Follow Us on Google Discover
In 2016, Nigeria was rocked by one of its most explosive legislative scandals when Hon. Abdulmumin Jibrin, then Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriation, publicly accused the House leadership of budget padding.
He alleged that Speaker Yakubu Dogara and other principal officers had inserted projects worth over N30 billion into the 2016 Appropriation Act through questionable means.
Jibrin claimed he was being pressured to accommodate personal and constituency projects outside the normal legislative process.
The accusations led to his suspension for 180 legislative days and triggered a national debate about corruption and lack of transparency in the budgeting process.
Also Read
Fast forward to 2026, and Nigeria is once again confronted with a budget-related scandal, this time involving a fictitious government agency that allegedly secured N1.3 billion in the national budget.
Prince Adeniyi Adeyemi is accused of creating a non-existent body called the Presidential Foreign Intervention Promotion Council, forging official documents, operating from an office at the Federal Secretariat, and obtaining a budget allocation.
The comparison is clear: in both cases, Nigeria’s budget process was vulnerable to manipulation, weak verification, and poor oversight. Unlike the 2016 scandal, which was largely contained within the National Assembly, this latest episode has drawn in security agencies, including the EFCC, and exposed deeper weaknesses in how government institutions verify and document public expenditure.
The 2026 fake agency scandal: A deeper breach
The current scandal is more alarming because it goes beyond legislative manipulation. A private citizen allegedly created a government agency from scratch, secured official recognition, obtained an office within a government building, and got the agency listed in the 2026 national budget with a N1.3 billion allocation.
Adeniyi Adeyemi allegedly forged appointment documents, opened multiple bank accounts in the name of the non-existent agency, and attempted to use official channels to facilitate his operations. The Presidency has since disowned the agency, describing it as fictitious.
The matter has now been referred to the EFCC, signalling a criminal dimension absent from the 2016 Jibrin case. This makes the scandal a direct test of institutional verification and a sharper contrast with the earlier legislative dispute. Despite the differences in scale and actors, both scandals reveal the same fundamental problem: the manipulation and abuse of Nigeria’s budget process.
In both cases, public funds were allegedly diverted or allocated through questionable means. In 2016, it was through the insertion of projects during legislative consideration. In 2026, the Appropriation Act was included in the creation of a fake agency.
Both incidents show how individuals or groups can exploit gaps in the system to access public resources for private gain. More importantly, both scandals point to weak verification and oversight mechanisms.
In 2016, the National Assembly failed to scrutinise the projects allegedly inserted by its leadership properly properly.
In 2026, the Budget Office, Ministry of Finance, and National Assembly all failed to detect that a non-existent agency had been allocated over a billion naira. This underscores a single thesis: Nigeria’s budget process remains porous enough to be exploited by insiders and outsiders alike.
Loopholes in verification, documentation, and oversight
Nigeria’s budget process has several structural weaknesses that these scandals have exposed. First, there is weak verification of new agencies. For an agency to receive a budget code and allocation, it should be properly established by law or executive instrument.
However, the 2026 scandal shows that this verification process can be bypassed or manipulated. Second, documentation remains poor. The ability of an individual to forge documents, open bank accounts, and secure office space within the Federal Secretariat without immediate detection points to serious lapses in record-keeping and authentication systems.
Third, oversight is inadequate. The National Assembly is expected to thoroughly scrutinise the budget, yet questionable allocations continue to appear.
The executive arm, through the Budget Office, is also expected to ensure that only legitimate MDAs are funded, but this clearly did not happen in the recent case. These loopholes create an environment in which both lawmakers and outsiders can exploit the system, revealing that the core problem is not a single scandal but a broken approval chain.
Loss of public confidence in budget and governance
Beyond the financial loss, these scandals have inflicted serious damage on public trust. Many Nigerians now view the national budget not as a genuine instrument for development, but as a tool for personal enrichment and political patronage.
The perception that the entire governance and oversight architecture is compromised has become widespread. The fact that a fake agency could operate from the Federal Secretariat, open bank accounts, and secure ₦1.3 billion in the national budget has reinforced the belief that no institution is truly immune to manipulation.
International loss of confidence
The damage is not limited to domestic perception. Internationally, such scandals reinforce Nigeria’s already poor reputation for corruption and weak institutions. It also weakens Nigeria’s moral authority when seeking debt relief or international support.
When a country cannot guarantee that funds allocated in its national budget go to real institutions and projects, it becomes harder to attract serious partners or convince the world that its reforms are genuine.
Wasteful spending and Nigeria’s rising debt
Nigeria has been running persistent budget deficits and relies heavily on borrowing to fund its expenditure. Every naira wasted or misallocated increases the deficit and forces the government to borrow more.
The N1.3 billion allegedly allocated to the non-existent Presidential Foreign Intervention Promotion Council could have been used to reduce borrowing or fund critical infrastructure. Instead, it adds to the deficit, which will eventually be financed through loans.
The personalisation of public office
At the heart of both scandals is the personalisation of public office. When public institutions are treated as personal fiefdoms rather than impersonal systems governed by rules, due process is easily abandoned. This culture of personalisation weakens institutions, erodes public trust, and makes the budget process vulnerable to abuse.
The lesson is clear: Nigeria’s budget failures are not isolated events but symptoms of a deeper institutional problem.
Until Nigeria strengthens its systems of verification, documentation, and oversight, and until public office is treated as a public trust rather than a personal opportunity, such scandals will continue to recur — further damaging both domestic and international confidence in the country’s governance.
