
Birnin Kano, Birnin Zazzau, even though factions within the old elite were already trying to reform themselves. In some sense, the young Muslim radicals were seeking to modernise Muslim Hausaland, bring it up to date and into line with developments elsewhere in the Islamic world, most notably in the Middle East. They sought to erase the traditional ‘Habe’ (or ‘Sudani’) sources of power and the ‘false’ knowledge on which it was based.

Although the Shehu was quite old in 1805 (he was 50), it is striking how young were the new leaders of Hausaland. For example, in 1805 at the start of the jihad, the following were aged ca. 25:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Emirate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Bello</td>
<td>Sokoto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umar Dallaji</td>
<td>Katsina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Dabo</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakubu</td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buba Yero</td>
<td>Gombe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambo</td>
<td>Hadejia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dan Kawa</td>
<td>Katagum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adama</td>
<td>Yola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi</td>
<td>(Borno)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The extreme youth of the military commanders appointed for the various emirates is in contrast to the few elderly appointees whose ages we know. Of those who were ca. 40 years old in 1805, there were M. Sulaiman in Kano and M. Musa in Zaria, two senior figures whose role as relative elders was, I think, to mediate between competing factions among the local mujahidun. It is interesting how older appointees or reforming scholars were marginalised (or chose to opt out): men like ‘Abdullahi in Gwandu and Shaikh ‘Abd al-Salam in Kware are well-known examples, but less obvious were Shaikh ‘Abd al-Rahman Chacha in Nupe or the poet Mamman Tukur in Zamfara, or indeed any of the Shehu’s kin in Kwonni.

But it was not just politics that changed. Sufi practices, like dhikr or the practice of khalwa, enabled large numbers of young men to attain religious experience that was in itself empowering. Sufism was no longer just for a religious elite. And when dhikr and other teaching were done in a da’ira, it inculcated into groups of young men a sense of solidarity that they had rarely experienced.
before; furthermore, since *almajirai* were coming to the Shehu from far-away places, students as a body gained a wide network of friendships. Acting in the name of Allah, they were imbued with an authority that, in their eyes at least, out-ranked any authority the *hakimai* or the *jarumai* of the Muslim Hausa states could claim.

The Shehu’s community at Degel, however, also attracted young men who were not perhaps as obedient as the Shehu may have wanted. For example, in the *jihad* in Sokoto, the fighting was sparked off by young hotheads or ‘hooligans’ (*sufaha’, in a contemporary’s phrase) living at Degel; they attacked a passing column of government troops to rescue some fellow Muslim prisoners.21 Similarly, in Kano it was Fulbe looters who killed an old ba-Maguje defending his property and thereby issued the ultimate challenge to the authority of Sarkin Kano. As the war developed and the Muslim students (keen but poorly trained soldiers that they were) found martyrdom, the *jihad* army came to be dominated by the young military-minded Fulani on whom it was hard to enforce the original ideals and discipline of Islamic *jihad*. They had a will of their own: on at least one occasion, when stopped from taking the booty of war when on campaign, they threatened the life of their own Muslim commander, the Shehu’s own son Muhammad Bello.

In short, the jihad was effectively a youth movement, in which the youth’s Islamic knowledge (sufism, concern for the Shari’a and a better command of written Arabic) superseded the knowledge of their old-style Shaikhs who preached in the vernacular, served at royal courts and carried out ritual services in the traditional manner. Before these youths the whole edifice of Hausa political authority quickly crumbled as a result.

II. The new Native Authorities and Colonial Bureaucracy

The second episode when items of new knowledge seriously ‘trumped’ the old occurred a century after the jihad. The introduction of wholly new technologies was set in motion by the conquest, a century ago this year, of the northern emirates by the British-led forces. De facto, the British officers deposed most of the elderly (or not so elderly) emirs that remained (some emirs emigrated eastwards rather than remain under Christian over-rule), and appointed younger men in their places.22 British colonialism
was effectively a government by the young: not only were the British officials themselves young men but the ‘native administrations’ they set up were staffed by young men. Distaste for serving under Christians led many senior emirate officials to retire or else to act as simply nominal heads of a bureaucratic department.

The change in regime, however much a notional ‘colonial caliphate’ may have sustained the image of continuity, required very different ways of administration: offices and office-hours, careful book-keeping, the beginnings of a formal bureaucracy. It involved new styles of doing justice, within the framework of a modified Shari’a law. It involved writing Hausa not in Arabic but roman script, using ‘Arabic’ numerals (and not the numerals Arabs use) and new methods of mathematics. And there were new modes of transport, new notions of space and time.

Initially much of the British side of the administration was run by English-speaking Christian clerks from southern Nigeria, whereas the ‘Native Authority’ side required young Hausa men to learn the new skills and everyday methods. It was an enormous transformation from the manners of the pre-colonial palace administration with its Arabic correspondence, its slaves and servants and its more personalised fiscal administration. The new training opened up, in addition, huge fields of new knowledge ... world geography and history, astronomy, the sciences - of medicine, agriculture, botany, zoology. It was ‘mind-blowing’ for some, who read and talked to teachers and discussed with fellow students. In short, the new world was a young man’s world. Alongside it was another world, of increased interest in sufism and brotherhoods (the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya mainly), and an extension of Qur’anic (primary) education to groups of children and categories (such as ex-slaves) who’d not had access to it before.

Finally, there were the new careers for the former military class - the young princes, the royal slaves and the various retainers who in the past had been used to raiding and training for war on the frontier. With their type of war now banned (and the new army not recruited from the old warrior class), the young princes were put into local administration, as district and village heads now posted out to the areas they administered: they resided in the
countryside, not in the capital any more. There they had new work to do: collecting tax, measuring land, maintaining peace (there was brigandage, and the roads were not always safe for traders). This thus followed the old pattern of sending the young out to the margins, this time not to raid local peoples but to administer them.

Effectively, then, early colonial rule empowered the young, giving them both new authority and new knowledge, and disempowered the old except insofar as the old still carried the morality and integrity of the once independent Islamic state. I do not mean to suggest that the newly powerful young did not behave as good Muslims; rather, their faith was so integral to their identity that they could safely engage with the new ideas. Very few converted to Christianity (a few in Zaria did so where there was a mission; elsewhere in the Muslim north the missions were banned).

The stability of the colonial regime over fifty years meant that this cadre of youth grew old in their jobs, and in time recreated a kind of gerontocracy. The Native Authorities recruited the young, of course, and trained them, but seniority was re-affirmed along with the hierarchy of emirs, title-holders and councillors. It was this colonial gerontocracy that a new cohort of the young challenged, not in the name of youth-power but anticolonialism.

III. The Rise of Political Parties in the 1950s
Yet another new item of ‘knowledge’ - in this case, a new way of doing politics - was marked by the young’s rebellion against these NA-based elders, in the late 1940s and 1950s.\(^{23}\) In the political parties, formed to unite progressives demanding independence from Britain, were the new young, the school-teachers and others with ‘modern’ education. The young’s opportunity came with the world-wide movement against colonial regimes - but first they had to topple the powerful Native Authority system which had been in control for some fifty years. Leaders of these political parties were not necessarily so young in years but they had to behave with some of the stridency of the young, talking over-much at public rallies and making jokes in a way no elder would. Politics was a young man’s occupation, a trade that brought an income (and travel); it involved telling lies, it might often involve violence. It is this identification of politics with youth - and the low status it has in many people’s eyes - that has remained until today. Once again,
forty years on, there are old men at the top of the system - as president, ministers, senators - but the behaviour of most of them isn’t really that of an elder, not least in their pursuit of worldly wealth and their display of affluence.

The new young of the 1950s came from a milieu different from those of the early colonial period. In the 1950s they were also from provincial, even rural backgrounds that had been able to use the widening school system to escape the limits of their background. Furthermore, they tended to know English and functioned politically on a wider plane, responding to trends globally as well as to trends (and tensions) within Nigeria as a whole; theirs was a world of radios and newspapers, and relatively easy travel within the country. Numerically, they formed a much larger cadre, with its factions and alliances. Not only was the scale new; so too were the actual processes of debate and angry argumentation.

Most importantly perhaps theirs was a world where freedom, national independence beckoned. Whereas the young of 1910 had a colonially shaped career ahead of them, the young of 1950 could expect to control their own destinies and that of their region or country; and that destiny included such new ideas as ‘democracy’ and ‘modernity’ as against the old, stable authoritarianism of their elders’ regime. The element of excitement and drive (as well as the thrill of political risk-taking) is evident in the writings of the time. They thus challenged the wisdom and the traditional authority of their elders, and in the politics of self-government and independence sought to side-line the Emirs and the Sultan (the deposition of Sarkin Kano Sanusi was one such trial of strength). The latter’s powers became more ceremonial than actual; they were symbols of stability in a society that had become politically divided and was experiencing local violence as rarely before. But I think it was clear that ‘the young’, alias the new class of politicians, were the winners; force became an effective tool even in areas where previously the Emirs’ authority had maintained a pax.

The process was carried further by the advent of military regimes. Military men are by definition ‘youths’ in style if not always in age; even Generals, particularly Generals actively in power, are not elders. Nonetheless, in establishing military offices
in the new states, they took over such honorific elders’ titles as “mai martaba” which in the past had occasionally been used for Emirs; Emirs were now just “mai girma”. In the contest for primacy, successive military regimes have downgraded senior Emirs by upgrading previously subordinate emirs and thereby reducing the territory of each. By earlier abolishing the Native Authorities, the military regime had already removed the structures that had underwritten the Emir’s authority locally. The official belittling of emirs proved easy to implement. It is as if it was deliberate government policy to systematically reduce Emiral authority in order to eliminate any rival focus of popular respect. Clearly the military are proponents of a ‘new knowledge’ of their own: like the Shehu’s Qadiriyya or the British NA bureaucracy, the army constitutes a distinct style of organisation but in addition it has an expertise with weaponry and tactics that is a technology quite alien to ordinary civilians; it is different even from the old style of “force” that was associated with youth in the past.

In this third tranche of new knowledges, then, Hausaland experienced two new systems of generating power: first, the political party, then the politicised military. Both empowered the young vis à vis existing authorities, and enabled them to side-line their seniors. In both cases, however, their power was short-lived: the party-politicians were pushed aside in 1966 before they could grow old in power and establish a stable regime; the military regimes have similarly been forced to give way to civilians before they were able to consolidate power for the long term. Neither politician (with the possible exception of the Sardauna) nor General has ever achieved the great authority or deep popular respect that a Sultan or an Emir once were in a position to achieve. Neither the circumstances - a long reign, a moulding palace culture, for example - nor the special personal attributes were present as foundations on which they might have built their authority. They had power but never that rare “majesty”, however hard the protocol officers tried to construct it for them.

**IV. Wealth and Briefly Powerful Young**

Recently the most remarkable consequence of this identification of modern politics with the young has been the election of the chairmen for the Local Government Areas. These LGAs had a
huge monthly income, direct from the oil account of central government, and with it considerable power. Yet it was mostly young men in their twenties, some unmarried and with at most some secondary education, who took control and were in a position to order around their social seniors, the emir or district head in their locality. Some such senior men were deliberately humiliated in public. Elsewhere in Nigeria the LGA posts were won by middle-aged men, often leaders within their communities; but in the far north it was wholly different. The image of a ‘feudal’ north could scarcely have been further from the truth. Elections as a process are archetypically ‘young’ in style and in operation; for an older man to contest against youth would itself be demeaning, whilst the abuse and lies he would be subjected to would be humiliating. Better to support a youth as his ‘front’ man. But where, in one case I know, that has happened, the winning youth has turned his back on his patron and taken all the money, month upon month, to share it out among some of his young mates for their personal spending.

The ‘new knowledge’ associated with this new breed of young men is, I suggest, their skill in accessing the oil-based revenue that flows in and out of the federal government in Abuja. They need the right networks to get themselves chosen to represent their party in their LGA; they need to ensure their party wins, in one way or another, the elections that legitimate their positions on the LGA council. What is also new is their actual wealth and the uses they can put it to. For the first time, it is money rather than people that can be deployed; electioneering can be very expensive, and hence is ultimately more about cash than policies or changing the views of people who will vote. After an election, parties now cease to matter as much; the new skills free up the individual young man to develop his own political or commercial career within coalitions of like-minded political ‘entrepreneurs’ that cut across local allegiances. I admit I do not understand all the new skills required in contemporary politics, but I have heard enough from participants in today’s political processes to see it as ‘new knowledge’. Furthermore, it seems too that none of today’s LGA chairmen in northern Nigeria will grow old in the job; they will be ousted in their turn by a ‘new breed’ of young men on the make.
I have pinpointed LGA councillors as examples of how new skills have empowered a new generation of young men. But they are, I suspect, symptomatic of a wider change in northern Nigerian politics, in that higher-level offices are held for an equally short length of time and involve a similar concern for personal financial gain: wealth has become enormously important for achieving anything in Nigeria (or indeed abroad), in a way it was not before. So long as there is a single source of great wealth - the oil account - it is unlikely that the current political ethos will change much. In which case no new figures of great authority are likely to arise, thereby making old foci of authority all the more significant. The fact that there are no individuals monopolising ‘authority’ may indeed be beneficial today: it reduces the chances of dictatorship and injustices on a grand scale. Elsewhere in Africa recently we have seen such men ruining the countries they are meant to be governing.

In Conclusion
In this essay I have stressed the significance of knowledge and key skills in shaping political change, and have argued for an understanding of “authority” as a special kind of knowledge, a knowledge that is more often ‘given’ than acquired by learning. Knowledge therefore underw rites the authority of the old, just as new knowledge passes power over to the young. Old and young are usually not so much competing in knowledges as having spheres of competence they can call their own. Yet at certain historical junctures, knowledge systems have been in conflict. In the cases I have described, the new knowledge espoused by the young has won out over the old. But there are other cases when this has not happened: new movements have been defined as rebellions and defeated - one might think mahdism was such a movement; a recent and more extreme example might be the young followers of Maitatsine. I know of other smaller movements that went into seclusion in the deep countryside rather than face outright annihilation - such as the Salihawa or the Digawa.

I have argued too that authority based upon ‘knowledge’ is often a more potent tool for accessing power than force or violence. It is easy, in the context of a historiography dominated by talk of “the jihad”, to focus upon the battles, the troops and their
weaponry, on commanders, martyrs and massacres. And indeed the outcome of battles determines much; bravery matters. But in a culture such as Hausaland’s, where brute force and strength are less honoured than mental skills, it would be perverse not to focus here on ‘ways of knowing’. Persuading someone to think in a certain way is as much an exercise of power as holding a knife to his throat; and if you can also please him with your persuasion, the effect of your power lasts much longer. In short, longer-lasting, effective power lies more in the mind than in the arm. “Authority” - and therefore issues of security too - is largely about winning minds without resort to violence.

It is agreed, I think, that Nigeria today is more a land for the young than it has ever been before. It is no longer a patriarchy, let alone a gerontocracy; the hierarchies of age and social status play less of a role than ever before. In a way, bariki has won out over fada. Even on the farms where sons used to work for their fathers, it seems that fathers (and mothers) work for their children now. Similarly, new largely secular knowledge has edged out the older knowledges. Yan izala have diminished the appeal of yan tariqa; school-learnt ‘science’ has altered the young’s patterns of response to illness. Bori, and even herbal medicines, have yielded to pills and look old-fashioned. Nonetheless I would argue there remains a significant place for the old-style authority associated with an Emir or a mai gida. No longer is this a dominating knowledge that gives orders to all and sundry: it is not an authority on the model of Muhammad Bello’s, but an authority in the manner of the Shehu’s - a point of stillness amidst the maelstrom of life outside, an inner, ‘domestic’ authority. I have seen an elderly mai gida act as the still focal point of a large household; he was seen as providing the ‘power’ that was essential to the well-being of the whole house. He was there to listen, to respond briefly if that was asked of him. There was no display of authority or affluence, no violence or raised voice. On a larger scale, communities, even emirates, need a similar ‘armature’ that in its very centralness, its stability, generates a sustaining energy from the movement all around it. I believe that Hausa political culture has always ensured there are such focal points; they may be inconspicuous, but they are there, and known to those who need them and value them. They are seen as ‘bridges’ not only to the past but to a deeper, timeless security.
Notes
2. Sokoto’s population of 120,000: see Richard Lander, Vol.I, p.260. On Waziri Gidado’s brother, Mudi, see Hugh Clapperton; “2nd journey”, p.245. Clapperton stayed twice in 1826 with Malam Mudi and his 70 slaves on his farm/village on the road from Sokoto to Magaria (where he had yet another house; 2nd journey, p.243).
3. Clapperton (2nd journey) p.171. The discussion was sparked off by the murder, in Birnin Kano, of a Ghadames merchant (by strangling, on a Saturday night in September); apparently it was not the first: “two or three similar cases had occurred before”. Female slaves were suspected. Cf. his first journey (Vol. II, p.407), when an exceedingly rich Tripoli merchant based in Katagum told him that he feared being strangled by female slaves, and always kept each night’s sleeping place secret from them. He implied all the Arabs were similarly fearful and slept with loaded pistols under their pillow. If Arabs habitually took care to sleep in different places each night, did they too sometimes use a tent?
4. I am grateful to Abba Isa Tijjani for discussions on this practice in Borno. Given that this conference will discuss the subject of security, I hope more information on the use of tents, like the use of decoys and substitutes for the Emir, will be offered by participants. Assassination was clearly seen as a threat.
6. Lander, vol. II, p.28. In 1826 this was what visitors were being told: “Kano submitted without a blow” (Clapperton, 2nd Journey, p.204); “with a handful of men the flourishing and important city of Kano was taken and pillaged” (Lander, p.28).
9. See Clapperton, 2nd journey, p.206, for Shehu’s hair being kept in cases of gold and silver (as far as I know, no such cases have survived till today); and p. 210 for his tent “inside of the square enclosure, behind the room he generally occupied when living. It is visited as a holy place by all Mahometan strangers...”. It seems as if Clapperton actually visited the house and so probably saw the tent; he was interested in architecture and described in some detail the urban structures he examined. So I think we
must trust him that there was indeed a tent, and not some other structure that an informant had only mentioned to him. I don’t know of any other reference to the Shehu’s tent, which I take to be a translation for the old Hausa term *laima* (which is itself derived from the Kanuri version of the Arabic *al-khaima* [cf. the Hausa word *labari* from *al-akhbar*]. Tents were of course common among merchants and for commanders on long military expeditions (though Bello on week-long patrols around Sokoto/Wurno/Magaria made use of mat shelters). I am told that *laima* would not be used for, or confused with, a *rumfa* or a *bukka*; in short, that it wasn’t an awning, a porch or some standard kind of pastoralist’s temporary shelter. In Kanuri *laima* is used for the royal umbrella, but in Arabic it is specifically a tent (it is mentioned in the Qur’an). In normal nomad [Tuareg or Arab] usage it is made of woven cloth rather than hides or skins; it’s round and supported on four poles. I do not know of any other references to tents in Sokoto history, but Waziri Gidado’s father, Shaikh Abu Bakr, had the nickname “Sambo Laima”: is it possible that *laima* here refers to his idiosyncratic use of a tent when on, say, a preaching tour?

10. Cf. M. Last, *The Sokoto Caliphate*, p.210. Ironically, mares were actually the horse of choice for stealthy, silent night-raids, as they would not neigh, whereas stallions do. But classically mares are for the non-violent; sometimes a malam would use a (special) donkey.


16. Traditions about *tsafi* and *asiri* are commonplace, but there is contemporary talk too. Gossip, for example, tells of how the Sardauna wore a *bante* that offered him protection, and, aware of this, his assassins chose the middle of the night to kill him. Or when Dasuki became *Sarkin Musulmi* and instructed Berger to re-build Muhammad Bello’s house (which served as the Sultan’s palace), he took care to have all the sub-soil (as well as Bello’s original “study” or *turaka*) removed so that no charms of Bello or subsequent Sultans could remain buried there, if indeed there were any. See also my essay, ‘Charisma and medicine in northern Nigeria’, in D.B.Cruise O’Brien, C.Coulon (eds), *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 176-224. An earlier essay, in 1967, is ‘A Note on attitudes to the supernatural in the Sokoto jihad’, *Journal, Historical Society of Nigeria*, IV.1, pp. 3-13.

17. Recognition of such authority affects non-Muslims too. It is striking how deeply respected by non-Muslim groups are *malamai* who take refuge from Muslim persecution in ‘pagan’ hills. Examples abound, for example of *ansar* of the Mahdiyya in the Mandara mountains of northern Adamawa;
but one might add M.Hamza’s welcome by Ningawa, or indeed the way Maguza support Malams with alms. These scholars are respected as much for their character as for any “powers” they might have: those that I have met (when researching jihadi poetry in Fulfulde in the 1960s) have been very remarkable men, impressive but unpretentious. The authority that such pious scholars have comes not from their ‘office’ but more from their way of life and, I think, their personal attributes which their non-Muslim neighbours recognise and appreciate.

18. I have heard it said that a father, particularly in a family used to holding high office, usually picks up a recently born baby of his and silently scrutinizes it; if he sees the right signs, he then and there decides that this is the baby who will inherit - and that baby is then groomed as his heir, perhaps eating with his father or sharing his father’s mat as he works or reads. Implicit in this account is the assumption that people can pick out, long in advance, the characteristics of future ‘greatness’. It becomes, of course, a self-fulfilling prophecy if the ‘grooming’ is done right.


20. Clapperton, 2nd Journey, p.206; Lander, Vol. II, p.32. Though Lander had access to Clapperton’s journal after Clapperton died in Sokoto (Lander then went back to Britain with his and Clapperton’s journals), they probably shared a common source or sources, or discussed what they had heard. Hence the similarity of wording: Clapperton says: the Shehu “became religiously mad, and is said to have died some years afterwards in that state”. He goes on, some ten lines later: "His madness took a very unhappy turn. In the midst of a paroxysm, he would constantly call out that he should go to hell, for having put so many good Mussulmen to death”. Lander says the Shehu “became religiously mad, and was often seized with paroxysms of remorse” (p.32). Clapperton, who spoke Arabic and spent much time with the north African merchants, emphasises the Shehu’s acknowledged Qur’anic expertise; Lander, who spoke Hausa and was with the servants more, refers to him as “the terrible Danfodiio” and focuses more on the drama. We know that the Shehu was ill for a year or more before he died in 1817; he had been moved from Sifawa to Sokoto ca. 1815.


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Ci Rani, Almajiranci and Security in Kano

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Almajiranci, a Hausa word for the occupation of Almajiri, originated from the Arabic word al-Muhajir, which means one who emigrates. Hijra (emigration) in Islam is very important and one of its meanings is physical emigration from the land of Unbelief or injustice to the land of Islam and justice. The Prophet (SAW) made the Hijra from Makkah to Madina and later liberated Makkah from the unbelievers. Shehu Usman Danfodio made the Hijra from Degel to Gudu, he later waged a Jihad, which liberated most of Hausaland from tyranny and he established a just Caliphate. Almajiri in Hausa language in this paper means someone who leaves his home for another place in search of knowledge. Not all Almajirai (singular Almajiri) engage in bara (begging). The Almajiri of the Qur’anic school are categorized according to their stage of maturity. They are kolo (infant), tittibiri (adolescent) and gardi (adult). Only the kolo and to some extent tittibiri engage in bara but the gardawa (singular gardi) engage in menial jobs and crafts for their livelihood.1

Bara is the most conspicuous practice of Almajirai that Hausa Muslim elites dislike. Many of those who engage in it do so as a result of necessity but some others believe that it is only through hardship and discipline of austerity that Qur’anic knowledge could be acquired hence it was observed that:

Hausa culture presumes that poverty and hardship are a necessary part of character building and appropriate for the young. Just as there is a hungry season in the annual farming cycle, so too the young are expected to go hungry when the work load is at the hardest, the harvest and fatness of middle age, will come in due time, the Work is done well.2

Ci rani is voluntary temporary migration from one’s domain to another for the purpose of petty trading, wage labor or any other occupation during the dry season, which is a long period in the Savannah of West Africa. It has been a long tradition because it helps in saving the meager farm output and also supplements the income of those engaged in it. Part of the income is saved for use during the rainy season. Population increase and land pressure in the colonial period-necessitated Ci rani.3 This migration could be to cities in the Savannah especially Kano or to Kurmi (the forest zones) especially the coastal cities of Lagos and Port Harcourt in the colonial and post-colonial period.4

Qur’anic teachers (Mallamai singular Mallam) and their pupils engage in migration from their domains to various locations, especially the cities during the dry season. This was done because it was a period when there as no farm labor and the Mallamai move with their Almajirai as an opportunity for the pupils to learn
more during this period. This tradition is declining as a result of the transformations of the post-colonial state.

Although Ci rani is a temporary phenomenon, there are strong indications that it contributed to the expansion of the settlements in the outskirts of Kano. Some of these settlements for example Mariri have many Qur’anic teachers who settled with their pupils. Qur’anic teachers are famous for establishing settlements for their studies known in Hausa as Tsangaya. Another good example of a settlement that grew from the activity of migrant Qur’anic teachers is Rimin Kebe, which has become one of the most densely populated settlements in Kano metropolitan. Migration has been an important factor in the formation of states in Hausaland. In contemporary period it is an important factor that contributed to over stretching of facilities in urban Kano.

The traditional institution (sarauta) or chieftaincy because of its administrative and religious roles is closely related to the Mallam class. Which includes Qur’anic teachers and the more advanced Ulama (Islamic Scholars). Both the colonial and post-colonial states have depended on the traditional institution (sarauta) as one of its organ for the control of the society. One of the reasons is that the traditional leaders are still the closest to the people and this has implications for the security of the state. Especially because the greatest threats to its security are from ethnic and religious challenges. In Muslim parts of Nigeria the greatest challenge has been from the religious institutions. The state always regarded the Almajirai as potential recruits for any violent challenge and this is partially true because of the Maitatsine challenge that ravaged Kano during the second republic. Some of the traditional elites have argued that it was the deterioration of traditional authority that brought that violent upheaval because Maitatsine was earlier deported by Sarkin Kano Sanusi who had full authority. In any case the traditional institution has always demonstrated its influence whenever there as any crisis by its call for sanity, which is always respected by the society. This paper examines the transformation of the institution of Almajiranci and the persistence of bara (begging) and suggests an Islamic strategic for social mobilization towards socio-economic development because begging is a socio-economic predicament linked to Islam by the society.

Almajiranci and Islamic Education
Schools under the Islamic education’ system could be graded into elementary, which is the Qur’anic School, and advanced which is the Ilmi School. The person’s ability determines his progress. Many in this part of the Muslim world do not memorize the Qur’an before they proceed from the Qur’anic School to the Ilmi School, but classical Islamic Scholars, like Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taimiyyah do not consider someone an Alim (Islamic Scholar) if he does not memorize the Qur’an.

In Hausa land long before the Jihad of Shehu Usman Danfodio the Qur’anic School (Makarantar Allo) was established and it has
been reported that it was Sarkin Kano Muhammadu Rumfa who initiated the formalization of the Syllabus, which included the literary technology in Arabic script that became known as Ajami. It was during this period that alphabets were given Hausa names. And since then they have remained in use in Qur’anic Schools that use the Warsh recitation of the Qur’an, which is now gradually been replaced with the easier Hafs recitation. The wooden slate (allo) from which the school got its name is used in many other parts of the Central and Western Sudan including Mauritania.

The Almajirai or pupils of Qur’anic School could be categorized into those who depend on alms for their feeding and those who do not. Those who depend on alms for their feeding are also in two categorizes. Those who live permanently and those who migrate to locations during the dry season (Ci rani). Many people in Kano still send their wards to Qur’anic Schools after primary school hours and during the weekend and these are the majority. They also supplement this school with the modern Islamiyya School that uses some of the modern techniques of classroom grading system. There are now many Islamiyya Schools in the Metropolitan Local Government Areas and many of them are enjoying the patronage of His Highness the Emir of Kano.

All the outstanding Islamic scholars of pre-colonial and 20th century northern Nigeria were products of Qur’anic Schools from where they proceeded to Ilmi Schools. The pattern of schools was common in the West and Central Sudan since the period of the Timbuktu pre-eminence. Students proceeded to various stages of learning depending on their individual ability. The Qur’anic School has remained the last instrument of socialization in urban Muslim communities. It is an important institution for Islamic social cohesion especially in multi-ethnic urban settlements such as Tudun Wada in the Kano metropolitan area. It has been noted that: “Whatever formal knowledge is imparted the social experience of Koranic schooling creates the urban Muslim identity which integrates the children into the wider Muslim community and inculcates in them at an early age an Islamic worldview”. This and the fact that the United States' broad interest in Nigerian education might have informed the decision of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to participate in Qur’anic education in order to influence Muslim thinking at an early age but the Qur’anic teachers and the Muslim society have remained cautious of US actions, largely because of increasing awareness of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in which the current US policy makers intend to dominate the world.

After completing the Qur’an the elementary text of fiqh (jurisprudence) such as Qawa’id, Mukhtasar of al-Akhdari, Muqadimat al-Izziya and al-Risalah of Ibn Abi Zaid are studied. In the area of Arabic language and grammar al-Burda, al-Ishiriniyat of Alfazazi and Ajurimiya are studied. The intermediary stage involves the study of advanced text of jurisprudence such as Mukhtasar of Sidi Khalil, advanced texts of Arabic language and
grammar such as *Shuara, Muqamat* of Hariri and *Alfiyat* of Ibn Malik. The advanced stage involves the study of rhetoric, etymology, *Usul al-Fiqh* and *Alfiayat Ural* is one of the commonly studied books written by Shehu Abdullahi Danfodio. Other texts are also studied and the Tafsir lessons are held during Ramadan and in other specialized schools like that of Shaykh Yusuf Makwarari who held Tafsir lessons for over fifty years every working day in the mornings. Many of the prominent scholars traveled to different locations to acquire proficiency in various disciplines. Some scholars have argued that many of these prominent scholars did not undergo the process of *Almajiranci* that involved begging for food at the junior stage. But there are indeed narrations of the stages of hardship that the outstanding scholars went through.  

This system of study has remained in the non-formal schools that still produce Islamic scholars commonly known as *Makarantun Zaure*. But the Mashriq (Oriental) style is becoming popular with those who studied in Saudi Arabia now delivering various lessons of Hadith and Tafsir (Exegesis of the Qur’an) to large group of students in their various Mosques. Some of them were *Almajirai* before they proceeded to Saudi Arabia for higher studies. They have received extensive patronage from their wealthy students who popularized their lectures in the mass media. Many former *Almajirai* acquired Islamic education by proceeding from the *makarantar allo* to one of the formal Islamic schools the earliest was the Kano Judicial School that was established in 1927 by Sarkin Kano Abdullahi with Mallam Sulaiman who later became *Walim Kano* as the first headmaster. This school was followed by the Law School that later became known as School for Arabic Studies (SAS). Many who came to Kano as *Almajirai* and were even engaged in barn (begging) found access to formal education through these schools some of them have even acquired higher degrees as a result of this opportunity. The government later established other schools that provide similar opportunities. Apart from university education the less proficient students have another opportunity for a diploma at the state polytechnic. Some have also been lucky enough to gain admission in Arab countries.

There are arguments that the formal schools have not been of any advantage to the society, and that they are mere agents of modernization and erosion of Islam. Some of the points given against them are correct especially when the colonial authorities hijacked the schools and used them for the purpose of producing those who perpetuate the colonial culture and for undermining the Shari’ah. Many of the pupils lost their self-confidence because of the training they received in one of such schools, where they were always taught to look down upon their heritage. But there were some students who remained committed to Islam. The British were aware that even religious schools in a secular educational system could be used effectively in propagating a particular interpretation of religion. The products of such schools were expected in this case to propagate the ideas of modern rationalists
such as Syed Jamuldeen Afghani and his student Shaykh Muhammad Abduh, who became Rector of al-Azhar University.

Some scholars and commentators have argued that proficiency in Islamic disciplines will disappear if formal schools are allowed to replace the non-formal Islamic schools the Makarantun Allo (Qur'anic Schools) and Makarantun Zaure or Makarantun Ilmi (Advanced non-formal Islamic schools). Others are of the firm view that the schools must be reformed because “they are obsolete and at variance with the nation’s socio-economic and political realities”.\(^{22}\) One of the major reasons for the argument that Islamic education would be at loss with the phasing out of Qur’anic schools is the diminishing number of Arabic literary output\(^ {23}\) in Nigeria since the 1970s with proliferation of the products of the formal schools. But the deterioration of education is not restricted to Islamic Schools. Western schools are also affected more critically. The literary output of the western educated Muslims is far below expectation even in the humanities. One observer noted that a 30 minute search for recent books on Nigerian history in ABU bookshop “will turn up one or two volumes”\(^ {24}\). Therefore the fear by some that Muslims from Nigeria who travel to the Middle East could return and influence the social situation in Nigeria has basis. More especially with the tradition of Islamic revival in this part of the country led by Shehu Usman Danfodio, and in Islamic history few scholars have ever established a polity like the Sokoto Caliphate of Shehu Usman Danfodio.\(^ {25}\)

Many European Muslims are getting more interested in non-formal Islamic education\(^ {26}\) and are indeed surprised that West Africans are allowing the erosion of this system with the importation of the Mashriq (Oriental) style. They believe this will phase out the centuries old Timbuktu tradition that produced great scholars who taught simple religion that brought those profound social transformations instead of scholastic arguments of the Orient that breed unrest and sectarianism. In the contemporary period because of politics the Orient remains the home of militant Islam, which the Europeans cannot accept.

**Almajiranci and the State**

Fredrick Lugard, the colonial governor had estimated that at the beginning of the 20th century “there were about 20000 Islamic primary (Koranic) schools in the north attended by about 250000 pupils”. This led Ozigi and Ocho to suggest that: “Here again, if all this is not education, then one wonders what education is. Those who hold the notion that Islam does not encourage education are sadly ignorant of the facts of history.”\(^ {27}\) The role of the Ulama in mass literacy in northern Nigeria is well documented.\(^ {28}\)

One of the achievements of the founders of the Sokoto Caliphate was their mass literacy effort and the promotion of Hausa language as the lingua franca.\(^ {29}\) They produced poems in Hausa and also encouraged others to do the same and some of their Hausa poems are used by the *Almajirai* and others who engage in *bara* (begging).\(^ {30}\) The students of the Jihad leaders established
chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria

Sarkin Musulm Muhammad Bello appreciated the importance of higher Islamic education hence he established a university center at Silame, which was later destroyed by the French when they were competing with the British and they took away valuable manuscripts. Another outstanding achievement of the leaders of the caliphate was the institution of social welfare system that took care of the needy including the Almajirai. The colonialists wiped out this system and it is one of the major causes of child begging in the northern part of Nigeria. It has been noted that:

Social security is as old as human civilization itself. In the northern part of Nigeria, particularly the areas, which constituted the Sokoto and Borno Caliphates, social, economic and political changes emerged largely as a result of the Sokoto jihad of the nineteenth century. One of such changes is that the state evolved a comprehensive social security system...

There is hardly the time or space to give details of the workings of the system. Two examples will however suffice, in 1820s, a British traveler, Hugh Clapperton, found that in Kano, blind men were accommodated in special quarters and maintained by the emirate government. Resident, J. A. Bourdon, found the “poor rate” system fully operational in Sokoto Emirate. He was amazed to find that it was not limited to destitutes but was extended even to students who were prevented by the exigencies of studies from pursuing economic activities to maintain themselves. (This is the origin of the Almajiri system which degenerated into begging in the streets, for reasons which will be examined shortly)

Despite the protests from Emirates authorities, the British went ahead and dismantled the system, with the result that the attendant social dislocation gave rise to a multitude of social problems; notably begging in the streets, a malady with which modern state and local governments in the emirates and elsewhere are struggling to grapple without any lasting solution.

The British were in need of manpower to run modern government and obviously they had to depend on the educational system to produce the qualified personnel. Elementary and vocational schools were set up but they were not enough therefore the missionary schools supplemented. They were cautious in encouraging missionary activities in Muslim areas and Muslims were also skeptical of the missionaries who were determined to convert Muslims to Christianity at all cost including force as advocated by Dr. Miller and Bishop Tugwell. Gbadamosi graphically explained the Muslim understanding of the missionary education:

It is clear that the opposition of Northern Muslims to the new concept was not peevish; it was born out of a realization that missionaries with their Christian education were unnecessary. What, indeed, is the need for them when the society had its law, ethics, and administration derived from Islam—a world view which was held by its adherents as superior to any other? The Emirs were frankly suspicious. They could see no necessity for the new education which to old ways of life was not only unnecessary but, in their view, dangerous”. It will be seen later
The educational system of the British was not only designed to meet the manpower needs of the colonial state as well as to prolong their rule but also as a tool of cultural transformation of the society from an independent Muslim society to a society subservient to the British. As a result of this policy the students of the colonial high school who were not given Islamic education beyond rituals. They turned out to be holiest, respectful and hardworking. “But, certainly, they were not prepared to be intellectually inclined. They trusted the ‘British and were friendly with them for they depended on them even on matters that affected the Sharia.” That is consequence of secular education introduced by the colonialists and their sympathizers to the Muslim world. It has remained the most powerful tool of undermining of Islamic ideals of Muslim societies. Sweetner observed that: “the most effective way of destroying the Muslim mind and character is through secular education.”

At first, products of traditional Islamic education could reach the peak in Native Authority administrative structure, but later they could only be district head or Alkali (Area court judge) and not permanent secretary, a position that could be occupied by a grade II certificate holder. Gradually only the products of Western secular education could get a dignified employment. Nigerian Muslims were thus faced with the challenge of accepting this system, maintaining the previous system that produced great scholars or integrating both. The Almajirai were part of the previous system and their appalling material condition was also a major source of concern for the northern Muslim elites who were constantly rebuked for neglecting their less privileged. Some of the parents of the Almajirai are simply scared of the dangers of Western secular education that has not brought peace and social harmony in Nigeria. The Almajiri system therefore remained despite all the obstacles and the begging associated with it persisted but largely because of the socio-economic status of the pupils.

Since the first republic northern political elites have remained concerned about begging by the Almajirai, and several committees were instituted to find lasting solutions to this problem, but there has been little or no success. One of the reasons is that the state that was created by the colonialists was not natural and the process of integration of the state and society is still not complete. While the society still cherishes the values of Islamic education as a lifelong process the state considers education as a process of producing manpower needs for economic reasons but even in this respect the post-colonial state has not been efficient. The introduction of the structural adjustment plan further marginalized the poor and denied their wards education. Therefore it has been rightly observed that Muslims cannot afford to place the destiny of their educational system at the mercy of the inefficient state’s “shaky foundation.”
There are brilliant analyses of the failure of the previous attempts at eradicating *bara* and integrating Qur’anic Schools with the formal western education. The Islamiyya schools are also gradually becoming more popular than the *Makarantun Allo* (Qur’anic schools) especially in the urban areas where many parents want their wards to have both Islamic and Western education and the Islamiyya schools are designed along formal modern schools. The graduates of the Islamiyya schools who do not attend any other formal primary school are easily absorbed into the formal system through the many Islamic secondary schools. The College of Qur’anic Studies near the famous School for Arabic Studies is also another attempt at absorbing products of Qur’anic schools many of whom were *Almajirai* who have memorized the Qur’an. The Kano State government directed the local government councils to establish model Qur’anic Schools as recommended by the committee on *Almajirai* such schools were built but they were never taken care of. And during one of the military administrations the social policy accepted by previous administrations was abandoned. But the most important reason for the persistence of begging by *Almajirai* and destitute is the failure of the government’s economic programs, which result in widespread poverty. In Gurjiya, a village in Minjibir Local Government Area, there was no well for water at the primary and junior secondary schools, and the pupils had to fetch water from the house of a leper who travels to Lagos for begging where he earned money and constructed his well. Persistent pressure compelled the authorities to dig a well at the premises. As part of the government’s misplaced priority only N80000 was provided as credit for agriculture while N25million was spent in electrification. Without improvement in agriculture poverty will remain and the children and disabled of such villages will have no option but to beg in cities.

**Almajirai and Security**

The Savannah area in which northern Nigeria is located has been an area of intense competition in the early period of African history, and people were always forced to migrate for refuge in the forest areas. Stronger groups resided in the Savannah and this led to earlier formation of states in the zone. This tradition of migration and settlement in other parts for commercial reasons remained even in the 19th century leading to the formation of various Hausa communities in other areas of West Africa. Others continued seasonal migrations for economic reasons but they always returned to their domains during the rainy season to work on farms. The *Almajirai* of Qur’anic schools as noted earlier engage in these seasonal migrations. Other categories of Islamic scholars were also engaged in these migrations and travels to learn from great scholars in other locations. Many of the 20th century scholars of Kano traveled to other cities to learn. Shaykh Umar Falke and Imam Umaru are good examples of scholars who were involved in travels and scholarship. Umar Falke was both a
40th Anniversary of the Emirship of HRH Alh. (Dr). Ado Bayero

merchant and a scholar. Imam Umar was engaged in trading and learning until he finally settled in Kete Krachi where he lived and died. The movement of the Almajirai has been the great source of concern for the authorities because of security implications.

The Qur’anic teachers migrate with their pupils to the cite during the dry season where they continue with their studies. The teachers and senior pupils engage in crafts and other menial jobs while the younger ones go out and beg. Most of these scholars have permanent residences in Kano City. For example there are some in Yola quarters and they permanently reside in the house of the late Sarkin Shanu Alhaji Mansur and they were taken care of by a philanthropist in the quarters. Similarly at Tudun Wazirici the late philanthropist Alhaji Musa Maibuhu took care of many Qur’anic pupils and they never begged while he was alive, but after his death they had no other option apart from begging. The number of Almajirai coming for Cirani in Kano city at least in the Municipal Local Government area has drastically reduced. This was based on the findings of a focused group discussion with the Masu Unguwanni (ward heads).

The government’s greatest concern and interest on Almajirai came after the Maitatsine uprising. This was because Maitatsine was a product of the Qur’anic school and he used the system to recruit his followers. It was indeed the bloodiest civilian uprising in the history of Kano and it claimed between 6,000 and 10,000 lives from the 18th to 29th December 1980 when Maitatsine was crushed by the military. The Federal Government of Nigeria under President Alhaji Shehu Shagari set up a tribunal to investigate the causes of the uprising. The tribunal was convinced that the remote causes of the uprising were “traceable to a certain extent, to religious, social, political and economic considerations”. The Maitatsine phenomenon grew out of the Nigerian situation of deprivation by the semi-industrial capitalist system and not exclusively out of Muslim tradition as suggested by some scholars. The report of the tribunal was criticised for projecting the influx of the aliens among other reasons as the cause of the uprising. It was also enticed for not exposing Maitasine’s connection with some powerful members of the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN).

Accordingly, these criticisms were from those who believe Maitatsine uprising was a case of religious manipulation by the ruling class. There were others who believe that the Maitatsine Crisis would have been averted had the traditional rulers been given the authority they deserve. This argument has continued to this day. The major reason advanced is that the traditional rulers are the closest to the people and that even Maitatsine was once deported on the orders of Sarkin Kano Sanusi. This is partially true. The traditional rulers are closer to the people largely because the Nigerian state has not achieved the level of development for it to be felt at the lowest level. The elites are further aggravating the problem by their attempt to scrap local government councils as means of reducing corruption instead of strengthening the civil
society to light corruption at all levels. The sympathizers of the traditional institutions downplay the role of the economy in social relations. With increased poverty the poor especially youth including Almajirai could easily be exploited and drafted into violence.\footnote{57}

After the Maitatsine episode during the military era the government became more determined to control the Almajirai as contained in its White Paper on the subject. The committee on Almajirai was aware that that movement not be outlawed easily hence it recommended the amendment of ‘‘the Qur’anic Edit of 1987; to contain a specific injunction restraining the movement of children for \textit{Cirani}’. But this has not been possible because poverty the root cause of the migration from the rural to urban areas has not been effectively tackled. The committee on Almajirai recommend that “the government should have a broad program of rural development” and “should make a multi-faceted approach to the problem of \textit{Bara} by first attacking it from its social-economic root”.\footnote{58}

Kano has the “pull” factors that encourage people from the rural areas and neighbouring Niger and Chad Republics.\footnote{59} The rural areas of Nigeria, Niger and Chad on the other hand have the “push” factors that encourage their people to emigrate. Both the “pull” and the “push” factors are economic.\footnote{60} Kano is the leading commercial Muslim city in African Savannah, therefore it has the greatest economic opportunities for laborers and Qur’anic teachers. Almajirai and migrant labourers from Niger Republic engage in similar activities especially water hawking which became very common with the collapse of the Kano urban water supply. Many of these categories settle in the new low income urban settlements, especially from Kurnar Asabe to Bachirawa. This area was also notorious during the spill over riot after the Shagamu crises hence focusing more attention to the implication of settlement of migrants. That riot made many Nigerians of Yoruba origin to vacate the area.

Kano has experienced several riots very often Almajirai were unjustifiably accused of participating.\footnote{61} This has been the source or security concern. The scholars who subscribe to the manipulation of religion thesis believe that Almajirai could easily be exploited. But this thesis has shortcomings as explained by other scholars.\footnote{62} One of the excellent critiques of the manipulation thesis attempted to provide an alternative paradigm because Islamic consciousness occurs under conditions of both economic tranquility and severity.\footnote{63} The earliest riot was in 1953 and it had its root in the competition for political power and economic resources by the elites.\footnote{64} Several other riots, with religious undertones occurred. But it is significant that religious leaders never led most of them. And when they made their voice prominent in the political arena their protests have been peaceful and more constructive. For example the protest against the American invasion of Iraq was peaceful and had profound impact attracting the attention of the \textit{Wall Street}
Journal because it deconstructed America’s major interest which is the future of the dollar as the dominant world currency.65

These riots made Kano to be a focus or security concern specially with the persistent propaganda by a section of the Nigerian press and rival religious establishments. One of such propaganda piece against the Almajirai was in the Vanguard where it is stated that “the northern almajirai are experts in political rampage, looting of houses and shops, burning of properties slaughtering innocent souls. For a fee of about N100 or N150 per head, the dare devil rioters are prepared to risk their lives to please their sponsors.66 The propaganda is not restricted to Nigerian press; even the so-called professional foreign journalists are not left out. A piece in Le Monde Diplomatique depicted all the Qur’anic pupils in Kano as beggars except students of one school because the journalist was not interested in visiting other locations in the city and was more interested in negative image of Islam and the Shari’ah.67

In 2001, Kano witnessed another major riot, which was the most militant anti-American demonstration held anywhere as a result of the American-led attack of Afghanistan.68 This was indeed a source of worry for the American government and it stepped up its public diplomacy in Kano by exploring avenues for mutual understanding before its war on Iraq. Northern Nigeria and Kano in particular were not included in the potential areas or targets of US counter-terrorism activities because some sensible non-Nigerian analysts discounted the presence of any terrorist groups in these areas.69 This was despite insinuations by Nigerian Tribune newspaper that the United States blacklists northern Nigeria. On the other hand Niger, Chad and Mauritania are the Sahelian countries that are witnessing intense counter-terrorism activities by US Special Forces”’.70

Few Almajirai are criminals engaged in breach of public peace. The Almajirai are more of victims of unfounded allegations. This was the observation of most of the participants at a focus group discussion held at the Wakilin Kudu office.71 Abubakar Lawal an Almajiri who stated that none of his colleagues was ever engaged in rioting and none has ever been convicted for any criminal act also independently indicated this.72 All informants are of the opinion that most of those engaged in rioting and crimes are hooligans (“yan daba) and others whose parents are known in their wards. The informants were also of the opinion that if the Masu Ungwuanni (ward heads) are empowered they would be able to assist in contributing to the maintenance of law and order.73 Walin Kano who was an ex-police Deputy Inspector General also stated that when the traditional leaders had authority they were able to maintain law and order effectively.74 But he also noted the role of the economy in the current situation especially unemployment.
Islamic Strategy for Socio-Economic Development and Security

All the analyses of the report and white paper on Almajirai confirmed that the problem is socio-economic and that the government must tackle the root cause (which is rural poverty the “push” force for Ci rani. Agriculture is the most important aspect of the economy that has been neglected by many of the previous governments of Kano State. Local Governments who are also nearer to the people are even worse. Based on questionnaires administered to local government workshop participants in July 2002 some local government councils spent less than N3 million on agriculture in three years. And one local government council spent N1.8 million in running the chairman’s car in one year. And in three years the legally approved amount spent on councilors was more than the agriculture budgets of some of the local government councils. Obviously under this kind of atmosphere one should expect Ci rani and even total migration because of poverty, persistent corruption and mismanagement of resources despite the call of the report of the committee for multifaceted rural development.

For the society to develop economically it must search for the elements of its culture that promote economic development. In other words the development strategy must have basis in the culture of the society this will ensure smooth transition. Any attempt to import foreign strategies wholesale will fail as experienced in other societies. Likewise the society cannot depend on “normative incentives for economic” development alone because they cannot solve all economic problems. There must be “emphasis on routine bureaucratic authority’,- merit, specialization, material incentives for economic effort and responsible leadership”.

History has shown the progress of societies that harmonized their economic with strategies with their culture. One of such examples was the Sokoto Caliphate, because “by giving Hausaland a polity appropriate to its economy” its leaders “made it the most prosperous region in tropical Africa”. The state system of the Sokoto Caliphate was the most effectively organized system of indigenous rule to he found south of the Sahara”. Sarkin Musulmi Bello encouraged crafts and utilization. The emirate authorities pursued the policies recommended by Sarkin Musulmi Bello as indicated in their social welfare provision observed by Clapperton and urbanization policies.

There are several provisions in Islamic precepts that encourage economic development. It has also been demonstrated that even in the US, physical factors contribute just over half of all output growth, and one scholar “calls the unexplained part the measure of our ignorance”. The unexplained part is the moral factor. It has been shown that Muslims could “accelerate the role of economic growth by greater use of moral factors”.

Economic development could be reduced to “engendering internal change”. This is because the desire to grow is deeply
rooted in the human spirit hence Islam emphasizes spiritual training, which “should be the highest goal of every Muslim individual and society”. The Muslim intellectual Malik Bennabi stressed this when he observed that the important economic issue in the Muslim world “is that of harnessing the social force—humanity, land, and time—in a project propelled by a cultural will undeterred by any difficulties”. Tahawi has also shown that “invoking Islamic injunctions in the context of development efforts will release powerful forces from the masses”. Chapra believes “that Islam envisages an economic system that promotes human well-being and a good life (hayah tayyibah) by giving the utmost importance to brotherhood and socio-economic justice, and requiring a balanced satisfaction as regards humanity’s material and spiritual needs”. It has also been observed, “that within an Islamic framework of work ethics, economic accomplishment turns into spiritual achievement, for the bounty of God is earned by seeking His acceptance”. From the foregoing there is enough evidence to show that Islam “provides a strong motivation of economic growth”. It is therefore the responsibility of the Muslim elites “to encourage Muslims to regain their past glory, for when they become aware of this, they will make concerted efforts to achieve rapid economic growth.\(^8\)

**Divine injunctions in the Qu’ran and Sunnah** have provided the motivating factors for economic growth in a Muslim society. Islam as the final message that balances between the spiritual and profane “induces growth promoting tendencies by encouraging the human instincts of acquisition, provision, and enterprising behavior”.\(^8\) According to Fetullah Gulen: “At least in this world, God treats people according to their attributes”. Thus your attributes are important. A believer is expected to have the finest attributes that will make him successful in this world and if he abandons them he has no one to blame. He also observed that: “If other believers spend all their time in the mosque but lack believers’ attributes and do not grasp the spirit of the matter, they cannot succeed in worldly affairs”.\(^8\) Islam “discourages such growth-inhibiting tendencies as begging sloth, the waste of time and resources, and extravagance by invoking tendencies favorable to economic growth”. The injunction against begging is contained in this Hadith transmitted in Musnad of Imam Ahmad, which enjoined the believers thus: “Beg not anything from people”. The injunction against extravagance is contained in the Qur’an (17: 26): “But squander not (your wealth) in the manner of a spendthrift” and in this Hadith transmitted by Imam Bukhari: “Verily Allah likes three things for you and dislikes three things for you. He is pleased with you that you worship Him and associate not anything with Him, that you hold fast to the rope of Allah and be not scattered; and He disapproves for you irrelevant talk, persistent questioning and wasting of wealth].”\(^8\)

Islam favors and encourages “growth-promoting tendencies” with injunctions in the Qur’an and Sunnah. For example in the Qur’an Allah enjoins the faithful: “And when the prayer is
finished, then disperse in the land and seek Allah’s bounty”. And in the Sunnah it is reported that: “Allah desires that whenever anyone of you performs a job, he/she does it perfectly”; “To earn an honest livelihood is a duty (ranking) next to the chief duty (of offering prayers)”.

Muslims are encouraged to utilize natural resources for the benefit of their societies in ways “that are economically efficient and ecologically sound”. These resources are available for the faithful and others as contained in this verse: “And He made in it (the earth) mountains above its surface, blessed it, and placed therein provisions in due proportion, in four days, alike for all seekers”. (34: 9). Muslims are especially enjoined to utilize these resources for improving their life as contained in Qur’an 7: 32.

Economic growth is essential for acquiring “the material strength for the defense of Islam” as implied in this verse: “Make ready for them what thou canst of (armed) force and of horses tethered that thereby ye dismay the enemy of Allah” (8: 60).

Islam encourages Muslims to trust each other and above all to have good opinion of their Creator. This is in the mutual interest of all Muslims, which is an important means of achieving social justice. Therefore “as a general rule, a transaction is forbidden if it means gain for one individual but loss for another”. Some non-Muslims scholars have even asserted that the future belongs to those societies in which the people trust each other and their institutions. Business flourishes when partners trust each other.

The most important institution available to Muslims for mobilization for socio-economic justice is the Mosque. This is because among its many attributes the Mosque commands a position of high respect and love, for it signifies the house of God on earth. “All able bodied Muslims are expected to say their five daily prayers in the Mosque” within which “a divine atmosphere prevails” because “people are worshiping, reciting the Qur’an, remembering Allah, as well as learning, teaching and propagating Islam”. These breed the impetus for “change in the outlook, taste, and aspirations of Muslims and make them more God-conscious” which is the source of strength. If the Muslims are lucky to gain Taqwa or God-consciousness then they have succeeded because “it embodies the effects of many values, among them trust (tawakkul), patience (sabr) and thankfulness (shukr), all of which are important” for moral regeneration. It was trust and patience that ensured the success of all previous Muslim generations of the Prophet (SAW), his rightly guided Caliphs and even our predecessors who established Sokoto Caliphate. The largest, most complexly organized and most prosperous state in pre-colonial tropical Africa.

The Mosque as an institution especially in Kano where attendance is high even at places of work also provides an excellent framework for achieving Islamic social cohesion in terms of brotherhood and cooperation. This is because in the Mosque every Muslim “is a humble servant of God and tries to respect all others”. In the Mosque the faithful “mix freely and enquire about
each other’s welfare”. This “produces a feeling of love and cooperation, for the assembly is like a single family: “And the believers, men and women, are protecting friends of one another” (71: 9). The faithful will ripe the fruit of this moral investment and there will be social harmony and genuine affection for each other as in the time of the Prophet (SAW) as stated in the Qur’an: “And (moreover) He hath put affection between their hearts: not if thou hadst spent all that is on the earth, couldst thou have produced that affection, but Allah hath done it: For He is exalted in Might, Wise (8: 63)”. 

From the foregoing it is clear that there are sufficient provisions for mobilizing Muslims to ensure socio-economic justice. Also the suggestion that bara (begging) has root in the culture must not be accepted uncritically. Begging by Almajirai could be eradicated with improvement in economic conditions and without such improvements people will keep on emphasizing control as the only basis of security. It is true that poverty could lead to crime and insecurity but Muslims generally can survive on the very minimum without retort to crime this is because it is has been shown that there is less crime in poorer Muslim areas than in more prosperous non-Muslim areas in Nigeria as well as in other countries.

**Conclusion**

Islamiyya Schools in Kano are becoming more popular than Qur’anic Schools, and proponents of the integration of Islamic Education with Western formal education regard this as a welcome development. Attempts by the state to reform Qur’anic Schooling have not yielded positive results because such reforms did not take socio-economic realities into consideration. And for any reform of Qur’anic School to be successful it must have a root in the culture and history of the society as noted by other scholars.

The number of Almajirai leaving their localities for Cirani is also reducing as noted by ward heads. Bara by Almajirai is a socio-economic issue and therefore all government’s efforts to stop it by legislation did not yield any positive result since rural poverty the root cause has not been tackled. It is unlikely if it would ever be tackled successfully by the state in the nearest future because most of the poverty alleviation programs do not involve the poor who are the “true poverty experts”. Hence the governments never utilized the capacities of the communities and it is tragic that this is still going on, when even international agencies are focusing their attention towards learning from communities through their various learning departments. The civil society has also not been able to pressurize the state and its agents to execute meaningful programs and anti-corruption strategies. The civil society groups are the only hope since the political parties have no meaningful programs and are only vehicles for the acquisition of power to be discarded after elections, and those elected are more or less concerned with personal agendas. It is therefore likely that successors could abandon a program of poverty alleviation or rural development no
matter how laudable the program is for political reasons as previous military regimes did in Kano. Therefore the phenomena of Ci rani and Almajiranci would persist until they are phased out by the society and not the state. This would be a slow process as it has been going on with the slow economic growth in the rural areas and greater rate of awareness against bara (begging). Some of the Qur’anic teachers have even begun charging fees because they do not allow their pupils to beg. 

Even though the state is undeveloped the elites must refocus their attention from coercion as the only source of security to the more lasting solution of socio-economic justice as the guarantor of peace and security in the society. This is only possible with the active vigilance of the civil society.

Notes
2. Last 1990: 11-12 cited by Kane 2003: 101, a lecturer at Aminu Kano School of Islamic Legal Studies reports that one wealthy trader at Kwari market took his son to a Qur’anic School in Dorayi so that he can engage in bara, but this is rare (private discussion on September 13, 2003). Abba 1983: 196 also reports similar reasons given by parents, which they justified religiously.
4. Alhaji Abdulkadir Galadima who is the Wakilin Kudu, a sub-district head of Kano City notes during a focused group discussion on Thursday September 11, 2003 that most who engage in ci-rani nowadays go to the forest areas of the Nigerian coast such as Lagos and Port-Harcourt instead of places like Kano hence the number of Qur’anic pupils coming to Kano for that purpose has reduced.
5. This Information is front a discussion on 20th September 2003 with one of the Qur’anic teachers at Mariri.
6. From field notes of a study in the area conducted by this writer in March 2003.
10. Even Qur’anic Schools enjoy his patronage and he attends several of their graduation ceremonies as noted in the British Council sponsored video documentary Madrassa.
11. For more information see Kani 1988 generally and especially pp. 26-28
12. Madauci, Isa and Daura 1968: 41-46 where they described the system up to graduation ceremony .
14. Steele 199.
16. The late Shehu Maihula one of the most prominent scholars of 20’th century Kano (Hunwick 1995: 300-303 and Katsina 1984: 52-55) often narrated during his lessons the hardship they went through in Zaria looking for food in nooks and crannies of the city and sometimes they had to scavenge with Shehu Gidado one of his colleagues another prominent scholar who became the Wazirin Kano.
17. Kane 2003: 108-1 10 for the biography of one of them.
19. This is from discussions with Muhammad Sani Abdulkarim an alumnus of the school, who noted that some of their colleagues became victims of this self-hates induction.
23. The Arabic and Islamic literary output of scholars who did not attend western schools is more than the one of those who attended western schools. Hunwick (1995) made this documentation and one of the most prolific scholars who did not attend western schools was Nasiru Kabara (see Loimeier 1991 and Hunwick 1995).

29. Sanneh nd.
30. Dangambo 1980: 2-4 where he documented the poems of Dikoye, a student of Shehu Danfodio some of whose poems are recited by others.
35. Ozig and Ocho 1981: 52 quoted Hubbard who was reported to have said: “the most tenable desire of British policy in northern Nigeria between 1900 and 1940 had to do with the desire to prolong British rule in the territory”
42. Ya’u 2000: 162.
45. Mallam Mukhtar Abdallah a Juma’at Imam in Birnin Kebbi emphasized the increasing popularity of Islamiyya Schools over Qur’anic schools in his locality (Discussions September 2001).
47. It has also been noted that Hausa Muslim clerics contributed to the spread of Hausa culture in West Africa (Adam 1978: 179).
50. Discussion with Atiku Muhammad Yola September 7, 2003 Yola quarters
51. Discussion With Abubakar Lawal a Qur’anic School pupil from Doguwar Gingiya at the school established by Alhaji Musa Maibuhu held on l0th of September 2003.
52. Held at the Wakilin Kudu’s office on September 11, 2003.
57. Walin Kano. Alhaji Mahe Bashir; a retired Deputy Inspector General of Police believes that both the Almajirai and Yan daba (hothigans) could easily be drafted into violence (discussion on September 12, 2003.
59. For an in dept study of these factors in Kano see Hill 1977: 66-67.
60. Clarke 1965: 133.
61. One of the Ward Heads at the focus group discussion at the Wakilin Kudu Office (September 11, 2003) was very emphatic that the Almajirai hardly participated in riots and that most of the rioters were hooligans.
62. For example, Heynes 1996:214-231 offered more complex explanations of the religio-political conflicts in Nigeria beyond the manipulation thesis.
63. Bala 2001:43-51 earlier Sulaiman 1986:xv-xvi while discussing the character of the Jihad movement identified three categories of classifications which are not economic classes unlike the Marxists who do not recognize any relationship which is not materialistic.
66. See Farukanmi 2002 and for the rival faith see the depiction in ‘Dorothy serves up the gospel with beans and rice’, available at www.sim.org/mag_78_1.asp.
68. Lewis 2002:1.
69. For example Lewis 2002:9.
70. Mauritania’s repressive regime has been more welcoming to the Special Forces (Saunders 2003).
71. On Thursday September 11.
72. Discussion on 10'h of September 2003.
73. Focus group discussion Thursday September 11.
74. Discussion on the 12'h of September 2003 but Ya’u 2000: 177 is more critical of this suggestion.
75. McDonald 1987: 160.
76. Illife 1995: 171 emphasis is mine.
77. Lord Bailey 1957: 453-4 cited in Mazrui 1986: 226 emphasis is mine
78. Martin 1971:84.
80. Usman 1978: 190 and 212.
89. Akhtar 1993.
90. Adeleye 1971 observed that the loyalty “the Sheikh received from various communities was freely given not imposed” just as the observation by Last 1963 cited in Crowder 1978: 173 where he noted that: “the Sokoto Caliphate was not properly speaking an empire, since its unity depended not so much on force, as on religious obedience the emirs or provincial governors owed the Commander of the faithful or Caliph at Sokoto”.
95. Indabawa 1992: 78 n30 was critical of the notion that the Qur’an justifies bara (begging) he regarded such justification as manipulation of Qur’anic injunctions.
96. There is more crime in the West especially murder than in the Middle East despite the fact that the West is materially wealthier (Winter 2003) and in Nigeria Zamfara State has the lowest crime rate as noted by the Inspector General of Police (Sunday Triumph of May 26, 2002) despite the fact that it is one of the materially poorest states.
98. Igbuzor, Akanji and Adeagbo 2003 and as well as Igbuzor et al 2003 where it is stated that: “The communities attributed the failure of the previous anti-poverty programs to lack of involvement of the people and politicization of the programs”.
99. Mallam Badamasi Alhassan of Magashi Quarters, a social activist who witnessed how one of the social policy projects was abandoned by one of the previous military administrations (discussions on September 10, 2003).
100. One of such is Shariff Alhaji Bala who made this known in a video documentary sponsored by the British Council titled Madrassa.
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Urban Gangs (‘Yan Daba) and Security in Kano State: A Review of Trends And Challenges

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Introduction
The world over, the youth are generally seen as the most dynamic and vibrant segment of the society. Potentially they are the custodians of posterity; they have the reservoirs of enthusiasm and energy to cultivate the appropriate social, economic, religious, political and technological resources to enhance the development of the society. With proper socialization, the youth can develop their civic and social responsibility to contribute their quota to national development.¹

Nigeria’s socio-political and economic experiences are fraught with discontent and distortions that make the youth today confused and bewildered. The exacerbating economic crisis, inflation and declining quality of life, since the fallout of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), all contribute in further marginalizing the youth.

There are concerns that millions of Nigeria youth are not getting a fair deal in terms of access to proper socialization, education and employment opportunities; and, as a result, there are serious security consequences that abound.² This paper is about a specific group of youth i.e. ‘Yan daba in Kano state, as an example of a local terrorist’ group that belong to a dislocated and maladjusted subculture which poses a serious security threat to the people of Kano state. The paper reviews the conceptual, theoretical, social world, predisposing factors, trends and challenges of social control measures of ‘Yan daba activities in Kano state, especially as they pertain to the chieftaincy institution.

Concepts, Origin and Nature of ‘Yan daba
The general opinion on the original meaning of the Hausa word daba connotes a group who may share similar trade, age, profession or personal relationship and who regularly gather in a specific place (mazauna), to do certain things.³ The term “daba”
now has pejoratively assumed a deviant meaning because it is associated with urban gang youth groups that are engaged in criminal and other nefarious activities harmful to the society.

There are various versions on the genesis of ‘Yan daba syndrome in Kano. Daba’ activities reached an epidemic level from 1978 to 1983, during the second republic; also it was clear that in the first republic at the turn of 1960’s there were some traces of daba’ through the use of Yan bang (political vanguards) another variant of ‘Yan daba”. Other explanations trace the origin of daba to the period of the mythical Barbushe, the leader of the settlers around the Dala Hill.4

‘Yan daba in Northern Nigeria
From available information ‘Yan daba emanate from the activities of hunters (‘Yan farauta) who use dangerous weapons like knives, spears, clubs, axes and other domesticated animals to hunt for prey; the colonial administration banned organized group hunting under Northern Nigeria Law No. 18 of 1959.

‘Yan daba as a group of hoodlums in possession of dangerous weapons terrorize opponents and other people in their communities. They engage in sporadic and at times periodic feuds. ‘Yan daba activities are facilitated and sustained by the prevailing social and economic and political conditions of the society. Most ‘Yan daba come from poor families; they are jobless, and frustrated, with a bleak future. Almost all ‘Yan daba do take hard drugs and intoxicants, such as ICD, Marijuana, alcohol and other stimulants.

For a proper explanation of the groups associated with ‘Yan daba activities Yau5 has given a comparative classification:

Although the ‘Yan daba do share a number of similarities with the ‘Yan tauri and Yan bang… the ‘Yan tauri are people believed to be immune to harm or injury from iron or other metallic weapons such as knives….During the pre-colonial period, they were not only hunters but also a warrior class who depended their territories against attack… They have survived the social restructuring that colonialism and capitalism have engendered in the society… The ‘Yan bang, on the other hand, are professional political party thugs recruited by parties… Most of the leaders of ‘Yan bang were Yan tauri such as the famous Sabo Wakilin Tauri. However, not all ‘Yan tauri are ‘Yan bang, just as not all ‘Yan bang were recruited from ‘Yan tauri background.
And,

A variant group of ‘Yan daba is the ‘Yan Daukar Amarya who generally share the same characteristics with the ‘Yan daba, but specializes in abducting women/brides, whom they rape”

Theoretical Consideration

There are a number of classical studies on deviance and social control that articulate the nature and orientation of criminal subculture in the society. For Sutherland delinquent, criminal and other deviant behaviours are imbibed through associating, interacting and identifying with the elements of the underworld, or peers. That is, as one is affiliated with a criminal role model, he/she can easily be socialized into learning the ethos and other normative behaviours of the criminal sub-culture. For Cohen delinquency does not inhere in the personality of the child. Deviant behaviour is not an inborn disposition, but socially learnt as a way of life. As such the phenomenon of ‘Yan daba should be seen as something that is socially learnt and transmitted, because of specific factors that condition its existence.

A classic argument by Merton on Anomie Theory is instructive. In his Social Structure and Anomie, it is shown that non-conformity to norms and social codes are, at times, engendered by the distortion in the social structure. There is usually a gap between conforming goals of the society and the legitimate opportunities available to achieve these goals by the disadvantaged persons. For those who are denied legitimate opportunities to attain the conforming goals, they easily create illegitimate means to achieve the societal goals. So, as individuals fail to get access to opportunities that would enable them to conform to societal expectations, they may find their way into the criminal subculture of Yan daba to realize their dreams within the general conventional culture. Daba, system, therefore, can be seen as an “innovation” that responds to blocked access to the appropriate opportunities to attain societal goals. By this perspective, the family, community and societal institutions are to blame by not providing the requisite resources that would prevent the transformation of juveniles into Yan daba syndicates.
For Cloward and Ohlin,\textsuperscript{10} it is not easy for a person to be a successful criminal, because access to illegitimate opportunities are equally scarce and competitive, just like legitimate opportunities, i.e. it is not easy for one to be a successful \textit{Dan daba} (sing). The challenge to illegal opportunities can create different subcultures within the group. These are (1) Criminal subculture that is involved in theft, extortion and other illegitimate means of sourcing income; (2) Conflict subculture that give emphasis to gang violence, as an avenue of gaining recognition and status; (3) Retreatist subculture, a gang that emphasize the consumption of intoxicants to retreat back to their shell of social and psychological fantasies, dreams and nightmares.

\textit{‘Yan daba} exhibit the characteristics of the last two categories, even though some pockets of them do use illegal means to source income to perpetrate their nefarious activities as in the first category. The “criminal pattern” can be established where from young age, the criminal role model they consider as the “right guy” tutors and initiates juveniles into deviant behaviors. The techniques and orientations of the criminal world are socially adopted through the appropriate “connections” in the criminal enterprise.

Shaw and Mckay\textsuperscript{11} have shown how exposure to conflicting conducts at home, school and in delinquent gangs creates conflict of values. The juvenile can easily be confused where competing conducts are racing to capture his attention. Deviant conducts may easily be transmitted if the conventional conduct fails to orient the child, as it is expected.

At societal level, according to Wolfgang and Ferracutti,\textsuperscript{12} the subculture of violence is created and perpetuated based on the cultural context; manifest violence is exhibited the more a person is fully integrated into the network of subculture of violence.

**Social World and the Predisposing Factors of ‘Yan daba Activities**

The social world of ‘Yan daba activities is very clear to all those involved; they are self conscious of their identity, their group, and their opponents. One of the most notable factors in discerning the social world of ‘Yan daba is their location. This is because criminal outcomes of ‘Yan daba are linked to the wards and quarters they come from. Dan-Asabe\textsuperscript{13} has outlined the locations
where the incidence and prevalence of *daba* are active, after their suppression by May, 1988:

‘*Yan Taya* (between Kofar Wambai and Fagge), Kofar Wambai, Kantin Kwari (Syrian Quarters), Kasuwar Rimi, Dala, Kofar Mata, Kara (Just outside Kofar Mazugal), Warure, Sani Mai Nagge, Tal’udu (off Mal. Aminu Kano Road, near a police Barrack), Rijiyar lemo village, Aminu Kano International Airport, Kofar Ruwa (opposite Bukavu Barracks). (former) ‘*Yan Awaki’, Gama, Dakata, Kofar Gadon Kaya

As for the flash points of Yantauri and their variants ‘*Yan daba*’ the following are the main wards where *daba* activities are prominent in the Kano metropolitan:


Based on the research by Dan-Asabe\(^1\)\(^5\) a rather detailed list of the wards of the allies and opponents are hereby presented: The arch rival wards are Warure and Gyaranya Quarters: Others are:

Kofar DanAgundi and Dala, Tudun Nupawa and Dala, Kofar Wambai and Fagge, Warure and Tudun Nupawa, Yakasai and Tudun Nupawa, Mandawari and Yandandu, Mandawari and Kofar Naisa; Tukuntawa and Dala, Kofar Mata and Tudun Wada, Tudun Wada and Tudun Murtala; Gayawa and Gwagwarwa; Dakata and Warure; Yakasai and Warure, Badawa and Hotoro; Rimin Kebe and Mandawari; Dala and Yalwa.

Friendly allies:

Warure, Kulkul, Sanka, Man-ladan, Madigawa, Yalwa, Adakawa, Yar Maishinkafi, Maiadua.

Other allies:

Gyaranya, Tudun Nupawa, Karofin Sudawa, Karofin Kwalwa and Ayagi.\(^1\)\(^6\)
The security situation for ‘Yan daba’ feud is a cause for serious concern. The feud can continue for quite some time. In fact some strife between opposing groups or wards may perennially be waged with colossal consequences in the loss of human lives and other material resources. The spiral spurts of violence of ‘Yan daba’ can defy mutual conflict resolution for quite some time. The Kano State Emirate Council through its appropriate traditional apparatus had been trying to contain the ‘Yan daba’ conflict. The former Emir of Kano His Royal Highness Abdullahi Bayero tried with difficulty (at times in vain) to tackle the menace of ‘Yan daba’ conflicts. It is on record that the Emir of Kano His Royal Highness (Dr.) Ado Bayero has been trying his best to appeal and control the incessant ‘Yan daba’ conflicts over the years. But because the ‘Yan daba’ complex is deeply embedded in the psyche of its subculture, it is becoming increasingly difficult to eradicate.

The social scenario of urban gang fights is such that it breeds suspicion, hate, ill will and reprisal amongst those involved. This is precisely why there is always a vicious circle of violence, counter violence and insecurity. Wherever the conflict takes place members of the community feel insecure; even bystanders are at risk.

The behaviors of Yan daba are not pro-active and positive; prolonged or mere squinted stare of ‘Yan daba’ may elicit backlash of anti-social acts of provocative slang.

The mannerism of talking, dressing walking as well as their general personality makeup is unique, relative to their sub-cultural groups. There is little research, however, on the psychology of the ‘Yan daba’, in terms of what they are thinking, their feelings and aspirations. The stigma associated with their way of life makes them suspicious of the public. They are aware of the stereotype and the labels against them. As a consequence, they become comfortably lost in their deviant sub cultural world. One of the major deficiency of the present social control measures on Yan daba is the failure by the community and the society at large to cross-over into the minds of ‘Yan daba’ and understand how best to re-orient their thinking and attitudes. As they are seen as rebels and outlaws, there is difficulty in understanding their social position and needs.
Predisposing Factors
Retrospectively, one of the main factors that underpins the blossoming of ‘Yan daba activities in Kano was the emergence of modern partisan politics in Nigeria, from 1954-1966. As Dan-Asabe asserts:

It all started when the leadership of NEPU, ... mainly commoners (talakawa), were faced with increased harassment, molestation, arbitrary arrest by the Native Authority (N.A.) Policemen who appeared to support the (ruling) rival political party (N.P.C, which had sympathy of the traditional rulers and European colonial administrators). NEPU began to recruit hunters in order to protect their leaders during campaign tours, and to act as body guards (‘Yan bangar).

Following this, other political parties adopted similar strategy. Later on, clashes between rival political parties became common, intense and deadly, especially during the 1954 parliamentary elections, which were fiercely contested by NEPU and NPC. A committee of elders comprising the late Alhaji Dantata, Shiekh Nasiru Kabara, and Sheik Tijjani Usman Zangon Barebari failed to reconcile the parties involved.

Based on this the use of ‘Yan daba became well entrenched into the mainstream political activities. By 1966 the army took over because of, among other things, the worsening security situation in the country. The ‘Yan bangar activities did not prosper during the civil war, and the long years of the military rule up to 1979. As at that time there were few incidences of ‘Yan daba; and ‘Yan bangar became integrated back into the society engaging in small-scale business activities.

With the oil boom and the general improvement in economic condition in the 1970’s, coupled with increase in population, urbanization and modernization, the activities of urban gangs were transformed. Many ‘Yan bangar transformed into ‘Yan daba during the second republic from 1979-1983; with the exit of the military administration of General Olusegun Obasanjo many youngsters were easily socialized into this subculture because of the prevailing liberal political climate. Urban gangs became fluid. ‘Yan bangar and ‘Yan daba started to double as vanguards/ political body guards, “praetorian” party militia, youth political wing,
mercenaries and/or hoodlums for hire. Political assassinations became common. For the first time the use of hard drugs among the ‘Yan banga’/‘Yan daba’ became widespread. Through political manipulation, ‘Yan daba’ were made to easily “molest, harass, attack and kill” opponents freely in broad daylight.

Despite the paucity of crime statistics in Nigeria, police reports show that from 1980 to 1983 a total of 1002 cases of ‘Yan daba’ operations were recorded, thus:

Table 1. ‘Yan daba’ Attacks in Kano 1980-1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reported Cases of ‘Yan daba’ Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dawakin Tofa, (1994: 46)

However, following a similar pattern, from 1984-1988 the incidences of ‘Yan daba’ attacks successively declined. With the spate of ‘Yan daba’ activities continuing unabated, the government banned urban gangs, established a Special Magistrate Court to prosecute ‘Yan daba’ and others. Daba activity became publishable by imprisonment of up to seven years, or fine or both. Also law enforcement agents were given the backing to track down, arrest and interrogate ‘Yan daba’ suspects.

Yau observed that there were, as a result, human right abuses against suspected ‘Yan daba’ in terms of torture, and even death. It seems there are no human right groups that champion the cause of ‘Yan daba’ on access to fair trial and justice. Following the October 1991 riot in Kano, the Kano State Government 1991 Report of the Panel of Investigation on Kano Disturbance made reference to the way loss of traditional authority is attributable to increase in daba activities. As Yau observes:

The argument being canvassed is that during the time that traditional rulers were in control of local government, it was not easy for criminals to operate since the traditional rulers “knew every one”; it is then suggested that traditional rulers should be given definite powers in the running of local governments to ensure that crime is wiped out.
‘Yan daba in Development
The development of ‘Yan daba complex over the years is associated with many correlates. The dynamics of some factors contribute in facilitating and perpetuating the problems of ‘Yan daba. First, the demographic component is important. The Nigeria’s young population is always graduating millions of juveniles into adult categories, with more potential ‘Yan daba by the year. The youth that belong to age group 15-39 years constitute 38.6% of Nigerian’s over 130 million population; also those in age group 0-14 years are about 45% of the population. Second, the enormous influence of the electronic media through the effect of pornography and violent movies facilitate the change of attitudes of youth in our society. Media, thus, mediate the acculturation of violent deviant behaviors in youth. Third, the abiding consequences of declining quality of life in family circles in the last two decades are putting pressure on family living and proper socialization. These concomitant consequences contribute in producing decadent youth in our society. Fourth, the existence of centers for peddling narcotics facilitates and accentuates the problem of drug dependence amongst ‘Yan daba. With more drugs there would be more violence.
Fifth, the increase of cases of school dropouts, inaccessibility or unequal opportunities to education results in having a large army of either idle or unemployed youth who can easily be lured into daba activities. Sixth, the continuing poor quality of governance and corruption in Nigeria are giving wrong impression of role models and political socialization for the youth. Any attempt to control the security problem of ‘Yan daba must look into these important factors.

Chieftaincy, Social Control and ‘Yan daba
The structure and functions of chieftaincy affairs are central to the proper management of our communities. Though, constitutionally the role of traditional institution is passive in modern democratic administration, yet the traditional institutions being closer to the people at local level are daily coming into contact with disgruntled, disrespectful and dangerous youth. There is the need to re-energize the traditional institutions and get them fully involved in social
control measures at local level in our communities. This is because the generality of the people have a lot of respect and confidence in the traditional institutions.

Also it is becoming clear that the law enforcement agencies are finding it difficult to eradicate ‘Yan daba. This is largely because the problems are multifaceted, as this paper has shown. Despite this, however, the following suggestions are given on how best the traditional authorities can complement government efforts in managing and controlling the menace of ‘Yan daba in our society:

- The functions of His Royal Highness, the Emir (Sarki), District Head (Hakimi), Village Head (Dagaci) and Ward Head (Mai Unguwa) should be further strengthened constitutionally to fully participate and deliberate on how best to address youth problems in their locality.
- The above traditional offices should be involved in policy formulation and implementation of projects in the community.
- The role of the Ulama and other respected community leaders should be institutionalized to formalize local inputs in government policy and implementation.
- Community based organizations (CBOs) and other Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) should be involved in studying and solving some of the problems of youth at local level.
- A census of all delinquent youth in each locality should be undertaken by all the stakeholders to have comprehensive data on the social, economic and religious needs of all the youth involved in daba activities.
- The parents/guardians of all ‘Yan daba be identified with a view to integrating them into comprehensive counseling scheme.
- There should be regular CBO meetings in all wards comprising of the residents, and other stakeholders to examine and find solutions to some of the major problems affecting the youth at the community level.
- All stakeholders should participate in developing the social capital and economic resources of the youth with a view to enhancing the community’s productive capacity.
- The stakeholders, together with the traditional institution should ensure that all factors that facilitate the ‘Yan daba’ activities in their localities are checked and reported to the appropriate authorities.
- Youth should be encouraged and supported to form productive associations to express and realize their dreams and aspirations.
- There should be opportunities for educational development, training and retraining in socioeconomic and political undertakings with a view to enhancing or consolidating the productive potentials of the youth.
- Leadership by example can assist in giving the needed moral guidance to the youth.
- In order to boost their morale, the social, cultural and economic exhibitions of the productive output of the youth should be acknowledged, honored and rewarded, where necessary,
- A forum should be organized where highly placed persons in the society would participate in youth activities in order to give them inspiration and support in their undertakings.

Conclusion
The role of the chieftaincy in security matters is critical in the drive to do away with the problems of ‘Yan daba’ in our society. Problems associated with ‘Yan daba’ are myriad. The chieftaincy institution has the advantage of being closer to the community; hence any community based programme on tackling ‘Yan daba’ problems should consider the enormous power of the traditional institution at local level.

Notes
Nigeria, Nordiska Afrika Institute, Uppsala, Sweden/The Centre for Research and Documentation, Kano, p.161.
6. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
14. Ibid p.94
15. Ibid p.95-96
16. Ibid p.16
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.

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Women, Power and Security in Kano Emir’s Palace

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This paper narrates the role women play in the economic and security structure of the Kano Emir’s Palace. The Palace is often referred to as Gidan Rumfa, the Emir as Sarki, the Concubines as Kwarakwarai, the Eunuchs as Babannin Sarki, the Princes as ‘Yan Sarki, the Queen Mother as Mai Babban Daki, the former Emirs’ concubines as the Matan Fada, the guards/messengers as Jakadu, the traditional slaves as Cucanawa, the wards as Waje-waje.

Physically Gidan Rumfa is divided roughly into three. The southern part which is now the official gate (Kofar Kudu), the northern gate, divided into two (Kofar Kwaru and Kofar Fatalwa). Then we have the middle portion called Cikin Gida where the wives and female slaves reside.

Gidan Rumfa was commissioned by Sarki Muhammadu Rumfa (c. 1463-1499) in 1479. The building was supervised by his chief bricklayer Dan Jigawa, who built it in three years. Sarki Muhammadu Rumfa instructed the builder to construct three doors Kofar Kudu, Kofar Fatalwa and Kofar Kwaru.

Entering through the northern gate, you pass straight into a large open courtyard called Sararin Garke which was said to contain sheep. On the right and left of Sararin Garke the wards or quarters are located; these are the waje-waje of the Kwara-kwarai. Behind the waje-waje we find large walled gardens called Shekar Gabas and Shekar Yamma. The house looks like a mini city with houses, paths and gardens. The houses, waje-waje are arranged between the walled gardens Sheka and Sararin Garke.

Yelwa is a waje. It is called Katuwar Unguwa—the main ward because it is where Uwar Soro, the senior Kwarkwara resides. There is Dutse Babba, Dutse Karama, Kacako, Unguwar Bare-bari, Unguwa Uku, Ka’iya Nasarawa, Garko Farin Gida, Sabon Soro, Bayan Dan Soro, Dogon Gida, Soron Malam Dabo and Sakkwato where the daughters of Shehu Usman or their descendants reside whenever they are given in marriage to Sarkin Kano.

The administrative hierarchy starts with the Uwar Soro, the matron of the Soro—waiting room chamber. The Uwar Soro is the supreme head of the Cikin Gida. She is the head Kwarkwara chosen because of her intelligence and experience. Every child and woman is under her care and authority. Everybody is accountable to her but she is accountable only to Sarki. As Kwarkwara extraordinary, her privilege exceeds that of the legal wives.

After the Uwar Soro comes the Mai Soron Baki: she is another important personality in Cikin Gida administration. The Mai Soron Baki is also a senior Kwarkwara living near Soron Baki, that is Soron Sarki reception. The name might have been referred to as Soron Baki, visitors’ waiting room, because visitors to the Sarki have audience with him there. The Mai Soron Baki acts also as a
valet and messenger as well as zagi to the Sarki when he visits his legal wives. She is also a messenger between the Sarki and Jakada. She and the eunuchs supervise the Friday alms giving by the Sarki.

The next after Mai Soron Baki is the Mai Kudandan. This is a title given to a senior Kwarkwara who is in charge of grain distribution. She works with the officer in charge of the grains, Sarkin Hatsi, who receives and organizes grains brought to the Cikin Gida and stores them in numerous silos. Subsequently and in conjunction with Mai Kudandan, he oversees its administration and distribution through the Iyayen waje and Kuyangi sent from waje-waje.

After Mai Kudandan comes Iyayen waje, starting with the Uwar waje, literally the mother of the quarter (waje). Every waje has a mother (a sort of matron) who leads the affairs of her waje. She is in charge of the Kwara-kwarai and children of the waje. She is answerable to Uwar Soro. All the Iyayen waje report to the Uwar Soro every morning. Food, information and all activities are passed from the Uwar Soro through the Iyayen waje down to Kwara-kwarai. And it is the job of the Iyayen waje-waje to report all the happenings of their waje to Uwar Soro, so that she can solve any problem or report to the Sarki if it is beyond her capacity.

Next in line comes the Jakadu, the inner gate keepers and coordinators of affairs from the inside to the outside. There are a lot of soraye or waiting rooms before one enters the Cikin Gida proper. The Jakadiya is the person who delivers messages from the inside to the outside or vice-versa. She knows about everyone passing through her Soro, because she has to give them permission to enter the Cikin Gida. She must know who is visiting and their mission. The Jakadiya is Bacucaniya chosen because of her intelligence and keen powers of observation. She is a chief security agent in the palace. Any access through the Cikin Gida has to have her permission, and if granted, her assistance to negotiate the inner spaces of the palace. Some Talakawa especially from the rural areas believe that mere seeing the Sarki will absolve them from all their sins and will solve their problems. Women come with their marital problems and appeal for justice; other Talakawa come to the Palace seeking either employment or some form of assistance.

After Jakadu comes the Matan Fada. They are the former Sarkis Kwara-kwarai. They are respected for their age and their former positions. They go and come as they like. They help Uwar Soro to resolve conflicts among the women in the house.

Another group of Cikin Gida residents are Babannin Sarki who had been castrated and made eunuchs—a procedure which confers on them the highest access to the inner female chambers of the Palace for security purposes. The tradition of Babannin Sarki living inside the Cikin Gida started at the time of Sarki Muhammad Zaki (1582-1618). However, it was after the assassination of Sarki Shesheri (1573-1582) that the practical advantages of castrated male slaves was realized and two things became apparent: their sexual loyalty to the Sarki vis-à-vis women in the Palace, and their physical strength for security purposes.
There used to be two cadres of Babanni, ones on the outside, and the ones in Cikin Gida. Those outside the Cikin Gida were often given high military and State positions. Those inside the Cikin Gida follow the Sarki wherever he goes in the Cikin Gida. Sarki Kutumbi is said to have been always followed by as many as one hundred Babanni.

However with the emergence of Islam, the castration custom diminished. Sarki Abdullahi Bayero (1926-1953) had seventeen Babanni. In the current regime there are hardly any Babanni. After the deaths of the previous ones, their roles were taken over by trusted women in the Palace.

Some of the Babanni duties include reporting on wives and Kwara kwarai. They were trusted because they cannot produce any family for themselves due to their biological inability. They perform, tasks for his security and wellbeing whenever he walks in or outside the Cikin Gida they tag alongside him saying: Takawa Sannu, Gangare Sabkawa, Sunkuye, Daukawa Sannu. This means walk carefully, descend, turn carefully, bend dawn step dawn. This is done with a chanting voice. The Sarki trusts his Babanni so much that whatever they say he does.

Though the making of Eunuchs was said to have been strictly forbidden to his followers by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), African rulers in their search for reliable civil servants sometimes found Eunuchs attractive in the lower ranks for looking after the Sarki but in higher political offices also since there could be no temptation to found new dynasty.

The Mai Babban Daki is the Queen Mother. She is the mother of any current Sarki. She resides in another large house outside the Gidan Rumfa called Babban Daki. i.e. The Grand Room. She cooks for the Sarki, and sends it to Uwar Soro. Traditionally the Sarki visits her twice a year with pomp and pageantry with all his district heads, Hakimai. The affairs and activities in the Cikin Gida are reported to her either by the Sarki himself or by Uwar Soro through Matan Fada who visit her daily. Mai Babban Daki interacts with the king makers and the district heads. Through them she hears about events or any intrigues that might have been going on. As the palace’s information manager, she would be in a position to keep peace.

The Royal children consist of sons, daughters and grand children of the Sarki. They are called Yan Sarki. It is traditional belief that the Sarki has no grand children; rather all children belong to him. The sons and daughters of female princess are weaned in the Palace so that they imbibe the culture of Gidan Sarki. The Cucanawa children are also treated like Yan Sarki. They eat the same food, play and go to same school together, and sleep in the same apartments. This situation reduces conflict among the children and promotes peaceful co-existence.

Gidan Rumfa cultural environment strongly promotes the education of women in the Palace, based on strong Islamic injunctions about the need to educate women. This Islamic view of women education was adopted by Sarki Abdullahi during his time.
He championed women education – both Qur’anic and secular. He built a Qur’anic school inside Cikin Gida and supervised it. He allowed a Government girls school to be built for the whole of Northern Nigeria and sent his children, grand children and all other children of the household. This writer was among the third intake in 1952. We were very much encouraged to learn about all the cultures in Nigeria. There were almost everybody there. Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, Kanuri, Tera, Tiv, Bachama etc. We learnt English, Maths, Religious Knowledge, Islam for Muslims, Christianity for Christians, Home Economics and Social Studies. We ate together, played together and slept in the same rooms, therefore we all became friends. During Sallah activities the Sarki used to invite us to Cikin Gida for three days and every morning we used to go to Gidan Sarki from seven o’clock in the morning till seven at night. We played and we entertained all who came to Cikin Gida for the festival. All the ethnic groups perform their dance and songs in Sararin Garke atrium. i.e. the main court yard.

Everyone was happy and felt secure. We may not have learnt all the various languages but each one of us knew the words for greeting in all the various languages and we could at least communicate with one another. A lot of children who were not sent to the school would wish that they were part of us. Also our mothers’ anxieties about us going to school at the age of seven years was alleviated completely because they saw the rest of the children we associated with, were harmless children. The Sarki even went to the extent of sending his sister, the wife of Sarkin Katsina Muhammadu Dikko, as a Matron and later a Matar Fada was sent by Sarki Sunusi as her Assistant. Thus we see through sharing and doing things together peace was promoted.

Every year after harvest, Sarki Abdullahi encouraged Cikin Gida women to dramatize the roles of various peoples in the state so that the citizenry even from the rural areas came to learn. During the drama performances which took place in the Sararin Garke for two weeks from 7.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m., “houses” would be erected for various dramatis personae which included the Sarki’s house and houses for district heads, a school with children, a clinic with a nursing sister with her uniform and all the hospital equipment, a prison with Yari (Chief Warden) and his staff, various Alkalai and Police in uniform. Men, however, were not allowed to witness the event; every role was played by women. This drama is called Wasan Gauta. Apart from sensitizing and educating the Talakawa this drama gives the Cikin Gida women opportunity to learn about nursing, court procedures, administrative activities and social norms. Every actress is instructed by corresponding women professionals. These measures make the women in the Gidan Rumfa to be aware of the various techniques of social administration.

We have seen the women in Cikin Gida and their various roles in the household. Each group plays a very important role in the security of the Sarki giving way to his well being and freedom from anxiety. The food he eats is well guarded, there is no chance
of any mishaps reaching it. The cook is a most trusted woman who has a stake and interest in keeping the Sarki safe. The food is cooked either by Mai Babban Daki or Uwar Soro. Then when it is finished, the Kwarkwara in charge of feeding the Sarki takes the food and conveys it to Soron Sarki. On her way nobody is allowed to move about until she passes out of sight. Male persons stand still and women kneel down until she passes out of sight. This measure prevents any chance of the food being hijacked or poisoned on its way.

Women in the Gidan Rumfa are also part of the economic security apparatus of the Palace. They play the various roles of social actors, mediators, conflict preventors, negotiators and educators. Women are very important as cradle pushers and rockers; they could make and unmake the children under their care. They are the ones in-charge of children in their crucial stage of development. Educating them and empowering them is educating and empowering the whole nation.
Poverty and Insecurity: Theoretical And Empirical Issues

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Introduction
Given the sheer size of its land mass, forest resources sea and water resources, and different soil types, Nigeria is placed at an advantageous position vis-à-vis other countries of the world to be endowed with abundant mineral/natural/physical and material resources. These resources are still being explored and exploited.

According to Africa Recovery magazine (1998) Nigeria’s wealth in energy and solid minerals exceeds that of South Africa. Proven oil reserve is put at 25 billion barrels and further exploitation could increase the reserve to 40 billion barrels, Shell geologists estimated that Nigeria’s untapped off-shore oil reserves at about 8 billion barrels. Records have also placed Nigeria as the 7th largest exporter of oil in the world proven reserves of natural gas deposits were also estimated at about 80 billion cubic feet. Experts have asserted that if these resources can be exploited continuously for domestic use and export, it can last for over 100 years.

It was documented that Nigeria is endowed with the 10th largest natural gas reserves in the world. Nigeria is said to be the largest producer of Columbite in the world and possesses large deposit of Tin, iron ore, Uranium, Limestone, Lead, Zinc Gold and Coal. In terms of earning, from oil, Nigeria has earned about U.S $280 billion exports since the early 1970s and this was equivalent to 90% of the total income or GNP of the whole countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite Nigeria’s enormous wealth, it has also been a major recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 80% of which goes to the oil sector. Available data suggest that FDI in Nigeria in the period 1997 -2001 has on the average amounted to US $1,184 million per year (CBN 2001).

Despite all the aforementioned resource strength of Nigeria it was ranked among the 25 poorest countries in the world some time in 1998. As far back as 1992 40% of Nigerians were poor. Since then the figure has been rising. For instance, in 1996 Federal Office of Statistics (F.O.S) reported that 66% of Nigerians live below the poverty line. Africa Recovery magazine of 1998 reported that 2/3 of Nigerians were poor. It is also reported that 80% of Nigerian poor were said to be residing in rural areas. Women were also said to constitute the bulk of the poor.

Total Federal Government expenditure on health sector has been declining in the last decade except in 1998 when it was about 3.7%. Even in that year the whole expenditure as a % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was only 0.4% compared to the minimum 5% recommended by WHO (Egwuatu, 2002). The same
trend was observed in the social services sector, such as education, housing and water supply, between 1990-1998. For instance, the combined share of the health and education sectors in the Federal Government expenditure was less than that of defence in 1991-1992. Equally, within the entire period of 1990-1998 the Federal Government expenditure never reached 10% (Egwuatu, 2002). This is far away from the COMPACT 20/20 agreement which recommends that developing countries should at least commit 20% of their budgetary expenditure to basic social services if they really want to achieve a reduction in human deprivation and poverty.

Theoretical And Empirical Issues

The concept of poverty

The new global call for sustainable development has coincided with an emphasis on poverty alleviation in the decade of the 1990s. This is more pertinent to sub-Saharan Africa, where, on the average, 45 to 50 percent of the people live below the poverty line. This of course is a much higher proportion than in any other region of the world except South Asia (World Bank, 1996; Mbaku, 1994). Poverty is one of the main symptoms or manifestations of underdevelopment. It has adverse effect on the people, national economies and the political and social development of the affected countries. Because poverty affects many aspects of the human condition, including physical, moral, and psychological, a concise and universally accepted definition of poverty is elusive. Different criteria have been used to conceptualize poverty. Most analysts follow the conventional view of poverty as the absence of sufficient income for securing basic goods and services. The concern here is with the individual ability to command resources to achieve this (Sen, 1981; Amis and Rakodi, 1994).

Many other experts have conceptualised the poor as the portion of the population that is unable to meet basic nutritional needs (Ojha, 1970; Reuthriger and Selowsky, 1976). Others view poverty, in part, as a function of education, health, life expectancy, and infant mortality. Musgrave and Ferber (1976) identify the poor, using the criteria of the level of consumption and expenditure. Poverty is related to entitlements (Sen, 1983), which are taken to be the various bundles of goods and services over which one has command, taking into cognizance the means by which such goods are acquired (e.g. money, coupons etc.) and the availability of the needed goods. Yet, other experts see poverty in very broad terms, such as being unable to meet basic needs—physical (food, health care, education, shelter, etc.) and non-physical (participation, identity etc.) requirements of a meaningful life (Streeten, 1979; Blackwood and Lynch, 1994).

Evolution of Poverty in Nigeria
In spite of the abundant human and natural resources with which the country is endowed, the scope and depth of poverty experienced today has brought with it a plethora of socio-political crises. It is however, necessary to begin with a critical analysis of the Nigerian economy noting that a successful poverty alleviation programme depends on a thorough assessment and understanding of the nature and causes of poverty in the country.

Indeed the history of the Nigerian economy shows that people were engaged in traditional economic activities such as farming, hunting, teaching, fishing etc. These activities were not only self-sustaining, but they had a sufficient capacity for the growth and development of the country. Indeed the causes of poverty in Nigeria could be assessed from two theoretical perspectives viz; the conventional economics and the political perspective. There is some interdependence between the causes and thus some inter-relationship between the remedies as given by both perspectives.

Resource gap, mismanagement of resources, corruption and slow rate of growth in output are two principal context within which conventional economics discuss the causes of poverty. This thought explains that poverty is the collective consequences of certain sectoral distortions, shortages or the inevitable results of limited recourses (Edozien, 1975; Dike, 1997).

While Nigeria always had a large population of poor people, the incidence of poverty has been changing overtime, though not in a consistent pattern. The period from 1980 to 1985 was one of increasing poverty in Nigeria. Total factor productivity in Nigeria declined steadily from 1970s to the mid–1980s. Real average family income in the rural areas and average unskilled labour real wage, in both rural and urban areas, declined throughout the period. Gross domestic products at factor cost in 1987 prices declined at an average annual rate of 1.8 percent between 1981 and 1985. Agricultural production stagnated and rate of unemployment increased.

**Measurement of Poverty**

The initial attempts to measure poverty were made more than a century ago by Booth, (1889), Rowntree (1901) and Naoroji (1901) (See Anyanwu 1997). While Booths and Rowntrees’ studies were focussed on the urban cities of London and New York, Naoroji’s was directed at estimating the extent of poverty. These initial attempts were intended to identify poverty lines, hence it was only later that poverty profiles and indicators were introduced. Also, the initial axiomatically based measure of poverty was not introduced into the debate until 1976, by Sen.

In quantifying poverty and identifying the poor, there are two obvious basic requirements. First, the measure of the standard of living is used (consumption approach) in order to distinguish different individuals, households and countries from each other. Second, a ‘cut off point’–the ‘poverty line’ is chosen which separates those identified as poor from non-poor (Ravallion and
Huppi, 1991; Kanbur, 1990). The second requirement is how the degree of poverty relative to a particular poverty line is measured and how this is aggregated across those who are termed as poor.

The literature has identified a number of desirable properties for poverty measures. Basic among these properties are the monitoring axiom, the transfer axiom, and addictive decomposability. The measure of poverty should increase when the income of the poor household, for instance, decreases (the monitonicity axiom) or when income is transferred from a poor to a less poor household (the transfer axiom). These properties imply that one desires the measure of poverty to take account of the distribution of living standards among the poor, not simply to indicate how many people are poor (based on the focus axiom, looking at the household’s income only). Another desirable property is that the measure of poverty be additively decomposable by population sub-group, so that aggregate poverty can be represented as an appropriately weighted sum of poverty levels in the component subgroup of a population.

As noted earlier, absolute poverty measures refer exclusively to the well-being of those who are defined as poor, hence suggesting that the condition of the poor only, and not of the overall society, is important. There are seven kinds of absolute poverty measures: the headcount ratio/ incidence of poverty, the poverty gap/ income shortfall, disparity of income distribution, composite poverty measures, the physical quality of life index (PQLI), the augmented physical quality of life index (APQLI), and the human development index (HDI).

Structure and Composition of Poverty in Nigeria
Recent studies have indicated that universally, poverty is predominantly gender biased. For instance, studies by the World Bank show that women earn only 10% of the world income and own less than 10% of the world’s property. The studies also indicate that of the absolutely poor, more than 70% are women.

In recent years, the issue of poverty has become a major concern at both the international and local levels. Because of the multidimensional nature of poverty and the threat it poses to human kind and societal development, many studies have been carried out on the structure and composition of poverty at different levels.

The World Development Report (1990), estimated that more than one billion people in the developing world were living under poverty. However, it has been reported that the incidence of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is worse than anywhere else in the world (World Bank, 1996). Indeed Nigeria’s poverty rating within the sub-region is very low. For instance, the under-five mortality rate for Nigeria was 191 per thousand against the sub-regional figure of 170.

In a report on ‘Poverty and Human Development in Africa’ the UNDP (1990) ranked Nigeria among the 35 poorest nations of
78 least developed countries of the world. Another report by UNDP (1996) ranked Nigeria within the global context as 137 out of a total of 174 member countries. In the World Bank report of poverty assessment in Nigeria (1996), it was shown that non-poor households spend about four times as much as money than poor households can afford. The report also indicates that poor households have more children than non-poor households.

Indeed while more studies are being carried out, they are becoming more comprehensive and articulate. One of such studies was conducted by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER). The report discussed the impact of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) on Nigerian Agriculture and Rural Life (1992).

In an overview of the symptoms of poverty in the Nigerian rural sector, the World Bank report enumerated a number of factors, such as bad roads, small farm holding and poor credit facilities among others. It also posited that poor people could not afford decent housing and clothing.

According to the World Bank Report, the regional Variation in Poverty is worsened by the largely ‘agricultural economy with a fragile agro-climatic environment and a different socio-economic history’. Another study on the ‘poverty profile for Nigeria’ was recently conducted by the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS, 1999). In the report, Kaduna and Katsina State combined, had 67.7% poverty incidence as at 1996. However this report did not disaggregate between rural and urban poverty for each state. It also presents a generalised view of rural poverty, which increased from 46.1% in 1992 to 69.8% in 1996. In addition, the report made a broad analysis of poverty situation in Nigeria by considering age, household size, education occupation and gender.

In the proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference of the zonal research units of the CBN (1998), zonal studies were conducted on the situation of poverty in Nigeria. Thus in a study titled “a profile of regional/ zonal poverty in Nigeria: the case of Ibadan zone”, it was deduced that poverty problem increased over a period of 1992 - 1997. In another survey conducted by CBN and assisted by the World Bank (1999) the incidence of poverty in Nigeria was assessed using the economic and living conditions of the poor as a base. Consequently, a nation-wide survey of household head was conducted within the country. Using descriptive and deductive method of analysis, the survey indicated that poverty increased to 69.2% in 1997 up from 34.1% of 1992/93.

**Poverty Alleviation Efforts in Nigeria**

One of the anti-poverty measures introduced by the government in 1996 budget is the payment of negative income tax by the low income earners whose total annual income is less than N10,000. By 1982 the oil boom receded and oil glut surfaced which led to the fall in the government revenue earnings. Before the end of 1982, Nigeria was caught in the throes of depression and found her
self among the league of highly indebted nations (HIPC) and hence among the poorest nations. Since 1982 there have been attempts by successive governments to alleviate the high rate of poverty and improve the performance of agricultural sector. See Table 1 for the summaries of the various poverty alleviation programmes by successive governments in Nigeria from 1986 to date.

Table 1: Anti-Poverty Programmes by Government in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Target group</th>
<th>Nature of Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Directorate for Food, Roads And Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI)</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Rural Areas</td>
<td>Feeder roads, rural water supply and electrification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>People’s Bank of Nigeria (PBN)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Underprivileged in urban and rural areas</td>
<td>Encouraging savings and Credit facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Community Bank (CB)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Rural residence, Micro-enterprise in Urban Areas.</td>
<td>Banking facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Family Economic Advancement Programme (FEAP)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Rural Areas</td>
<td>Credit facilities to support the Establishment of cottage industries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>National Poverty Alleviation and Eradication Programme NPAEP</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Unemployed youth and under privileged</td>
<td>Training of youth in different skills and Provision of Social security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from, Suleiman (2002), p. 7.

The Link Between Poverty and Insecurity

The theoretical model of the economics of crime was first propounded by Becker (1968) and later given an empirical content by Ehrlich (1973). The basic argument of the model is explained by an assumption that society is divided into 2 classes: The poor and the non-poor with their resources or income (N) such that:

\[ u_P < u_{NP} \]

Where

- \( U \) = Resources or income
- \( P \) = Poor
- \( < \) = Less than \( Np \) = Non-poor

It follows that engaging in crime brings a benefit, if successful, but yields a loss if caught, in which case, a sanction becomes inevitable. The theory also postulates that an individual will opt for criminal activity if his or her expected utility of crime is higher.
than in legal activity. However, the theory was quick to point out the influence of cultural or sociological factors on crime. In particular, the degree of honesty and morality within a society. In this respect the theory predicts high level of crime and insecurity in societies where morality and honesty are low, and categorized the wage earned by members of society into two: an honest wage (Wh) or dishonest wage (Wd) and predicts that a moral person may prefer the honest wage.

According to the model, the crime rate, which is a replica of insecurity, depends positively on the extent of poverty as measured by the proportion of poor people and on the potential relative gain that criminals made by engaging in crime.

\[
\text{Crime rate} = f(\text{Poverty} + \text{Relative gain})
\]

Where
\[
f = \text{function}
\]

**Discussion and Analysis**

In this section an attempt is made by way of discussion and analysis to pinpoint the salient features of the model in both explicit and implicit form using symbols where appropriate.

In symbolic expression, the model linking poverty and crime (insecurity) seems to suggest that the following variables influence crime and insecurity in societies.

\[
\text{Crime (insecurity)} = f(P, RG, CF, PC, SS, WP, IHP, ASM)
\]

Where:

- **P** = Degree of poverty in society
- **RG** = Relative gain in criminal/illegal activity
- **CF** = Cultural factors i.e. Degree of honesty and morality
- **PC** = The probability of being caught
- **SS** = Size of the sanction/punishment on criminals or illegal activities
- **WP** = Size of wage paid to the police
- **IHP** = Incentives for honesty in the police force
- **ASM** = Absence of social mobility/capacity for self improvement

Other perceptions and thoughts derived from the model include the propositions that:

- Any increase in relative urban poverty increases the incentives for people to switch to illegal activities. On this Ehrlich (1973) has found that poverty and inequality have helped explain spatial differences in criminality in industrial countries.
- The prospect of permanently rather than temporarily low relative income may tempt some individuals towards illegal activity.
- Poverty necessarily means inequality in income and opportunities and create ill feelings among members of society, which in turn exacerbates insecurity.
- From the economists point of view, crime is not a social
loss because it may be considered as equivalent to a transfer from victims to criminals.

- When private and public crime protection benefits only the rich, the relative poverty that may be responsible for criminology has an additional social cost. This means whatever crime remains will necessarily be directed towards the middle class and poor. Thus, both criminals and victims would have to be found in the lower range of the income distribution.

- High level of crime and by extension insecurity undermines the social and economic climate and weakens investment by both domestic and international entrepreneurs.

- The probability of being a victim of crime should increase with an increase in income. But, the opposite might occur where there is private protection against crime or a high income bias in policing. The 1988 Brazilian household survey has confirmed the above proposition. It was found that for theft and robbery, the victimization rate clearly increases with income (Bourdigoignon, 1999).

### The Economic and Social Cost of Crime and Insecurity

The immediate social cost is the insecurity felt by all citizens regardless of whether they are victims of crime or not. The immediate economic cost that affects the whole society is the disruption of production activities and the disincentive effects on domestic and foreign investment.

In a systematic form, the losses incurred due to insecurity and crime can be categorised into direct and indirect cost. The direct cost includes:

1. The pain and suffering of the victims
2. The cost of crime prevention
3. The cost of the judicial system
4. The cost of sanctions on convicted criminals or arsonists
5. The forgone earnings due to imprisonment

The direct cost may be summed up to be the negative effects of crime and insecurity on overall economic activity in the society.

In the specific case of property crime (or transfers) part of the wealth of the victims may be destroyed in the process. In addition to what the victims lose, other cost they may incur include medical expenses, time spent dealing with the police or justice personnel. In the case of homicides or ethnic/tribal or religious killings there is the loss of human capital. In terms of overall governmental spending on crime in relation to GNP or GDP, Table 2 gives a picture of the magnitude.

### Table 2: Statistical Cost of Crime in U.S. and Latin America (1996) as a % of GDP
### Recommendations

**Newly Suggested Strategies/Approaches to Poverty Alleviation and Reduction of Insecurity**

The Government must renew its commitment to the adequate funding of Basic Social Services (BSS) using the Oslo (1996) integrated components which comprise:

- (a) Basic education
- (b) Primary health care
- (c) Nutrition Programme
- (d) Reproductive health & Population programmes
- (e) Safe drinking water & adequate sanitation.

From the available statistics, public expenditure on these sectors have been on the decline at both Federal and State levels.

- The Government must salvage the manufacturing sector. In my view existing and past strategies tend to give too much emphasis to micro initiatives and in sufficient attention to the impact of macro policy on the poor. The usual emphasis is on micro credit scheme, training and skills provision.

- However, these strategies though important should be supplemented by sound policies at the center with the hope that they will enhance the performance of manufacturing industry so that it can regain full capacity utilization, expand operation, provide jobs, foreign exchange earnings and absorb the products of micro enterprise, SME’s and other informal sector activities which will further promote their growth.

- The government must build an investment climate that facilities the growth of private sector and simultaneously empower poor people to participate in that growth.

How can these be done or achieved? First empowering poor people means providing them with opportunity to obtain education and health care. It also means reducing the risks in their economic activities, agricultural or other off-farm activities, as well as involving them in the key decisions that affect them and their families.

Two, providing good investment climate implies provision of right policies, right institutions and the promotion of good behaviour in those institutions so that economic actors/entrepreneurs can find their investments worthwhile. The notion of good investment climate extends beyond good policies to include right institutions, good governance, stability and qualitative...
infrastructure. Seen in this broad way, good investment climate clearly depends on public and private sector action and behaviour.

The Link between good investment climate and the empowerment of poor people and reduction of poverty
Good investment climate will enable members of society with big small business to revise their opinion about the riskiness of their ventures. Potential entrants will also be motivated to enter the industry of their choice. Existing firms will expand their scale. The combined effect of all these will be a boost to economic activity, as micro enterprises, Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (SMES) and large firms as well as the informal sector will all benefit. So, the poor could be gradually empowered as a result of good investment climate.

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, future strategies of poverty alleviation in Nigeria must recognize the need to create good investment climate so that existing small and medium as well as large-scale firms could expand and propel the growth of micro enterprises and the informal sector activities. This will no doubt enable the poor to be empowered and be able to participate in the development process.

Other supplementary strategies of poverty alleviation include enhancement of government expenditure on Basic Social Services (BSS) and salvaging the manufacturing industry through appropriate policies that can mitigate the negative effects of liberalization/Globalization policies on their growth.

Conclusion (Policy Focus)
One can hardly doubt that poverty and insecurity can be tackled from two fronts: more government spending to capacitate the poor (carrot approach) and more government spending to make the law enforcement agencies more effective (stick approach). But, due to resource limitations in developing countries, the strategy of poverty alleviation and insecurity control suggested in this paper is the carrot approach. This is in line with the principle of ‘prevention is better than cure’ or the principle of ‘It is better to prevent than to punish’. The other rationale of this strategy relative to the other one is that more government spending to capacitate the poor many diminish the need for more spending on law enforcement agencies. It is also a fact that criminals or criminal organizations may grow more powerful to prevent or neutralize more spending on law enforcement agencies.

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Session 3

The Future
The Question of Sovereignty, Security and Justice in Kanem-Borno History

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That the Kingdom of Kanem as already a well-established State in the ninth century A.D. is no longer in dispute. What is in dispute is for how long the kingdom existed before Al-Yaqubi wrote his account. The first written reference to Kanem was Al-Yaqubi in 891, an Arab Geographer who gave us an idea of how Kanem was established around this period. But it was not until the eleventh century that the kingdom began to develop as an Islamic State under its ruler Mai Humay Ibn Abduljalil (1096-1108).

This was a major landmark for the State as thereafter Kanem was to be seen as an Islamic State, governed according to the Shari’a, which became the law of the land. This development also implied that henceforth the issues relating to sovereignty, security and justice should be seen within the context of the wider Islamic law, principles and values. Indeed, certain traces of the traditional system of governance were retained subject to their conformity with the laws of Islam.

Kanem was then regarded as Dar-al-Islam, providing free access and entry to all Muslims but with the right to defend its territories and frontiers from enemies and belligerent States. The kingdom had the right to defend its citizens from aggressors and provide them with the freedom of movement not only from within the State but even when they were on foreign land. This position was emphatically put forward by Mai Uthman Ibn Idris in c.1394 when the wrote to Barquq the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt when the Judham Arabs attacked and invaded Kanem. According to Mai Uthman.

To the great King of Egypt, the blessed land of God... We have sent to you our envoy, my cousin, Idris B. Muhammad, in connection with a problem which we encountered. The Arabs called the Judhama and others have enslaved our free subjects—women, children, weak men, our relatives and other Muslims. Some of these Arabs are polytheists, apostates outside the fold of the faith. They raided the Muslims and killed a great number of them during a war which broke between us and
our enemies... they killed our king, Amr B. Idris, the Martyr—that is our brother, son of our father al-Hajj Idris b. Alhaji Ibrahim.³

The incidence referred to in this correspondence was the invasion of Borno by the Arabs from Egypt in the fourteenth century when the Sayfawa were engaged in a civil war with the Bulala. The Judhama Arabs who were believed to be the ancestors of the Shuwa Arabs of Borno having arrived in Borno joined the Bulala in this war against the Sayfawa Mais. Mai Uthman began by attempting to establish his credentials, attributes and the legitimacy of his position. He made it known to Barquq that he was “the noble King, the sword of Islam, the spring of the orphans, the brave warrior, the protector of the affairs of the merciful, the victorious commander at every time and place, the just and pious ruler, the pride of religion, the ornament of Islam, the ‘Pole’ (qutb) of sainthood, the descendant of the noble fathers, the cave of secrets, the bright lamp.”⁴

Although, Mai Uthman claimed that these were the words of his scribe, he must have accepted them since he had allowed the release of the correspondence. But more significant than the foregoing assumption was the claim by the Mai that they (the dynasty) “are the children of Sayf b. Dhi Yazan, the ancestor of our tribe who was an Arab from the clan of Quraish.”⁵ By this desperate attempt to trace his ancestry, the Mai seemed to have “justified” the legitimacy of his position not only in the eyes of his subject but also another monarch in a powerful sovereign State of Egypt. Based probably on these assumptions, Mai Uthman went further to challenge Barquq on his responsibility as the King of Egypt.⁶

God has placed in your hands the Government of Egypt from the sea (i.e. Mediterranean) to Aswan but your dominions have become a market place (for slavery). Send forth messengers to all your lands (to search for captives from Borno) and if they (the captives) say ‘we are free men–we are Muslims’ believe them and do not regard them as liars... Allow them to return to their liberty and their faith.⁷

Mai Uthman found it necessary to back his actions with extensive reference to the Qur’an and Hadith not only to show the legitimacy of his position but also to demonstrate his depth of learning and
knowledge. Of particular significance was his reference to the Hadith of the Prophet (S.A.W.) that “the Sultan is the show of God upon earth at which the wronged takes refuge” and that “the obligation of commanding the good is incumbent upon those who have dominion over the Earth (i.e. the Sultans) and upon those who are associated with the authority (i.e. the qadis, the governors and emirs)... We beseech you–to command these wicked Arabs to desist from their evil... You are shepherds all of you, and you are in charge of your herds.”

No doubt, the contents of the letter of Mai Uthman had raised a great deal of astonishment and probably even anger at the court of the Sultan of Egypt. During this period Borno must have been regarded as a great power to reckon with and even a threat to Egypt. This view is supported by the several pilgrimages undertaken by the rulers of Kanem prior to this period with great pomp, pageantry and display of wealth and power while going through the city of Cairo. In the process of defending the sovereignty of the State and the legitimacy of their positions the rulers of Kanem had to come into conflict with other sovereign nations. This was exactly what happened between the Mai Uthman of Borno and the Sultan Barquq of Egypt. Be that as it may, the most important question that comes to the forefront was the responsibility of the State to its citizens. As could be seen from the foregoing, it was the matter of security, defence and justice that was the most central. These have come out very clearly from the position taken by Mai Uthman against his rival, Barquq of Egypt. To justify his actions, Mai Uthman found it necessary to establish the sovereignty of his State and the legitimacy of his position. But more than the issue of his ancestry and his personal attributes was his determination to protect the citizens of Borno even in a foreign land like Egypt.

Indeed a few questions have emerged from the Uthman–Barquq correspondence which are relevant to the theme of this paper. First, Mai Uthman regarded himself as the Head and leader of a Sovereign State. Secondly, the legitimacy of his position could only be established if he succeeded in protecting and preserving the sovereignty of his State and the freedom of his subjects. Thirdly, sovereignty was only justified if he protected the lives, freedom and welfare of his subjects. Fourth, he was proud to make
it known to Barquq that he derived his authority from the Qur’an, the Hadith and other well-established sources of Islamic jurisprudence. Fifth, and perhaps the most controversial for the Islamic world of the time was his claim of the role of teaching the Egyptians the proper tenets of the faith in relation to the rights and privileges of Muslims in the Dar-al-Islam.11 Sixth, the sum total of all this was that justice must be done to protect the faithful in whatever situation they found themselves.12

As we may see later, the issue of sovereignty, security and justice has remained a recurring and consistent theme throughout Kanem-Borno history. It was also for these and other related reasons that the rulers of Kanem-Borno assumed a universalistic role and approach to crises situation facing the State. This concept of universalism appeared to have encouraged them to view all such crises within their global context.13

From the content of Sultan Uthman’s letter it appeared very clear that all the apparatus of government meant to ensure the security and welfare of the citizenry had already been well established in Borno. He made reference to the emirs, viziers, the qadis, the governors and the ulama and market supervisors who should be vested with the responsibility for ensuring that justice was done.14 The issue of Justice was central to his communication with the Egyptian Government. In a show of anger and disappointment with the enslavement of the free citizens of Borno by the invading Egyptians Sultan Uthman had this to say:

Some of the Arabs, indeed, spread corruption to our land and are good for nothing. They are ignorant of the Book of Allah and the Sunna of our Messenger, and they regard wickedness and attractive occupation. Fear God, therefore, and do not let them enslave our people... (God) said to his Prophet ‘Judge among them according to what God has sent down and do not follow their passion.15

There is no doubt that by the beginning of the fifteenth century Borno had already emerged as a strong military and political power in the Central Bilad-ad-Sudan and its only political rival was Egypt. Nevertheless, the internal conflicts created by the encounter with Bulala the Judham Arabs continued in the land of Kanem, which also forced the various groups to struggle for the control of the scarce resources available to them.
The decision of the Sayfawa Mais to move out of the land of Kanem in the North Eastern part of the Lake Chad to Borno which lay to the South Western part of the Lake gave them a more secure base to establish a more stable government and an administrative structure which focused more on the matter of security and justice.\(^{16}\) The new capital Birni Gazargamo which was founded by Mai Ali Gaji in c. 1470 was to become a formidable defensive city, a center of commerce and political activities. Here, the rulers, their courtiers, emirs, security chiefs and scholars assembled in considerable numbers to direct the affairs of the State. From Garzargamo the Sayfawa rulers also grew from strength to strength extending their hegemony to their ancient home of Kanem and to Bagirmi Waday and Darfur to the East, while to the West they controlled and offered protection to Hausa land and Damagaran. To the South the Sayfawa rulers suppressed the incursions of the Jukun while they completely subdued the Ngizim and the Bade who defied their authority.\(^{17}\)

The effect of the coming of the Sayfawa Mais to Borno was to bring about peace, stability, security of lives and property and rule of law to the people of the entire region. The East-West trade routes linking Borno with Hausaland were secured while the flow of traffic along the Saharan routes was adequately guaranteed. It was this security condition that made it possible for the various European traders such as Leo Africanus, Giovanni Lorenzo D’anania, Denham Clapperton and Oudney, Richardson, Henry Barth and Nachtigal to visit the Western and Central Bilad-al-Sudan.\(^{18}\)

For the Sayfawa rulers, peace, security and stability could only thrive if there was good governance and justice. They established in Borno an elaborate and effective political system and administrative structure from the capital Birni Gazargamo to the provinces and emirates. In the capital the Mai was assisted by his Wazir, the members of the Majlas (Majlis) which included officers such as the Yerima–the Governor of Yeri province; the Qadi Mainyin Kenandi–the Chief Justice, the Talba the judge of the Mai’s Court and “Head of the Police Affairs”, the Kaigama–the commander in chief and a host of scholars conferred with the title of Shettima.\(^{19}\) The Imam-ul-Kabir and the Imam-ul-Idaini were also members of the Council. The Galtima (Galadima) the
governor of the Western Province in charge of the Hausa States and Damagaram also attended the Council meetings.

The entire Kingdom was divided into Provinces and Emirates administered by Mai’s subordinates. For instance, the Province of Arjino in the North was administered by the Zanna Arjinoma who was vested with the responsibility of defending the Northern frontiers against the Tubus and the Tuaregs; the Province of Kazal was under the supervision of the Zanna Kazalma, while Duji was administered by the Zanna Dujima. One unique feature of the Sayfawa administration in Borno was that the Provincial governors known as the Chima Kura resided in the capital while their subordinates the Chima Gana administered the territory on their behalf. There were also officers of the same rank selected from among the various ethnic groups and vested with the responsibility of administering and supervising their territories and tribes. These tribal Heads were known as the Chima Jilibe and like the Chima Chidibe, the more Senior ones resided in the Capital and attended the Mai’s Sessions (Nogena) daily.

Uppermost in their responsibility was to guarantee peace and security in their territories particularly in the provision of safe passage to travellers along the trade routes. Justice was administered by the Qadis in the provinces and those aggrieved had the right of appeal to the Mai’s Court. Markets were administered through the professionals and the designated leaders such as the Mala Kasuube (Head of the Market), Mala Kaalmabe (Head of the blacksmiths), Mala Mundulmabe (Head of the Leatherworkers), and many others. Channels of communication and the chain of command were elaborate and well established for the free flow of information and decision-making.

Islam continued to be recognized as the State religion and all officers of the State were clearly mandated to propagate the Islamic faith and ensure its strict adherence in administration, justice and all public affairs. They were to be guided by the Qur’an, the Hadith and the Ijma, and where there was dispute the Qadis of the Mai’s Court had to intervene and issue the Fatwa.

From the fifteenth century onwards the kingdom of Borno attracted a large number of immigrants particularly from the North and North Eastern part of the Lake Chad, which were exposed to the continuous desiccation of the Sahara and civil wars. Borno
became a safe haven for various groups of people and the process of urbanization took place in many areas. Apart from Birni Gazargamo the capital, there were other cities such as Damasak, Nguru, Ngilewa, Dapchi, Jimbam, Ballara, Mufiyo, Marte, Mintar, Marguba, Dikwa, Auno, Biu and Amsaka. Some of these were major commercial centers and had even survived to the present day. Population movements into Borno raised the serious question of citizenship to all Muslims by virtue of being the Dar-al-Islam. This was, however, subject to the local chiefs—the Chima being satisfied about the nationality, background and the conduct of the migrants. Settlement in any part of the State involved acquisition of land, commerce and allegiance to the Mai and the laws of the land. Movements of traders, and migrant communities were monitored to ensure that the peace of the State was not disturbed.

Perhaps, the most effective means of ensuring peace and stability in the State was the rigorous process of integration, assimilation and Islamization, which the Sayfawa Mais pursued. One clear example was the case of the Judham Arab cited above, a group who came as invaders but later settled down and remained part of the Borno Society to this date. The Shuwas who were descendants of these Arabs had in spite of all their resistance to the Sayfawa rule gradually become assimilated into the wider Kanuri and Borno society. This process of integration becomes more apparent during the reign of Mai Idris Alauma (1570 -1603). Mai Idris fought several wars in his time as clearly brought out in the accounts of his Imam–Ahmed Ibn Fartua. But most of these wars were undertaken to defend the territory, expand the frontiers of the kingdom in order to subdue or control rebellions and belligerent groups and provide security to merchants. Territories, which were conquered were administered by their own Chima Jilibe who were responsible directly to the Mai. For instance, after a fierce and prolonged battle with the Ngizim, the Mai appointed one Bultu as the Dallatu of the Ngizim people. Bultu was the leader of the Ngizim who led his people to pay allegiance to Mai Idris after his defeat and even joined the Sayfawa army during an expedition against the Bulala in Kanen. In the case of the Babur (Pabir) people of Biu the Mai delegated his entire power to the Mai Ali Yamta of Biu to lead the Borno army in a battle against Amsaka. The Borno army in most of their battle consisted of different tribal
groups such as the Koyam who had specialized in desert warfare and the Ngizim who were great archers and had excelled in the use of arrows. By the closing decade of the sixteenth century, Borno had emerged a much stronger Nation and the Sayfawa whenever on their way to the battlefield moved along as an entire Nation. Imam Ahmed was emphatic about the object of these wars—to provide security, protect merchants and travellers.27

Thus we have taken in hand to narrate the mode of life of our Sultan and what he did, in a history of his reign and his wars and camps, and his clearing the roads for merchants, though we cannot pretend to give a thorough and full account of his enterprises...To God belong the secret sins and in His hands is direction, and prevention, and prohibition and sanction. All the people had recourse to the sacred Sharia, putting aside worldly intrigues in their disputes and affairs, big or little.28

Borno under the Sayfawa rule in the sixteenth century assured the role of a super power in the region. During this period the only other super powers of the Islamic world were the Ottoman Sultanate and the Saadi Morocco of Mulay Ahmed al Mansur. Both were aware of Borno’s hegemony in the Central Bilad-al-Sudan. Songhay under the Askias was another strong power of the time but remained under threats of conquest by Morocco. In view of the enormous political and military power wielded by the Sayfawa Mais, Borno also assumed the role of policing in the entire region. Having secured their Northern, Eastern and Southern frontiers, the Sayfawa directed their attention to certain parts of Hausa-land not only for defensive purpose but also to maintain law and order. This was one of the major reasons for the expedition against Kano in the 1570s by Mai Idris Alaum as narrated by Imam Ahmed.29

Or again his war with the people of Kano, during the time they built many ‘stockades in their land seeking to harm the land of Borno. They kept raiding and carrying off plunder (from merchants) and flying to their stockades and walled towns... so they did, till our Sultan attacked them with lofty purpose and aim, and destroyed all their defense except the stock’ called Dala.30

It was clear from the foregoing accounts that the Sayfawa were disturbed by these attacks on merchants, which seriously affected
the free flow of trade between Borno and Hausaland. The objective for an expedition against Kano appears neither to have been conquest nor Empire building. This could be deduced from the Imam’s reference to “lofty purpose and aim.” For the Sayfawa, economic, commercial and cultural relationship between Borno and Hausa-land was a major and primary objective. In their opinions all impediments to such relationship must be removed. In such situations, the main objective of warfare or military expedition was to bring about peace. Indeed, such goals had been achieved by the Sayfawa in many respects. For instance, after several decades of war between the Sayfawa and the Sau we hear no more about the latter’s activities after their encounter with Idris Alauma. Nor did we hear of the Bulala after the conquest of Kanem, and likewise the Ngizim remained fully integrated into the State.

It is necessary to state here, in conclusion, that the Kingdom of Kanem-Borno become a stabilizing factor in the Central and Western Bilad-al-Sudan since the fifteenth Century and continued so up to the nineteenth century. The Sayfawa had built a formidable Nation, which outlived the dynasty. When Borno was attacked by the Jihad forces of Shehu Uthman Dan Fodiyo, the dynasty of the Sayfawa had already declined but the Nation survived and indeed flourished under a new dynasty of the Elkanemis. Borno was attacked partly by the Jihad leader due to its defence of Hausa-land and its rulers. This position was clearly brought out in the Elkanemi Bello’s correspondence. Elkanemi insisted in his defence that Borno was a sovereign Muslim State and there was no moral justification for the attack. Elkanemi was a highly enlightened leader and he established in Borno a founder of another dynasty that kept the Kingdom together. He believed in the sovereignty of the State and the people and he carried forward the concept of defence, security and justice from where the Sayfawa left. Even when he was confronted by the visiting explorers such as Denham, Oudney and Clapperton in 1824 on the issue of slavery and slave trade he attributed this to the Arabs in a similar manner Mai Uthman Ibn Idris communicated with Sultan Barquq of Egypt in the fourteenth century. Said Elkanemi to Denham.
You say, also, that the sons of Adam should not sell one another, and you know everything! God has given you all great talents but what are we to do? The Arabs who come here will have nothing else but slaves: Why don’t you send us your merchants? You know us now; and let them (the Arab merchants) bring their women with them and live amongst us, and teach us what you talk to me about so often, to build houses and boats and make rockets.  

With the foregoing statement from Elkanemi it appeared a complete cycle between Mai Uthman Ibn Idris of the Sayfawa and Sheikh Mohammed el-Amen of the Elkanemi dynasty had been attained. Perhaps this study has raised many more questions for which answers have to be found. The concept of sovereignty, security and justice, war and peace, leadership and governance in pre-colonial times are beginning to be much more complex and relevant today. The state system we are considering in this study has preceded the European state structure and their systems of government. The modern State structure based on the Western models are crumbling almost by the day due to the lack of those values which the colonized people of the Western and Central Bilad-al-Sudan were familiar with. The modern Nation States, even the strongest advocates of Democracy and rule of law, have failed to guarantee peace, security of lives, property and justice for their citizenry. For many of the “copycats” particularly in Africa and other parts of the developing world, there will continue to be the need for a return to where they missed the road and adopt those cultures and traditions that guarantee the safety, freedom and protection of their citizenry.

Notes and References
3. Al-Qalgashandi, ibid.
4. In an editorial note Mai Uthman inserted the following words as addendum to his Scribe’s words “these words emanate from the tongue of our scribe and not from ours, since we do not boast.”
5. The Sayfawa claim of ancestry from Sayf ibn Dhi Yazan of Himyar cannot be so easily justified as a close examination of their genealogy makes this doubtful. See the Diwan Salatin Bornu, translated by Palmer as addendum
to Mai Idris of Bornu (1571–1583) p.84-91.

6. Mai Uthman’s extensive reference to the Qur’an, Hadith and Philosophy were meant not only to display his depth of knowledge but also to test Barquq’s knowledge as well. This development finds its parallel with the Elkanemi Bello’s correspondence about five hundred years later.


8. Ibid.

9. For instance, Mai Donuma Humemi performed the pilgrimage on three occasions but was drowned in the Red Sea on the fourth one. Each time he passed through Cairo with great pomp, pageantry and enormous amount of wealth. See the Diwan Salatin Bornu, op cit.

10. Here, it is our contention that the claim of distant ancestry such as Sayf ibn Dhi Yazan was not a sufficient justification of Mai Uthman’s legitimacy to leadership nor was it for Borno’s claim of sovereignty. In fact the Egyptian Court disputed this claim as reported by al-Qalqashandi. Legitimacy and sovereignty were only earned through the determination of the Mai to defend his people even in a foreign land and to challenge the powers of another sovereign State.

11. By telling Barquq that he (Barquq) had left the path of Allah, Mai Uthman was in fact waging a Jihad against the Egyptians.

12. Strangely enough Mai Uthman did not insist that the captives from Borno should be freed by the Egyptians whether or not they were guilty. He strongly advised that justice must be done.

13. In view of the international politics of the time Borno pursued this policy of “universalism”, finding it necessary to communicate with or even confront other sovereign States on matters affecting Islam and the citizens of the State.

14. The Mahram of Mai Selem ibn Kaday listed a number of titles and offices already in existence in Borno. See the Diwan Salatin Borno in Palmer Borno Sahara and Sudan, (John Murray, 1936).


17. No where was the defensive role of Borno in the entire region so clearly demonstrated than the poem composed by Dan Marina, the Katsina poet in celebration of the defeat of the Jukun by Mai Ali of Borno in the seventeenth century. See T. Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives, OUP, p. 178.

18. For various accounts of these travelers see T. Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives, ibid; Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa, 1822, 23 and 24 Vols. 1 and 2 Darf Publishers London, 1985 and other PRO and Co records.


20. Ibid. Duji is now located South-east of Damasak.

21. A good number of towns and villages which survive to the present day are also mentioned in the accounts of Imam Ahmad ibn Fartua, Mai Idris of Borno, op cit.
22. As a security measure the Sayfawa administrators in the field such as the Chimas and Amirs were under instruction to ensure that all migrant settlers in Borno were not criminals or fugitive offenders from other lands.

23. Process of integration appears to have been a dynamic and progressive policy pursued by the Sayfawa rulers which assured them of peace, loyalty and stability in the State.

24. In fact, even after Kanem was conquered by Mai Idris Alauma he established a garrison there under the leadership of the Khalifa of Kanem who was a member of the Bulala royal family. See the accounts of Imam Ahmad, in Mai Idris, op cit.

25. Imam Ahmad, ibid.

26. ibid.

27. For a more detailed account on the composition of the Sayfawa army and the directions of the various expeditions see Imam Ahmad, Mai Idris, ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. For the Kano expeditions of Mai Idris Alauma see Imam Ahmad p.1 1,30-31.

30. ibid.

31. Reference to “lofty purposes and aims” by the Imam appears to have confirmed the policing role of the Sayfawa Mais rather than mere conquest and Empire building.

32. After the wars of Mai Idris Alauma no more was heard of such dissident groups as the Sau, the Bulala and the Ngizim even though they remain part of the Kingdom of Borno.

33. Here, it is important that when the Sayfawa Mais were defeated by the Fulani leaders in Borno the Kingdom of Borno remained intact as a sovereign Nation State.

34. See the translations of Muhammad Bello’s Infaq-al-Maisur, in T. Hodgkin, Nigerian Perspectives, op cit, pp. 261-267. Bello argues that one of the reasons for the attack against Borno was the latter’s support for the Hausa states in defence during the Jihad.


36. Ibid.

37. Today many African States are in search for viable political systems–hence the blind pursuit for Western type of democratic models. Many have failed and are failing because they have kept farther and farther away from the pre-colonial value systems, state structure and concept of justice. The issue of peace and security of lives and property of the people can never be guaranteed under new and alien systems that have no relationship whatsoever with the norms, values and virtues which were known to the people for time immemorial.
Youth Deviance and Traditional Authority in Kano Metropolitan: Some Issues

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Introduction
The paper first of all begins with the definition of concepts in the title. An attempt will be made to back the discussion here with sociological theories and data from the works conducted in the area under study and other places.

Youth
Youth is a concept with a variety of definitions. The report of The Political Bureau (1997) classified youth as those between 16–30 years. This range conforms with the formal education years – from primary to post-secondary education. But not all youth have been opportuned to either go to or finish school. According to Last and Sa’id “youth include young adults in their twenties (20–29 years old). (1991:iv)”. Vision 2010 Report defined youth as persons aged from 12–30 years. In an earlier work Abdullahi (1982) defined youth as any person in the period between early childhood and old age. This permits further differentiation of youth stratum on the basis of seniority. For example youth of 19–24 years, 25–30 years and 31–36 years. Odekunle (2002) provides socio-economic variegation and typologies of youth: “male/female, educated/uneducated, employed/unemployed, rich/poor parental background stable/unstable family environment, able/disable etc”. He further described the youth as:

...a psycho-mental, socio-economic age category with certain time – honored attributes such as physical and mental agility, buoyancy, freshness, vigor, curiosity, deviance, vulnerability, malleability, a “can do it” disposition etc (2002:8).

A scholar says of them: “young men are fitter to invent than to judge, fitter for execution than for counsel; and fitter for new projects than for settled business”
According to the National Youth Policy, youth are all the young persons of ages 18–30 years. They have for long been making important contributions to the development of their individual societies in the areas of agriculture, defence, hunting, transmission of cultural values. This is in addition to the role they played during the colonial period and the struggle for self-rule. In present day Nigeria, youth contribute in protecting the nation from lawlessness within and defense against external aggression, manpower, and sports. Thus the youth are crucial to the survival of society, to day and tomorrow. To effectively function in this capacity as Sugarman maintains:

The survival of society requires that as members go through this phase (adolescence) in their lives, many of them should work hard at acquiring certain knowledge, skills and values. Failing this, important roles that require great expertise and dedication will not be filled adequately. Yet at this phase of their lives the young are undergoing considerable strain… and are exposed to the temptations of a youth culture (1968:71).

But to what extent can we say the position of all the Nigerian youth today conforms to the above? Stating “Where We Are”, The Vision 2010 report classified the problems confronting the Nigeria youth as follows:

Inadequate parental care, non-availability of suitable sports and recreational facilities, moral decadence in the society, lack of appropriate role models, religious fanaticism, cultism, political manipulation of youth organizations, unemployment, poor education, break down of family values; and indiscipline (1997:30).

Deviance
The second concept (in the title of this paper) to be looked into is “deviance”. Starting from looking at crime is likely to facilitate a clear understanding of deviance to be discussed here. Crime is generally defined as any behavior that violates criminal law. Tappan gives a more formal definition of crime as:

… an intentional act or omission in violation of criminal law… committed without defence or justification, and sanctioned by the state as a felony or misdemeanor (cited in Michalowski 1985:3)
Deviance is a behavior that violates the standards of conduct or expectation of a group or society. Deviance connotes violation of group norms, which may or may not be formally acknowledged as being part of a law. It is a broader concept that includes not only criminal law but also many actions that are not subject to prosecution.

Deviance according to Jary and Jary is:

…any social behavior, which departs from that regarded as ‘normal’ or socially acceptable within a society or social context. Whilst deviance includes criminal behavior, its sphere, is far wider…. Although there are some recurring elements among the forms of social behavior regarded as deviant within society, for the most part social deviance must be seen as a socially relative phenomenon, in that conceptions of normality and deviance are relative to social context and highly variable between different societies, different sub-cultures etc (1991:160–161).

Contemporary Map of Youth Deviance in Kano
This map is induced by the author’s research association with the Kano underworld (as researcher, research team member or students’ research supervisor) from 1980 to date. The map is motivated by the need to have clear understanding of the types of youth deviance as they exist today in the area under discussion. As such, the presentation of a map with distinct territories of various non-conforming activities of the youth should be seen as this author’s attempt to attract further discussion and research in the area.

The Map
The Map has three main areas as follows:

- **Conventional Deviance**
  - Theft (Armed Robbery and others)
    - Households
    - Vehicles
    - Animals
    - Gumama/Kasuwar tsaye
    - (stealing/selling of women clothes, jewelry
by women)

- **Deviance of Violence**
  - Daba (thuggery)
  - Daukar Amarya (bride snatching/abducting women for the purpose of group sex)
  - Banga (political body guards)
  - Soccer craze

- **Occupational Deviance**
  - Acaba (Commercial motorcycling)
  - Gadagi (a central nervous system stimulant in form of multi herbs tea usually served with or without milk and or sugar).
  - Cuwa-cuwa (illegal roadside selling of petroleum products)

- **Victimless Deviance**
  - Drug Abuse
  - Prostitution
  - Gambling

**Nature of Some Selected Forms of Deviance indicated on the map**

For some reasons, three among the deviant activities engaged in by Kano Youth shown in the map are briefly treated here.

**Daba**

Dan daba (pl. 'Yandaba) is the social actor. In day-to-day usage daba (pl. Dabobi) refers to a group of individuals–field chatting or play group. It is sometimes used to refer to the collection of hunters who normally camp in a far away locality before setting off for hunting expedition. According to Dan Asabe (1991), there are two views on Daba as gathered from his respondents. One that opined Daba originated from Barbushe, the leader of the first settlers around Dala Hill. The second view posited Daba started during the politics of the second republic. Daba in its original form is peculiar to Kano. But it is worth stating that similar deviant activities exist in Zaria–the ‘Yan Sara Suka (cutting and deepening of knife into the human body) and Lagos–Omo-Eko (the Area Boys).
The following are some of the *Dabobi* that existed/are existing from 1966 to date in and around Kano city. And, even though some early leaders may not be in control because of death, old age, imprisonment or sickness, most of the *Dabobi* listed below still exist:

1. *Dabar* Muhammadu Dagaza (Zage)
2. *Dabar* Malam Na ‘inna now Malam Habu (‘yan taya)
3. *Dabar* Gogarma (Masukwani), replaced by *Dabar* Gambo Zigidir (Kofar Wambai)
4. *Dabar* Malam Hadi (Kantin Kwari)
5. *Dabar* Ubale Chiang Kai Shek, (usually called Change (Kara)
6. *Dabar* Yahuza M.T. (Dakata)
7. *Dabar* Muhtari Gurafe (Rimi/Yakasai)
8. *Dabar* Uwa-uwa (Kofar Mata)
9. *Dabar* Zagi (Sani Mainagge)
10. *Dabar* Sule Kwaran *alias* Media (Dabar Sheka)
11. *Dabar* Kadiri Kwande (Kofar Na’isa)
12. *Dabar* Shehu Zaiti *alias* Baban Karya (Dabar Tukuntawa)
13. *Dabar* Abe (Dabar Mandawari)
14. *Dabar* Aminu Daru (Dabar Dan Agundi)
15. *Dabar* Aminu *alias* Baban Jaba (Dabar Warure)
16. *Dabar* Jibo (The head, Malam Jibo was speculatively killed by the police in 2003 – ‘Yar Maishinkafi)

As a social group *daba* has a structured hierarchy that not only states who is who, but who does what. *Daba* is a community of insiders; they are usually youth from the area but living at home away from home located in uncompleted buildings around markets, motor garage/park, roadside barrow etc. Many of them have one form of contact or another with their families, parents or relations. According to Dan Asabe (1988) the early membership of *daba* started out of interest to play with a knife, hunt, master dogs etc. In early days, ‘Yan *daba* earned livelihood through selling the meat of hunted animals, various herbs and engaging in menial jobs. Activities such as stealing, raping were punished–some even led to expulsion from a group. Fighting between rival *daba* groups was
not only accepted but also applauded. The *daba* as it exists today is characterized by:

1. Theft of property—particularly animals.
2. Raping women
3. Inter *daba* rivalry that usually results in even killings
4. Drug abuse—particularly smoking marijuana, sniffing *sholisho* (solvent) etc.
5. Public disturbance.

**Drug Abuse**

Today, due to the advancement in science and technology, the society has within its disposal, chemical substance(s) to sedate, excite, slim, fatten, arouse, put to sleep or cure. These substances are drugs, which people usually ingest or inject into their bodies. It comprises all sorts of medicines such as over the counter and illegal drugs, beverages, industrial chemicals as well as herbs such as *Dankamaru*, *Gadagi* and *Burkutu*. Drug Abuse is non-medicinal use of drug. Ebi (1988) named two factors that generally contribute to drug abuse, which can be relevant to this paper. These are: supply and demand of drugs among the youth in Kano. The supply refers to factors that contribute to the availability of the drugs like factory, patent medicine stores, hospitals, cannabis dealers, drug pushers and traffickers. The demand side deals with factors associated with the abuse of a particular drug. Abdullahi (1991a) observed the existence of several licensed and (in some cases) unlicensed drug “shops” in both the traditional city and *Waje* areas of Kano. This is in addition to many stationed multiple consumer items sellers who normally conduct illegal drug business through symbols and sub-cultural codes. Equally found are many licensed and unlicensed mobile drug sellers that move from one place to another carrying variety of drugs on trays, bicycles, motorcycles or even cars/buses. This situation is perhaps compounded by environmental drug use/abuse sub-culture. The dominant belief seems to be drug is the solution to all problems. As revealed in a study conducted in Dawanau by Abdullahi (1991b), 77% of the respondents said they either abuse drug to work hard so that they can become materially successful, or to forget about their
problems. In another work by this author, a commercial motorcyclist stated:

If I take Gadagi, I feel strong and fearless, I find it much easier to
maneuver any traffic congestion in order to quickly drop my passenger
and be paid within a short time and wait for another passenger…
(Abdullahi 2003: 15)

Drug abuse sometimes results in drug dependence that has the
potentials of encouraging the commission of further deviance;
disruption of family, lost to the nation etc.

**Acaba**

*Acaba* is the act of using the motorcycle for commercial purposes.
As an occupation it is not peculiar to Kano alone. In Abuja,
commercial motorcyclists are called *Goyin* (Going); in Lagos,
*Okada*; and in Katsina “Express”. The name *Acaba* is used to refer
to them in Kano. The motorcyclist is called *Dan Acaba* (pl. *Yan
Acaba*). The use of motorcycle for hire started in the early 1980s
when many Nigerians became unemployed because of
retrenchment, or their income became very insufficient to sustain
them. At present, most of the *‘Yan Acaba* in Kano have
membership of their association (Kano State Motorcycle Hire
Service); and as reported by Adamu (2002) there were 45,000
registered *‘Yan Acaba* in Kano at the time of his data collection.

But who are the *‘Yan Acaba*? As indicated by Adamu (2002),
80% are from 18–27 age group, 95% of them have from primary to
secondary school education only. And why are they considered
deviant? In a study conducted by Magaji (2002) the sampled
respondents from the public maintained that *‘Yan Acaba* are
deviants for the following reasons:

1. Over speeding, which sometimes results in accidents
2. Refusal to obey traffic rules
3. Involvement in Drug abuse—particularly *Gadagi*
4. Some of them are assist/get involved in crime

Drug (particularly *Gadagi*) is perhaps responsible for the rampant
cases of accident between/with the *‘Yan Acaba*. 
Traditional Authority

This is a power that has been institutionalized and recognized by the people over whom it is exercised. Weber (1947) identified three types of authority, 1) Rational, 2) Traditional and 3) Charismatic. Traditional authority is based on an established belief in the sanctity of tradition, and rulers rule in accordance with the customs and practices within a given tradition. For example, the Emir, District head, *Wakilin Fuska* (area representative)/ village and ward heads. Traditional rulers are the symbols of, and actors in traditional institutions and are the people associated with traditional authority. Dasuki Commission (1984) defined a traditional ruler as:

The person who by virtue of his ancestry occupies the throne or stool of an area and who has been appointed to it in accordance with the customs and tradition of the area and whose throne has been in existence before the advent of the British in Nigeria. (Cited in The Political Bureau Report 1994:147)

There are different views regarding the existence and the role of traditional rulers in the present day Nigeria. Two schools of thought emerged in response to this. The radical questioned traditional institution because of the existence of a rival institution, which is more effective, efficient, democratic and hence more relevant to modern society than the outdated beliefs and values. For example, Jagun (1985) posited that traditional authority is in direct opposition to democracy because it uses non-democratic method of election. Ekong (1985) argued that traditional rulers are invariably the same as the present ruling class and therefore have similar interest to protect; emphasizing that in the past their survival was ensured by continued exploitation of the labor and resources of their subjects. Lalaye (1985) argued further that traditional rulers could have advised the government on the socio-economic problems being faced by their people. They did not because they share the same interest with the capitalist class. The liberals, however, maintained that traditional rulers are still relevant in the society even though their influence and power have been eroded over the years. They argued that they are still being
respected and regarded as legitimate in their respective communities. As reported in The Report of Vision 2010:

Traditional rulers have... played a positive role in ensuring peace and preservation of culture. They have gradually discharged their responsibilities as advisers to government, peacemakers and custodians of culture... (1997:33).

The Social Control Function of Kano Traditional Authority
In the traditional setting of maintaining law and order, the general stability and security of the society is maintained through both informal and formal arrangements. The informal arrangement like; complying with the directives of significant others’ regarding to, and supervision of groups’ norms and values. In this setting, elder is seen as senior brother or father figure. Therefore, he is obligated to immediately correct in case of any unacceptable behavior. And, all accept his verdict. Thus, correcting the young (especially) is every elder’s responsibility whether he is biologically related to the person or not. At the formal setting, keeping the society from lawlessness within is the responsibility the emir through delegated persons/officials appointed by him. Information on daily events is reported to him across status strata from all parts of the emirate. The closest to the people is the Mai Unguwa (Ward head) who operates through his sectional representatives (Wakilai) who daily report all that happened in their sections to the ward head, who will solve the ones within his powers and report the ones he cannot handled to the Area Representative (Wakilin Fuska), in his daily briefing of what happened in his ward (the previous day). This daily briefing from the ward heads is usually on:

1. Events – marriage, birth, death etc.
2. Happenings – fighting, theft, illness, disease, case of witchcraft etc.
3. New comers into the area: from where, occupation, duration of stay, etc.
4. People going out.

The Wakilin Fuska will gather all the reports from the ward heads under him and inform the District Head who will in turn solve the ones within his capacity and submit the ones beyond his limit to
the Emir in his daily briefing. At this level, all cases of deviance are treated appropriately. People known with aberrant record are denied staying as soon as they came into the Emirate. Career criminals are ejected and escorted out.

The corrections techniques are; - warning, lashing, fining, jailing and expulsion from the emirate. So it can be seen that there are several checks on deviants - informal and formal. The afore-stated probably explains the relative minimal cases of deviant activities when the Emir was fully in control.

Discussion

A review of sociological theories and literature on deviance would seem to indicate three different orientations. Some of the theories focused their attention on the nature of society (Anomie and Social Structure and Radical Deviation). Others on the characteristics of the environment and socialization process (Cultural Transmission, Differential Association and Differential Opportunity Structure). And, still others dwell on the nature of people’s reaction against the behavior of their group members (Labeling).

Durkheim (1897) used the term anomie to explain why there is deviance like Daba or Drug Abuse in the society. In his study of suicide he explained that suicide is a result of social and personal disorganization. In normal time, norms are clear and followed by almost everyone, but in times of social disorganization people find themselves in a very unfamiliar situation. In this, ability to differentiate between normative and deviant behavior becomes difficult. Merton (1938) attempted explaining this further using his society as an example. According to him, social environment influences people behavior. He argued, a person’s behavior reflects his attitude towards culturally defined goals (acquisition of wealth) and the institutionalized means (hard work) of achieving that goals prescribed by the society. What happens to individuals in a society with a heavy emphasis on wealth as a basic symbol of success? He argues that people adapt in different ways–either by conforming to or by deviating from such cultural expectations. Merton posits five basic forms of adaptation: conformity to social norms, which is the most common and the exact opposite of deviance. Other forms of adaptation are: Innovation-accepting the goal of society but using improper means, for example, Dan acaba who operates tirelessly
and recklessly under the influence of drug disregarding the traffic rules, in order to make money quickly. Or a tailor that become addicted to drug as a result of continuous usage in order to be able to work hard and become materially successful. Or Dan cuwa-cuwa (pl. ‘Yan cuwa-cuwa) that sourced petrol at the illegal market and trade by the roadside; day and late night in order to become employed and be materially successful in the society. Ritualism accepting the means and rejecting the goal. Retreatism is rejecting both the goal and the means. And, rebellion is rejecting both the goal and means and substituting them with his. People are uniformly committed to the goal of becoming materially successful as set for them by the society but the means for achieving the goals are not equally distributed. According to this theory, if society denies people the opportunity to achieve success through socially approved means; some individuals will turn to illegitimate avenues.

Social action theory can be used to further support our explained action such as youth deviance like Drug Abuse, Acaba and or Cuwa-cuwa, as they exist in Kano today. Weber (1947) divided social action into four types: 1) rational oriented action, referring to the action that takes place when the goal is rational and the way the person pursues it, is from the actors’ position, rational, 2) value oriented action, 3) effectual/emotional action, 4) traditional action. This paper is interested in the first type.

Following this, Drug Abuse in order to work hard so as to become successful is “a consequence of the choice of most effective means for the achievement of a specific rational goal. For example, in an achievement oriented social setting like Nigeria, the major concern of most members is to earn money quickly in order to attain the goal of richness and be respected in the society. The emphasis is on money accordingly; “Whatever” one does to get it is “tolerated”. Some earlier works conducted on Drug Abuse, e.g. Ebie and Pela (1981) in Benin, Akangbe (1982) in Ibadan, Dauda (1994) in Jos, Mainingi (1988) and Abdullahi (2003) in Kano revealed that users of drugs for reasons other than medical such as students tailors, long distance drivers, wielders, plumbers, ‘Yan acaba and even criminals do so in order to be able to endure the hardship of their work with the ultimate goal of becoming materially successful in the society.
Barlow (1978) posited that Marx said little on deviance but his position on the nature of man, the nature of society and social relations under capitalism, and the nature of social change provided a framework for the analysis of deviance. He argued that owners of the means of production are in a position to control the lives of others and because they have the power, they are the owners who control the “most basic of socially meaningful activities”. Later scholars like Bonger (1916) and Taylor, Walton and Young (1975) picked up these ideas to explain the existence of deviance. Deviance is viewed as a means of survival in a social environment “within which survival is never assured”. Thus given the existence of differentials among schools, abject poverty, unemployment etc. and the resultant wide difference in income, one can understand why deviance like Drug Abuse, Cuwa-Cuwa, Daba, Acaba etc exist among the lower stratum of our society.

In other words, when the upper and the stronger section of the society has consciously restricted all lucrative positions in the society to limited circles of eligible, then members who happened to be in structural term, at the economic margin of the society have to work hard in order to stay alive.

The socio-cultural learning perspective believed humans learn how to behave in social situations-conforming or deviant. The attention here is on the role of socialization in a particular environmental subculture in causing and passing deviant sub-cultural norms, values and beliefs through interaction with others. And, these are passed to new members through sub cultural socialization. According to Shaw and McKay (1929) cultural norms are passed on to the associates such as peer groups or play group during day-to-day interaction. Subsequently, these new comers “too, become deviants, not by violating norms but by conforming to the dominant norms of the subculture”. This, perhaps explains the persistence of Daba in Warure, Dan Agundi and ‘Yan Taya (K/Wambai). Sutherland (1939) further argued that not only through friends and playmates but people learn to become deviant from parents, teachers and other normative agents of socialization. Mainingi (1988) revealed that 70% of the inmates of Dawanau Rehabilitation Center were into drugs because of friends’ influence. During a focus group discussion in Dawanau a
discussant (mechanic apprentice) narrated how Marijuana was introduced to him:

One day my master asked me jokingly do you know this? I said no. The master said, okay try it, you will enjoy it… take this (N1.00) and buy food. I complied… I found it helpful and pleasurable in that it allowed me to do my work properly, I became very much used to it. Later I tried combining it with ICD… (Abdullahi 1997: 78).

The work of Alemika (1998) is equally relevant in explaining why deviance exist among the youth. He argued youth deviance is a result of:

1. Socio-political incompetence in the country
2. Strains experienced by the youth who are (as prescribed by the society) requested to attain the goal of success through high education and wealth.
3. Rapid social change, travels and contacts with foreign cultures.
4. Developments in communication.
5. Rulers being occupied with protecting their interest and tenure to the detriment of the people.
6. Breakdown of families, morality and “we” feelings that characterized traditional Nigerian communities.

**Youth Deviance and its Resilience**
Can youth deviance be wiped out? The answer is highly unlikely because of the following:

1. The gap between rich and poor is widening and most government (in particular) economic policies are not poor oriented.
2. The services of ‘Yan daba are being patronized by the politicians who employ them as personal home and or bodyguards. As being speculated, most of the renowned Dabobi in Kano are enjoying the patronage of one influential politician or another from late 1960s to date.
3. Illicit Drug business is an organized deviance; by nature the persons central to it (the drug importers/distributors) are far away from the scene. Thus the
persons seen on the street with drugs on trays and bicycles or in a store are not the problem.

4. As shown by Adamu (2002) majority of ‘Yan Acaba are not the owners of the motorcycles. They are given to them at an agreed amount to be submitted daily, weekly or monthly. As earlier said, the recklessness and, the quick nature of their operation is to get more money, the total result is more benefit to both parties (motorcycle owner and the Dan Acaba).

5. The same argument can be applied to different types of deviant activities earlier stated such as Ciwa–Ciwa, Gumama, prostitution etc.

Modern Society/Traditional Deviance Control Responsibility: Can it be possible?
The complexity of Kano today is not the same 20 years back. Thus there are a lot of changes in population and in the forms of deviant activities. Despite this, given the necessary encouragement and support, traditional authority can make a positive impact on deviance control, if given the necessary support by the government.

Summary and Recommendations
The paper started with definition of the key concepts in the title and traditional social control mechanism was briefly examined. To provide a clear picture of Youth Deviants, a map of what can be considered Youth Deviance today was drawn and a deviant activity from each of the three main areas explained. Sociological theories were employed to explain the reasons for the existence of Youth deviance in Kano. Finally, the paper identified some of the key problem areas that reinforced the perpetuation of Youth Deviant activities in Kano. There was the need for traditional rulers to be encouraged and supported so as to effectively of act as agents of social control. Accordingly, the following recommendations are offered.

1. Traditional rulers should:
   i. assist in advising government to provide more jobs to the people.
ii. assist in fighting poverty by requesting
government to make available meaningful
income generating activities—particularly among
the low-income earners.

2. Government should come up with better-defined roles
for the traditional rulers beyond their present evidently
ceremonial role. This is one of the ways they can be
effectively empowered to carry out their social control
function.

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The Role and Responsibilities of Community Leadership in National Security

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Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man, has by nature a right not only to preserve his property that is his life, liberty and estate but also to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others as he is persuaded the offence deserves. But because no political society can be, nor subsists without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order there unto punish the offences of all those of that society; there and there only is political society where every one of the members has quit his natural power, resigned it into the hands of the community. There upon the community comes to be umpire, by setting standing rules, indifferent and the same to all parties and by men or women having authority from the community for the execution of those rules. Such men and women having such authority from the community are the community leadership. At grassroots level and in terms of our Northern Nigerian Society these include the head of the family unit, the Ward Head, the Village Head, the District Head and the Emir on one hand. It also includes Religious Leaders such as Imams and Pastors, Leaders of Religious Sects such as the leader of Izala Group, Qadiriyya Group etc., leaders of Trading Groups such as Sarkin Kasuwa, Sarkin Yan Awaki etc. and the leaders of professional groups such as Sarkin Pawa, Sarkin Aska etc.

In a modern style of government it also includes the Chairman of a Local Government and the retinue of his officials. The definition and concept of community leadership could extend to state and national level, but for the purpose of our paper the above definition appears adequate.
National Security/Grassroots Security
The concept of national security is still subject to contending definitions by scholars. There are two broad views regarding the definition.

- The traditional notion of national security is defined as “the state of military preparedness to defend a country against (largely) external threats, and
- The more broad and more acceptable definition of national security as going beyond the scope of military readiness to include factors like political, economic and social development.

The traditional conception of national security renders it an area of activity where only the exclusive class of rulers and the military establishment can partake. It is often shrouded in secrecy, considered too sensitive and too important to open up to a wider group of players. In this concept national security is considered too important to play politics with. Thus, this concept of national security is often invoked to justify the expenditure of enormous sums of money, maintenance of armed forces, deployment of men, weapons systems, interventions by stronger powers in the affairs of weaker nations or even the violation of human rights at home.

This concept has often been the preferred option for autocratic governments which are accountable only to themselves. In the name of national security, many unwholesome acts get committed against the people, thereby exacerbating the security dilemma of such a country. The result is that such a country is usually not democratic, it is unstable and therefore unable to develop economically, socially and politically, its military defence is evaded and weakened. This concept therefore destroys national security rather than build it. It is a system that protects the regime or more particularly the head of state nor matter how unpopular he is to the people. National Security is considered to be the security of the regime. All the military regimes in Nigeria adopted and practiced this system. Large sums of money, more than enough to develop the country socially, politically and economically to a first world country, were wasted or stolen under the notion of national security.
The more accurate conception of national security is the one which sees national security as the ability of a country to maintain its sovereignty, tackle its political, economic, social and other interests in a sovereign manner, and likewise act in relation to others in the international system. In other words, national security is about national interest, of which the physical survival of the country is just an aspect. It is about the “good life” basic values, which keep the community together, about advancement in the quantity and quality of life available to the individual. As aptly put by McNamara:

In a modernising society, security means development. Security is not military force though it may involve it, security is not traditional military activity, though it encompasses it, security is not military hardware though it may include it. Security is development and without development there can be no security.

In addition to being broad enough to include all the public goods which people seek through their association in the political community, this concept of national security assigns to political authority responsibility to provide it. Thus, national security, being a public good, is also a political value which those entrusted with political authority must provide to their community. It is often the case that those countries which take the provision of freedom, prosperity, stable social order as part of the package of national security, have gone on to become more developed politically and economically, socially stable, technologically more advanced and military more powerful. They are usually the more democratic countries hence the link between national security and democracy.

**Grassroots Security**
This is the consideration of security at the lowest level of the society. It is the consideration of security at village, ward and local government level. This is our main area of discussion. However before we tackle this area exhaustively, we need to discuss what constitutes threat to security.

**Threats to Security**
The concept of threat may be defined as an intention or act which aims at or has the potential of harming, frustrating or inhibiting the
achievement of a goal or set of goals and objectives. Threat may also be defined as an act, intention, indication or anything that has the potential to adversely affect our national interests in whatever form. Threat may also be understood to include any act of commission or omission, which is capable of undermining the internal cohesion or corporate existence of the nation. By these various definitions or concepts of threat, we can conceptualise threat into external and internal. For our purpose we concentrate on internal threat.

**Internal Security Threat**

*Socio-Economic*—is clearly one of the most potent threats in Nigeria today which is traceable to our ailing economy. The economic down turn has brought the standard of living of most Nigerians to an all time low. The performance of our economy so far typified by the low exchange rate of the naira, high inflation, low industrial capacity utilisation and the general hike in the cost of living has generated very high rate of unemployment among our youths, increased the rate of school dropouts resulting in frustrations and restiveness among our youths. Since the health of an economy is a hub around which other activities revolve, this has thrown up a myriad of negative social developments such as labour unrest, riots and demonstrations at the slightest opportunity, and increasing rate of crime.

*Socio-Political*—Our murky political waters starting from the manipulation of the nation’s political machineries by the military to the annulment of the June 12 1993 election which placed this country in a precarious political crisis and threatened the existence of the nation. This political threat is still very much with us. This gave birth to OPC and other violent ethnic militia groups. Socio-Political threat is a continuous threat, which has to be monitored continuously especially in an emerging democracy like our own. At a grassroots level political threat is normally interwoven with economic and socio-cultural threats and hardly distinguished.

**Socio-Cultural Threat**

The socio-cultural diversity of Nigeria has conferred on her a mixed vista of strengths and weaknesses. Although there are cultural values peculiar to individual ethnic groups, there exist
others such as respect for old age, extended family system, which are common to all or national in nature. These values are steadily being eroded and displaced by the negative aspects of westernisation and urbanisation. In essence this is a problem common to states in transition from traditional to modern society such as ours. Arising from this, the socio-cultural threats common to Nigeria are:

1. Religious Intolerance, Misunderstanding or Misrepresentation.
2. Ethnic Bigotry
3. Corruption in high and low places
4. Communal Clashes
5. Drug Abuse
6. Juvenile Delinquency
7. Student/Lecturer Militancy
8. Social Deviance
9. Increasing Criminal activity including armed robbery.

**Constitutional and Legal Provisions on Security Matters**

National Security is such a very important subject that both the constitution of the Federation and Ordinary Laws of the nation made specific provisions and created strong and very important bodies to deal with it. For the proper understanding of our topic we shall discuss briefly these legal bodies and the general concept of the legal provisions. Section 153 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 created two bodies to deal with both the External and Internal Security situation of the nation. These bodies are:

a) The National Defence Council
b) The National Security Council

Under part I of third schedule of the same constitution the composition of the two bodies were given as follows:

**National Defence Council**
The National Defence Council shall comprise the following members:
The National Security Council shall comprise the following members:

a. the President who shall be the Chairman;
b. the Vice-President who shall be the Deputy Chairman;
c. the Minister of the Government of the Federation responsible for defence;
d. the Chief of Defence Staff;
e. the Chief of Army Staff;
f. the Chief of Naval Staff;
g. the Chief of Air Staff; and
h. such other members of the President may appoint.

The Council shall have power to advise the President on matters relating to public security including matters relating to any organisation or agency established by law for ensuring the security of the Federation.
These two bodies are directly charged with the National Security of the country.

**State Security Committee**

At the state level there is the State Security Committee which takes decisions on all matters of security affecting the state. The membership is composed of:

1. The State Governor as the Chairman
2. The Commissioner of Police of the State
3. The Army Commander
4. The State Director of Security
5. The Permanent Secretary Special Services Department in the Governor’s office.

Similar arrangement operates at the local government level with the Chairman of the local government as Chairman Local Government security committee, with the DPO, the SSS, the representative of the traditional authority and the local unit commander of the military if any as members.

Each of these bodies right from the National Security Council down to the local government security committee has a legal responsibility to meet regularly, at least once in a week, and to review security situation within its area of jurisdiction. At the local government level all information gathered during such a meeting which is of security importance shall be transmitted through various channels to the state level authority. The Chairman of the local government shall pass his information to the governor. The DPO shall pass his own to the state Commissioner of Police while the SSS Representative shall communicate his information to the State Director SSS. The District head shall brief the Emir and if there is any local army unit commander he shall communicate his situation report to the Brigade Commander at the state level. It is at this level the participation of grassroots authority in security administration begins.

At the local government level, the Chairman of the local government is the Chief Security Officer of the local government just as the State Governor is the Chief Security Officer of the State. He has a legal responsibility to ensure peace and tranquility within
his local government and create a proper atmosphere for the economic and social development of his local government. He should bear in mind that national security is development. All other members of the local government security committee have legal responsibility to gather information on a daily basis regarding security situation of the entire local government and report such information to the Chairman of the local government and their head at state level. Security information is not restricted to armed robbery, or possible student riot but includes and extends to closure of factories which may lead to unemployment, price hike, and scarcity of essential commodities. Anything that shall effect the social and economic tranquility of the local government is of security importance to the state and to the local government.

**Traditional Authority**

As argued in the earlier part of this paper, community leadership includes our traditional authority. In the emirate system of administration it includes the Emir, the District Heads, the Village Heads and the Ward Heads. In a highly traditionalised society such as the Hausa Fulani Society it also includes the *Sarkin Pawa*, the *Sarkin Kasuwa* etc. This spectrum of community leadership has a very vital and important role to play in security administration of every local government, the state and the nation. This cadre of authority is closest to the people and is what one can call the proper grassroots community leadership. Due to long years of being with the people a strong bridge of confidence has developed which is of paramount importance in ensuring security at the grassroots right up to the National Level.

Starting from the Ward Head we can examine the role of each one of them in security administration:

*The Ward Head* - He is the closest traditional authority to the community. He interacts with them freely and gets sensitive information with ease. He has responsibility to pass such information to his Village Head as well as to the police and the state security operative where applicable. Although their information is unrefined however such information is mostly the truth and highly reliable and only needed some professional touch to classify. No information coming from such authority should be disregarded.
At this level you can also place Sarkin Kasuwa, Sarkin Aska, Sarkin Pawa etc. Unfortunately this class of traditional leadership is being disregarded, neglected and its authority eroded. They are not being enlightened to appreciate their role or to appreciate the importance of the information they have at their disposal. They are not being paid salaries and I think it is only recently in some States that Ward-Head are being paid allowances. They are not consulted when decisions affecting their Community are being taken neither are they regularly used to educate their people on security decisions.

Village Head—A very important figure in security administration at the grassroots. He is the link between the District Head, the local government and the people. He gets reliable information from various segments of the community. By virtue of his position as the Village Head he appoints the Sarkin Kasuwa, the Sarkin Aska, the Sarkin Pawa etc. and all of them have allegiance to him. He also recommends who is to be appointed the Chief Imam of the town. In view of this he gets first information on any matter of security which effects such professional and trading groups. He has easy access to the District Head and passes such information to him. He is therefore a strong bridge in the maintenance of law and order and effective security coverage of his area of domain.

Ironically such an important institution is being neglected by the local government administrations. They are not been accorded their proper positions in the scheme of things and vital information coming from them is brushed aside or treated lightly. Local Government Chairman seems to rely more on SSS and the police who are thinly distributed and before they cultivate informants they are transferred out.

District Head—He is the representative of the Emirate Council or the Emir on the ground. He enjoys good respect from a cross section of the society. The fact that he has a sizeable number of Village Heads under his supervision made his channel of information much wider. His easy access to the Chairman of the Local Government makes his passage of information upwards also easy. Unfortunately some of them get involved in politics and place themselves on a collision course with the Chairman of the
local government. Because of this factor Information received from them Is sometimes treated with suspicion.

Where a District Head maintains his neutrality and keeps to his traditional authority, he could be termed as the most important member of the local government security committee. He feeds the committee with good information and is an effective channel in passing government information down the ladder. The institution of District Head is an effective channel of dousing tension and maintaining peace.

The Emirate Council/The Emir - This institution can be called the power house as far as information management and maintenance of security is concerned. The Emir is the highest traditional authority who has the dual role of being a community leader, and a religious leader. He enjoys respect from his subjects, the political leaders at State and Federal level and the religious leaders. He gets first hand information on every incident of security importance in the state and words coming from him are passed down the ladder with speed and respect. He is therefore a strong pillar in security administration of the State and in most cases a willing tool to be employed by the government in the maintenance of law and order.

Powers of Arrest of Police Officers and Private Persons. - As stated earlier, Security Matters are considered of utter-most importance to the nation that all our laws including the Constitution of Nigeria placed legal responsibilities on citizens to ensure that information regarding issues of security are promptly conveyed to the right quotas and treated appropriately. Section 11 of the 1999 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order. Section 4 of the Police Act provides for the duties of the Police thus:

- The prevention and detection of crime
- The apprehension of offenders
- The preservation of law and order
- The protection of life and property
- The due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged
In the performance of his duties a Police Officer is empowered to seek the assistance of any person and such a person is bound by law to render such assistance. The law provides for a punishment including imprisonment for any person who fails to assist a police officer in the performance of his duties.

Under section 26 of the Criminal Procedure Code a Police Officer has powers to arrest without warrant a person who committed certain categories of offences. There are 13 subsections or circumstances for which the police could arrest without warrant.

Similarly the CPC provides for a power of arrest for a private person. Under this provision a private person including community leaders may arrest any person for whose arrest he has a warrant, or who he is directed to arrest by a justice of the peace or a superior police officer or who has escaped from his lawful custody or who committed an offence in his presence for which the police are entitled to arrest without warrant. Section 28 of the CPC is relevant here.

**Duty to give information on Security Matters** - Every village head, ward head or any person in authority has a duty to give information on matters relating to the security of the nation, state or local government or to receive information on the same matters and transmit such information to the appropriate authorities. Whenever circumstances arise in which it is obligatory to give information, the information must be given forthwith. The obligation to inform the “nearest native authority” would appear to permit information to be given to the nearest representative of the native authority who will normally be the Ward Head.

The circumstances under which a person is bound to give information are:

1. Whenever a dead body has been found;
2. Whenever a person has reason to believe that someone has committed suicide;
3. Whenever a person is believed to have been killed by another person whether intentionally or by an accident of any kind whatsoever;
4. Whenever a person knows that any of the following
offences have been committed or has grounds for believing that any person is intending to commit any such offences:

a. culpable homicide;
b. causing grievous hurt with dangerous weapons;
c. causing hurt to extort property;
d. kidnapping with intent to commit culpable homicide;
e. buying or selling a child for an immoral purpose;
f. theft after preparation to cause death or hurt;
g. robbery;
h. causing hurt in robbery;
i. brigandage, brigandage with culpable homicide and belonging to a gang of brigands;
j. assembling for brigandage;
k. belonging to a gang of thieves;
l. arson and arson in a dwelling house or store;
m. house trespass with intent to culpable homicide or to commit offence punishable with life imprisonment;
n. lurking house trespass with intent to cause offence punishable with imprisonment or when death or grievous hurt is caused.

A Village Head or Ward Head may call upon any person to assist in carrying out the duties imposed upon him by law and a person is bound to give all reasonable assistance if call upon to do. A village head and a ward head are defined in the law as a person appointed by law to be head of an administrative area. The Code also requires that village and ward heads should give information to the nearest court, nearest police officer or to the local government concerning the following:

1. the whereabouts of receivers;
2. the passage through the area of his jurisdiction of any person known or suspected as a murderer, robber, escaped convict or required by a public summon;
3. the death or disappearance in suspicious circumstances
of any person;
4. any other matter likely to affect the maintenance of law and
5. order or the prevention of crime or the safety of persons or property concerning which the Provincial Commissioner or native authority has directed him to report.

Grassroots participation in security administration does not stop at the level of local government Chairman or the DPO. By the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of Northern Nigeria every magistrate is a justice of the peace. A Justice of the Peace has powers of arrest and search, and wide powers in respect of maintenance of public order. In detail manner a justice of the peace has the following powers:

1. A Justice of the Peace may direct a private person to make an arrest.
2. Every person is bound to assist a Justice of the Peace demanding assistance in arresting or preventing the escape of a person whom the justice of the peace has power to arrest.
3. Every male person may he required to assist a justice of the peace in the dispersal of an unlawful assembly.
4. Every person is bound to assist a justice of the peace reasonably demanding aid in the suppression of a breach of the peace or preventing damage to public property movable or immovable, or to any railway, canal, water supply, telegraph, telephone or electrical installation or in preventing the removal of any public landmark or buoy or other mark used for navigation.
5. Issue a summons to any person to appear before a court. If he does so, he must personally sign the summons. He may issue a summons for service outside his area of jurisdiction.
6. Issue a warrant of arrest in writing and duly signed by him. He may endorse the warrant for bail. He may issue a warrant for service outside his local limits of jurisdiction by forwarding it for backing by court within
whose jurisdiction the person to be arrested may be found. He must issue a warrant if the police show sufficient cause. A warrant will normally be issued to a police officer for service unless immediate execution is necessary and no policeman is available.

7. Issue a warrant of arrest in addition to or instead of a summons if he has reason to believe that the person will not obey a summons or will abscond or if the person has not appeared in response to a summons properly served. Alternatively, he may issue a summons whenever he has power to issue a warrant.

8. Take a bond of appearance before a court, whenever a person summoned or arrested on warrant appears before him.

9. Issue a summons to produce a document or other thing before a court.

10. Issue a search warrant to a person generally and issue a search warrant to the police authorising a search for stolen property and the arrest of any person found in the place apparently a party to an offence committed in respect of stolen property. He may dispense with the normal requirement that a search be undertaken in the presence of two respectable inhabitants of the neighbourhood under search. He may also without issuing a search warrant order a search to be made in his presence of any place in respect of which he would be competent to issue a search warrant.

11. Record a confession after satisfying himself that it is being made voluntarily. In recording the confession, he is bound only by the provision of section 125 of the Code and is not required to administer the cautions or follow the procedure prescribed in the Criminal Procedure (Statements to Police Officers) Rules, 1960.

12. Order a medical examination of an arrested suspect by a medical officer or, if no medical officer is available, by a dispensary attendant.

13. Personally arrest or direct the arrest of a person committing an offence in his presence, whether or not the offence is one for which a warrant of arrest is
required, providing that he thereupon hands over the person arrested to a police officer or takes security for his attendance before a court. In the exercise of this power, a justice of the peace may not direct a superior police officer. A superior police officer is an officer of the Nigeria Police of the rank of Assistant Superintendent or above.

14. Order a search in his presence of any place for the search of which he is competent to issue a warrant.

15. Issue a summons requiring a person to appear before a court when it appears likely that a person is likely to commit a breach of the peace for the purpose of executing a bond to keep the peace. This power can only be exercised when the person against whom the summons is issued is within the jurisdiction of the court before which he is summoned, or when the place where the breach of the peace is apprehended is within the area of jurisdiction of the court before which the person is required to attend.

16. Issue a warrant of arrest when it appears that a breach of the public peace can only be prevented by immediate arrest. In such cases, the justice of the peace must record the substance of the information acted upon. The warrant must show if a bond and sureties are required, the terms of the bond, and the number, class or character of sureties required.

17. Order an unlawful assembly to disperse. If, when ordered, the assembly does not disperse, proceed to disperse it by force, requiring the assistance in the dispersal of any male person and, if necessary, arresting and confining any persons forming part of the assembly for the purpose of facilitating the dispersal.

Thus in this paper we have examined the concept of national and grassroots security and the operation of national security, particularly at grassroots level. Most people tend to under-rate security at grassroots level. This is a big mistake. Security at grassroots is of a very significant importance and any information at such level must be treated with utmost regard.
Recommendations
Having examined the concept of National Security, Security at Grassroots and the contribution of Community Leaders to Grassroots Security Operation, we now focus on areas of recommendations and improvement.

Under the Northern Nigeria Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal Code every community leader is given legal responsibility with regards to the maintenance of security, peace and order. By an act of commission or omission these legal duties are eroded or abandoned. There is a very serious need to re-examine these laws and make them living. Ward Heads, Village Heads, District Heads and Local Magistrates should be made to appreciate their legal responsibilities with regards to the maintenance of law and order viz. viz. Security situation. Seminars and workshops should be arranged for such purpose.

There seem to be a systematic neglect by governments at all levels of the institutions of community leaders. The ward heads, the village heads and even the district heads are being neglected by governments to the extent that they are past losing relevance. Members of their community do not accord them any respect because governments don’t accord them their proper place in the scheme of things. The situation is worsened by the calibre of politicians i.e. Chairmen and Counsellors at local government level who appear new and ignorant of the role of community leaders proper and therefore don’t accord them any respect. This position has to be reversed otherwise security at grassroots shall continue to suffer.

The posting of policemen to villages and district headquarters did not help matters much. In most cases the policemen posted to a village or local government headquarters are highly inadequate to cover the jurisdiction of their duty. On the other hand, the moment policemen are posted to a village community leaders withdraw from the issue of security, law and order leaving the enormous problem to the few policemen posted. This creates a big vacuum and ultimately security suffers. Policemen and community leaders must be made to see themselves as partners with the objectives of ensuring security law and order. They must be seen as complimenting each other. A forum has to be formulated where
each will appreciate the role of the other and work towards achieving the same goal. Joint workshop and lectures have to be organized for each to appreciate the role of the other.

Community Leaders must be properly remunerated so that they can live above board.

The office of justice of the peace is almost dead or in a limbo. This is rather sad because a justice of the peace is an important office for the maintenance of law and order. Such office should be resuscitated. As earlier mentioned, every magistrate is a justice of the peace, every police officer of the rank of Assistant Superintendent and above is a justice of the peace. We think there is a need to improve on this. Since the governor has powers to appoint justices of the peace apart from the two mentioned above, it is our opinion that every district head should be made a justice of the peace and every Grade I Area Court Judge should be made a justice of the peace. A special workshop should be arranged to make these people understand their role as justices of the peace and guard them against abuse.
### Appendix 1

#### Members of the Organising Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Prof. M. Sani Zahradeen</td>
<td>Dept. of Islamic Studies, and former Vice-Chancellor Bayero University, Kano.</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Alhaji Muhammad M. Karaye,</td>
<td>Bauran Kano, District Head of Rogo</td>
<td>Secretary, Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Dr. Tijjani Naniya,</td>
<td>Department of History, Bayero University, Kano.</td>
<td>Member, Coordinator</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Sarki Abdullahi Ibrahim</td>
<td>Makaman Kano, District Head of Wudil</td>
<td>Chairman, Finance and Planning Sub-Committee, Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Alhaji Sanusi Ado Bayero</td>
<td>Ciroman Kano, District Head of Gwale</td>
<td>Member, Chairman, Protocol Sub-Committee</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Alhaji Aminu Ado Bayero,</td>
<td>Sarkin Dawakin Tsakar Gida, District Head of Dala</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Alhaji Muhammad Wada Aliyu Gaya</td>
<td>Sarkin Yakin Kano, District Head of Ajingi, Former Federal Permanent Secretary</td>
<td>Member; Deputy Chairman, Protocol Sub-committee</td>
</tr>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Alhaji Shehu Mohammed.</td>
<td>Falakin Kano, Chartered Accountant, Banker, and District Head of Tofa</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Alhaji Gidado Mukhtar</td>
<td>Former Permanent Secretary, Kano State</td>
<td>Member; Chairman, Venue and Security Sub-Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Alhaji Bashir Othman Tofa</td>
<td>Former Presidential Candidate</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Alhaji Ahmed Aminu</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Information</td>
<td>Member; Chairman, Publicity and Publications Sub-committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Prof. Philip Shea</td>
<td>Department of History, Bayero University, Kano.</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Dr. Mustapha Namadi</td>
<td>Department of Sociology, Bayero University, Kano</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>Dr. Badayi Sani</td>
<td>Department of Economics, Bayero</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Alhaji Faruk Abdullahi</td>
<td>Dan Lasan, District Head of Gwarawa</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Alhaji Isyaku Umar Tofa</td>
<td>Dan'adala Tofa, Village Head of Tofa, Chairman of Intercontinental Bank</td>
<td>Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Alhaji Abubakar Isa</td>
<td>Director, Sani Abacha Youth Centre</td>
<td>Member</td>
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Appendix 2

Conference Programme

Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria: Past, Present, and Future
A National Conference to Mark the 40th Anniversary of The Emir of Kano,
Alhaji Ado Bayero, on the Throne

Sunday 12 October 2003
Arrival and Registration

Monday 13 October 2003
Morning Formal Opening Session
10:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
Address by the Guest Speaker: Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sule, Dan Masanin Kano

Afternoon Session
3:00-6:30 p.m.
Lead Papers:
1. General Aliyu Mohammed, National Security Adviser, Abuja,
   *Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria: The Roles of Traditional Institutions?*
2. Dr. Ibrahim Tahir, Talban Bauchi, Bauchi, *Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria - A Case Study of Sarkin Kano Alhaji (Dr.) Ado Bayero and the Kano Emirate Council*
3. H. E. Gov. (Dr.) Chimaroke Nnamani, Governor of Enugu State.
   *Chieftaincy and Security in Modern Nigeria*

Refreshment Break
4:30 - 5:00 p.m.

The Past
4. Prof. M. Nur Alkali, Centre for Trans-Saharan Studies, University of Maiduguri, *The Question of Sovereignty, Security and Justice in Kanem-Borno*
5. Dr. Kemi Rotimi, Department of History, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, *The N.A. Systems and Security in the Northern and Western Regions of Nigeria*
6. Prof. Isa Alkali Abba, Department of History, Bayero University, Kano, *Differential British and Gombe Views of Security and Insecurity: Local Authority in Gombe Emirate with Particular reference to the Creation of the District Head System, 1902-1920*
7. Dr. John Nengel, Department of History, University of Jos, Jos Plateau State, *Traditional Security Structures Among the Peoples of Northern Jos Plateau*
8. Prof. M.S. Abdulkadir, Department of History, Bayero University, Kano, *The Role of the Attah of Igala in the Security System in Igalaland, 1800-1960*
Tuesday 14 October 2003
Morning Session
9:00 a.m. - 1:30 p.m.
The Present
Prof. Sani Zahradeen, Department of Islamic Studies, Bayero University, Kano, The Unseen Hand of God - the Role of Islamic Scholars in Maintaining State Security in Northern Nigeria (Paper not made available for the proceedings)
11. Ibrahim Ado Kurawa (Centre for Democratic Research and Training, Kano, Ci-Rani, Almajiranci and Security in Kano
12. Dr. Baffa Umar Aliyu, Department of Sociology, Bayero University, Kano, 'Yandaba and Security in Kano

Refreshment Break
11:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.
14. Dr. Badayi M. Sani, Bayero University, Kano, Poverty and Security in Kano
15. Dr. Asma'u G. Saeed, Dept. of History, Bayero University, Kano, Cooperation Between Religious Leaders And Traditional Authority in Kano

Lunch Break; 1:30-3:00 p.m.
Afternoon Session: 3:00 - 6:30 p.m.
The Future
17. Prof. P.J. Shea, Department of History, Bayero University, Kano, Colonial Power and Traditional Legitimacy: Contradictions in Defining and Maintaining Security
18. Dr. Salisu Abdullahi, Department of Sociology, Bayero University, Kano, Youth and Deviance and Authority in Kano: Some Issues
Prof. Auwalu Hamisu Yadudu, Faculty of Law, Bayero University, Kano, Constitutional Alternatives: Chieftaincy and the Modern Security Structure in Nigeria (Paper not made available for the proceedings)

Refreshment Break: 4:30 - 5:00 p.m.
Dr. Salihu Abubakar, Director, National Agricultural Extension and Research Liaison Services, Ahmadu Bello University, Food Security and Elimination of Hunger in Nigeria: Past, Present and Future. (Paper not made available for the proceedings)
19. Alhaji (Dr.) Aminu Saleh, GCON, Sarkin Yakin Katagum, Bauchi State, Security in the Civil Service, Past, Present and Future
Prof. Dahiru Yahya, Department of History, Bayero University, Kano, The Concept of Security in the Sokoto Caliphate and Its Impact on Contemporary Nigeria (Paper not made available for the proceedings)

Wednesday 15 October 2003
Morning 9:00-11:00 a.m.
Plenary Session and Communiqué
Departure
Appendix 3

Communiqué

of the National Conference on Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria
to Mark the 40th Anniversary of His Royal Highness, the Emir of Kano Alhaji
(Dr.) Ado Bayero on the Throne, held from 13th to 15th October, 2003 at the
Murtala Mohammed Library Complex, Kano, Kano State, Nigeria

1. Preamble

1. The international Conference on Chieftaincy and Security in Nigeria
was held from Monday 13th to Wednesday 15th October, 2003 at
Murtala Mohammed Library Complex Kano to commemorate the 40th
Anniversary of His Royal Highness, Alhaji (Dr.) Ado Bayero, CFR,
LLD, on the throne of Kano. The Conference was attended by scholars
and other dignitaries within and outside Nigeria.

2. The Conference opened on Monday 13th October 2003 with the
President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo and members of his entourage in
attendance. Members of the National Assembly, State Governors,
Ambassadors of foreign countries, special delegates from Saudi Arabia,
Libya, Niger, and traditional rules, members of the political and
business elite form various parts of the Nation also attended the
opening ceremony and some sessions of the conference.

3. In his message of goodwill at the occasion, His Royal Highness, Alhaji
(Dr.) Ado Bayero expressed his delight at the great show of solidarity
by the presence of these dignitaries, and informed the audience that the
celebration of his 40th anniversary was kept at a low-key in order to
allow for a sober reflection on some of the most critical issues facing
the society and the nation today and to proffer solutions to them. He
lamented that the society is losing its value systems and the great ideals
of past that have held our people together in peace, harmony and
handwork. He called upon Nigerians to embrace the culture of
tolerance, respect for leaders and elders and to be guided by
knowledge, honesty and the truth at all times.

4. Chief Olusegun Obasanjo extolled the virtues and leadership qualities
of Alhaji (Dr.) Ado Bayero and acknowledged his immense
contributions toward the development of Kano in particular and the
entire nation in general.

5. During the proceedings of the Conference, a total of 24 papers were
presented on the subject of chieftaincy and security in Nigeria by
various scholars and other important personalities within and outside
the country. The Conference focused extensively on this subject,
highlighting the state of security in Nigeria in the past, present and the
future. Deliberations were open, frank and highly educative, and at the
end, the following conclusions and recommendations were made:
   a. that the pre-colonial, administrative, political and social
      structures and institutions were dynamic, effective and
efficient in the provision of peace, stability and security among the various kingdoms and states that constituted the Nigeria area today. The colonial intervention and its aftermath have brought about changes which have led to the total breakdown of those traditional values and virtues giving rise to serious state of insecurity at all levels in Nigeria today.

b. That concept of governance, leadership, rule of law which were collectively upheld by rulers and their followers for centuries have been eroded by the blind adoption of new and alien cultures, standards of behavior which are neither superior nor relevant to those great traditions and heritage of our people and societies.

c. Due note was taken by the Conference of latest trends in study and evolution of the total African experience. In particular, there is now total despair with Africa under its leadership over several generations since colonial independence as the worst performing continent. Successive generations of leaders are deemed and shown to have left a legacy of continuing decay and decline and overall legacy of violence, disorder, civil wars and massacres which continue up to this day. It was noted by the Conference that on the other hand, there is growing acceptance of the view that in important fears on the contemporary and future circumstances of African Nations, our traditional institutions will remain crucial and central to mobilization of development crises management and conflict resolutions as well as national integration and African union.

d. In relation to the theme of the Conference, Chieftaincy and National Security, participants were unanimous in highlight this observation in almost every contribution. There was also unanimity on the general picture which continues to emerge since 1977 that the position of traditional institutions has gained strength, prestige and significance in the protection and sustenance of the safety of life, property and community peace, harmony and unity within and across group boundaries. This is matched on the other hand by declining status and public image in the reputation of the modern system which has implications for national security.

2. Current Trends in the State of Security in Nigeria
The Conference completely agreed that Nigeria today has very many serious security problems. It was agreed that developments in recent years justify serious anxiety on the future safety of the security of the nation state itself. It was also noted that lack of security and public safety has played a key role in
damaging economic recovery and discouraging foreign capital investment and participation in the national economy. Conference opinions were reinforced by certain features of debate on the future of Nigeria:

a. the continuous circulation and popularization of ideas concerning the future structure of Nigeria which would effectively dissolve it if adopted.
b. Persistent demands for a Sovereign National Conference under an existing constitutionally elected democratic government
c. The degeneration of political, community and government-people relations into violence and manslaughter
d. The prevalence of ethnic and other private militia some of which possess superior arms
e. The existence of underground armories in almost every part of the Federation
f. A sensitization and politicization of religion
g. The adoption of the ideology of ethnic cleansing with respect to access and land residence
h. Gradually but continuously, there has been an increasing tendency to substitute loyalty to the state with loyalty to other entities such as ethnic, religious, territorial and other groupings. Conference noted that this is a serious security matter.

3. Governance, Politics, Politicians and Society
1. The general picture which has emerged at the Conference is that even though formal institutions of government exist and consume vast resources in as many as 811 constitutionally designated centers of authority and power (the federation, 36 States, FCT and 774 local governments) insecurity in almost every aspect is the main cause of anxiety. Participants were unanimous that most of the root causes of the decay of order and society lie in the actions of the political and other elites in the formal institutions of government over the years:
   i. legendary acts of corruption and general widespread material abuse of public property and public office
   ii. the replacement of constitutional provisions, due process, and procedural regulations and substantive laws with the personal wishes of office holders
   iii. abandonment of democratic principles such as free and fair elections and their replacement with various forms of abuse of institutions, corruption and violence.
2. In consequence, after exhaustive discussions, Conference also agreed that there have been a gradual but very real decline in the credibility, moral legitimacy, general trust and confidence in the formal institutions of governance in the leadership classes which has bred a counter culture of violence and lawlessness.
4. Reformism, Chieftaincy and Traditional Institutions

Virtually all presentations at this Conference were unanimous in the affirmation of the valuable and important role of the traditional ruler and traditional institutions in maintaining peace within and beyond their territories, the creation of unity among the diverse people within their domains and in the Nation, past and present. Conference, however, regretted that since colonial era to the present day, these institutions have suffered continuous constitutional molestation until their complete total exclusion from governance and administration in the 1999 constitution:

1. Conference was unable to appreciate why the exhaustive provisions made by the Constitutional Conference, and upheld by the 18-man committee in 1995 draft constitution was expunged by the PRC.

2. It was further noted that the blind reformism which affected those institutions and their relationship with the society is responsible for their decline which is the root cause of the breakdown in order, incipient violence and tension in society; growth in crime, social dislocation, drug abuse, gangry and general demise of civic culture.

3. Conference also regretted that over the years no opportunity has been given for a national re-examination as on this important occasion.

4. Participants also observed that even where attempts are made to give them some role in governance or to emphasize their importance and relevance, this is ignored in action. It therefore rejected any measure other than a concrete provision in the constitution to underline their role.

6. Other Issues

I) The Role of Police Force

Participants are dissatisfied with the present situation with regards to the organization, size and operations of the Police Force which do not appear to have received re-orientation towards operating in a democratic setting or to come to terms with the unfolding circumstances in Nigeria today. Weaknesses identified include:

a. inadequacy of their size relative to the population of Nigeria
b. poor technical backup and support equipment including communication facilities and logistics
c. poor conditions of service including pay, uniform, accommodation and general welfare
d. insensitive recruitment and posting policies, bias and partiality in socially difficult situations.

II) Restructuring

Participants at the Conference were unanimous in rejecting any form of restructuring which returns to the country to regionalism in any form or guise. They also did not support the piece-meal transfer of the territory of one State to another or of a federally-owned territory to any one State. Conference was
emphatic in its desire for Government to override any action that could recreate the conditions that led to our civil war.

**III) Local Government Reform**
Many speakers discussed the intent to remove local governments as the third tier of government and to appoint civil servants to run local governments as Chief Executives. The overwhelming opinion from the Conference completely disapproved of this intention which runs counter to democratic principles. Recommendations in this communiqué harmonized between the needs for the relevance of traditional institutions and the need for democratically elected local governments.

**IV) Constitutional Reform**
Conference was fully aware that constitutional amendments must arise in the attempt to serve the national interest by re-incorporating traditional institutions of governance and security into the wider system of government and management of security. It noted the President’s efforts in this regard but cautioned that whatever is done must respect the provision of the present constitution.

**6. Recommendations**
In view of the views expressed by this Conference, traditional instructions have to be given constitutional regulations, their roles and duties should be clearly spelt-out and their spheres of competence delineated by law to be passed at the National level. In particular, it is strongly recommended that:

a. all provisions expunged from the 1995 Constitution which defines the role of traditional institutions must be revisited and reinserted into the 1999 constitution.

b. The act of restoration must include the provision for a National Advisory Council of Traditional Rulers, State Advisory Council of Traditional Rules, Local Government Advisory Council of Traditional Rulers

c. The terms of reference for the Councils specified in (b) above shall emphasize their advisory nature and without restrictions as to subject matter and shall include anything that the higher authority at that level may from time to time refer to them for advice.

d. At the Local Government level, Executive Authority must still reside with the elected Local Government Council in that area providing that

e. local governments carved out of the territory of an establishment paramount ruler shall recognize their membership of that territory in a local government coordinating body whose responsibility shall be specified by the constitution

f. that membership of the coordinating council shall include the paramount ruler who shall be its president; all Chairmen of Local Governments, District Heads located at the Local Government
Headquarters, members of the Emirate Council or a number of them.

g. The Secretary of the Council shall be a Senior Member of Staff of the Ministry of Local Government at least at Director status.

h. Among the things the Co-ordinating Council shall have touring duties, harmonizing of standards, monitoring/observance and enforcement of rules, regulations, due process and expenditure.

i. The Emirate Council under the Paramount Chief shall also have constitutional responsibilities to exercise such powers in respect of any matter in relation to customary law, cultural affairs, inter-community affairs, traditional/land matters, grazing rights and reserves, local chieftaincy matters; maintenance of law and order; and any delegated responsibility or security duties.

j. A Ministry of Local Government shall be created with the general duty of supervising local governments within the States provided that the Ministry shall have only supervisory powers. Local Government Co-ordinating Council shall report to the Ministry.

k. Both individual local governments and the co-ordinating council shall receive their subventions directly from the Federation Account and the control of their expenditure shall not be interfered with except in a proven case of abuse.

l. A Constitutional provision shall be made prohibiting the creation of new paramountaries out of those existing since antiquity and hallowed by immemorial customs and tradition.

m. On security matters generally traditional institutions should be incorporated into the formal system of management of security in its widest sense. In particular:
   - They should be integrated into the Security Committee at the State level
   - Rotational membership of the National Defense Council and the National Security Council (1 per zone/year)

n. The NPF shall be retained as a Federal Force as at now. No State Police Should be allowed. However a local constabulary should be established and posted to emirate customary councils with strict responsibility only for crime prevention, crime detection and apprehension and community order. They shall have separate uniforms, separate barracks and separate scale of remuneration. They shall however report to the State Commissioner of Police

o. Present posting procedures in the NPF should be reviewed to reflect at least 75% local content. Steps to be taken through recruitment to ensure this.

p. With respect to the Constitution, there shall be (i) a return to the parliamentary system at all levels, or (ii) the so-called French Presidential system which is of African origin.
7. Postscript
The Conference wishes to thank all participants especially those who presented position papers or made contributions from the floor. Considerable gratitude and appreciation goes to those who facilitated the holding of the Conference, especially the Governor of Kano State, Malam Ibrahim Shekarau, the Celebrations Committee under Prof. Sani Zahraadeen and the Secretary, the ‘Yan Dakan Kano, Alhaji Muhammad Maharaz Karaye, and of course the Conference Co-ordinator, Dr. Tijjani Naniya.

Members of the Communiqué Committee:
- Dr. Ibrahim Tahir, Talban Bauchi, Chairman
- Professor Nur Alkali, Member
- Professor Isa Alkali Abba, Member
- Professor Abdalla Uba Adamu, Member/Secretary
Appendix 4

Selected Picture Gallery